Main Committee III

General debate (continued)

General debate (continued)

1. Mr. Kadri (Algeria) fully supported the statement made by the representative of Indonesia on behalf of the Movement of Non-Aligned Countries. He said that Algeria, which had become a member of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) in 1963, attached great importance to the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. By acceding to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) in 1995, Algeria had wished to demonstrate its commitment to the collective endeavour of nuclear disarmament with a view to making the Treaty an effective instrument for non-proliferation, nuclear disarmament and promotion of the peaceful uses of the atom.

2. In March 1996, Algeria had concluded full-scope safeguards agreements with IAEA and had placed all its nuclear activities under Agency supervision in application of article III of the Treaty, thus reaffirming its commitment to the use of nuclear energy exclusively for peaceful purposes.

3. In that connection Algeria appreciated the cooperation programme it was undertaking with IAEA, which was being implemented both through bilateral cooperation with the Agency and within the framework of the African Regional Cooperative Agreement for Research, Development and Training Related to Nuclear Science and Technology (AFRA Agreement).

4. Algeria, which had paid its financial contributions to IAEA in full and on time, believed that there was a need to strengthen the Agency's role, which should not be confined to preventing the proliferation of nuclear weapons.

5. IAEA must be able to ensure the transfer of technology necessary for the development of the countries party to the Treaty that had renounced the military nuclear option. In order to continue to discharge that mandate without restrictions and imbalances — and to do so without safeguards affecting cooperation or without regional cooperation being pursued to the detriment of bilateral cooperation — IAEA must continue to receive resources in a regular and predictable manner.

6. His delegation also wished to reaffirm the inalienable right of the non-nuclear-weapon States party to the Treaty to develop research, production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes without discrimination or hindrance, as stipulated in article IV of the Treaty, which was far from having been put into practice because of the numerous obstacles that impeded the cooperation provided for therein.

7. Indeed, new and ever more discriminatory regimes had appeared outside the universal framework of the Treaty imposing further constraints on developing countries in the name of prevention of the proliferation of nuclear weapons.

8. Algeria had always supported the idea that the NPT should be a powerful vehicle for the promotion of the peaceful uses of the atom. His delegation was therefore asking that Main Committee III should take into consideration the points raised on that subject in the working document presented by Indonesia on behalf of the Movement of Non-Aligned Countries.

9. Mr. Bompadre (Argentina), speaking on the issues of nuclear cooperation and nuclear-related export-control regimes, emphasized that Argentina was actively participating in the IAEA technical cooperation programme and, in particular, in the projects launched in the context of the Regional Cooperative Arrangements for the promotion of nuclear science and technology in Latin America (ARCAL).

10. Argentina was also organizing annually, within the framework of the IAEA technical cooperation programme, advanced courses on radiological protection and nuclear safety, notably for professionals and technicians from Latin American countries.

11. Regarding international nuclear cooperation and export controls, it should be pointed out that the Argentine nuclear programme had always sought to encourage the development of local technological capacity. Thus, Argentina had acquired know-how that had enabled it to offer other countries access to nuclear technologies.

12. Argentina had quickly elaborated policies aimed at establishing precise and non-discriminatory rules with respect to the export of nuclear materials, products and technologies. Those rules specified inter alia that the recipient countries must undertake to implement IAEA safeguards and to comply with commitments made concerning the peaceful use of nuclear materials and equipment and that the prior consent of the Argentine Government was a condition for the transfer of nuclear materials to third countries.

13. The evolution of non-proliferation policy since the early 1990s had led Argentina to accede to the guidelines of the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG), then to the NPT, and finally to the conditions laid down by the Zangger Committee.

14. Not only had acceptance of export-control regimes not impeded Argentina's capacity to export nuclear products and technologies, but it had also facilitated the establishment of bilateral cooperation in that area, which had led to the signature of more than 30 bilateral cooperation agreements on the peaceful uses of nuclear energy.

15. Argentina was convinced that the guidelines of such nuclear-related export control regimes were not intended to hinder cooperation in that area, and it considered that nuclear trade and cooperation were not only possible, but indeed preferable, when a country subscribed to the standards established in respect of controls by NSG and the Zangger Committee.

16. Furthermore, control regimes were not aimed at restricting legitimate access to nuclear technology. Argentina was opposed to the proliferation of nuclear weapons, but supported the promotion of the peaceful uses of nuclear energy.

17. Lastly, in order to achieve those objectives, regimes must be transparent and the related guidelines must not be applied solely in order to obtain commercial advantages. The nuclear-related export-control regime could be effective only if the guidelines were applied impartially to all international suppliers. Transparency and broad application were the keys to achieving greater acceptance of export controls as non-proliferation safeguards.

The meeting rose at 10.30 a.m.

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