

Draft: Outcome of the 2005 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons.

(Part A)

1. The Conference notes that the international security environment has changed dramatically in recent years. Non-state actors, terrorists and States in non-compliance with non-proliferation and disarmament obligations have challenged and continue to pose a threat to international stability, peace and security.

2. The Conference agrees that the NPT has a vital role to play also in addressing new security challenges. Both States parties and States outside the Treaty are urged to undertake all necessary measures to prevent non-state actors from participating in illegal trading in nuclear material and technology, weapons of mass destruction or any other components that will threaten peace and security. Particular attention should be paid to combatting terrorism and prevent terrorists from obtaining access to weapons of mass destruction.

3. The Conference realizes that non-compliance threatens the integrity of the Treaty. The DPRK is urged to rejoin the Treaty and honour its non-proliferation and disarmament obligations, in full and unconditional cooperation with the IAEA. States parties are obliged to respect the verification regime under the Treaty and refrain from any action that may cause obstacles to the implementation of IAEA's verification activities. Under article III of the Treaty all States parties are obliged to conclude safeguard agreements with IAEA. The Conference considers the Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement combined with the Additional Protocol to be the verification standard under the NPT and calls upon all States parties to conclude and implement these instruments without delay, thereby enhancing confidence in compliance. States parties which hold the view that they are not yet in a position to implement the Additional Protocol are encouraged to indicate a time schedule and report on progress achieved to all States parties on an annual basis.

4. The Conference calls on the Depository States to immediately begin consultations among States parties in the event that a State party indicates intent to withdraw from the Treaty. If considered useful the Depository States should convene an extraordinary meeting of the States parties. Unless the situation is swiftly resolved in a manner acceptable to the States parties it would be appropriate for the Security Council to convene automatically and address the problem. The Conference stresses that nuclear material, equipment and technology acquired by a State on the basis that they would be used for peaceful purposes remain subject to peaceful use obligations even if a State withdraws from the Treaty. Nuclear suppliers are urged to forbid the use of nuclear technology, equipment and technology delivered to a recipient that withdraws from the Treaty.

(Part B)

5. The Conference reaffirms the urgency and importance of achieving universality of the Treaty. All States not yet party to the Treaty, namely India, Israel and Pakistan, are urged to accede to the Treaty as non-nuclear weapon states promptly and without delay.

(Part C)

6. The Conference notes that progress has been made in implementing many provisions contained in the final documents from the 1955 and 2000 Review Conferences. But more needs to be done. The States parties commit themselves to actively continue efforts to implement previously agreed action in the field of non-proliferation, nuclear disarmament and peaceful use.

7. The Conference calls for particular attention to be paid in the following areas:

- Efforts to achieve an effective prohibition against the production of fissile materials for nuclear weapons purposes.
- Continued nuclear disarmament, emphasizing the need for predictability, transparency and irreversibility.
- Continued moratoria on nuclear weapon tests explosions, pending the entry into force of the CTBT.
- A solution to the issue of negative security assurances should be sought, also in relation to the States parties not belonging to nuclear weapon free zones.
- A verifiable and transparent destruction of the remaining non-strategic nuclear weapons.
- Means to achieve accountability and control with the nuclear fuel cycle is to be explored as a matter of urgency, bearing in mind the right of States parties to utilize nuclear energy for peaceful purposes and receive assistance to this end provided they are in compliance with the Treaty.
- Minimizing the use of highly enriched uranium (HEU) in civilian nuclear activities is desirable, as is the goal of total elimination of HEU in the civilian nuclear sector as soon as technically feasible. New civilian projects involving HEU are discouraged.
- The establishment of Nuclear Weapons Free Zones are important means to achieve non-proliferation and nuclear disarmament.

(Part D)

8. The Conference supports the objective of establishing an effectively verifiable Middle East Zone free of nuclear weapons as well as other weapons of mass destruction.

(Part E)

9. In view of recent challenges and events the Conference decides to convene annual meetings of the States parties as a replacement for the preparatory committees for the Review Conferences. The annual meetings will also devote sufficient time to make the necessary preparations for subsequent Review Conferences.

10. At the annual meeting to be convened in 2006 the States Parties are invited to review progress in implementing the paragraphs 1-8 of this declaration.