NGO Analysis of the Seventh Review Conference of the
Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty

"A Phoenix of Hope"- Rhianna Tyson, Reaching Critical Will/WILPF
                  see other analyses in the News in Review, Final Edition, No. 21

"Spineless NPT Conference Papers Over Cracks and Ends with a Whimper"- Rebecca Johnson, Acronym Institute
                  read other reports from the Acronym Institute

"The NPT Review Conference: No bargains in the UN basement" - Patricia Lewis, UNIDIR

"Deadly Deadlock: A political analysis of the Seventh Review Conference of the Non-Proliferation Treaty,"- Hon. Douglas Roche, O.C., Middle Powers Initiative

"The NPT Crisis Concerns Us All"- Praful Bidwai (published in The News International [Pakistan] on June 4, 2005)

"Failure in New York"- Joseph Cirincione, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace

"NPT Conference Collapses in Acrimony"- Dr. Erika Simpson, Canada

"Reflections on the NPT"- Alice Slater, Global Resource Action Center on the Environment

"Armi nucleari, terrorismo e non proliferazione: Le conseguenze della Conferenza di Riesame 2005 del TNP"- Giorgio Alba, Archivo Disarmo

"Undermining the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty: It Didn't Start with the Bush Administration" - Stephen Zunes, Foreign Policy In Focus

"Can We Avoid the Apocalypse?" - Peter G. Cohen

Report from the 2005 NPT Review Conference- Liz Griffiths, Clergy Against Nuclear Arms

"The NPT at a Crossroads"- Wade Huntley, Simons Centre for Disarmament and Non-Proliferation Research

To post your organization's RevCon analysis, contact us.

NPT Conference Collapses in Acrimony
(This article originally appeared in the journal, Embassy, June 1st, 2005)

By Erika Simpson

The abysmal failure of diplomats from 188 nations to agree on Friday to anything at all -- not a single document or proposal -- means that the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) has reached the greatest crisis point since its inception in 1968. In fact, the entire nuclear non-proliferation regime faces its greatest and most daunting threat ever, augmented by the United States' decision to pull-out of the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty and to renege from signing the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty.

The blame for this sorry state of affairs will be placed squarely by countries in the Non-Aligned Movement on the current U.S. administration, even as they begin thinking about possibly acquiring nuclear weapons of their own. The fact that nobody could agree on any proposals to reign in Iran and North Korea, despite a plethora of ideas from non-governmental organizations in North America and the European Union, means these two countries will be perceived as having implicitly obtained the 'go-ahead' to acquire nuclear arsenals of their own. We face the frightening prospect of a world of nuclear 'haves' and 'have-nots' where possession of nuclear weapons is perceived as a state's right, even a normal state of affairs. Moreover, future attempts at the UN to control terrorists from acquiring their own nuclear arsenals will probably be jeered at outright because diplomats wasted precious time at this NPT Review Conference arguing about diplomatic wording, instead of solving pressing nuclear problems. A disturbing precedent has been set for any future arms control and disarmament conferences.

Debates about punctuation marks dominate the diplomatic discussions

Historians will look back at the failed Review Conference of May 2005 and explain that strong disagreement centred around the placement and retention of an asterisked sentence that was uttered by the chair of the review conference, Ambassador Sergio Duarte from Brazil. Fervent debate about 'the asterisk' was supported by the Non-Aligned Movement and opposed by the U.S. and other members of the Western group. But this final debate was preceded by a month of similarly distressing debates about whether to include documents from the previous 1995 and 2000 Review Conferences in the agenda. These fervent debates were not just the normal daunting challenges faced by career diplomats; they disguised basic opposing interests that could not be bridged despite pressure and lobbying from over 5000 representatives from non-governmental organizations all over the world. Even the united appeal of over 2000 mayors in a missive organized by the Mayor of Hiroshima, as well as strong messages by UN Secretary General Koffi Annan, and former U.S. Defence Secretary Robert McNamara failed to impel the diplomats to come to any agreement whatsoever.

Secret discussions focus around the motives of the United States, U.K., and Iran

The diplomatic discussions were held behind closed doors -- ending in acrimonious disagreement late Friday afternoon -- but it is evident that the original nuclear weapons states (U.S., Russia, U.K., France, and China) were roundly criticized for not having lived up to their obligations under Article VI of the NPT to move decisively toward the irreversible elimination of their nuclear arsenals. In particular, the United States' relative inaction led to well-warranted charges of hypocrisy by many non-nuclear weapon states. To some, it was particularly galling that the United States and the United Kingdom were seeking to deny access to nuclear technologies to Iran at the same time as their own nuclear stockpiles remained far higher. It seemed unfair that the nuclear powers condemned Iran for attempting to process nuclear technology at the same time as they turned a blind eye to Japan's development of nuclear processing facilities. Even more disturbing for some from the Middle Eastern bloc (particularly Egypt) was the United States' implicit support of Israel's retention of its own nuclear stockpile (its 'bomb-in-the-basement'). Proposals for a nuclear weapon free zone in the Middle East were met with disinterest or opposition by mid-level American diplomats, and high-level U.S. diplomats, like Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice chose not to attend the conference.

Prior work of the Canadian government and various organizations comes to naught

In preparation for this year's Review Conference, the Canadian government and many organizations and individuals around the world worked to prepare lengthy reports and detailed suggestions. For example, last spring the Middle Powers Initiative and Pugwash Canada sponsored a roundtable for Canadian officials and NGO representatives which recommended building bridges between the member states of NATO and those of the 'New Agenda Coalition' to strengthen the 'moderate middle' of the nuclear debate. We discussed building bridges between the nuclear-weapon states and the non-nuclear-weapon states to open the road to substantive progress on disarmament and non-proliferation. The paper was circulated worldwide and used to prepare many policy-makers, politicians, and journalists for the substantive discussions that were expected at the NPT Review Conference. But the Conference itself was spent in endless debate about procedural issues. Consequently, delegates from NGOs around the world had plenty of time on their hands to network in the basement of the UN headquarters, and calls for more radical action can probably be expected in the future.

The root cause of the conference's collapse

It was hoped that a month of discussions at the UN would produce solid recommendations and a substantive final document. But the conference was simply adjourned with no final report, chairman's summary or even minimal public details about the sources of the conflict. When asked on Friday what the fundamental cause of the failure was, the chair of the conference said, "I think you can write several books on that." Most of the meetings were held behind closed doors so it is difficult to ascertain what, exactly, happened. But it seems clear that the most fundamental problem at the heart of all the procedural wrangling was the United States' approach to the relative weight that should be given to disarmament and non-proliferation. The Bush administration refused to countenance that the treaty's chief priority should be disarmament, as promised under Article VI by the nuclear powers and previously agreed upon by the Clinton government. The previous Clinton administration had promised to sign and ratify the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, reduce U.S. tactical nuclear weapons, refrain from testing, and halt the production of weapons-grade nuclear materials. These commitments were included in the final documents of the previous 1995 and 2000 Review Conferences in what became known as "the 13 steps" -- specific actions the nuclear powers agreed to as part of their disarmament commitments under the NPT. Indeed, the 13 steps included "an unequivocal undertaking by the Nuclear Weapon States to accomplish the total elimination of their nuclear arsenals." Apparently, the Bush administration sought to break free of these promises by denying their importance.

Instead American diplomats obfuscated by insisting upon focusing on proliferation threats by rogue states such as North Korea and Iran. U.S. officials argued that counter-proliferation was key while many others (including Canadian diplomats) argued that the U.S. and the other Nuclear Weapon States were at fault for not honouring their NPT obligations to disarm. In fact, U.S. administration officials said in interviews reported in the New York Times on Friday that they had given up hope several weeks ago that the meeting would accomplish anything, and they defended their decision not to send Secretary Rice to press Mr. Bush's agenda. Instead, the American representative, Jackie W. Sanders, said the United States wanted to continue the discussion "in other fora," without describing when or where. As Canada's Ambassador Paul Meyer summed up, "We have seen precious time that might have been devoted to exchanges on substance and the development of common ground squandered by procedural brinkmanship."

Many efforts to develop common ground and build bridges are stymied

Just prior to the Conference, a 'bridge' on the long road to nuclear disarmament was built when eight NATO States supported a New Agenda Coalition resolution at the UN calling for more speed in implementing commitments to the NPT. The bridge gained extra strength when Japan and South Korea joined with the NATO 8 -- Belgium, Canada, Germany, Lithuania, Luxembourg, The Netherlands, Norway and Turkey. It was hoped these states, along with the New Agenda countries -- Brazil, Egypt, Ireland, Mexico, New Zealand, South Africa and Sweden -- would form an impressive centre in the nuclear weapons debate and could play a determining role in the outcome of the 2005 NPT Review Conference. What happened?

It is too early to say whether the New Agenda Coalition and the Middle Powers Initiative played any significant role. Whilst it was true that seven NATO states joined with Canada, which for two years had stood alone in NATO in supporting the New Agenda resolution, the fact that important NATO players such as Germany, Norway, The Netherlands and Belgium took a more pro-active stance seems to have had little, if any impact on American officials. The message these countries tried to send to the Nuclear Weapons States (especially the U.S.) to take more significant steps to fulfill commitments they already made to the NPT seems to have utterly failed.

Working toward nuclear disarmament -- despite the Bush administration's recalcitrance

It is now up to the friends and allies of the United States -- who live in open democracies -- to steadfastly question whether the Great Powers' enormous stockpiles of nuclear weapons are necessary. It may be that the diplomatic problems at the NPT Review Conference could be tackled next year at an unofficial conference sponsored by Canada that focuses on striking a 'balance.' We could focus on issues concerning 'vertical' proliferation -- which relate to Article VI and promises to decrease, rather than increase the numbers of weapons of the Nuclear Weapons States. Plus we could wrestle with issues surrounding 'horizontal' proliferation -- which revolve around handling the concerns of countries, like the U.S. and France, about possible Iranian or North Korean plans to acquire or develop nuclear weapons. It may be that the 13 Steps need to be entirely jettisoned in favour of smaller stepping stones toward nuclear disarmament, at least until the current American administration changes. But the most pressing problem we need to tackle at such a global conference, possibly in Ottawa, relates to the Great Powers' threats to possibly resort to pre-emptive nuclear war rather than rely on minimal deterrence. Instead of moving toward nuclear disarmament -- and eventual nuclear abolition -- they are drastically decreasing global security.

-- Dr. Erika Simpson is an associate professor of international relations in the Department of Political Science at the University of Western Ontario in London, Canada and the author of NATO and the Bomb (2001: McGill-Queen's University Press). She attended the 2004 Preparatory Committee meeting in New York City and the Atlanta II Consultations at the Carter Center in Atlanta as a representative of the Canadian Pugwash Group which is working closely with the Middle Powers Initiative under the chairmanship of Canadian Senator Douglas Roche to support the Non-Proliferation Treaty.

Can We Avoid the Apocalypse?

By Peter G. Cohen

The intransigence of the Bush administration set the tone for the failure of the Non Proliferation Treaty Review Conference in May. Not satisfied with that, Robert G. Joseph - notorious for his opposition to international treaties - has become Undersecretary of State for Arms Control. Bolton has been nominated to represent the US at the UN. "It doesn't bode well for future negotiations of threat-reduction agreements," said nuclear expert Cirincione. "Bolton and Joseph are dedicated to tearing down the arms control treaties, not building new ones."

The administration has declared war on the peace movement, on the rule of law, on every person who doesn't want our country to incinerate human beings, on every person who doesn't want to see the world filled with radioactive fallout and the inevitable rise in cancer, weakened immune systems and children born with genetic defects.

We have lived with this threat for too long; we have lost our sense of urgency, even though proliferation and terrorism are increasing the chances of disaster. We live our lives with a repressed awareness that we and millions of others are targets for aging nuclear weapons and cold-war control systems of unknown reliability - all on high alert. This is an unsustainable situation. Either we move resolutely on the path to disarmament, or we are in increasing danger of a horrible terrorist act, or a nuclear exchange caused by human or mechanical failure. It is up to us.

Disaster is not inevitable. At the 2000 Review Conference all of the 188 nations of the Non Proliferation Treaty (NPT) agreed to 13 practical steps toward nuclear disarmament. The United States could take many of those steps without losing its overwhelming nuclear superiority. They include signing the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, a moratorium on all testing, banning the production of weapons fissile materials, weapons reductions, transparency, and developing the technology to verify international compliance in a nuclear weapons-free world.

But at the May 2005 Review Conference the United States reversed its policy and refused to accept or even discuss these treaty obligations. We would only discuss the non-proliferation aspects of the treaty, while maintaining the right to use nuclear weapons against anyone trying to obtain them. This perversity was distressing to the international community and left many non-nuclear nations wondering whether they should try to obtain nuclear weapons for their own security.

What Can Be Done?
In spite of the fact that the vast majority of Americans and of the world's nations want a nuclear-free world and that good information on nuclear weapons is readily available, the Bush administration persists in placing these weapons at the center of their defense policy. When I try to visualize President Bush or his successor making a U-turn in our policy and living up to our treaty obligations, I see that the cause of that change is a broad, politically active organization, (as effective as the National Rifle Association) threatening the reelection of any incumbent who does not support nuclear disarmament.

In the fifties, SANE was such an organization and it was able to achieve the nuclear test ban in spite of cold war tensions. Can we do it again, or have the luxuries of American life robbed us of our will to survive? I think we need both rational solutions and a passionate love of life to fight the arrogance and corruption of the suicidal Bush nuclear policies.

The NoNukes Plan

Goal:
We need to transform the 2/3 majority of Americans who oppose nuclear weapons into an effective political force that can prod the U.S. to lead the world in nuclear disarmament, in securing weapons grade materials and in ending proliferation.

These goals are indivisible. We cannot get the international cooperation on non-proliferation and securing materials that we need unless we begin the process of irreversible nuclear disarmament. Our current "do as I say, not as I do" approach has not and will not work. Like most arrogant behavior, it breeds more resentment than cooperation.

To build such a force we need to educate younger people on what these weapons are really about, to remind them that today's weapons are seven to forty times more powerful than the bomb we dropped on Hiroshima, that these weapons are useless against terrorists hiding among civilian populations, that even the smallest weapons throw up radioactive dust that travels vast distances and poisons innocent people and other forms of life wherever it lands.

We need to remind people of the huge cost of developing and maintaining workable weapons and their delivery systems in both money and human lives. We must count not only the thousands of lives lost to cancers and other radiation diseases, but the thousands of lives reduced by hunger, disease and ignorance because our government spends the money on weapons of mass destruction.

I visualize a non-partisan organization that does everything possible to change this suicidal policy to one of working for a nuclear weapons-free world. Imagine a world in which there is less fear, in which the future is more assured and in which families can raise their children without fear of insidious radiation disease.

We need an organization that provides basic nuclear information to the public, suggests easy ways to influence our representatives, and that is organized around congressional districts. It is much harder for a representative to ignore a local demonstration outside of his office than one in distant Washington. Plus, there are thousands of working people who care about the issue but who cannot afford a trip to the capitol.

We also have to face the fact that many thousands of Americans, from scientists to miners, make their living in weapons-related activities. We must support the conversion of that work force to the difficult job of disposing of nuclear weapons and their materials. Safe, permanent disposal of all radioactive waste is a problem that must be solved, if our grandchildren are to have a healthy future.

Nuclear weapons are a burden on our society, a continuing threat to the health of every family and an obstacle to the international trust and cooperation essential to solving the world's problems. Let us not pass them on to another generation of Americans.
# # #

Peter G. Cohen was on a troopship bound for Japan when the bomb was dropped on Hiroshima. He prepared materials on nuclear weapons for the Ban the Bomb campaign of the 1950s. He was a peace candidate for U.S Congress in 1968 and Executive Director of the New Democratic Coalition-PA in Œ69-¹70. He can be reached at <aerie2@verizon.net>

Reflections on the 2005 NPT Review: Crisis and Opportunity
by Alice Slater
(originally published as "10 Years of Mad Cowboy Nuclearism" in the News in Review, Final Edition.)

This is my tenth year with the Non-Proliferation Treaty. I was at the 1995 Review and Extension Conference when the nuclear bullies twisted metaphorical arms to get the indefinite extension. If it hadn’t been for the promises made for “systematic and progressive efforts for nuclear disarmament”, together with pledges to sign a CTBT one year later, negotiate a fiss-ban treaty and establish a WMD-free zone in the Middle East, the nuclear powers would not have received their hard-sought gift to make the treaty permanent. Still, the evident reluctance of the nuclear powers to commit to a nuclear weapons free world inspired NGOs at that meeting to form the Abolition 2000 Network calling for a treaty to eliminate nuclear weapons and, presciently, recognizing the “inextricable link between nuclear weapons and nuclear power”.

Despite the dreadful flaws in the CTBT, which was negotiated in Geneva and unprecedentedly brought to the General Assembly for signature without consensus over India’s objections to the loopholes, which allowed virtual-reality, computer-simulated testing of new weapons designs as well as “sub-critical” underground tests, the world held its breath in the wake of India and Pakistan’s nuclear tests and forged ahead to negotiate even stronger commitments for nuclear disarmament in 2000. Yet the nuclear weapons states were still at it­spending billions for research, design and testing short of full scale underground explosions­to keep improving and expanding their nuclear arsenals.

I remember when we stopped the diplomatic clock and hung out for an extra day of negotiations to reach consensus on the 13 steps in 2000. Both China and Russia commented, after the gavel fell, that if we failed to maintain the “strategic stability” of the ABM Treaty, all bets were off. During this 2005 Review, the headlines actually screamed the news that the US was planning to weaponize space to dominate the earth, having abrogated the ABM Treaty in 2002 under the guise of building a “missile defense”. The good news is that we can’t fool ourselves any longer about the positions of the nuclear weapons states. And it’s clear that the United States is setting the pace for unlawful behavior.

I found it extremely curious that there was little mention of the report that appeared in Novosti, during this Conference, that Russia was prepared to negotiate for huge cuts in its arsenal­down to 1500 warheads or less. Here’s an offer to break the logjam on nuclear disarmament! For it’s obvious that if Russia and the US actually committed to reduce their arsenals to 1000 weapons or so, we could get all the countries to the table and finally nail down the steps we must take to save our world from a nuclear holocaust.

The shock and dismay of the vast majority of participants at this failed meeting will galvanize us to address the known threat­the shameful influence of the military-corporate-scientific establishment in the United States. NGOs and governments have begun planning for parallel processes­in the General Assembly, at the June meeting of NATO, at the World Court, with the new conference of Nuclear Weapons Free Zones parties, and with gathering alliances of law-abiding countries working with NGOs to clear a path forward.

One hopeful note is that we have shaken the foundation of our delusions that we can keep giving nations the key to the bomb factory, spreading “peaceful” nuclear reactors around the world, while still being able to prevent weapons proliferation. Our NGO proposal for an International Sustainable Energy Agency, to provide an alternative to the toxic effects of nuclear power, is garnering new interest. The rising engagement of civil society, as we saw in the May 1st demonstration, in the Mayors Campaign, in the new and growing Parliamentary Network for Nuclear Disarmament, in the good news from the Belgian Senate calling for the removal of its US nuclear weapons, is a harbinger of genuine prospects for nuclear disarmament. We’ll still need regime change in the US, but a burgeoning mass of nations and NGOs are ready to start examining the legal, political, and technical steps required to put an end to the nuclear age. We certainly won’t wait five more years. The explicit approbation of the rest of the world, for the mad cowboy nuclearism in the wild west of the United States, will be very helpful to those of us living in the belly of the beast in mobilizing public pressure to shift US policies towards a saner and safer world.

The NPT crisis concerns us all
by Praful Bidwai

(The writer is a Delhi-based researcher, peace and human rights activist, and former newspaper editor)

It is a telling comment on the narrowing of the scope of public debate in South Asia that a recent major development that concerns global security has found hardly any mention in the news columns of our press, leave alone the comment pages. This is the disastrous collapse of the second Review Conference of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). The four weeks-long meeting failed to produce a consensus declaration or even an agreed account of the worrisome developments that have taken place since the last such conference, in 2000, and the progress (or lack of it) on the
commitments made by the five "recognised" nuclear weapons-states (NWS) in respect of disarmament.

It does not speak well of our "strategic community" that it should be so indifferent to events that have far-reaching implications for the spread of nuclear weapons and the prospect for global disarmament.

But wait a minute! Perhaps what's at work is not indifference at all, but quiet, smug, cynical rejoicing that the NPT conference ended in failure and the non-proliferation agenda has received a setback. Since non-proliferation is no longer in the limelight, and since neither Pakistan nor India is a signatory to the NPT, there will be reduced pressure on the two states to demonstrate nuclear restraint. We can carry on stockpiling fissile material, build more and more
bombs and make or acquire more and more missiles, warplanes and ships that can deliver them -- so that our governments can assuredly roast millions of non-combatant civilians to gory death or turn them into specks of radioactive dust!

However, the failure of the conference raises the level of nuclear danger all over the globe, not excluding South Asia. In particular, it makes nuclear proliferation more likely -- both through the spread of a nuclear capability to new states, and through the development of new designs for existing weapons in states that already have them. South Asia cannot be immune from that danger.

As it happens, some of the states involved are either close to our region (Iran), or have had military transactions with us (North Korea). One of them is being fervently wooed by both our governments.

So, why did the NPT review fail? The short answer is that the world's leading nuclear powers do not have the political will to defend and abide by the Grand Bargain that lies at the core of the treaty -- to accept the obligation to disarm their own nuclear weapons in exchange for the rest of the world, consisting of some 180-odd non-nuclear weapons-states, agreeing not to make nuclear weapons.

The NWS' failure produced a climate of utter cynicism, which allowed aspiring nuclear powers like Iran to run rings around everyone else. This also made it possible for the total of 153 governments present to get so entangled in procedural disputes that they could not even agree to a working agenda for the first 10 days of the conference!

At the core of the NWS' failure was the United States' attempt to manipulate the Review Conference in such a way that Washington would be under no obligation to get rid of its nuclear weapons, but the non-NWS would be more effectively prevented from having them than in the past.

Five years ago, the US and the other four NWS agreed to 13 steps, including acknowledging the principle of irreversibility for all nuclear disarmament and arms reduction measures, bringing the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty into force at an early date, completing talks on a fissile material cut-off treaty, and executing an "unequivocal" undertaking to eliminate nuclear arsenals.

The Bush administration says it no longer supports the 13 steps. The 2000 consensus agreement is "merely historical" and can be set aside -- especially in the light of the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001.

The US has "unsigned" the CTBT and reneged on many other commitments. It wants to develop "usable" mini-nukes and redesign old-generation bombs for "bunker-buster" capabilities against terrorists and weapons facilities hidden deep underground. The US and Britain have launched multi-billion dollar programmes to do research on fusion-based
weapons, and space-based nuclear weapons.

The US believes the NPT can only work if it allows it to keep its nuclear weapons. But Article VI of the Treaty explicitly mandates the total elimination of nuclear weapons. According to an important decision of the International Court of Justice of 1996, the NWS have a duty not just to pursue, but to bring to a successful conclusion, talks for the complete elimination of nuclear weapons. The ICJ is the world's highest authority on international law.

The US's strategy at the Review Conference turned out to be counterproductive at least in part. Because the NWS stonewalled any discussion of nuclear arms reduction and disarmament, the non-NWS too refused to discuss how new proliferation threats might be met.

For instance, if an NPT signatory uses the access the treaty provides to civilian nuclear technology to reach the threshold of becoming a nuclear state, and then decides to walk out of the treaty, what can and should the international community do? Should the present regime of inspections be modified? How to dismantle the global black market in nuclear technology and materials -- not just through AQ Khan "Wal-Mart", but through leaks in the former Eastern bloc and other countries? Should there be multilateral efforts to press North Korea to roll back its nuclear weapons programme? Or should the task be left to the US, Russia, Japan and other major powers?

The US has shown it has no coherent strategy to deal with any of these issues. It periodically threatens North Korea and Iran with military "action", but has not calculated the real cost, including possible retaliatory attacks on its own 35,000-plus troops stationed in South Korea. It has pursued tough sanctions against Iran, but President Bush himself admits to the failure of the sanctions strategy.

The US is now aggressively promoting a Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI), under which signatories co-operate to halt suspect nuclear shipments everywhere, especially to "rogue states". But the PSI has just 21 active participants. And, it leaves out of the net "friendly", "cooperative" regimes, which are useful to the US in the "war on terrorism".

The real tragedy today is that the world has not been able to fully implement what has been termed its most successful and significant disarmament agreement -- even though more than a decade has passed since the Cold War ended, destroying the last excuse for the existence of nuclear weapons. The globe continues to be menaced by some 27,000 nuclear weapons, each capable of killing hundreds of thousands of people at one go. Thousands of these weapons are on high alert; some might even go off accidentally.

All states have a stake in the elimination of nuclear weapons, including India and Pakistan. Nothing would be more worthy than that the two states should bilaterally agree to nuclear risk reduction and comprehensive nuclear restraint measures, and then jointly campaign for the global de-alerting of nuclear weapons -- they have both supported resolutions demanding this in the UN -- as the first step to complete nuclear disarmament.

Alas, the issue is not on their agenda at the moment

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