
**2005 Review Conference of the Parties
to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation
of Nuclear Weapons**

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New York, 2–27 May 2005**Further measures to be taken to strengthen the Treaty on
the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons regime (Main
Committee I issues)****Working paper submitted by Japan and Australia**

1. The 2005 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons provides States parties with a valuable opportunity to show their resolve to strengthen the Treaty regime, thereby contributing to international peace and stability.
2. Japan and Australia believe that States parties should redouble their efforts to reach a common understanding on measures to be taken for further strengthening the Treaty regime at the coming Review Conference.
3. To this end, Japan and Australia propose the following measures to be included in the document(s) to be issued as final outcome(s) of the 2005 Review Conference.

Universalization of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

4. The Conference urges all States not yet party to the Treaty, namely India, Israel and Pakistan, to accede to the Treaty as non-nuclear-weapon States promptly and without condition, and to bring into force the required comprehensive safeguards agreements and additional protocols. The Conference strongly urges the non-party States to refrain from acts that would defeat the object and purpose of the Treaty as well as to take practical steps in support of the Treaty, pending their accession to the Treaty as non-nuclear-weapon States.

Nuclear disarmament

5. In accordance with article VI of the Treaty and pursuant to paragraphs 3 and 4 (c) of the 1995 decision on “Principles and Objectives” and the Final Document of the 2000 NPT Review Conference, the Conference agrees that all States parties should take further practical measures towards the goal of nuclear disarmament.

I. Further reduction in nuclear arsenals

6. The Conference agrees that the realization of a safe world free of nuclear weapons will require further steps, including deeper reductions in all types of nuclear weapons by all the nuclear-weapon States with greater transparency and in an irreversible manner, in the process of working towards their elimination.

Treaty between the United States of America and the Russian Federation on Strategic Offensive Reductions

7. While recognizing the progress made by nuclear-weapon States on nuclear arms reductions, the Conference encourages the Russian Federation and the United States of America to implement fully the Treaty on Strategic Offensive Reductions and to continue their intensive consultations in accordance with the Joint Declaration on the New Strategic Relationship between the two States.

International cooperation on reducing nuclear-weapons-related materials

8. With a view to accelerating disarmament of nuclear weapons excess to military needs, the Conference encourages States to continue to pursue efforts within the framework of international cooperation aimed at the reduction of nuclear-weapons-related materials, such as the Cooperative Threat Reduction programme, and the Group of Eight Global Partnership against the Spread of Weapons and Materials of Mass Destruction.

II. Reducing the operational status of nuclear weapons systems

9. The Conference calls for the nuclear-weapon States to further reduce the operational status of nuclear weapons systems in ways that promote international stability and security.

III. A diminishing role for nuclear weapons

10. The Conference reaffirms the necessity of a diminishing role for nuclear weapons in security policies to minimize the risk that these weapons will ever be used and to facilitate the process of their total elimination.

IV. Securing fissile materials

11. The Conference stresses that fissile material resulting from reductions in nuclear arsenals must be controlled and protected to the highest standards and calls for arrangements by all the nuclear-weapon States to place fissile material no longer required for military purposes under international verification as soon as is practicable to ensure such material is irreversibly removed from nuclear weapons use.

V. Early entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty

12. The Conference reaffirms the importance and urgency of signatures and ratifications, without delay and without conditions and in accordance with constitutional processes, to achieve the early entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty.

13. The Conference urges all States that have not yet ratified the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty, in particular those 11 States whose ratification is required for the Treaty to enter into force, to do so at the earliest opportunity.

Moratorium on nuclear weapon test explosions

14. The Conference agrees that existing moratoriums on nuclear-weapon test explosions must be maintained pending entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty.

Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty verification regimes

15. The Conference reaffirms the importance of continued development of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty verification regime, including the international monitoring system, which will be required to provide assurance of compliance with the Treaty.

VI. Fissile material cut-off treaty

16. The Conference reaffirms the importance of immediate commencement of negotiations on a fissile material cut-off treaty, and its early conclusion.

17. The Conference stresses that a conclusion of a fissile material cut-off treaty will be an essential building block towards the total elimination of nuclear arsenals and will also contribute to the prevention of nuclear proliferation by banning globally the production of fissile materials for nuclear weapons and enhancing transparency and accountability in the management of such materials through its verification system.

18. The Conference calls upon all nuclear-weapon States and the non-States parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons to declare moratoriums on the production of fissile material for any nuclear weapons pending the entry into force of a fissile material cut-off treaty.

19. Given the importance of immediate commencement of negotiations on a fissile materials cut-off treaty, the Conference regards it as a primary task for the Conference on Disarmament to reach agreement on a programme of work.