


Nuclear Disarmament:



What NOW?!



A publication of the Reaching Critical Will project of the Women's International League for Peace and Freedom

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About Reaching Critical Will

The Women's International League for Peace and Freedom created the RCW project in 1999 in order to increase the quality and quantity of civil society at international disarmament fora, such as those that take place at the UN. We believe that nuclear disarmament will require coordinated and sustained effort on the part of governments, non-governmental organizations and the United Nations. Reaching Critical Will is WILPF's initiative to encourage people to act and contribute to a variety of international fora. For non-governmental organizations and concerned individuals to act, they need information, primary documents and analysis. Reaching Critical Will collects, packages and often translates disarmament related information into terms ordinary people can understand.

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NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT | What *Now*?!

Every five years since 1970, the Review cycle of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) has offered an opportunity for the world community to come together to hold governments accountable to their promises and obligations.

Tensions continue to plague the processes surrounding the NPT, primarily due to the lack of action on behalf of those governments, both within the Treaty and outside of it, which possess nuclear weapons. Despite its faults, and throughout the frustrations that accompany negotiations around its Review, the positive possibilities inherent in the Treaty need to be held in strong focus.

The NPT is the only legally-binding international agreement on nuclear disarmament. It binds 184 of the world's governments to never develop nuclear weapons and 5 of the world's nuclear powers to the total elimination of their nuclear stockpiles. In order to fulfill the reasonable and achievable goal of a nuclear-free world - a goal of peace and security that the majority of governments and citizens have articulated as their democratic right - the NPT demands consistent attention and focus from non-governmental organizations and governments alike.

In 2000, all States parties agreed to a package of practical steps for the systematic and progressive disarmament of the world's nuclear weapons, usually referred to as the 13 Practical Steps. This consensus-based agreement, contained in the Final Document of the 2000 Review Conference, was a monumental achievement, reinstating much of the faith in the NPT that had been lost after years of abysmal progress on disarmament. At that time, experts from around the world contributed to a booklet, "Nuclear Disarmament: What Next?" to outline ways and means of fulfilling the promise of the 13 Practical Steps.

Now, five years later, the 13 Steps are in serious danger. "Nuclear Disarmament: What NOW?!" again brings together opinions from non-governmental experts to both assess the fulfillment of these promises as well as to identify areas for further progress. This booklet paints a picture of a way forward, while acknowledging the challenges facing the Treaty negotiations in 2005. This booklet will be distributed widely as a peace education tool for use in formal school curricula, and in the informal public education work done by non-governmental organizations (NGOs).

At a time when weapons of mass destruction are the focus of so much political, media and popular concern, this Review Conference offers the opportunity to assert that what the world really needs is a mass destruction of weapons.

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INTRODUCTION | Jayantha Dhanapala

In his address to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) Review Conference in 2000, Secretary-General Kofi Annan observed that much of the multilateral disarmament machinery was starting to rust due to lack of use. While States are undoubtedly its mechanics and drivers, it is clear that NGOs are an important source of fuel for this disarmament machinery. Indeed, civil society has been referred to as the "new superpower".

Despite the lack of adequate human and financial resources, quite often it is NGOs that generate ideas and public momentum towards creating positive change. We have witnessed some instances of this in the field of disarmament, and in other recent unanticipated outbreaks of democracy. Through providing information, such as that contained in this booklet, NGOs educate and raise the public's expectation that those steering policies on behalf of citizens will indeed uphold their commitments.

The NPT has the twin vital goals of non-proliferation and disarmament, along with a longer-term goal of general and complete disarmament. It remains the only legally binding document that commits the Nuclear Weapon States to nuclear disarmament. In 2000 those States strengthened this commitment further in giving an unequivocal undertaking to accomplish the total elimination of their nuclear arsenals. While this part of the Treaty is arguably one cornerstone, along with the non-proliferation Articles, other elements of the Treaty's utility and relevance should not escape our attention, particularly the safeguarding of all nuclear programmes of those States with nuclear power.

The six nuclear NPT Review Conferences to date have provided opportunities to, among other things, review the success of the Treaty in achieving its goals. The 5th Review Conference, over which I presided in 1995, decided that the Review Conferences should not only look back and assess these elements, but also look forward towards practical steps that can be taken towards fulfilment of the Treaty's goals. The 6th Review Conference delivered on this promise by generating a 13-point action plan for nuclear disarmament.

The 7th Review Conference commencing in early May 2005 will be another important chapter in the Treaty's life, especially considering the increased concern and awareness of the dangers of weapons of mass destruction. NGOs can bring vital fuel to the 2005 process if they educate and organize their constituencies, and provide analysis and recommendations to their governments. As we lament the chronic stalemate in the Conference on Disarmament, and the slow rate of progress in other disarmament fora, I urge the NGO community to not lose hope. Rather, study the information in this booklet and generate concrete ideas and strategies for overcoming the insecurity of today's world.

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STEP 1 : ACHIEVING ENTRY INTO FORCE OF THE CTBT | Daryl Kimball

The importance and urgency of signatures and ratifications, without delay and without conditions and in accordance with constitutional processes, to achieve the early entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty.

The Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) has been a centerpiece of the international disarmament and non-proliferation agenda since the 1950s. By banning all nuclear weapon test explosions, the CTBT impedes the development of advanced, new types of nuclear warheads, thereby reducing dangerous nuclear arms competition between the existing nuclear-capable States and the capabilities of nuclear weapon aspirants.

Although crude nuclear devices can be produced without testing, a nuclear warhead design small enough to be delivered by missiles would generally require nuclear test explosions to certify its integrity. While a proliferator could conceivably develop an ambiguous nuclear weapon capability, it could not demonstrate its capability or prove their weapons' reliability without nuclear test explosions.

Entry into force of the CTBT is also fundamental to the long-term viability of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, which was extended indefinitely in 1995 largely on the basis of the commitment of the United States and the other major nuclear weapons powers to conclude the CTBT.

Entry into force of the CTBT would also prevent additional environmental and health damage from nuclear test explosions. Since 1945, seven countries have conducted 2,050 nuclear test explosions - an average of one test every 10 days. Most of these tests were conducted at the US test sites in Nevada and the Marshall Islands, the Soviet Union's test sites in Kazakhstan and Novaya Zemlya, France's test site on the Polynesian atolls of Fangataufa and Moruroa, China's Lop Nor test site, and in Algeria and Australia. Most of the tests were conducted in the lands of indigenous peoples and far from the capitals of the testing governments.

The CTBT's far-reaching verification provisions, including an international monitoring network, confidence-building measures, and short-notice on-site inspections, will help detect and deter nuclear test explosions. The international monitoring system (IMS) is augmented by thousands of civilian seismic stations worldwide, which can also be used to alert the international community about any nuclear explosion.

The full-scale implementation of this system depends on the Treaty's entry into force. While some countries possess powerful national intelligence capabilities that bolster the CTBT's monitoring and verification system, most do not. The Treaty's integrated system provides additional confidence and transparency by combining technical and intelligence resources so that States can probe questionable activities and deter potential Treaty violations.

Status: Despite widespread global support for the CTBT, there are a handful of States that have not yet signed and/or ratified and which are holding up entry into force of the Treaty. They include US, China, India, Pakistan and North Korea (none of which have yet signed). As of January 2004, the CTBT has been signed by over 174 States, including 41 of the 44 States required for entry into force. It has been ratified by 120 States, including 33 of the 44 States necessary to achieve entry into force.

In October 1999, the United States Senate rejected the advice of its own military leaders, (including former Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Colin Powell), numerous nuclear weapons and verification experts, as well as the vast majority of the American people when it became the first and only legislature to vote down ratification of the Treaty. While the Treaty officially remains before the Senate, its highly partisan vote has given other countries a cynical excuse to withhold support for the CTBT. Following the vote in November 1999, then US Secretary of State Madeline Albright declared that the United States would continue to respect its legal obligation as a signatory to the CTBT not to test nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices.



Since then, the George W. Bush administration has said that it does not support the Treaty and will not ask the Senate to reconsider it, though the administration has said there are no plans to resume testing. The United States has continued to provide the largest share of the CTBTO budget, though it has unilaterally decided to suspend support for activities related to on-site inspections.

China has reportedly ceased production of fissile material for weapons purposes, although it has made no official announcement." (See: http://www.armscontrol.org/act/2005_01-02/Li.asp#China). India and Pakistan, which conducted nuclear test explosions in 1998 have each have pledged that they will not be the first to resume nuclear testing, nor will they be the last State blocking entry into force. Though this essentially amounts to support for a legally binding test ban, each government has said that signature of the CTBT awaits the development of a national "consensus" for such action.

The Provisional Technical Secretariat of the CTBT Organization continues to develop and build the IMS at a rapid pace despite the Treaty's delayed entry into force. Plans call for a system that will use 321 monitoring stations and four different technologies to detect nuclear tests, and well more than half of this system has essentially been completed. Even countries such as Israel, which have balked at other nuclear arms control accords, have shown a willingness to participate in the IMS. Also already in place is an International Data Center (IDC), which has begun to take the information collected by these technologies and make it available to signatories.

The preparatory commission, with an annual budget of about \$90 million, began operation in 1997; a full-fledged CTBTO will begin operation only when the Treaty becomes international law. The IMS has already demonstrated its capabilities by pinpointing such phenomena as the disintegration of the space shuttle, the explosions in the Kursk submarine and recent non-nuclear explosions in North Korea. If CTBT member States agree to do so, these assets can also be used to help provide earthquake detection and warning capabilities.

The Path Forward: To move toward CTBT entry into force, States parties to the Treaty must maintain their financial support for the establishment of the monitoring system, international data centre, and CTBT Organization. They must also continue to press CTBT hold-out States to sign and/or ratify the Treaty without further delay through active public and private diplomacy. Those States that have not ratified, including Iran, Israel, North Korea, should do so to prove that they have no nuclear weapons ambitions or interest in improving existing capabilities.

In 2004, the countries that have already ratified the CTBT called on Netherlands Ambassador Jaap Ramaker, the former chairman of the CTBT talks in Geneva, to serve as a liaison between those countries that have ratified the Treaty and those that have not done so. Additionally, in September, 42 foreign ministers, including those from Australia, Finland, Japan, and the Netherlands, issued a statement calling on other States to sign and ratify the Treaty and facilitate its early entry into force.

While it may be possible to sustain the unilateral nuclear testing moratoria of nuclear testing States for several years, uncertainties and the risk of a resumption of testing will only grow over time. It is therefore imperative that measures be undertaken to uphold nuclear testing moratoria and secure the ratifications necessary for CTBT entry into force.

Until the CTBT enters into force and its international monitoring system and option for on-site inspections is fully available, the Nuclear Weapon States with active test sites should voluntarily agree to periodic inspections of their test sites by neutral observers to increase confidence that clandestine nuclear testing has not occurred. They should also agree to avoid activities at their test sites, such as subcritical experiments, that might be mistaken for nuclear weapon test preparations.

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STEP 2 : STOP TESTING | John Loretz

A moratorium on nuclear weapon test explosions or any other nuclear explosions pending entry into force of that Treaty.

With the important exceptions of the nuclear tests conducted by India and Pakistan in 1998 and periodic sub-critical tests by the United States and Russia, a global moratorium on testing has held since 1996. The recent decision by the US Congress to eliminate funding for new nuclear weapons research from the 2005 budget and to decelerate the Bush administration's rush to prepare the Nevada Test Site for the resumption of underground tests has brought some unexpected, if temporary, relief. In the months leading up to the 2005 NPT Review, however, there is more than enough reason to be concerned about the fragility of the moratorium and the possibility that a breakout could come from any one of several directions.

In May 2004, the spokesperson for the Korean People's Army told the *Financial Times* of London, "When we can't develop without a test, we'll test. ... Even without a test, we can develop, complete, and manufacture nuclear weapons." Troubling evidence was disclosed later in the year that US and Russian nuclear weapons labs have been giving direct assistance to South Korean nuclear scientists conducting uranium enrichment experiments, raising the stakes for nuclear proliferation in North Asia still higher.

Throughout 2004, the Iranian government sent mixed signals to the world about its nuclear intentions, insisting that it would never acquire nuclear weapons as a matter of religious precept, yet concealing the development of some dual use technologies - including equipment purchases from the A.Q. Khan network - that have fuelled suspicion. In September, ambiguous construction activities at the Parchin military complex, 30 km southeast of Tehran, raised new questions about Iran's intentions.

Although relations between India and Pakistan showed signs of improvement in 2004, and new rounds of high-level peace and security meetings were held during the year and scheduled for early 2005, both countries have continued to test nuclear-capable missiles and to engage in provocative rhetoric on occasion. A joint statement issued at the conclusion of ministerial talks in June offered some qualified reassurance, noting that "each side reaffirmed its unilateral moratorium on conducting further nuclear explosions unless, in exercise of national sovereignty, it decides that extraordinary events have jeopardized its supreme interests."

France has adhered to the testing moratorium and has arguably done the most to facilitate the transition to a permanent cessation of explosive testing under the CTBT by dismantling its test sites. By partnering with the US weapons labs on the National Ignition Facility, however, the French government has committed itself to a simulation program that, according to its own public statements, "seeks to renew France's nuclear arms deterrent program without actually testing the weapons."

China has not yet delivered on its promise - made at the 2003 CTBTO conference in Vienna - to ratify the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty "by an early date." Moreover, while the Chinese government has upheld its testing moratorium and has vocally affirmed the principles that link the moratorium and the CTBT to non-proliferation, it has maintained its test site and has taken other steps to modernize its nuclear arsenal.



President Putin's recent announcement that Russia would commence tests of a new multiple warhead missile in response to the US missile defence program, while a step backward, has not signalled any particular concerns about a resumption of nuclear test explosions by Moscow. Yet, like the US, Russia conducted sub-critical nuclear tests in 2004, and both countries were harshly criticized by Hiroshima Mayor Tadatoshi Akiba and others for having done so.

Meanwhile, the UK, which has signed and ratified the CTBT, is nevertheless spending £2 billion to "upgrade" the Aldermaston nuclear weapons plant, and came under scrutiny in 2004 for its collaboration with the US in programs that could contribute to the design of new nuclear weapons. The Blair administration asserted that it has no plans to replace Trident or to build new types of nuclear weapons, a claim that has been disputed by the British American Security Information Council, Greenpeace, and IPPNW's British affiliate, Medact.

Which brings us full circle back to the US. Despite the setback just handed to it by Congress, the Bush administration remains aggressively committed to the development of nuclear bunker busters and other so-called useable nuclear weapons, and is expected to renew its budget demands for research funding for those weapons and for accelerated test site readiness in 2006. The administration has insisted that it will not resubmit the CTBT to the Senate for ratification, and the experience with the ABM Treaty strongly suggests that the present leadership will not hesitate to withdraw the US signature to the CTBT, even in the face of worldwide condemnation, should testing a new warhead design become a realistic objective.

The Chair of the 2005 NPT Review, Ambassador Sérgio de Queiroz Duarte of Brazil, in a recent interview with Arms Control Today, summed up the importance of honouring the moratorium and keeping the CTBT alive, "waiting for the right moment" to bring it into force. "If any of the nuclear weapon countries, which have all been observing a voluntary testing moratorium, resumes testing," Ambassador Duarte said, "it would be a very hard blow to the whole system of non-proliferation, as much as if any non-nuclear weapon country would be shown to be developing nuclear weapons. Although the nuclear weapon countries are not bound by any obligation not to test, the blow would be the same."

The principle behind Ambassador Duarte's observation ought to be made explicit: nuclear non-proliferation and nuclear disarmament are two sides of the same coin, and both depend upon a universal commitment-among nuclear and non-nuclear weapon States alike - to refrain from nuclear testing. Not in the atmosphere, not underground, not in a computer lab. Never again.

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STEP 3 : Fissile Materials Treaty | Rhianna Tyson

The necessity of negotiations in the Conference on Disarmament on a non-discriminatory, multilateral and internationally and effectively verifiable treaty banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices ... taking into consideration both nuclear disarmament and nuclear non-proliferation objectives...

Since the signing of the NPT, a significant issue in the disarmament community has been the continued production of fissionable materials. In 1995, informal consultations amongst Conference on Disarmament (CD) Members produced the Shannon Mandate (named after Ambassador Gerald E. Shannon of Canada), which calls for a non-discriminatory, multilateral and internationally and effectively verifiable treaty banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices. Such a treaty should be negotiated in the context of an Ad Hoc Committee, wherein all issues pertaining to a possible Fissile Material Treaty (including the contentious issue of existing stocks) can be discussed. The committee has not yet gotten off the ground, and the Shannon Mandate remains the basis for future negotiations.

At the 2000 Review Conference of the NPT, States Parties decided to include, as part of its historic Final Document, another call to the CD to finally begin negotiations on the long awaited Fissile Material Treaty (FMT).

The CD, however, still hasn't adopted a program of work- a package agenda that would include an Ad Hoc Committee to begin the FMT negotiations. A major breakthrough in adopting an agenda occurred when, in August 2003, China and Russia agreed to de-link FMT negotiations from negotiations on the Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space (PAROS), and many then thought that movement on FMT would be possible.

Then in the summer of 2004, progress on the FMT hit another obstacle when US Ambassador Jackie Sanders announced that, "The US policy review...raised serious concerns that realistic, effective verification of an FMT is not achievable."

The fight for a verifiable FMT is far from over. However, as the vast majority of States continue to push for this treaty in the Conference on Disarmament, more innovative ways of moving the discussions forward will have to be devised. CD Member States should consider holding more workshops in Geneva, New York, Vienna and beyond, inviting a variety of governmental and non-governmental experts to contribute ideas and approaches to the negotiations. Advocates of a verifiable FMT should be working with scientists, nuclear engineers and other technical experts to develop an FMT verification mechanism.

One thing remains clear- the final document of the 2005 Review Conference cannot simply put the onus back onto the CD - the same body to which many (66) are members - without further elaborating proposals for moving the talks forward.

The need for an FMT is now clearer than ever. At a time when disarmament and non-proliferation are pursued as separate goals, an FMT could serve as both a disarmament and a non-proliferation tool, embodying the very essence of the NPT itself.

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STEP 4 : NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT IN THE CD | Felicity Hill

The necessity of establishing in the Conference on Disarmament an appropriate subsidiary body with a mandate to deal with nuclear disarmament. The Conference on Disarmament is urged to agree on a programme of work which includes the immediate establishment of such a body.

True, the Conference on Disarmament (CD), the world's lone body for negotiating disarmament treaties, has not made substantive progress in 8 years. For the CD, its day in the sun ended in 1996 when Jaap Ramaker, then-President of the CD, gaveled the end to the CTBT negotiations.

The CD has not yet made good on the unanimous conclusion to "establish... in the Conference on Disarmament an appropriate subsidiary body with a mandate to deal with nuclear disarmament." History, however, heartens, because in the past the CD has indeed worked - the exact reason for this reference to the Conference on Disarmament in the 13 Step plan. After all, the NPT promises good faith negotiations, and the CD, the world's sole multilateral disarmament negotiating forum, is the obvious venue.

The NPT acknowledges that disarmament requires multilateral engagement, a point heavily emphasized by the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) during the negotiations on the 2000 Final Document. No one had any illusions about disarmament happening quickly, but there was firm belief in the possibility of it working; after all, in 1995, the NPT gave the CD the job of finishing the CTBT and it happened.

However, an optimistic future for the CD is damaged as governments postpone the negotiations that the majority of governments- and peoples- demand.

Despite the good faith efforts from many- including Algeria, Belgium, Chile, Colombia and Sweden which put forth a proposed agenda, the CD has yet to agree on a program of work. The Five Ambassadors' proposal (the A5), which incorporates the "necessity of establishing" a subsidiary body on nuclear disarmament, remains the best basis for agreement on a programme of work. After China and Russia accepted the proposal in August 2003, France and the US remain the only Nuclear Weapon States which have not yet voiced support. It is this lack of political will, not other contentious issues such as the weaponization of space or fissile materials (see Step 3)- that prevents necessary disarmament negotiations from taking place.

But the NAM and the majority Non-Nuclear Weapon-States have not given up. Calls for nuclear disarmament negotiations at the CD and fulfilment of Step 4 continue to mount. The New Agenda's resolution (59/75) submitted to the General Assembly, which called for, inter alia, the creation of a nuclear disarmament subsidiary body in the CD, garnered 151 votes in favour, more than any other New Agenda resolution in the past.

While States remain mired in discussions over agenda and program of work, some NGOs and NNWS are thinking of other, creative ways of prompting negotiations to move forward. These collaborative efforts amongst governments, civil society, students and the media could help to pressure the Nuclear Five to live up to the grand bargain: the total elimination of nuclear arsenals.

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STEP 5 : PRINCIPLE OF IRREVERSIBILITY | Jacqueline Cabasso and Andrew Lichterman

The principle of irreversibility to apply to nuclear disarmament, nuclear and other related arms control and reduction measures.

If observed, Step 5 would ensure that all disarmament measures are done so irreversibly; that is, taking steps to ensure that the dismantlement process cannot be reversed and used to rearm again.

The principle of irreversibility applies most obviously to the dismantlement of warheads, the long-term disposition of fissile materials including those removed from dismantled warheads, and the physical destruction of delivery systems. However, it also applies to retention of large "responsive" forces and expanding laboratory capabilities including research, development, testing and production of new or "improved" warheads and delivery systems. Fundamentally, the principle of irreversibility is essential to both Article VI obligations - to negotiate "in good faith" on "cessation of the nuclear arms race," and on "nuclear disarmament." Led most egregiously by the United States, the NWS are failing utterly to honor "the principle of irreversibility" in any of its aspects. Indeed, it appears that a new period of arms racing is already underway.

The 2002 US Nuclear Posture Review (NPR) is virtually a blueprint to ensure that any nuclear and related arms control and reduction measures undertaken by the United States are fully reversible, by maintaining maximum flexibility regarding arsenal size and capabilities and minimum treaty limitations. The NPR calls for the modernization of the research laboratories and production plants needed to maintain, design and build new nuclear warheads, along with the means of their delivery. The laboratory-based capability to modify existing nuclear weapons or develop new weapon types will be upgraded, along with an enhanced capacity to resume full-scale underground nuclear tests. Research is going forward on improving nuclear weapons for new missions, including the destruction of deeply buried targets and chemical and biological weapons and materials. An expanding mission for nuclear weapons (contrary to Step 9 e.) demonstrates one of many violations of the principle of irreversibility.

The NPR has been buttressed by policy declarations at the highest level, and implemented through closely matched annual budget requests and a barely there approach to arms control. The best known example is the 2002 Moscow Treaty, which does not require the destruction or dismantlement of a single warhead or delivery system, and places no limits on the development or deployment of new kinds of weapons. (See Step 7)

The nearly \$7 billion US nuclear weapons budget for 2005 includes funding for modifications and upgrades to every nuclear weapon type in the existing arsenal, "reliable replacement" warheads, and "stockpile life extension" programs to render the US nuclear arsenal reliable for decades to come. At the same time, the Pentagon is funding other programs to develop more accurate and flexible long-range delivery systems capable of carrying either conventional or nuclear weapons. Following its unilateral withdrawal from the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty (in violation of Step 7), the US has begun to deploy anti-ballistic missile interceptors. In response to these developments, Russia has increased its own nuclear weapons budget and announced plans to develop and deploy advanced new nuclear missile systems.

The US is working in close cooperation with Britain and France to observe the backwards principle of full "reversibility" of nuclear disarmament and related measures through shared high-tech laboratory capabilities, and in the case of Britain, joint "sub-critical" underground nuclear tests. As the programs and policies outlined in the NPR go forward, Russia will retain an arsenal large enough to destroy the US, and China will likely modernize and expand its own relatively small nuclear forces and modest delivery capabilities. Countries which have so far refrained from developing nuclear weapons, may be prompted to enter the race.

The irreversibility of the disarmament process is essential to the long-term viability of the NPT. This will



In essence, States that have unequivocally undertaken to eliminate their nuclear arsenals do not need to enhance their capabilities and keep open options to develop new nuclear weapon systems or even to 'replace' aging weapons. Of course, any reductions in arsenals help towards the goal of elimination, but not if the NWS are keeping their infrastructures primed to be able to build replacements or new weapons, especially if these have refinements making new missions or uses possible.

An unequivocal undertaking to eliminate nuclear arsenals implies the following:

- quantitative reductions in numbers of warheads and delivery systems combined with qualitatively diminishing - preferably foreswearing - reliance on nuclear weapons in terms of doctrine and policy;
- no replacement of obsolete, dismantled or withdrawn nuclear weapons or systems;
- progressive transfer of nuclear infrastructure from research, design, production and refurbishment of nuclear warheads and delivery systems to safe and secure dismantlement with enhanced verification capabilities.

As we head towards the 2005 Review Conference, all the NWS have failed to treat the unequivocal undertaking seriously. Not one has taken a convincing step towards its implementation. For example:

- none of the NWS has closed off the option to produce new or further nuclear weapons;
- China is continuing to modernize;
- Britain has begun consideration of 'replacement options' for Trident and refused any parliamentary debate when it pushed through with the United States the renewal of their nuclear collaboration through the Mutual Defence Agreement in 2004 despite a legal advice from a prestigious law firm (founded by the Prime Minister's wife) that the renewal could breach the NPT;
- the 2002 Moscow (SORT) Treaty between the US and Russia requires the withdrawal of significant numbers of strategic weapons from deployment but does not mandate the elimination of either their warheads or delivery systems or prevent the weapons' reconstitution after 2012;
- the Bush administration continues to press for 'mini-nukes' and robust nuclear earth penetrators ("bunker busters"), although Congress is rather less keen to fund them;
- Russia has proclaimed its intention to build a new generation of "hypersonic" multiple warheaded missiles in response to US missile defence plans;
- Russia also clings to large non-strategic nuclear forces while NATO has failed to get rid of the US free-fall bombs still pointlessly deployed at several European bases;
- France continues to proclaim that it already has "minimum sufficiency" with its Triomphant and Super Étendard, and has no plans to reduce further.

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(1) The New Agenda Coalition, Brazil, Egypt, Ireland, Mexico, New Zealand, South Africa and Sweden, were instrumental in negotiating the 2000 Final Document and the 13 Steps.



STEP 7 : START II AND START III AND ABM TREATY | John Burroughs

The early entry into force and full implementation of START II and the conclusion of START III as soon as possible while preserving and strengthening the ABM Treaty as a cornerstone of strategic stability and as a basis for further reductions of strategic offensive weapons, in accordance with its provisions.

At the initiative of the Bush administration, the 2002 US-Russian Strategic Offensive Reductions Treaty (SORT) replaced START II and START III. SORT measures very poorly against what START II and III would have achieved. In perhaps the most important instance of backsliding on the practical steps, SORT represents an emphatic rejection of the principles of verification, transparency, and irreversibility.

Under START II, each side could have deployed no more than 3,000 to 3,500 strategic (long-range) nuclear warheads by the end of 2007. Deployment of land-based missiles equipped with multiple warheads was prohibited. The reductions were to be verified by means including monitored dismantlement of delivery systems. START II never entered into force, because Russia had tied its fate to the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty, from which the US withdrew in 2002.

START III was never negotiated, but it was projected to lower the START II limits to 2,000 to 2,500. START III was also supposed to contain measures relating to transparency and dismantlement of warheads. This was an important and innovative objective. Previous US-Russian nuclear arms control agreements had required verified destruction of delivery systems but not warheads.

Only one page long, SORT is more a confidence-building measure than a true arms control agreement. Entered into force in 2003, it requires only that the United States and Russia deploy no more than 2200 strategic warheads in 2012 while permitting them to retain reduced warheads in reserve, ready for redeployment. The Natural Resources Defense Council (NRDC) estimates that in 2012 the United States will have over 2,000 strategic warheads in reserve. Unlike START II and the projected START III, SORT contains no provisions for verification, transparency, and irreversible dismantlement in relation to the warheads and delivery systems removed from deployment. Nor does it bar deployment of land-based missiles with multiple warheads, and Russia has continued and expanded its reliance on such missiles.

To come into compliance with their NPT commitments, the United States and Russia must make the reductions under SORT verified and irreversible. Monitoring mechanisms under START I may provide a means of verification, though they would not fulfil the principle of irreversibility. However, START I expires in 2009. US intelligence reportedly has advised the Bush administration that absent extension of START I, reliable verification of Russian reductions will not be possible.

The two countries must also negotiate further deep cuts in their *total* arsenals, bringing them well below the SORT levels for deployed strategic warheads. Such cuts are envisaged by Step 7, which refers to "further reductions" beyond START III. As it stands now, NRDC estimates the total US arsenal of warheads (strategic, tactical, reserve) will be about 6,000 in 2012.

While it was well known in 2000 that the ABM Treaty was in jeopardy, at Russian insistence its preservation was called for in Step 7. The Bush administration's withdrawal from the Treaty seemed aimed more at destroying the Treaty than at allowing near-term development and deployment of effective missile interceptors. The United States is now fielding a limited number of ground-based interceptors of highly dubious efficacy. The effects of US abrogation of the Treaty and large-scale US investment in missile



defenses on the postures of Russia and China are difficult to discern at this time, but strategic developments unfold over years and decades. Russia recently announced the development of a "superior" nuclear weapon system, apparently a maneuverable warhead intended to be capable of evading missile defenses.

Two points are clear from the decades of U.S.-Russian experience: First, deployment of anti-missile systems, like deployment of missiles, can be deeply destabilizing. Accordingly, plans for missile defenses should be subject to transparency and consultation. Second and more fundamentally, reduction of nuclear forces will necessarily also involve limitations on missile defenses. While the ABM Treaty is now gone, the principles it applied cannot be escaped.

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STEP 8 : TRILATERAL INITIATIVE | Jean du Preez

The completion and implementation of the Trilateral Initiative between the United States of America, the Russian Federation and the International Atomic Energy Agency.

Under the Trilateral Initiative launched in 1996, the Russian Federation, the United States and the IAEA were to create a financial, legal, and technical framework for verification regime appropriate for weapon-origin and other excess fissile material.

Although not a nuclear disarmament measure *per se*, placing fissile materials identified by NWS as excess to their military requirements under an appropriate international verification regime would ensure that such materials remain irreversibly removed from nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices, or from military applications. Practical Step 8 should therefore be considered with Step 3 and Step 10.

The expectation at the time of the 2000 Review Conference was that the Trilateral Initiative could provide a framework for verifying excess fissile material in all States possessing nuclear weapons. In September of 2002, the three parties declared that this framework has been completed in the form of a Model Verification Agreement. While preparatory work continues, the United States and Russia have yet to finalize any legally binding agreement with the IAEA, nor has any other Nuclear Weapon State. The United States and Russia are engaged in bilateral initiatives aimed at control and disposition of "excess" highly enriched uranium (HEU) and plutonium, through the 1993 HEU Purchase Agreement, the 2000 Plutonium Management and Disposition Agreement, and the 2002 Accelerated Materials Disposition. Efforts to put this framework into implementation have, however, been stalled due a number of disagreements between the parties.

One of the main points of disagreement concerns the material to be monitored while it is kept in storage. Russia has agreed to allow the verification of all fissile material kept in storage at its Mayak storage facility. However, this verification is to be dependent on the United States making a similar arrangement for the verification of its stored fissile material. The United States has not made any of the excess plutonium which is still in classified form available for verification, thereby keeping the IAEA from verifying material from either State.

Another remaining issue is how long the IAEA would be expected to monitor the excess material. Since



both States intend to re-use the excess fissile material for fuel once it has been converted from weapons-ready form, there is a question of whether the IAEA would only be responsible for monitoring the material until it has been converted to fuel, or whether monitoring would have to continue on to the civilian reactors since this fuel could still be converted back for weapons-use.

Finally, while the Trilateral Initiative was intended to be used as a framework for the implementation of the 2000 Plutonium Disposition and Management Agreement, a legal disagreement between Russia and the United States has stalled the process. Under the framework agreement, both countries have pledged to dispose of 34 tons of excess plutonium using one of two methods: conversion into mixed-oxide fuel (MOX), or immobilization and storage. Russia stated at the outset that it would convert all 34 tons to MOX fuel. While the United States originally designated 17 tons for MOX fuel conversion, with the intent of immobilizing and storing the remaining 17 tons, in January of 2002, the US government declared that it would also convert all 34 tons into MOX fuel. Progress in this disposition, however, has been halted in both States for a number of reasons. For example, an impasse exists regarding liability protection for US workers involved in the construction and technical assistance projects in Russia. In addition, progress in the United States has been delayed in part due to a Congressional mandate that US plutonium disposition proceed apace with plutonium disposition in Russia.

Other reasons for the delays include opposition from environmental and non-proliferation groups which claim that the use of MOX fuel is unsafe and creates a proliferation threat. In addition, not enough reactors have agreed to use the MOX fuel, which may leave some of the fuel to be left as waste and defeat the purpose of the conversion of plutonium into fuel.

Despite the lack of progress by the two principal parties, the Trilateral Initiative continues to be a valuable measure in support of nuclear disarmament. At the preparatory committee (PrepCom) meeting for the 2005 NPT Review Conference, many delegates supported the ongoing work and called for specific progress. The Chairmen's summaries of these PrepCom meeting reflected the concerns by the State parties over the lack of progress towards implementing the Initiative. Although progress was welcomed in agreements for disposing of highly enriched uranium and plutonium, the United States and Russia were urged to approach the IAEA to carry out the verification requirements set forth in the Plutonium Management and Disposition Agreement signed by the two States. The Agency was also urged to continue research and development into the practical aspects of verifying plutonium declared excess to military use. Many State parties stressed the importance of arrangements by all Nuclear Weapon States to place, as soon as practicable, fissile material designated by each of them as no longer required for military purposes, under IAEA or other relevant international verification, and arrangements for the disposition of such material for peaceful purposes.

Although the Trilateral Initiative on its own does not move the disarmament agenda forward, its value as a supporting mechanism for other actions to reduce and dismantle nuclear weapons, and to prevent further production of weapons useable fissile material, should be recognized. The current stalemate in negotiations towards an FMCT [see Step 3] is mainly as result of the US beliefs that such a Treaty cannot be verified. There is also general opposition by the NWS to include existing stocks under the Treaty, thereby making it an effective nuclear disarmament tool. A possible way to reconcile differences could be to use the Trilateral Initiative as a separate, but supporting mechanism to a future FMCT. In this regard the following should be considered:

(i) Expand the Initiative to include all NWS and de facto NWS (1): All eight States with nuclear weapons will need to reach an agreement with the IAEA for their inclusion in efforts similar to the Initiative. This could start as a voluntary arrangement and be expanded through diplomatic pressure applied by the United States and Russia.

(ii) Incorporate an inventory of excess weapons useable material: Excess material could be included in a starting inventory upon entry into force of each State's participation in an expanded Initiative with the IAEA. Material declared as excess in the future could continuously be added to the starting inventory in an irreversible way.



(iii) Include legally binding agreements between the IAEA and each State: The Model Verification Agreement is already available as a legally binding instrument which States may sign with the IAEA. IAEA verification and oversight of disposition can begin at different times for each State on the basis of the size of a State's weapons useable stocks of fissile material, beginning with the largest stocks.

(iv) Set a timetable for the inclusion of pre-existing stocks of fissile material: A timetable to ensure that disarmament actually takes place can begin with excess fissile material and gradually include additional material up to a certain point, at which time a conference may be required to assess the Initiative's progress and determine how much further to proceed.

(v) Establish a source of funding: Efforts will need to move forward on the establishment of the proposed Nuclear Arms Control Verification Fund in order to allow the expensive disarmament work to occur. The crucial role of the G-8 in providing funding for plutonium disposition in Russia will need to be expanded to other States as the initiative itself expands. In this regard the announcement of the G-8 Partnership Against the Spread of Weapons of Mass Destruction two years ago was a welcoming step. This initiative was further expanded at the 2004 G-8 Summit when the G-8 agreed to an "Action Plan for Non-proliferation" which includes a one-year moratorium on supplying equipment for producing fissile material to countries that do not already have it. Although its focus on the civilian nuclear fuel cycles in NNWS is important, the G-8 initiative could do more to secure weapons useable fissile material in States possessing nuclear weapons.

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(1) The three "de facto" NWS include India, Pakistan and Israel.



STEP 9 : STEPS | Hon. Douglas Roche, OC

Steps by all the nuclear-weapon States leading to nuclear disarmament in a way that promotes international stability, and based on the principle of undiminished security for all:

- * Further efforts by the nuclear-weapon States to reduce their nuclear arsenals unilaterally.*
- * Increased transparency by the nuclear-weapon States with regard to the nuclear weapons capabilities and the implementation of agreements pursuant to Article VI and as a voluntary confidence-building measure to support further progress on nuclear disarmament.*
- * The further reduction of non-strategic nuclear weapons, based on unilateral initiatives and as an integral part of the nuclear arms reduction and disarmament process.*
- * Concrete agreed measures to further reduce the operational status of nuclear weapons systems.*
- * A diminishing role for nuclear weapons in security policies to minimize the risk that these weapons ever be used and to facilitate the process of their total elimination.*
- * The engagement as soon as appropriate of all the nuclear-weapon States in the process leading to the total elimination of their nuclear weapons.*



In considering what has (or has not) happened to Step 9 since 2000, one must look carefully at the language in the umbrella paragraph. It is full of diplomatic ambiguity. The Nuclear Weapons States insisted that the actions in this section would only be taken "in a way that promotes international stability and based on the principle of undiminished security for all." What exactly does that phrase mean? Does it mean that a Nuclear Weapon State would not have to take a step, e.g. the further reduction of non-strategic nuclear weapons, if it felt that the step would diminish its security? It appears that the Nuclear Weapons States inserted that umbrella to give themselves an out. The New Agenda Coalition (NAC), at the time, agreed with the criticism of some NGOs that too much dilution had occurred, but stated that it had agreed to compromises so that the 2000 Review Conference would not fail to achieve consensus in NAC's principal demand - the "unequivocal undertaking."

Now, five years later, in examining what happened to the implementation of the steps under the umbrella, the result is hardly better than zero. The only place where progress can claim to be made is in the Moscow Treaty in which the US and Russia pledged to reduce their "operationally deployed weapons" to between 1,700 and 2,200 each by 2012. But this is not irrevocable or verifiable and the stockpile of each, containing active and reserve nuclear weapons and weapons components will be roughly seven to nine times greater than the publicly stated goal (see Step 5). Transparency as distinct from public relations, is virtually nil.

The Moscow Treaty reductions also have to be seen in the light of US and Russian policy steps taken since 2000 to embed nuclear weapons in their military doctrines for another half century. Both the US and Russia have made it clear that "a diminishing role for nuclear weapons in security policies" is the farthest thing from their minds. With respect to the further reduction of non-strategic nuclear weapons, one might say progress of a sort has been made by the reported move by Greece to get NATO's tactical weapons off its soil, but they are still stationed in Germany, The Netherlands, Belgium, Italy and Turkey, all ostensibly non-nuclear States of NATO. Russia says it won't reduce its tactical weapons until NATO gets them out of these countries.

Engaging "all the Nuclear Weapons States in the process" leading to elimination means comprehensive negotiations if it means anything at all. Far from "concluding" such negotiations as directed by the International Court of Justice, the members of the Conference on Disarmament cannot agree even to establish a committee to "deal with" nuclear disarmament (see Step 4).

Overall, the news on Step 9 is dismal. As long as the nuclear powers continue to claim that nuclear weapons are necessary for their "undiminished security," not much in the way of actual progress towards implementing the "unequivocal undertaking" will occur. The longer the stalemate goes on, the weaker the NPT will become.

It is urgent therefore for the 2005 Review Conference of the NPT to focus sharply on the need to implement immediately the priority steps identified in the 2004 New Agenda Coalition resolution: CTBT entry into force; reduction in non-strategic weapons; FMCT; a nuclear disarmament committee at the CD. If the Nuclear Weapons States will not agree that these steps are in their interests, they will have little credibility left in proclaiming that they are acting in good faith. The spotlight is now on the Nuclear Weapons States to prove that they believe in "a diminishing role for nuclear weapons."

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PERMANENTLY OUTSIDE OF MILITARY PROGRAMS | Susi Snyder

Arrangements by all nuclear-weapon States to place, as soon as practicable, fissile material designated by each of them as no longer required for military purposes under IAEA or other relevant international verification and arrangements for the disposition of such material for peaceful purposes, to ensure that such material remains permanently outside of military programmes

The International Atomic Energy Agency was created in 1957 to "seek to accelerate and enlarge the contribution of atomic energy to peace, health and prosperity throughout the world. It shall ensure, so far as it is able, that assistance provided by it or at its request or under its supervision or control is not used in such a way as to further any military purpose." This mandate of the agency has been enlarged and strengthened during the life of the NPT to include various safeguard agreements.

According to David Albright and Kimberly Kramer of the Institute for Science and International Security "stockpiles of fissile material - the key ingredient in nuclear weapons - remain huge. At the end of 2003 there were more than 3,700 metric tons of plutonium and highly enriched uranium (uranium enriched to 20 percent or more uranium 235), enough for hundreds of thousands of nuclear weapons, in about 60 countries. Although some fissile material is disposed of, more material is produced, causing the total to grow each year...Russia, Britain, and the United States have all declared a portion of their military plutonium excess to military requirements. This excess plutonium, about 107 metric tons in all, has been dedicated to peaceful purposes."⁽¹⁾

Safeguards are based on assessments of the correctness and completeness of a State's declared nuclear material and nuclear-related activities. Verification measures include on-site inspections, visits, and ongoing monitoring and evaluation. Basically, two sets of measures are carried out in accordance with the type of safeguards agreements in force with a State. One set relates to verifying State reports of declared nuclear material and activities. These measures - authorized under NPT-type comprehensive safeguards agreements - largely are based on nuclear material accountancy, complemented by containment and surveillance techniques, such as tamper-proof seals and cameras that the IAEA installs at facilities. Another set adds measures to strengthen the IAEA's inspection capabilities. They include those incorporated in what is known as an "Additional Protocol" - this is a legal document complementing comprehensive safeguards agreements. The measures enable the IAEA not only to verify the non-diversion of declared nuclear material but also to provide assurances as to the absence of undeclared nuclear material and activities in a State.

The Additional Protocol grants the IAEA expanded rights of access to information and sites, as well as additional authority to use the most advanced technologies during the verification process.

In China, the IAEA Additional Protocol entered-into-force on March 28, 2002, making China the first NWS to ratify. Only single-use items are subject to reporting under the Protocol. Russia signed the Additional Protocol in March 2000, but has not yet ratified. The US ratified the Additional Protocol in 2004. The Protocol contains a "national security exclusion clause," which allows the US to bar inspectors if they deem them a threat to national security. In March 1995, 200+ metric tons of Highly Enriched Uranium and plutonium were declared as surplus. In 1998 the SU agreed to remove approximately 50 tons of plutonium from weapons programs and irreversibly convert it into non-weapons grade form. In June 2000, the US agreed to dispose of 34 tons of plutonium. The Department of Energy proposed a 10 year plan which would allow up to 3300 pounds of plutonium to be stored at the Lawrence Livermore Lab at any one time, an increase in quantity from the 1540 pound standard that has been in place for years. It would also triple the amount of plutonium that scientists may work with at any one time.

France and the UK have both ratified the Additional Protocol, however, as the protocols for all EU countries enter-into-force through an IAEA-EURATOM arrangement, the Protocol has yet to enter into force for France and the UK. Only single-use items are subject to reporting under the Protocol, restricting the



ability of the IAEA to effectively complete its mandate.

In a 22 June 2004 speech to the Carnegie International Non-Proliferation Conference Mr. Pierre Goldschmidt, IAEA Deputy Director General, said: "In addition to a comprehensive safeguards agreement, having an additional protocol in force is essential. Without it the Agency does not have the access to information or locations necessary to provide credible assurance of the absence of undeclared nuclear material and activities in States. Having an additional protocol in force should become the norm for all States, even for non-NPT States, because it is essential for the Agency to be informed of nuclear-related cooperation with non-Nuclear Weapon States, particularly with regard to exports of nuclear material and technology."

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(1) For a table of global stocks in metric tons, please see their article on the website of the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientist. For an excellent primer called "Fissile Material Basics" please see the website of the Institute for Energy and Environmental Research. IEER state that nuclear weapons typically require three to five kilograms of plutonium.



STEP 11 : GENERAL AND COMPLETE DISARMAMENT | Dr. Ron McCoy

Reaffirmation that the ultimate objective of the efforts of States in the disarmament process is general and complete disarmament under effective international control.

The world is at a dangerous crossroads, where militarism, war, terrorism and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction menace our planet. A broad framework for disarmament of conventional and unconventional weapons already exists in the form of several treaties. Taken together, they form a tenuous arms control framework that suffers from distrust and suspicion that arms control measures are not being implemented in good faith. Together with the lack of genuine political will and a tendency towards double standards, there is no fertile ground for an unequivocal commitment to disarmament.

Current aggressive policies of counter-terrorism and counter-proliferation reflect an increasingly blatant military doctrine of unilateralism and pre-emption. In such an environment, the concept of general and complete disarmament, which originated as far back as 1954, is looked upon as quaint and out of place today.

Historically, plans for general and complete disarmament have been presented at many fora of the United Nations, including the adoption of the McCloy-Zorin agreement in 1961 which outlined in general terms a framework for a US-USSR Treaty as well as a verification regime.

During and after the Cold War, the NWS undermined debate on nuclear disarmament at NPT conferences, by claiming that Article VI of the NPT implied that progress in nuclear disarmament must parallel general and complete disarmament.

At the 1999 NPT PrepCom, Canada made a breakthrough by presenting a legal opinion that Article VI embraced two separate undertakings by States parties:



1- To pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating to cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date and to nuclear disarmament; and

2- To pursue negotiations in good faith on a treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control.

The debate was renewed at the 2000 NPT Review Conference where the New Agenda Coalition of States succeeded in securing agreement that each undertaking was distinct and not conditional to achievement of the other. This was reflected in the Final Document of the conference in which the NWS gave an unequivocal undertaking to accomplish the total elimination of their nuclear arsenals (See Step 6). The NWS have yet to comply with this undertaking.

Progress in disarmament of biological and chemical weapons has been more encouraging. The Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BTWC), signed in 1972 and entered into force in 1975, represented the first multilateral disarmament treaty to ban an entire category of weapons of mass destruction (WMD). The BTWC has two weaknesses: it permits research on defense and prevention against biological warfare, and it does not have a mechanism for monitoring and verifying compliance. Years of negotiations on a BTWC protocol for verification are deadlocked.

The Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC), signed in 1992 and ratified in 1997, is in better shape. It has established the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) to effectively monitor and verify compliance with the prohibition of the processing and production of chemical compounds relevant to the CWC.

Without a code of ethics, scientists continue to contribute to increasingly destructive weapons technology, including the proliferation of ballistic and cruise missiles. Research in weapons technology is nurtured and funded by the military-industrial complex. Restraint in conventional arms transfers also suffers when nation States continue to increase their military expenditures annually.

Disarmament is a multi-layered process that will often be held hostage to security dilemmas, as long as security continues to be defined and rationalized in military terms. Any national security policy that relies on nuclear weapons fuels the proliferation of nuclear weapons, as well as biological and chemical weapons, which weaker States look upon as 'force equalizers' or the 'poor man's nuclear weapons.'

These deep flaws in the international security system compel States to seek the protection of comparable weapons. In a world of unequal nation-States, a well-defined hierarchy of States is emerging, where the status quo of economic, cultural and political dominance is being maintained by superior military force.

The process of nuclear disarmament has become a charade. The NPT, the CTBT and the FMCT represent a litany of broken promises. US withdrawal from the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty (see Step 7) and its plans to build a ballistic missile defense system will ignite a second nuclear arms race and lead to the weaponization of outer space and the ultimate American goal of "full spectrum dominance" on land, sea, air and outer space. Predictably, China is modernizing its nuclear forces and Russia is planning to develop and deploy new nuclear weapons.

Where is the unequivocal undertaking by the Nuclear Weapon States to eliminate their nuclear arsenals? The objective of general and complete disarmament will not be met unless there is good faith in honoring treaties and a commitment to peace and justice.

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STEP 12 : REPORTING | Sarah Estabrooks

Regular reports, within the framework of the NPT strengthened review process, by all States parties on the implementation of Article VI and paragraph 4 (c) of the 1995 Decision on "Principles and Objectives for Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament", and recalling the Advisory Opinion of the International Court of Justice of 8 July 1996.

See page 26 for more detail

States are obligated to submit regular reports to the Preparatory Committees and/or the Review Conferences on the implementation of Article VI. Reporting is viewed by many as a key confidence-building measure that increases transparency and accountability in the international disarmament and non-proliferation regime.

After three PrepComs, it would appear that commitment to reporting is minimal: only 11 States reported in 2002, and 28 in 2003 and 2004 respectively, and only 39 States parties have submitted at least one formal report.

Step 12 calls for submission of "regular reports" by "all States parties". The question of regularity has been interpreted as annual submissions, reporting to all meetings of States parties, or reporting only at Review Conferences. To date, only six States have reported at all PrepComs, and none of the NWS have submitted an official conference document designated as a report for translation and distribution.

The reporting mandate focuses on a fairly specific agenda: the Article VI obligation and Paragraph 4(c) of the "Principles and Objectives" agreed to in 1995. The majority of reports submitted to date have used this outline, although in 2003 and 2004 several reported on the list of measures included the "13 Practical Steps". A small number of States have reported on the entire Treaty, using an article by article format. In its 2004 report, Lithuania noted that it "attaches great importance to enhancing the performance of and the accountability under the Treaty, in particular by submitting annual reports on implementation of all articles of the NPT. Such reporting promotes increased confidence in the overall NPT regime and its effectiveness."

The quality of the information contained in the reports, regardless of their format, offers more reason to be optimistic than the sheer number of States reporting.

The level of detail in early reports was not great; there was a high level of rhetorical content, including general statements of concern and commentary on developments and trends. This has changed over the three years, and of the reports submitted in 2004, a large number were very detailed. The kind of information provided identified:

- Agreements reached and legislation passed, particularly pertaining to IAEA safeguards, and CTBT ratification
- Diplomatic efforts undertaken including UN General Assembly votes and resolutions, demarches, and bilateral meetings



- Specific disarmament initiatives such as education programs and conferences
- Programs for nuclear facilities safety, materials disposal, and CTBT verification
- Funding for cooperative non-proliferation and disarmament efforts

Although no NWS have submitted “formal” reports, all have provided general statements, accompanying information papers, and informal reports in the context of the cluster discussions, showing an increase in information flow from the NWS. Several issues are specifically relevant to the NWS - warheads and delivery systems holdings, operational status, strategic and tactical nuclear weapons reductions, security assurances, and fissile material control - and therefore should be addressed in their reports. The UK is the only NWS to report on the number and operational status of its weapons. China and France have provided only vague information about their holdings, while the US and Russia have reported only on deployed weapons.

The function of a report, offering actual information about efforts toward nuclear disarmament, differentiates it from an opening statement. The utility of prepared statements reiterating support for disarmament obligations and goals is questionable; but demonstrating concrete effort to fulfil those same goals is a significant step toward transparent accountability.

The regularity, quantity, and content of reports submitted over the past three PrepComs show significant room for improvement:

Most States parties are engaged annually in a variety of bilateral and international negotiations and national arms control programs, worth reporting on to other States parties. Submitting a concise, though substantive report at each meeting of States parties would be the most effective way to build a norm of transparent reporting. A brief update to a previous report, as Belgium submitted in 2004, is an effective way to limit the work required to produce a report, while still contributing to the goal of transparency.

Although varied report format allows for slightly different emphasis, all have examined steps to further nuclear disarmament. Regardless of format, reporting on concrete and tangible programs and initiatives encourages transparency and enhances accountability.

Submission of reports by those States listed in Annex B of the CTBT - particularly the NWS - is critical. To date only 24 of the 44 States, 40 of which are States parties to the Treaty, have submitted reports. Annex B States have nuclear facilities, materials and/or weapons that pose the greatest challenge in terms of disarmament and the greatest threat in terms of proliferation. Action to control, limit, and ultimately disarm should be reported to demonstrate progress in Treaty implementation.

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STEP 13 : VERIFICATION | Andreas Persbo

The further development of the verification capabilities that will be required to provide assurance of compliance with nuclear disarmament agreements for the achievement and mainte-



nance of a nuclear-weapon-free world.

Verification is central to the proper implementation of all of the nuclear disarmament steps envisioned in the final document of the 2000 NPT Review Conference. Effective arrangements to monitor compliance are essential to maintain confidence that parties are fulfilling their treaty obligations.

At the time of the 2000 Review, it was expected that the strengthened IAEA nuclear safeguards system would be universally applied by 2005, more than a decade after being initiated. While some progress has been made, this expectation has been largely unfulfilled. It is encouraging that the additional protocols of 15 EU States have now been brought into force, but by December 2004, only 61 of the 189 parties to the NPT had done so. Three of these are Nuclear Weapon States (China, France and the UK). The remaining two Nuclear Weapon States (Russia and the U.S.) have signed a protocol, but have yet to bring it into force.

All States should have an additional protocol as a matter of course. It is essential that the Review Conference recognize the model Additional Protocol as the new safeguards standard. This would enable States to qualify for so-called integrated safeguards, which represent the most effective and cost efficient combination of all IAEA safeguards measures. At the end of 2004, such measures were being implemented only in Australia, Indonesia, Japan and Norway.

Over the last four years, the Provisional Technical Secretariat (PTS) of the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty Organization has worked hard to further advance the establishment of the treaty's verification regime, including the International Monitoring System (IMS), in preparation for entry into force of the treaty (see Step 1). The IMS is now capable of monitoring the globe for illicit nuclear tests. When fully in place and supplemented with national technical means and other scientific instruments and networks, the IMS will detect, locate and identify these tests with a high degree of certainty. The 2005 Review Conference should recognize the efforts of the PTS in making the IMS operational and call on all States to facilitate the earliest possible entry into force of the Treaty.

While there have been some reductions in strategic, tactical and inactive nuclear arsenals, these are still not internationally monitored, nor are dismantling efforts subject to multilateral verification. The 2005 Review Conference should call for the formation of a group of Nuclear Weapon State experts to study how multilateral verification of nuclear disarmament might work.

In 2000, we expressed hope for a verifiable ban on the production of fissile material for weapons purposes by 2005 (see Step 3). However, negotiations on such a treaty still have not started. Although the US has announced that it favors the negotiation of an FMCT, it prefers a treaty without verification. This is a retrograde step and the review conference should emphasize that a fissile material treaty should be subject to effective multilateral verification.

The IAEA, Russia and the US have reportedly reached agreement in principle on IAEA involvement in verification of excess nuclear materials resulting from Russian and US nuclear arms reductions (see Step 8). The IAEA has been standing ready to implement the so-called Trilateral Agreement since then, and the 2005 Review Conference should urge that it be implemented as soon as possible.

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REPORTING TRENDS | analysis of NPT Reporting over three Preparatory Committee meetings | 2002, 2003, 2004 | Project Ploughshares

Numbers

- 39 States have submitted at least one formal report
- 6 States have submitted reports all three years

Representation

- 6 New Agenda Coalition States have reported (Brazil, Ireland, Mexico, New Zealand, South Africa, Sweden)
- 1 Non-Aligned States have reported (Indonesia, Iran, Malaysia, Mongolia, Morocco, Peru, South Africa, Sri Lanka, Thailand)
- 16 NATO States have reported (Belgium, Bulgaria, Canada, Czech Republic, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Slovakia, Spain)
- 16 EU States have reported (Austria, Belgium, Czech Republic, Finland, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Slovakia, Spain, Sweden)
- 24 CTBT Annex B States have reported (Australia, Austria, Belgium, Brazil, Bulgaria, Canada, Finland, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Indonesia, Iran, Mexico, Netherlands, Norway, Peru, Poland, Republic of Korea, Romania, Slovakia, South Africa, Spain, Sweden and Ukraine)
- 0 Nuclear Weapon States have formally reported

**NGO SHADOW REPORT:
*Accountability is Democracy,
Transparency is Security***

Step 12 of the 13 Practical Steps recognizes reporting as an important confidence-building measure in an increasingly militarized world, a way by which States can promote transparency and accountability. Yet despite the promises, many States Parties have failed to fulfill their reporting requirements.

The Women's International League for Peace and Freedom, in collaboration with NGOs around the world, produces an annual Shadow Report as part of the global efforts to create a culture of reporting. The Shadow Report offers a comprehensive, standardized set of guidelines by which States can report on their nuclear holdings, both military and civilian.

The report includes information about all Nuclear Weapon States and the 44 States listed by the International Atomic Energy Agency as having nuclear power reactors and/or research reactors. Non-NPT party States have not been included in this publication, as this is an NPT-targeted report. Recent editions of the Shadow Report also include a chapter on the Nuclear Weapon States' compliance with the 13 Step Plan.

To find out more, go to: www.reachingcriticalwill.org



TREATY TEXT IN FULL

The Non Proliferation of Nuclear weapons. The NPT opened for signature 1 July 1968, and entered into force on March 5th, 1970.

PREAMBLE

The States concluding this Treaty, hereinafter referred to as the 'Parties to the Treaty',

Considering the devastation that would be visited upon all mankind by a nuclear war and the consequent need to make every effort to avert the danger of such a war and to make measures to safeguard the security of peoples,

Believing that the proliferation of nuclear weapons would seriously enhance the danger of nuclear war,

In conformity with resolutions of the United Nations General Assembly calling for the consideration of an agreement on the prevention of wider dissemination of nuclear weapons,

Undertaking to cooperate in facilitating the application of International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards on peaceful nuclear activities,

Expressing their support for research, development and other efforts to further the application, within the framework of the International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards system, of the principle of safeguarding effectively the flow of source and special fissionable materials by use of instruments and other techniques at certain strategic points, affirming the principle that the benefits of peaceful applications of nuclear technology, including any technological by-products which may be derived by nuclear-weapon States from the development of nuclear explosive devices, should be available for peaceful purposes to all Parties to the Treaty, whether nuclear-weapon or non-nuclear-weapons States,

Convinced that, in furtherance of this principle, all Parties to the Treaty are entitled to participate in the fullest possible exchange of scientific information for, and to contribute alone or in cooperation with other States to, the further development of the applications of atomic energy for peaceful purposes,

Declaring their intention to achieve at the earliest possible date the cessation of the nuclear arms race and to undertake effective measures in the direction of nuclear disarmament,

Urging the cooperation of all States in the attainment of this objective,

Recalling the determination expressed by the Parties to the 1963 Treaty banning nuclear weapons tests in the atmosphere, in outer space and under water and its Preamble to seek to achieve the discontinuance of all test explosions of nuclear weapons for all time and to continue negotiations to this end,

Desiring to further the easing of international tension and the strengthening of trust between States in order to facilitate the cessation of the manufacture of nuclear weapons, the liquidation of all their existing stockpiles, and the elimination from national arsenals of nuclear weapons and the means of their delivery pursuant to a Treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control,

Recalling that, in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, States must refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any State, or in any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations, and that the establishment and maintenance of international peace and security are to be promoted with the least diversion for armaments of the world's human and economic resources,

Have agreed as follows:

Article I

Each nuclear-weapon State Party to the Treaty undertakes not to transfer to any recipient whatsoever nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices or control over such weapons or explosive devices directly, or indirectly; and not in any way to assist, encourage, or induce any non-nuclear-weapon State to manufacture or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices, or control over such weapons or explosive devices.

Article II

Each non-nuclear-weapon State Party to the Treaty undertakes not to receive the transfer from any transferor whatsoever of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices or of control over such weapons or explosive devices directly, or indirectly; not to manufacture or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices; and not to seek or receive any assistance in the manufacture of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices.

Article III

1. Each non-nuclear-weapon State party to the Treaty undertakes to accept safeguards, as set forth in agreement to be negotiated and concluded with the International Atomic Energy Agency in accordance with the Statute of the International Atomic Energy Agency and the Agency's safeguards system, for the exclusive purpose of verification of the fulfillment of its obligations assumed under this Treaty with a view to preventing diversion of nuclear energy from peaceful uses to nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices. Procedures for the safeguards required by this Article shall be followed with respect to source or special fissionable material whether it is being produced, processed or used in any principal nuclear facility or is outside any such facility. The safeguards required by this Article shall be applied on all source or special fissionable material in all peaceful nuclear activities within the territory of such State, under its jurisdiction, or carried out under its control anywhere.

2. Each State Party to the Treaty undertakes not to provide: (a) source or special fissionable material, or (b) equipment or material especially designed or prepared for the pro-



cessing, use or production of special fissionable material, to any non-nuclear-weapon State for peaceful purposes, unless the source or special fissionable material shall be subject to the safeguards required by this Article,.

3. The safeguards required by this Article shall be implemented in a manner designed to comply with Article IV of this Treaty, and to avoid hampering the economic or technological development of the Parties or international cooperation in the field of peaceful nuclear activities, including the international exchange of nuclear material and equipment for the processing, use of production of nuclear material for peaceful purposes in accordance with the provisions of this Article and the principle of safeguarding set forth in the Preamble of the Treaty.

4. Non-nuclear-weapon States Party to the Treaty shall conclude agreements with the International Atomic Energy Agency to meet the requirements of this Article either individually or together with other States in accordance with the Statute of the International Atomic Energy Agency. Negotiation of such agreements shall commence within 180 days from the original entry into force of this Treaty. For States depositing their instruments of ratification or accession after the 180 day period, negotiation of such agreements shall commence not later than the date of such deposit. Such agreements shall enter into force not later than eighteen months after the date of initiation of negotiations.

Article IV

1. Nothing in this Treaty shall be interpreted as affecting the inalienable right of all Parties to the Treaty to develop, research, production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes without discrimination and in conformity with Articles I and II of this Treaty.

2. All the Parties to the Treaty undertakes to facilitate, and have the right to participate in, the fullest possible exchange of equipment, materials and scientific and technological information for the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. Parties to the Treaty in a position to do so shall also cooperate in contributing alone or together with other States or international organizations to the further development of the applications of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes, especially in the territories of non-nuclear-weapon States Party to the Treaty, with due consideration for the needs of the developing areas of the world.

Article V

Each Party to the Treaty undertakes to take appropriate measures to ensure that, in accordance with this Treaty, under appropriate international observation and through appropriate international procedures, potential benefits from any peaceful applications of nuclear explosions will be made available to non-nuclear-weapon States Party to the Treaty on a non-discriminatory basis and that the charge to such Parties for the explosive devices used will be as low as possible and exclude any charge for research and development. Non-nuclear-weapon States Party to the Treaty shall be able to obtain such benefits, pursuant to a special international agreement or agreements, through an appropriate international body with adequate repre-

sentation of non-nuclear-weapon States. Negotiations on this subject shall commence as soon as possible after the Treaty enters into force. Non-nuclear-weapons States Party to the Treaty so desiring may also obtain such benefits pursuant to bilateral agreements.

Article VI

Each of the Parties to the Treaty undertakes to pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating to cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date and to nuclear disarmament, and on a treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control.

Article VII

Nothing in this Treaty affects the right of any group of States to conclude regional treaties in order to assure the total absence of nuclear weapons in their respective territories.

Article VIII

1. Any Party to the Treaty may propose amendments to this Treaty. The text of any proposed amendment shall be submitted to the Depository Governments which shall circulate it to all Parties to the Treaty. Thereupon, if requested to do so by one-third or more of the Parties to the Treaty, the Depository Governments shall convene a conference, to which they shall invite all the Parties to the Treaty, to consider such an amendment.

2. Any amendment to this Treaty must be approved by a majority of the votes of all the Parties to the Treaty, including the votes of all nuclear-weapon States Party to the Treaty and all other Parties which, on the date the amendment is circulated, are members of the Board of Governors of the International Atomic Energy Agency. The amendment shall enter into force for each Party that deposits its instrument of ratification of the amendment upon the deposit of such instruments of ratification by a majority of all the Parties, including the instruments of ratification of all nuclear-weapons States Party to the Treaty and all other Parties which, on the date the amendment is circulated, are members of the Board of Governors of the International Atomic Energy Agency, it shall enter into force for any other Party upon the deposit of its instrument of ratification of the amendment.

3. Five years after the entry into force of this Treaty, a conference of Parties to the Treaty shall be held in Geneva, Switzerland, in order to review the operation of this Treaty with a view to assuring that the purposes of the Preamble and the provisions of the Treaty are being realized. At intervals of five years thereafter, a majority of the Parties to the Treaty may obtain, by submitting a proposal to this effect to the Depository Governments, the convening of further conferences with the same objective of reviewing the operation of the Treaty.

Article IX

1. This Treaty shall be open to all States for signature. Any State which does not sign the Treaty before its entry into force in accordance with paragraph 3 of this Article may acceded to it at any time.



2. This Treaty shall be subject to ratification by signatory States. Instruments of ratification and instruments of accession shall be deposited with the Governments of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United States of America, which are hereby designated the Depository Governments.

3. This Treaty shall enter into force after its ratification by the States, the Governments of which are designated Depositories of the Treaty, and forty other States signatory to this Treaty and the deposit of their instruments of ratification. For the purposes of this Treaty, a nuclear-weapon State is one which has manufactured and exploded a nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive device prior to 1 January 1967.

4. For States whose instruments of ratification or accession are deposited subsequent to the entry into force of this Treaty, it shall enter into force on that date of the deposit of their instruments of ratification or accession.

5. The Depository Governments shall promptly inform all signatory and acceding States of the date of each signature, the date of deposit of each instrument of ratification or of accession, the date of the entry into force of this Treaty, and the date of receipt of any request for convening a conference or other notices.

6. This Treaty shall be registered by the Depository Governments pursuant to Article 102 of the Charter of the United Nations.

Article X

1. Each Party shall in exercising its national sovereignty have the right to withdraw from the Treaty if it decides that extraordinary events, related to the subject matter of this Treaty, have jeopardized the supreme interest of its country. It shall give notice of such withdrawal to all other Parties to the Treaty and to the United Nations Security Council three months in advance. Such notice shall include a statement of the extraordinary events it regards as having jeopardized its supreme interests.

2. Twenty-five years after the entry into force of the Treaty, a conference shall be convened to decide whether the Treaty shall continue in force indefinitely, or shall be extended for an additional fixed period or periods. This decision shall be taken by a majority of the Parties to the Treaty. Article XI This Treaty, the English, Russian, French, Spanish and Chinese texts of which are equally authentic shall be deposited in the archives of the Depository Governments. Duly certified copies of this Treaty shall be transmitted by the Depository Governments to the Governments of the signatory and acceding States. IN WITNESS WHEREOF the undersigned, duly authorized, have signed this Treaty. DONE in triplicate, at the cities of London, Moscow and Washington, the first day of July, one thousand nine hundred and sixty-eight."

Article XI

This Treaty, the English, Russian, French, Spanish and Chinese texts of which are equally authentic, shall be deposited in the archives of the Depository Governments. Duly certified copies of this Treaty shall be transmitted by the Depository Governments to the Governments of the signatory and acceding States.





13 POINT ACTION PLAN IN FULL

At the NPT 2000 Review Conference, all governments agreed to the following practical 13 point 'action plan' for the systematic and progressive efforts to achieve complete disarmament. This plan was outlined in the official final document of the NPT 2000 Review Conference.

1. The importance and urgency of signatures and ratifications, without delay and without conditions and in accordance with constitutional processes, to achieve the early entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty.
2. A moratorium on nuclear-weapon-test explosions or any other nuclear explosions pending entry into force of that Treaty.
3. The necessity of negotiations in the Conference on Disarmament on a non-discriminatory, multilateral and internationally and effectively verifiable treaty banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices in accordance with the statement of the Special Coordinator in 1995 and the mandate contained therein, taking into consideration both nuclear disarmament and nuclear non-proliferation objectives. The Conference on Disarmament is urged to agree on a programme of work which includes the immediate commencement of negotiations on such a treaty with a view to their conclusion within five years.
4. The necessity of establishing in the Conference on Disarmament an appropriate subsidiary body with a mandate to deal with nuclear disarmament. The Conference on Disarmament is urged to agree on a programme of work which includes the immediate establishment of such a body.
5. The principle of irreversibility to apply to nuclear disarmament, nuclear and other related arms control and reduction measures.
6. An unequivocal undertaking by the nuclear-weapon States to accomplish the total elimination of their nuclear arsenals leading to nuclear disarmament to which all States parties are committed under Article VI.
7. The early entry into force and full implementation of START II and the conclusion of START III as soon as possible while preserving and strengthening the ABM Treaty as a cornerstone of strategic stability and as a basis for further reductions of strategic offensive weapons, in accordance with its provisions.
8. The completion and implementation of the Trilateral Initiative between the United States of America, the Russian Federation and the International Atomic Energy Agency.
9. Steps by all the nuclear-weapon States leading to nuclear disarmament in a way that promotes international stability, and based on the principle of undiminished security for all:
 - o Further efforts by the nuclear-weapon States to reduce their nuclear arsenals unilaterally.
 - o Increased transparency by the nuclear-weapon States with regard to the nuclear weapons capabilities and the implementation of agreements pursuant to Article VI and as a voluntary confidence-building measure to support further progress on nuclear disarmament.
 - o The further reduction of non-strategic nuclear weapons, based on unilateral initiatives and as an integral part of the nuclear arms reduction and disarmament process.
 - o Concrete agreed measures to further reduce the operational status of nuclear weapons systems.
 - o A diminishing role for nuclear weapons in security policies to minimize the risk that these weapons ever be used and to facilitate the process of their total elimination.
 - o The engagement as soon as appropriate of all the nuclear-weapon States in the process leading to the total elimination of their nuclear weapons.
10. Arrangements by all nuclear-weapon States to place, as soon as practicable, fissile material designated by each of them as no longer required for military purposes under IAEA or other relevant international verification and arrangements for the disposition of such material for peaceful purposes, to ensure that such material remains permanently outside of military programmes.
11. Reaffirmation that the ultimate objective of the efforts of States in the disarmament process is general and complete disarmament under effective international control.
12. Regular reports, within the framework of the NPT strengthened review process, by all States parties on the implementation of Article VI and paragraph 4 (c) of the 1995 Decision on "Principles and Objectives for Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament", and recalling the Advisory Opinion of the International Court of Justice of 8 July 1996.
13. The further development of the verification capabilities that will be required to provide assurance of compliance with nuclear disarmament agreements for the achievement and maintenance of a nuclear-weapon-free world.





ACRONYMS

- ABM** | Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty
A5 | Five Ambassadors' proposal
BWC | Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention
CD | Conference on Disarmament
CTBT | Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty
- CTBTO** | Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty Organization
CWC | Chemical Weapons Convention
FMT | Fissile Material Treaty
GCD | General and Complete Disarmament
IAEA | International Atomic Energy Agency
- ICJ** | International Court of Justice
IDC | International Data Centre
IMS | international monitoring system
MOX | mixed-oxide fuel
NAC | New Agenda Coalition - a coalition of countries (including Ireland, South Africa, New Zealand, Mexico, Brazil, Egypt and Sweden) working towards total implementation of the NPT agenda
- NRDC** | The Natural Resources Defense Council
NGO | Non Government Organization
NNWS | Non Nuclear Weapons States - that's nearly every nation on earth...
NPR | Nuclear Posture Review
NWS | Nuclear Weapons States - these are defined in the NPT as USA, Russia, UK, China and France
- NPT** | Non-proliferation Treaty (brought into force in 1970)
P5 | Permanent Five - these are the 5 Nuclear Weapons States who are also the five permanent members of the Security Council
PAROS | Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space
PrepCom | Preparatory Committee
PTS | Provisional Technical Secretariat
- RevCon** | Review Conference
SORT | Strategic Offensive Reductions (Moscow) Treaty
START | Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty
UN | United Nations
UNGA | United Nations General Assembly
- WILPF** | Women's International League for Peace and Freedom






Middle Powers Initiative,
*a program of
the Global Security Institute*



Risho Kosei-kai

...now what?!?




International Physicians for the
Prevention of Nuclear War

*be sure to check
www.ReachingCriticalWill.org
for all of the latest from the
NPT Review Conference,
May 2-27 2005*



Campaign for Nuclear
Disarmament- United Kingdom



Reaching Critical Will, a
*disarmament initiative of the
Women's International League for
Peace and Freedom, United
Nations Office*



Women's International League for
Peace and Freedom



Svenska Läkare mot Kärnvapen
*Swedish chapter of International
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