TO THE CHAIRMAN OF THE PERMANENT FOREIGN AFFAIRS COMMITTEE OF THE SECOND CHAMBER OF THE STATES-GENERAL

RE: NPT REVIEW CONFERENCE
27 March 2000,
DVB/NN-159/00I. Introduction
...........
(Description of history of treaty, review conferences; unlimited extension
noted, as well as Principles and Objectives, Middle East resolution.)
II. Expectations
"... Since the NPT extension conference in 1995 the climate for
non-proliferation and nuclear disarmament has gradually become less
positive. The successes, like the signing of the Comprehensive Test Ban
Treaty (CTBT) in 1996, the accession of Brazil and others to the NPT and
the strengthening of the IAEA safeguards system have been partially
overshadowed by negative developments: the lack of progress in the
bilateral nuclear disarmament process of the USA and the Russian
Federation, the Indian and Pakistani nuclear tests and the rejection of the
CTBT by the American Senate....."
(Here follows a list of the subjects to be discussed at the conference:
universal acceptance of the NPT, strengthening of IAEA safeguards, Indian
and Pakistani tests, Iraqi and N. Korean nuclear programs, nuclear weapon
free zones, technical cooperation on nuclear energy, safety and
transparency of export controls - KK)
"Naturally much attention will be focused on the subject of nuclear
disarmament, which is inextricably related to non-proliferation. There is
growing disenchantment amongst a large number of countries in this area.
For various reasons a number of steps agreed to in 1995 in connection with
the NPT have not been taken. As far as the multilateral track is concerned
this especially relates to the making of a treaty prohibiting the
production of fissile materials for nuclear weapons and for other explosive
aims (Fissile Materials Cut-Off treaty, FMCT). Further disarmament steps
were also expected from the side of the nuclear weapons states, but as is
known the START II treaty dating from 1992 has not yet entered into force
because it has not yet been ratified by the Russian Duma. The
implementation of START I has been carried through without delay and the
USA and Russia have in the meantime agreed to deactivate all the missiles
earmarked for this under the START II treaty by 31 December 2003 at the
latest. During my recent visit to the Russian Federation my colleague
Ivanov assured me that the Russian government would try to accelerate the
rate of the ratification procedures for START II and the CTBT and at the
same time talk to the USA about a possible START III.. Besides this France
and the UK have during the last few years undertaken unilateral reductions
of their arsenals and increased transparency in this area. It is expected
that the nuclear weapon states will be put under pressure to agree to new
concrete steps and to implement measures they have already comitted
themselves to publicly. Perhaps additional multilateral measures could be
identified and given priority the coming five years, for example in the
area of negative security assurances and nuclear transparency. However,
consensus on this appears to be far away.
III Dutch proposals
For the Netherlands the NPT remains the keystone of the global system of
non-proliferation and nuclear disarmament"
............
"In this particular importance is attached to the further implementation of
the 1995 Principles and Objectives and their possible expansion. For the
Netherlands it is of principal importance that the need for the CTBT to
come into force, the importance of (the resumption of) FMCT negotiations
and the urgency of further tangible progress in the area of nuclear weapons
reductions is underlined by all the States Parties of the NPT."
............
"The Netherlands furthermore takes as its point of departure that
consultations on procedures should be limited to a minimum, as these have
already been extensively discussed during the preparatory sessions in 1997,
1998 and 1999. Regarding one of the few procedural concerns on which on
those occasions no agreement was reached, the creation of subsidiary organs
on nuclear disarmament, for example, The Netherlands takes the position
that this is a good idea, provided the additional value can be shown and
these bodies are installed only for the duration of the conference.
The Netherlands will initially operate within the framework of the EU. At
the moment a common position and declaration are being worked on in the EU.
Besides this the Netherlands is consulting other non-nuclear weapons states
within NATO, such as Belgium, Germany, Italy and Norway, regarding
initiatives which could be undertaken or supported as an extension of the
EU position. The Netherlands agrees to calling for support for the proposal
by the above-mentioned countries concerning the possibilities of dealing
with the issue of nuclear disarmament in the Conference on Disarmament in
Geneva (see my letter to you on this subject dd 14 October 1999 concerning
the UN resolution of the New Agenda Coalition). The Netherlands will also
within this framework strive for a more judicially binding status of
negative security assurances and transparency in the field of nuclear
issues. It also argues for the creation and coming into force of treaties
providing for nuclear weapon free zones and the placing under IAEA
safeguards of fissile materials derived from or suitable for nuclear
weapons, so as to ensure the irreversibility of the process of nuclear
weapons reductions. Within this framework the Netherlands would also want
to encourage the nuclear weapons states to account periodically and in a
more systematic and compulsory manner for their contribution to the process
of nuclear weapons reductions, as well as involving tactical nuclear
weapons in the process of nuclear weapons reductions. These proposals are
still the subject of consultation. The Netherlands has already in a recent
declaration at the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva made an appeal to
all the nuclear weapon states to undertake more transparency and to account
for nuclear reductions. Besides this the Netherlands will also pursue a
dialogue, for example with the countries of the New Agenda Coalition (NAC)
with the aim of a succesful result.
In the area of nuclear safety, safeguards, peaceful nuclear cooperation and
export controls the Netherlands takes part in an informal group of ten
countries (Australia, Canada, Denmark, Hungary, Ireland, Austria, New
Zealand, Norway and Sweden) which are working at the expert level in Vienna
on proposals to be tabled at the Review conference. These concern appeals
to the NPT states parties to show more openness regarding export control
policies, to reach additional safeguards agreements with the IAEA, and to
become party to the various conventions in the area of nuclear security.

IV. Paragraph 32 process and NATO
The so-called Œparagraph 32 proces‚ in NATO also has lateral connections to
the NPT Review Conference. At the moment extensive discussons are taking
place in differennt fora in NATO regarding options for confidence building
measures, verification, non-proliferation, arms control and disarmament.
The Netherlands is playing an active role in this. Partially on the basis
of the Dutch non-paper (see the appendix to my letter to you dd 23 December
1999 concerning the Ministerial North Atlantic Council of 15 and 16
December 1999) the debate has been shaped and taken to hand by the
different NATO fora, like the High Level Group (HLG), the Senior Defense
Group on Proliferation (DGP) and the Senior Politico-Military Group on
Proliferation (SGP). The themes of the Dutch non-paper have in the meantime
largely found their way onto the agendas of these groups. The Netherlands
will also continue to play an active role in the further course of the
debate. For instance, Holland has made a number of suggestions regarding
nuclear transparency which at the moment are part of the discussion in the
HLG.
The Netherlands has argued that the paragraph 32 subjects which are
relevant for the NPT Review conference should if possible be dealt with in
NATO before the start of the conference. It would after all be beneficial
for the worldwide striving for non-proliferation and nuclear disarmament if
it becomes clear that NATO will be dealing intensively with this subject
matter and is exerting itself for an improvement of the atmosphere in this
field. Although the debate in the NATO framework could perhaps provide
impulses for the Review Conference in the coming two months, it is not very
likely that results of the paragraph 32 process will be available
beforehand in a formal sense, in view of the decision that this process
will only result in recommendations for the North Atlantic Council at the
end of 2000.‰
The Minister of Foreign Affairs
J. Van Aartsen

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