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This speech
was delivered at a panel hosted by the NGO Committee for Disarmament
Geneva, December 8-9, 2003
Addressing Compliance within
the United Nations System: Present and future prospects
Introduction
We're here today to discuss compliance to the nuclear Nonproliferation
Treaty (NPT). But since the NPT is just one part- albeit the
cornerstone- of a vast network of international machinery,
we must look at the various components of that network, including
the General Assembly (GA), the United Nations Disarmament
Commission (UNDC), the Conference on Disarmament (CD), and
the Security Council. How do they each address the issue of
compliance, whether it is to a particular treaty, to the growing
body of resolutions, or with the global framework of international
law as a whole? How can we harness the existing network of
disarmament bodies to revitalize the NPT and to facilitate
the realization of the Article VI promise?
Scrutiny, disclosure, accountability and transparency remain
central components of compliance with treaties. An absolute
imperative to this solution is societal verification through
civil society knowledge, expertise, and pressure on the various
bodies of international governance. With this in mind, the
Women's International League for Peace and Freedom (WILPF)
established in 1999 the Reaching Critical Will (RCW) project
in order to enhance the quantity and quality of NGO participation
at various disarmament fora. We are the primary watchdogs
of these fora: we monitor the GA First Committee, the UNDC,
the CD, and, especially, the NPT Preparatory Committees (PrepComs)
and Review Conferences. We post all statements, draft resolutions,
working papers and official documents on-line the day they
are made available, as part of the global efforts to make
these deliberations more transparent and to involve the public
in the work of their governments.
In this presentation, I will give a brief outlook on recent
developments and discussions taking place in various international
fora and how they relate to the issue of compliance. I'll
start with the United Nations General Assembly.
General Assembly
The GA, the most equitable and universal body in the history
of the world, must take the lead in proposing alternatives
to war in cases of non-compliance. Unfortunately, the potential
of this global and equitable body- its underrepresentation
of women notwithstanding- is being frustrated by a few States
which refuse to concede narrow national interest to the benefit
of global democracy and equal participation among States.
If a future GA resolution on compliance with the NPT and
other existing regimes is to be powerful, it must address
the issue of vertical proliferation. This year, the Member
States of the First Committee failed to draft and pass any
resolution regarding vertical proliferation, although some
States referenced this dangerous trend, such as the New Agenda
Coalition (NAC), Pakistan, Cuba, and India, to name a few.
How is the international community to effectively address
non-compliance to the NPT without discussing vertical proliferation
and its implicit violation of Article VI? Undoubtedly, the
U.S. would oppose such a resolution, and quite probably the
remaining NWS would as well, with its NATO allies abstaining
or even voting against. However, if the majority of states
that do not possess these deadly weapons support such an initiative,
a GA document on vertical proliferation would add to the growing
body of international law on nonproliferation and disarmament.
In the best case scenario, GA resolutions can form the basis
for future treaties such as the resolution sponsored by Ireland
in 1961, from which ideas and language were used to formulate
the NPT seven years later.
Last year, the United States sponsored a draft resolution
on compliance (57/86) which was adopted without a vote in
both the Committee and the GA, but not without some controversy.
Remember, of course, that this time last year, the U.S. was
trying to garner international support for a war on Iraq under
the interchangeably used justification of its non-compliance
with the NPT and Security Council resolutions. In addition,
the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) announced
its nuclear program while the First Committee was in session,
and its withdrawal from the Treaty was imminent.
While no state called for a vote on the draft resolution,
some, such as New Zealand, Mexico and South Africa, were compelled
to express their cautious support due to the political implications
of that resolution. These States and others were also disappointed
that this resolution on compliance omitted aspects from the
similar draft resolution of 1997. The 2002 draft, unlike its
'97 predecessor, did not request the assistance of the SG
on questions of compliance, which would suggest that certain
areas of verification might be conferred upon him- or her,
when we finally have a female SG. The later version also failed
to mention the necessity or even the utility of multilateral
efforts in the area of non-compliance. New Zealand, among
others, was also unsatisfied with the weak language of operative
paragraph 6, which merely "notes the contribution" of verification
procedures.
Desires to reform the General Assembly in an effort to increase
its efficacy are being usurped and politicized. This year,
another U.S.-sponsored resolution on "revitalization of the
working methods of the First Committee" was also adopted without
a vote, but only after a vigorous debate behind the scenes
and impassioned explanations of votes. Again, a seemingly
benign resolution that includes merely two operative paragraphs,
was viewed as an inappropriately politicized text with controversial
implications. Most states believe that reform of the Committee
and of the GA should be procedural alone: time management,
clustering of issues, earlier elections of the Bureau, etc.
The draft resolution, however, as Cuba and Pakistan heatedly
pointed out on the day of the vote, is itself political and
substantive, as it contextualizes the need for reform in a
"post September 11 period" in the first preambular paragraph.
Cuba asserted that any purported link between enhancing the
efficacy of the working methods and "the date that would characterize
a crime" is "not relevant." Pakistan and Cuba questioned the
"honesty" of the lead sponsor outright; Ambassador Umer asserted
that Pakistan "would have accepted the honesty of the lead
sponsor if they called for implementation" of any existing
resolution, and Cuba asserted that while "real effective reform"
is needed, nothing "can make up for the lack of will" from
the world's most powerful states.
Compliance, of course, is inextricably linked to the need
for effective verification methods. While GA resolution 57/86,
as mentioned before, offers only the weakest of language on
verification, Canada's draft resolution in 2001, "Verification
in all its aspects, including the role of the United Nations"
reaffirmed the "critical importance" and "vital contribution"
of verification measures. This resolution was adopted without
a vote. This resolution echoes the Disarmament Commission's
Sixteen Principles of Verification which declare, inter alia,
that verification is "an essential element" that will result
in "greater openness" among States Parties to the disarmament
treaties. For the purposes of brevity, I won't delve into
more details of these resolutions and others, but I urge you
to order a copy of the 2003 First Committee Monitor Compendium,
an overview report by NGOs on the debates and resolutions
passed in the 58th session. There are copies with me today
and they are also available on our website.
Security Council
And what of the Security Council, the most prominent and
powerful of the UN bodies? How is the Council handling matters
of compliance? Would a more aggressive Council on questions
of compliance be truly effective? With 1/3 of its members
nuclear powers, how would Article VI compliance ever be taken
up? And, in the absence of Article VI disarmament obligations
on the Council's agenda, how effective would action on non-proliferation
compliance be?
At the 58th session of the First Committee, Canada suggested
a "review of the role of the Security Council" such as established
"time frames for responding to referrals to the Council by
treaty organizations." The NPT, of course, lacks a standing
treaty organization, similar to a Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty
Organization (CTBTO) or the Organization for the Prohibition
of Chemical Weapons (OPCW). This will be discussed a bit further
later on.
Since the issue at hand here is of course compliance, perhaps
we should look at how the Council complies with its own mandate,
as codified in the Charter. What progress has been made under
Article 26, which orders the Security Council to develop an
international system for the regulation of armaments, maintaining
the least diversion for armaments of the world's human and
economic resources?
Of course, the issue of non-compliance was addressed in SC
resolution 1441 and others dealing with Iraq. Recently, the
U.S. wanted the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA)
to refer the Iranian situation (and the DPRK situation, for
that matter) to the Security Council, so that the Council
could find those countries in violation of their agreements.
But a key issue of non-compliance is the discussion of responses
to it: should non-compliance automatically be used as justification
for war? Regime change? For those of us who have dedicated
our lives to peace and security, the onus is upon us to explore
and promote alternative responses and the primacy of the Charter,
which, let us remind our governments once more, was established
to prevent war and seek peaceful settlements of disputes.
A new regime to halt the proliferation of weapons of mass
destruction (WMD) and their means of delivery might be facing
the Council soon. It is rumored that there may be a possible
resolution on the Proliferation Security Initiative in the
upcoming weeks or months. The PSI, very briefly, is an initiative
established last year in response to the flagless North Korean
ship, the So San, stopped and searched by Spanish intermediaries,
and found to be transporting missiles to Yemen. Under the
initiative, eleven countries- including the U.S., the U.K.,
Spain, Japan, Australia, Italy, Netherlands, Poland, Portugal,
France and Germany- intend to detain and search all vessels
thought to be carrying WMD or related materials. There are
also plans to deny overflight rights to "suspicious aircraft"
and to prohibit them from takeoff if they stop to refuel in
the territory of a member country. In December, the U.S. will
host the next "operational meeting" of PSI members and interested
parties, at which legal experts, to quote John Bolton, "will
analyze their authorities against real world scenarios and
examine any gaps in authorities that can be filled either
through national legislation or policy or international action."
It has already been rumored that many States, including France,
Japan, Germany, Russia- remain uneasy about PSI in the absence
of any UN blessing. A Security Council rubber stamp on PSI
could be invoked in various fora concerned with compliance
to nonproliferation regimes.
A permanent corps?
This year in the GA, the discussion of a new arm of disarmament
machinery emerged in various forms. The increasingly recognized
utility of UNSCOM and UNMOVIC and the desire not to lose their
institutional memory have prompted discussion on the pros
and cons of establishing a permanent corps of inspectors.
This preliminary discussion, which has not yet evolved from
the phase of brief references and backroom discussions, focuses
on the proposed body's mandate, subject matter, and institutional
location.
What would a permanent corps's mandate look like? Would it
be charged with investigating suspected nuclear programs?
If so, how would this body work with the IAEA? Would it be
similar to its predecessor, UNMOVIC, and investigate suspected
biological and chemical weapons? What of the OPCW?
To whom would it report? In his statement to the GA, President
Chirac proposed that a permanent corps of inspectors be placed
under the Security Council, requiring it to report both to
the Council and the SG. Canada expressed cautious support
for this new idea of "fact-finding teams" but favors it to
be placed in the Department for Disarmament Affairs (DDA),
not the Security Council. The U.K. noted it would support
fact-finding missions on a more ad-hoc basis, recognizing
the need to maintain UNMOVIC's institutional memory.
There is some debate about whether such a verification corps
should be directly responsible to the SG, Security Council,
or come under the Department for Disarmament Affairs. Placement
in the DDA would elevate its visibility and perhaps strengthen
that badly underfunded, yet crucially important department
of the Secretariat. If the Council were required to refer
to the DDA, the disarmament lens would be employed in Security
Council deliberations on the findings of the permanent corps,
which would surely benefit the disarmament cause. As is obvious
from statements, positions, attitudes, and official documents,
the linkage between disarmament and nonproliferation has been
lost in the United States over the past years, and the elevation
of the DDA would undoubtedly work to re-establish that linkage
among the P5 and the entire Security Council. As a shift is
made in capitals to move from nonproliferation to counter-proliferation,
strengthening the DDA and the relationship between disarmament
and nonproliferation is vital.
Over the years, some NGOs and members of the DDA have proposed
the creation of a standing Secretariat for the NPT: an Organization
for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons, for example. Currently,
much of the institutional memory of the deliberations and
developments in the NPT and other nuclear-related treaties
and fora reside in civil society groups such as RCW and the
Acronym Institute for Disarmament Diplomacy; this fact is
recognized by many States even as they close the door to keep
us out of meetings. In the absence of an enforcement body
for the NPT, who is credibly responsible for taking up matters
of NPT non-compliance? The NPT and its States Parties lack
an institutional memory, an official repository of documents,
and an administration.
An OPNW would work in close collaboration with standing verification
regimes, such as the CTBTO and the IAEA and the like. It would
also have a critical role to play in sending recommendations
and reports to the DDA and the Security Council.
In anticipation of an OPNW, NGOs have already registered
the site, www.opnw.org. In the upcoming weeks, clicking on
opnw.org will automatically lead you to RCW site, which is
the de facto repository of all NPT documents, including statements,
working papers, official documents, Chairmen's statements.
But as proud as we are of our site, we'll gladly hand the
responsibility to the permanent Secretariat.
An equally viable alternative to an OPNW would be the creation
of an NPT Executive Council, that would meet periodically,
with the power to call a full meeting of States Parties if
the need arises. Such a council could be granted the authority
to work closely with the IAEA, export control regimes, the
CTBTO, and the Security Council to monitor the implementation
of the NPT and respond to non-compliance or other crises for
the regime as they occur, thereby functioning as the emergency
response mechanism that has been discussed since the DPRK's
withdrawal. These ideas and others are discussed at length
in the Acronym Institute's Disarmament Diplomacy no. 71, just
another example of the contribution NGOs make to the NPT and
disarmament process.
Conclusion
If our question today is compliance, two aspects cannot be
emphasized enough: that any discussion on compliance must
give equal weight to all articles of the Treaty- the nonproliferation
requirements AND the disarmament requirements. For vertical
proliferators to accuse non-nuclear weapon states (NNWS) of
non-compliance, and then use their questionable evidence and
patchy national intelligence to declare the NPT a failure
is illogical and unjust. We must- as disarmament experts and
diplomats- utilize the United Nations and all of the tools
at its disposal to work to discredit nuclear weapons as a
primary source of security.
The second aspect that must be stressed is the value of civil
society in these efforts. Civil society can help build the
internal pressure on governments necessary for them to act
in good faith on their agreements. We can arm you with the
knowledge, research and expertise needed to fulfill obligations
under international law. Like, for instance, with the acknowledgement
of the role that verification and accountability play in compliance
issues, the Reaching Critical Will Shadow Report offers a
model of reporting, transparency and accountability and we
urge States Parties to use it as a measuring tool for compliance.
The Shadow Report is an example of what the fulfillment of
Step 12 of the 2000 Final Document would look like: it accounts
for the nuclear holdings of each of the 44 Annex II states
and looks at how each of the NWS are upholding their promise
to the 13 Steps.
If the NPT is indeed the cornerstone of disarmament, verifiable
compliance to the NPT is at the heart of a future free from
the nuclear scourge. Those of us- i.e. the world's majority-
who seek to rid ourselves of the nuclear threat must be steadfast
against allowing a few minority States to hijack the discussion
of compliance and frame it solely on purported "rogue states"
and matters of nonproliferation. The indisputable reality
is that these few nuclear weapon states (NWS) are thwarting
the central bargain of the NPT, codified in Article VI by
unequivocally violating their treaty obligations in hoarding
and developing their nuclear weapon stockpiles.
This was just a glimpse at small parts of the web of international
disarmament machinery that we have to combat the existence
of nuclear weapons. This network of tools was created, piece
by piece, over the last sixty years and it is time we put
it to back to work, wresting it away from the political inertia
cast upon it by a few big States. Through this network we
can instigate multilateral demarches against those that are
in non-compliance with the NPT. We can press for a standing
NPT Secretariat in the GA and at the next PrepCom. We can
tap the political will that remains dormant in the world's
governments and infuse the international disarmament community
with a sense of purpose and progress. You must use the NGO
research, documents, advice, and connections to grassroots
and the media to push your efforts forward. Only through this
network of actors- the GA, the CD, the OPNW, and NGOs- will
the world finally reach a critical will necessary to abolish
nuclear weapons.
Rhianna Tyson,
Reaching Critical Will
Women's International League for Peace and Freedom
December 8, 2003
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