Status of the Implementation of the NPT 13 Steps and Nuclear Disarmament

By Senator Douglas Roche, O.C.

Chairman, Middle Powers Initiative

Sponsored by United Nations Centre for Peace, Disarmament and Development in Latin America and the Caribbean, Department for Disarmament Affairs

United Nations, New York, March 14, 2002 At the 2000 Review of the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), the states parties agreed to take 13 practical steps to manifest their systematic and progressive efforts to implement Article VI of the NPT. The first PrepComm, in 2002, for the 2005 Review provides an opportunity to assess the amount of progress. I propose here to refer to each of the steps* and then to offer a comment on the status of implementation.

Step 1. Entry-into-force of the CTBT

To date, 161 states have signed and 87 have ratified the CTBT. Of the 44 nuclear-capable countries required to ratify it, 13 states have not yet done so. Most of these have signed and are in the various stages of the legislative process for ratification. India, Pakistan and North Korea have not signed. Israel has signed, but has said that ratification will depend on, inter alia, Israel‚s sovereign equality status and developments in the region. The United States presents a serious problem because it is the only one of the five NPT NWS to reject the treaty. The Administration has said it is „not supporting‰ the CTBT (even though the U.S. was the first to sign in 1996 under the previous Administration). When it was presented to the U.S. Senate for ratification, the treaty was rejected on a 51-48 vote. The U.S. did not attend the CTBT Entry-into-Force Conference November 11-13, 2001, voted alone in the First Committee to oppose putting the CTBT topic on the UNGA agenda for 2002, and cut its share of contributions to the CTBT Organization. The treaty must now be protected from abandonment leading to demise.

Step 2. Moratorium on Nuclear Test Explosions.

There have been no text explosions since India and Pakistan conducted, between them, 11 tests in 1998. The U.S. has stated that nothing in the 2001 Nuclear Posture Review changes U.S. support for the moratorium, and that the stewardship program will ensure stockpile safety and reliability without nuclear testing. However, the U.S. intends to reduce the lead-time, currently at 24-36 months, to prepare for and conduct an underground nuclear test. A continuation of the moratorium is essential.

Step 3. Negotiations to be concluded in the Conference on Disarmament (C.D.) within 5 years on a fissile ban treaty.

A stalemate is evident. A critical sticking point is the insistence of some countries that the negotiations address reduction of existing stocks as well as a cap on new production. Also, China and other countries resist such negotiations absent commitments on other fronts to pursue comprehensive nuclear disarmament and to prevent an arms race in outer space.

Step 4. Establishment of a subsidiary body in the C.D. to „deal‰ with nuclear disarmament.

No action here. The U.S. will only support such a committee to discuss nuclear disarmament. Russia says the time is not ripe for negotiations. China wants negotiations on outer space, nuclear disarmament and fissile materials all tied together. The C.D. must implement a mechanism to give equal treatment to a fissile ban treaty, the prevention of an arms race in outer space, and nuclear disarmament.

Step 5. The principle of irreversibility to apply to nuclear disarmament.

Thus far the principle of irreversibility is being applied selectively to limited quantities of weapon-usable fissile material surplus to military requirements by Russia and the U.S. Destruction of missiles under the Intermediate Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty and START I is considered at the moment irreversible disarmament. The new nuclear weapons cuts proposed by the U.S. and Russia would have to involve the actual dismantlement of weapons and be codified in law to be considered irreversible.

Step 6. Unequivocal undertaking by the NWS to accomplish the total elimination of their arsenals.

There is no sign that the Article VI obligation as now understood in light of its authoritative interpretation by the International Court of Justice (ICJ) and the 2000 „unequivocal undertaking‰ have been integrated into national planning. Rather, the obligation seems to remain a rhetorical flourish for international settings. In contrast to the NPT 2000 pledge, the U.S. Nuclear Posture Review, according to Congressional testimony, „reaffirms that nuclear weapons, for the foreseeable future, will remain a key element of the U.S. national security strategy.‰ France echoes this position. China says it will negotiate elimination when the U.S. and Russia get down to lower levels. The U.K. has taken a similar position.

Step 7. Full implementation of START II, conclusion of START III, preserving and strengthening the ABM Treaty.

START I requires and START II, which has not yet entered into force, would have required, the destruction of delivery systems; the 1997 Helsinki commitments to START III additionally envisaged accounting for and dismantling of warheads. However, the present U.S. plan does not call for destruction of delivery systems or dismantlement of warheads. Under START II, there would have been 3,000-3,500 deployed strategic arms by 2007, not the 3,800 in the new U.S. plan. The target of 1,700 to 2,200 for the year 2012 is about the range of START III, though slower. Regarding the ABM Treaty, the U.S. has announced that its withdrawal will become effective June 13, 2002, and the Nuclear Posture Review reportedly anticipates limited deployment of strategic missile defenses by 2008. This is directly contrary to the call for preserving and strengthening the treaty.

Step 8. Implementation of the Trilateral Initiative between the U.S., Russia and the IAEA.

Under this initiative launched in 1996, the U.S., Russia and the IAEA are creating an Agency verification regime appropriate for weapon-origin and other excess fissile material. Such a regime would enable verification of classified forms of fissile materials, including nuclear weapons components. The importance of this step is underscored by the huge stockpiles of fissile material held by both Russia and the U.S. Russia has more than 1,000 metric tons of weapon-grade uranium, and the U.S. has nearly 750 metric tons of weapon-grade uranium and 85 metric tons of weapon-grade plutonium. Work is now stalled on a model verification agreement.

Step 9. Steps by NWS based on the principle of undiminished security for all to promote international stability.

a) Further efforts for unilateral reductions. Both the U.S. and Russia have discussed reciprocal unilateral cuts. An „executive agreement‰ has been spoken of, but this would fall short of a legally binding treaty. The non-nuclear weapons states want such cuts to be codified and made irreversible through destruction of delivery systems and dismantlement of warheads, and internationally monitored disposal of the fissile materials.

b) Increased transparency of NWS capabilities and Article VI agreements. For decades, weapon development programs in the NWS have been cloaked in varying degrees of opacity and disinformation. The U.S. offer to have a senior official provide a briefing on nuclear weapon matters at NPT and other U.N. fora is welcome. But what is called for is a nuclear-weapon register and a weapon-usable fissile material register. NWS reporting on their compliance with Article VI is not standardized and not subject to verification of accuracy.

c) Unilateral initiatives for non-strategic reductions. No present activity is apparent.

d) Measures to reduce the operational status of nuclear weapons systems. The principal need, to get the U.S. and Russia to stand down almost 5,000 strategic nuclear weapons from launch-on-warning, has been ignored. The maintenance of weapons on high alert is contrary to the spirit and intention of the 13 steps program. The U.K. has relaxed notice to fire weapons from its deployed Trident submarine from „minutes‰ to „days.‰ It is understood France has followed suit. Chinese warheads are at the moment stored separately from missiles. De-alerting should not be seen as merely an adjunct to reductions but as a step to reduce risk of accidents and a signal that nuclear explosive are not usable.

e) Diminishing the role of nuclear weapons in security policies to facilitate the process of elimination. With the exception of China‚s longstanding position of no-first-use, there is no evidence of a diminishing role for nuclear weapons. Quite the reverse. In its recent $5.9 billion request to the U.S. Congress for nuclear weapons maintenance, research and development activities in 2003, the National Nuclear Security Administration relied on the Nuclear Posture Review as its primary justification. The centerpiece of the NPR is the New Triad of flexible response capabilities consisting of: non-nuclear and nuclear strike capabilities; active and passive defences including ballistic missile defences; research and development to maintain nuclear offensive forces. The New Triad stresses a robust and responsive nuclear weapons infrastructure. „Most importantly, this review reemphasizes the importance of nuclear weapons to deter the threats of weapons of mass destruction, to assure allies of U.S. security commitments, to hold at risk an adversary‚s assets and capabilities · .‰ [Weapons Activities/Executive Summary, FY 2003 Congressional Budget] Nuclear weapons in the U.K. and France can be used first to defend vital interests. Russia also contemplates first use.

f) Engagement of all NWS in the elimination process. There is no

evidence of this.

Step 10. NWS to place excess fissile materials under IAEA.

Russia and the U.S. are stalled on this step (see Step 8). China, France and the U.K. must place excess material irreversibly under safeguards.

Step 11. Reaffirmation of general and complete disarmament under effective international control.

The opposite is happening. Military expenditures, now at $800 billion a year, are climbing, with dozens of states increasing, led by the U.S. with a huge jump to nearly $400 billion (when Department of Energy nuclear weapons spending is taken into account). The Biological Weapons Convention is in disarray. The immense flow of small arms - the main instruments behind civilian casualties and economic and social disruption in many regions - is one of the clearest and most pressing human security concerns facing the international community today. The terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 appear to have provided justification for increased military spending.

Step 12. Regular reports on the implementation of Article VI, Paragraph 4 (c) of the 1995 Decision on Principles and Objectives, and a recollection of the 1996 ICJ Advisory Opinion.

The strengthened review process includes provisions for "regular" reporting by the NWS, but there is not yet any commitment to report on the implementation of the "practical steps". The 2002 PrepComm should allocate time to assess voluntary reports and consider methods to standardize reporting.

Step 13. Development of verification capabilities to assure compliance with disarmament agreements.

The CTBT organization has made steady progress in the development of an International Monitoring System (IMS), a global network of 337 facilities in 90 states. Construction of 121 IMS stations has been completed and another 90 are under construction. However, the U.S. reversal on the CTBT has created doubt about the entry-into-force of the treaty, which has led to complaints by others of the cost of a system that may not be fully utilized. Nonetheless, it cannot be alleged that the CTBT lacks proper verification measures. An Independent Commission on the Verifiability of the CTBT, composed of 14 experts from 11 countries, said there was a high probability that any nuclear testing could be detected. In addition, IAEA safeguards have been strengthened with new protocols; for the small sum of $90 million a year, the IAEA is safeguarding more than 100,000 significant quantities of nuclear material in 140 states. The IAEA remains starved of funds and depends on voluntary contributions. All verification work is under-funded.

* * *

Assessment

Analysis of the implementation, so far, of the NPT‚s 13 practical steps provides serious concern about the "good faith" of the NWS. It is regression from the thrust and intent of the program that is even more worrisome. Were the steps agreed to in 2000 only for political convenience? Is the "good faith" called for in Article VI evident today? Is the future of nuclear disarmament one of unrelieved gloom?

To focus on ways to inject momentum into the implementation of the practical steps, the Middle Powers Initiative convened a Strategy Consultation in 2001. Out of this deliberation, 10 "Principal Points" emerged, on which MPI recommended that governments take action in the years leading up to the 2005 Review Conference.

The "Principal Points" are:

Sharpen the Sense of Urgency of All 13 Steps.

De-alert Strategic Nuclear Weapons.

Preserve and Strengthen the ABM Treaty.

Link Unilateral Measures to the Treaty Process.

Apply the Principle of Irreversibility.

Address Non-strategic Nuclear Weapons.

Ban Nuclear Testing and Bring CTBT Into Force.

Inventory All Fissile Materials.

Require Standardized Reporting.

Convene New Conferences on Nuclear Disarmament.

For its 2002 Strategy Consultation, to be held on April 8 (during the NPT PrepComm), the MPI has further refined this list to three items on which immediate progress is possible: a) Link Unilateral Measures to Treaty Process and Apply the Principle of Irreversibility, b) Inventory Fissile Materials and Strengthen IAEA Safeguards, c) Require Standardized Reporting. The elimination of nuclear weapons may not be readily attainable. But the nuclear weapons states can show their "good faith" in moving toward the goal by demonstrating immediate progress on these three topics.

The non nuclear weapons States should use the NPT‚s strengthened review process to push for greater accountability; they should link the U.S. demand for consideration of nuclear terrorism and physical protection of nuclear materials to a commitment to abide by the NPT 13 Steps.

Senator Douglas Roche, O.C. is former Canadian Ambassador for Disarmament and former Chairman of the United Nations Disarmament Committee. He is the author of Bread Not Bombs: A Political Agenda for Social Justice (University of Alberta Press, 1999). He chairs the Middle Powers Initiative, a network of eight international nongovernmental organizations specializing in nuclear disarmament. The MPI program is integrated into the Global Security Institute.

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