



BRAZIL

III SESSION OF THE PREPARATORY COMMITTEE FOR THE 2005 REVIEW CONFERENCE OF
THE TREATY ON THE NON-PROLIFERATION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS

Cluster I

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NON-PROLIFERATION AND NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT

Mr Chairman,

First of all, I would like to stress that my delegation's views on nuclear disarmament are also contained in the statement that will be made by Mexico on behalf of the New Agenda Coalition in the session dedicated to nuclear disarmament. I would like, however, to make some points that my delegation considers to be of extreme importance.

Long before its accession to the NPT, Brazil had decided that our national security and international peace and security should not be predicated on the acquisition of nuclear armament. In the sixties Brazil was at the inception of the idea that would later come to life in the Tlatelolco Treaty, to make the Latin American and the Caribbean Region a Nuclear Weapons Free Zone. In the eighties, when a new Constitution was adopted, we inscribed in it a provision that allows for nuclear activities only for peaceful purposes. In the early nineties Brazil entered into a Quadripartite agreement with Argentina, the bilateral control agency and the IAEA and placed all our nuclear facilities under comprehensive safeguards. This agreement entered into force four years before we acceded to the NPT. Moreover, for decades, through the negotiating process of the Tlatelolco Treaty and of the NPT, we have asserted the need for disarmament measures to be implemented while we uphold the objectives of non-proliferation..

Over the past few years, we have noticed a striking - and worrisome - development as regards disarmament and non-proliferation affairs. While a renewed emphasis has been put on non-proliferation, less and less attention is paid to nuclear disarmament. And the modest achievements made in nuclear disarmament have only a very precarious basis, as they are not the result of multilaterally negotiated, irreversible and verifiable agreements, and thus can easily be rolled back. Verification exclusively by the involved parties themselves is not enough to establish international confidence. External verification is also necessary.

Some recent non-proliferation endeavors also lack the necessary multilateral support. A paradox is emerging, whereby ever more stringent measures are contemplated as regards the transfer of technologies and equipment to developing countries, while serious proliferation behavior and episodes tend to disappear gradually into oblivion or to be treated with a high degree of complacency.

The successful outcome of the 1995 and 2000 NPT Review Conferences generated the expectation of progress in the implementation of all aspects of the Treaty's obligations. In 1995, the NPT was extended indefinitely and decisions were adopted to strengthen the review process and to set principles and objectives for non-proliferation and disarmament. The NPT thus reasserted its role as the cornerstone of nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation. Five years later, the "unequivocal undertaking" made by the nuclear-weapon States to accomplish the total elimination of their nuclear arsenals and implement 13 agreed steps toward this end was hailed as a major outcome.

The international community should resist attempts to downgrade the degree of commitment to these measures. The preparatory process of the 2005 Review Conference provides the Parties with the opportunity to test the willingness and good faith of all States Parties to live up to their commitments and to the fulfillment of the expectations they have generated.

International peace and security can only benefit from the total elimination of nuclear weapons. But while those weapons exist, it is necessary that unconditional negative security assurances be granted to non-nuclear-weapon States. In this regard, reservations and interpretations by nuclear-weapon countries of their obligations contained in the Protocol II of the Tlatelolco Treaty should be revised or withdrawn, particularly since the treaty that created a Nuclear Weapons Free Zone in Latin American and the Caribbean is now in force for the whole region of its application.

The fulfillment of the 13 steps on nuclear disarmament agreed during the 2000 Review Conference have been significantly - one could even say systematically - challenged by action and omission, and various reservations and selective interpretation by nuclear weapon States. Disregard for the provisions of Article VI may ultimately affect the nature of the fundamental bargain on which the Treaty's legitimacy rests.

We are encouraged by having listened in this session to the near totality of Member States, including some nuclear-weapon States, refer to the importance of the entering into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty. We hope this almost unanimous perception will help countries that have not decided to ratify the CTBT to change this course of action and to decide to ratify the Treaty.

Furthermore the whole edifice of disarmament and non-proliferation has been undermined by the emergence of new strategic and military doctrines based on the development of new nuclear weapons, and on possibility of the use of such weapons on a pre-emptive basis, even against non-nuclear-weapon states. This is a clear example of how those who treasure nuclear weapons can easily have the impulse to seek new motives to stick to them. But one cannot worship in the altar of nuclear weapons and raise heresy charges against those who want to join the sect.

Having listened to the interventions of nuclear-weapon States during this PrepCom, on the measures undertaken to comply with obligations under article VI, we consider it useful that the Secretariat put together a comparative table of such measures, based on the information provided so far. This would give States Parties a means for a better evaluation of such measures. Such a table, or comparative chart, could then be used at the Review Conference in 2005.

My delegation intends to present you with a few suggestions based on these and other considerations we made in our interventions. We hope they will be useful to you in your final report.