

**Statement by the delegation of
The Islamic Republic of Iran
before
NPT 2005 Review Conference - PrepCom III
Cluster 2 - Safeguards**

Mr. Chairman

I would like to start by associating with the positions already expressed by the distinguished representative of Malaysia on behalf of Non-Aligned Movement.

1. The safeguards system of the IAEA is a fundamental pillar of the nuclear non-proliferation regime. According to Article III of the Treaty, each non-nuclear weapon state party undertakes to accept safeguards, as set forth in an agreement to be negotiated and concluded with the International Atomic Energy Agency for the exclusive purpose of verification of the fulfillment of its obligations assumed under the NPT with a view to preventing diversion of nuclear energy from peaceful uses to nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices.
2. Article III, while providing for the undertaking by each non-nuclear weapon states to conclude safeguards agreements with the IAEA, is equally explicit in articulating that the implementation of such safeguards shall be *"in a manner designed to comply with Article IV of this Treaty, and to avoid hampering the economic or technological development of the Parties or international co-operation in the field of peaceful nuclear activities, including the international exchange of nuclear material and equipment for the processing, use or production of nuclear material for peaceful purposes in accordance with the provisions of this Article and the principle of safeguarding set forth in the Preamble of the Treaty."*
3. Principle 9 of the 1995 Review and Extension Conference Decision on Principle and Objectives of the NPT, as an integral part of the deal over the indefinite extension of the Treaty provides that: *"The International Atomic Energy Agency is the competent authority responsible to verify and assure, in accordance with the statute of the Agency and the Agency's safeguards system, compliance with its safeguards agreements with States parties undertaken in fulfilment of their obligations under article III, paragraph 1, of the Treaty, with a view to preventing diversion of nuclear energy from peaceful uses to nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices. Nothing should be done to undermine the authority of the International Atomic Energy Agency in this regard. States parties that have concerns regarding non-compliance with the safeguards agreements of the Treaty by*

the States parties should direct such concerns, along with supporting evidence and information, to the Agency to consider, investigate, draw conclusions and decide on necessary actions in accordance with its mandate."

4. The Final Document of the NPT 2000 Review Conference, identically reaffirmed the role of the IAEA in verification of the compliance with the safeguard system and investigation of concerns regarding non-compliance.
5. We stress on the importance of achieving the universality of the IAEA comprehensive safeguards system which could reassure prevention of diversion of nuclear energy from peaceful uses. We reiterate that any international effort to strengthen the comprehensive safeguards would definitely be of much more effect if it considers the universality of the safeguards of the same importance and endeavors to achieve both together.
6. Israel is the only non party to the NPT in the Middle East region and has not placed its nuclear facilities under the full-scope safeguards of the Agency. Unsafeguarded nuclear facilities and continuation of clandestine nuclear activities of Israel pose the most serious challenges to the peace and security of this region which a single nuclear weapon state has turned a blind eye to it.
7. The states of the region of the Middle East are deeply concerned about Israel's access to nuclear material and technologies and know-how to develop nuclear weapons. We call for the total and complete prohibition of transfer of all related equipment, information, material, resources and devices and extension of assistance to states not party to the Treaty without exception in nuclear, scientific or technological fields enabling them to produce or develop nuclear weapons capability.
8. The application of unilaterally enforced export control regimes in contravention of the letter and the spirit of the Treaty has hampered the access of the developing countries to nuclear materials, equipment and technologies for peaceful purposes. The PrepCom and the NPT 2005 Review Conference should intensify their work in order to promote the implementation of the inalienable rights of all states parties, particularly the developing countries, to enjoy unrestricted access to nuclear materials, technologies, equipment and scientific and technological information for peaceful purposes.
9. The Islamic Republic of Iran signed the Additional Protocol to its Comprehensive Safeguard Agreement on 18 December 2003 and is provisionally implementing it. Today a number of countries including Non-Aligned Movement and EU countries in their statements welcomed Iran's signature of the Additional Protocol. We are of the view that this kind of

reflections, contrary to one single delegation, of Iran's cooperation with the IAEA is not only conducive to the positive atmosphere already existing between Iran and the IAEA but also could contribute constructively to our deliberations. We regard this as another confidence building measure to assure our firm commitment to the NPT and non-diversion of nuclear energy from peaceful uses to nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices. We are determined to continue our cooperation with the Agency to resolve any remaining outstanding issue. We believe this should remove any obstacle for the expansion of international cooperation on Iran's peaceful nuclear program.

10. In the review process of the Treaty, the states parties should adopt concrete measures with the aim to ensure that the rights of all states parties under the provision of the Preamble and articles of the Treaty are fully protected and that no state party is limited in the exercise of these rights in accordance with the Treaty on the basis of the allegations of non-compliance not verified by IAEA.