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NGO Presentations
to the 2004 NPT PrepCom
New York
1. Introductory Remarks
Delivered by Mayor I. Itoh, City of Nagasaki, Mayors for Peace (MfP)
Convened by Aaron
Tovish, MfP
2. Overview of NGO Presentations
Delivered by Susi Snyder, Women's
International League for Peace and Freedom (WILPF )
Convened by Rhianna
Tyson, Reaching Critical Will (RCW/WILPF)
Statement by Mordechai Vanunu
3. Vertical Proliferation
Delivered by Jacqueline Cabasso,
Western States Legal Foundation (WSLF)
Convened by Martin Butcher,
Physicians for Social Responsibility (PSR)
4. A Living Document: Reaffirming the 13
Steps
Delivered by Sarah
Estabrooks, Project Ploughshares
Convened by Sarah Estabrooks, Rhianna Tyson, and Justine
Wang, Nuclear Age Peace Foundation (NAPF)
5. A Fresh Look at Vertical Proliferation
- Ballistic Missiles, Missile Defenses, and Space Weaponization
Delivered by Charlotte Wohlfahrt, International Law Campaign
Convened by Regina
Hagen, International Network of Engineers and Scientists Against
Proliferation (INESAP)
6. Beyond the NPT: Recent Initiatives
to Prevent Proliferation
Delivered by Rhianna Tyson, RCW
Convened by John Burroughs,
Lawyers Committee on Nuclear Policy (LCNP) and Rhianna Tyson
7. The Human Tragedy of Proliferation
and Nuclear Rearmament
Delivered by Ron McCoy,
International Physicians for the Prevention of Nuclear War (IPPNW)
Convened by John Loretz,
IPPNW
8. Diplomacy of Cities and Promoting Peace
Mayor Olexandr Omelchenko, Kyiv, Mayors for Peace
Convened by Aaron Tovish and Steve
Leeper, (MfP)
9. Proliferation: Finding the Common
Thread
Delivered and convened by Alice
Slater, Global Resource Action Center on the Environment (GRACE)
10. Indigenous Peoples and the Nuclear
Non-Proliferation Treaty
Delivered by Motarilavoa
Hilda Lini, The Nuclear Free and Independent Pacific Movement
11. Nuclear Weapons Non-Proliferation
in the Middle East and South Asia: Issues and Policy Recommendations
Delivered and Convened by Elahe
Mohtasham, Nuclear Weapons Non-Proliferation and International
Safeguards System (NWN&ISS)
12. Introduction to Mayors for Peace
Delivered by Hon. Bill Perkins, New York City Councilman
- Citizens Weapons Inspections
Delivered by Senator Patrik Vankrunkelsven, Belgium, Mayors for
Peace
- Nuclear Testing in the Pacific
Delivered by Abelina Shaw, Chief of Staff, City of Honolulu, Hawaii
- Olympic Truce
Delivered by Mayor Andreas Pahatourides, City of Peristeri, Greece
All Mayors' presentations convened by Steve Leeper, MfP
13. Recommendations
Delivered and convened by John
Loretz, IPPNW
14. Concluding Remarks
Delivered by Mayor Tadatoshi Akiba, City of Hiroshima
Convened by Steve Leeper, MfP
** Participating NGOs
Introductory Remarks
Convened by Mayors for Peace
Delivered by Mayor Iccoh Itoh, Nagasaki
Chairman Sudjadnan and assembled representatives of national governments,
I am Iccho Itoh, Mayor of Nagasaki.
As a member of the Mayors for Peace, and representing the citizens
of a city that was subjected to an atomic bombing, I have been accorded
the privilege of opening this plenary session of NGO Presentations,
and am very honored to have this opportunity to address you.
On August 9, 1945, an atomic bomb was dropped on our city of Nagasaki.
Unlike the bomb dropped on Hiroshima three days earlier, the weapon
used against Nagasaki was a plutonium type bomb. Its explosion resulted
in unimaginably intense heat rays, blast winds, and radiation, instantly
transforming the city into a wasteland and killing or injuring some
150,000 people, or about two thirds of the population.
Many of those who only narrowly escaped death were afflicted by
the after-effects of the bombing, and continue to suffer today.
Recent studies carried out by the Japanese government show that
even people who were over 10 kilometers from the hypocenter at the
time of the blast were exposed to cell-destroying radiation. Furthermore,
anxiety over the possible development of disease has led to post-traumatic
stress disorder (PTSD), and we have scientific and medical evidence
that the physical health of such survivors was impaired. This, to
my knowledge, is the first evidence to reveal this effect. I say
this to ensure that this body understands that, even 59 years later,
nuclear weapons continue to inflict tragic suffering.
The cry of the citizens of Nagasaki for the elimination of nuclear
weapons began with our unspeakable experience of 59 years ago, and
continues to this day. But we bear no hatred against the United
States, the nation that dropped the atomic bomb. In fact, the first
sister city relationship between Japan and the United States was
established between Nagasaki and St. Paul, Minnesota in 1955, and
we are now looking forward to the 50th anniversary of exchange between
our citizens. The suffering sustained by Nagasaki must never happen
again to anyone. We continue to voice our appeal to the world that
the citizens of Nagasaki may be the last victims of nuclear warfare.
Nevertheless, looking at the state of the world in recent years
with respect to nuclear arms, we see a situation that betrays our
hope. We see the appearance of nations newly engaged in the development
of nuclear weapons. Meanwhile, the United States, the sole remaining
nuclear superpower, seeks to resume nuclear testing and to develop
tactical weapons. The danger is readily apparent.
It is not an overstatement to say that the NPT regime is now facing
the threat of collapse. The nuclear weapon states would do well
to remember the advisory opinion issued by the International Court
of Justice in 1996 that the “threat or use of nuclear weapons
would generally be contrary to the rules of international law.”
Has the “unequivocal undertaking by the nuclear weapon states
to accomplish the total elimination of their nuclear arsenals”
adopted by the 2000 Review Conference been forgotten?
The world’s people risk exposure to the horror of nuclear
weapons. Therefore, the cities of the world are superseding the
framework of nation-states, and are participating with the World
Conference of Mayors for Peace in an urgent effort to abolish nuclear
arms. In conjunction with NGOs, this movement will surely become
a groundswell. The City of Nagasaki stands at the forefront of this
movement, and in November of last year we hosted the 2nd Global
Citizens’ Assembly in Nagasaki for Elimination of Nuclear
Weapons, in cooperation with NGOs and citizens. The result of this
historic gathering was the Nagasaki Appeal 2003, which has been
delivered to the world through the efforts of the participating
NGOs. This document is even now being distributed from a booth outside
this hall. I urge you to read it, and to reflect on the desire of
the world’s citizenry to eradicate nuclear arms.
A delegation of nuclear survivors, university students, musicians
and other participants from Nagasaki has also come to New York in
order to take part in the NGO campaign that is running parallel
to the events currently being undertaken by the Preparatory Committee.
They have come because next year’s Review Conference must
“map the road to a nuclear free world” and they have
high expectations for the Preparatory Committee’s essential
role in this process. In this context, there can be no doubt that
the undying hope of the citizens of Nagasaki is also the resolute
will of the citizens of the world.
It is now up to you who are gathered here to act decisively. Thank
you.
Overview of NGO Presentations
Convened by Reaching Critical Will/WILPF
Delivered by Susi Snyder, WILPF
Mr. Chairman, members of the Secretariat, and distinguished delegates,
We would first like to thank all of the States Parties for permitting
us this small opportunity to address the official plenary of the
third Preparatory Committee of the 2005 Review Conference of the
Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. It is important that you are willing
to listen to views from the people who you are here to represent.
The treaty, as you are all aware, faces perhaps its most daunting
crisis to date. Some Nuclear Weapon States (NWS) are unabashedly
embarking on ambitious vertical proliferation programs while pursuing
horizontal nonproliferation programs that are dangerously militaristic.
These programs are implemented unilaterally or by “coalitions
of the willing” rather than by international institutions
accountable to the norms of treaties and international law. In an
environment of rampant terrorism, fissile materials and nuclear
weapons are not safeguarded adequately in some countries, and a
black-market in nuclear technology has been exposed after fifteen
years of operation. The practice of double standards generates distrust
and hostility among states and encourages the perceived need for
these genocidal, suicidal, and ecocidal weapons.
It is in this grave context that non-governmental organizations
(NGOs) will address you today. We are allotted but one, three-hour
session to address the States Parties in an official setting. Prior
to 2000, every NGO prepared its own written statement, culminating
in dozens of three minute speeches, hardly enough time to sufficiently
share our expertise and analysis. NGOs from around the world then
decided that our three hours would best be utilized if we worked
collectively on a smaller number of statements. In this manner,
we are able to cover a wider range of issues, provide more comprehensive
background information, and offer concretized ideas for moving forward.
The dozen presentations you are about to hear are the result of
six months of intensive consultations. First, ideas for presentations
were brainstormed, debated, and finally selected over conference
calls, meetings, email listserves, and web-based information. Then,
several NGOs volunteered to comprise each presentation’s drafting
committee, headed up by one convenor, who was responsible for writing
the drafts. Each of the drafts was submitted to the group at large,
whereby every NGO was invited to comment, critique, and edit. After
months of international conference calls, wrangling on-line and
in person, the drafts were finalized and the presenters were chosen
from a wide group of experts. This year, we have the privilege of
working with Mayors for Peace, a group of mayors from around the
world who have committed themselves and their cities to a world
free from the threat of nuclear weapons. Several of the presentations
before you will be delivered from representatives from this important
constituency.
The final products offer you analysis and recommendations on issues
ranging from vertical and horizontal proliferation, plurilateralism
and multilateralism, missiles, health effects, nuclear energy and
more. They speak of the perspective from North America, East Asia,
Europe, the South Pacific, and the Middle East, from indigenous
peoples, physicians, psychologists, legal experts, lab watchdogs
and policy analysts.
Over 20 NGOs struggled together to reach agreement on many texts
and a whole series of final recommendations. Disagreements over
several substantive points remain, and it is important to note that
the recommendations contained herein are not necessarily those advocated
by every single one of us. However, we enter this room with a clear
sense of purpose and a unified voice. One mutually primary concern
overrides any discrepancy in the policies of our individual organizations:
our unquenchable desire for nuclear abolition.
While the process may be arduous, time-consuming, and indeed frustrating
at times, the collaborative efforts behind these presentations represent
the collective will of the world to rid the planet of nuclear weapons,
verifiably and irreversibly. This collective will is also embodied
in the hundreds of young people who are attending the PrepCom this
year. They are convening their own Youth Caucus, to strategize and
demonstrate that the younger generations will no longer accept their
parents' and grandparents' nuclear legacy.
It is our hope that the ideas, suggestions, and recommendations
that we offer will motivate you to move beyond debate toward action,
so that the nuclear arsenals that have plagued our hopes for world
peace for decades will finally be eliminated. We have shortened
the length of these presentations in order to provide time for a
question and answer session immediately following the last presentation.
We look forward to engaging in discussions with you today and throughout
the rest of the conference.
Thank you.
Vertical Proliferation
Delivered by Jacqueline Cabasso, Western States Legal Foundation
(WSLF)
Convened by Physicians for Social Responsibility (PSR)
Mr Chairman, Distinguished Delegates,
I would like to thank you for the opportunity to address the Preparatory
Committee today on the topic of vertical proliferation.
All too often, when we consider the proliferation of nuclear weapons,
we think only of horizontal proliferation – their spread to
previously non-nuclear countries. However, the containment of proliferation
depends in large part on the assurance to non-nuclear weapon states
(NNWS) that they will be secure from nuclear attack or nuclear blackmail.
For this reason the 1965 United Nations General Assembly resolution
2028 (XX) called for non-proliferation and nuclear disarmament as
balanced obligations. Similarly, the Non-Proliferation Treaty obligates
not only non-proliferation, but disarmament too. The preamble to
the Treaty declares the need to:
.. facilitate the cessation of the manufacture of
nuclear weapons, the liquidation of all their existing stockpiles,
and the elimination from national arsenals of nuclear weapons and
the means of their delivery ..,
Vertical proliferation, the acquisition of more, new or different
nuclear weapons and improved means of delivery by existing nuclear
weapons states, runs directly counter to the purpose of the Treaty
as established in the Preamble, and enshrined in Article VI. This
concern for the prevention and reversal of vertical proliferation
was reinforced in 2000. The Conclusions of the 6th Review Conference
included a Programme of Action for Next Steps on Nuclear Disarmament,
of which paragraph 15, sub-paragraphs 4, 5, 6 and 9 address directly
the need for the restriction and prevention of vertical proliferation
through disarmament.
All States Parties endorsed the Programme of Action, and should
therefore play an important role in its implementation. We are,
therefore, deeply troubled that we today present to you overwhelming
evidence that the United States, the Russian Federation, the United
Kingdom, France and China are all proceeding with vertically proliferating
programs that undermine the Treaty in profound ways. We define vertical
proliferation as increases in the size of arsenals; the introduction
of new weapons and new capabilities to arsenals – including
new means of delivery; and changes in the role of nuclear weapons
in defense policy.
This is not simply an accounting of new weapons, but a description
of a deadly danger to our civilization. According to studies in
political psychology and conflict studies, deterrence works best
when accompanied by drastic measures in tension reduction, and GRIT
strategies of graduated reciprocated initiatives in tension reduction,
which begin with unilateral moves to reduce tension. Policies of
vertical proliferation, or even status quo mere possession of nukes
by some powers, are highly provocative, promoting escalation of
tension and volatility, and according to social science highly likely
to promote proliferation and eventual use, especially against those
NWS which seek their security behind a nuclear shield.
Several psychosociopolitical factors of vertical proliferation
will provoke horizontal proliferation the opposite of the
stated intention of Nonproliferation.
1 Fear and insecurity - People and nations can be more dangerous
when afraid. This creates a climate of bad faith and one in which
leaders can manipulate fears of the populous against NWS.
2 Envy and Humiliation both very dangerous, poisonous
emotions which impel violence and desires to get even. There are
tension reducing, face-saving ways of dealing even with dangerous
dictators, other than threatening, humiliating and backing them
into a corner which makes them more dangerous.
3 Asymmetrical Power provokes the development of countermeasures
which are 1/100 1/1000 the price, and require less technology,
which include asymmetrical warfare terrorism, There is no
nuclear or military system which cannot be overcome. Policies
don¹t consider innovation and ingenuity, or psychology of "enemies."
4 The Double Standard hold nukes as a status symbol and promotes
desire to join the nuclear weapons club.
5 The Experience of being Dominated creates a climate
of bitterness, resentment, hopelessness and provides a breeding
ground for endless new recruits to terrorist groups.
6 Spiral Theory All of the above create an atmosphere
where proliferation and use can spiral out of control.
We ask delegates to bear these points in mind as we produce evidence
now of Treaty breaches. We begin with the lesser transgressors,
in alphabetical order.
China
China maintains a declaratory No First Use policy with regard to
nuclear weapons, and has sponsored many disarmament resolutions
in UN fora. Moreover, China maintains a small, largely stable nuclear
arsenal. However, in contradiction of those policies, China is modernizing
its arsenal, while increasing its military capabilities.
China is modernizing its missile force … [including] mobility,
solid fuel, improved accuracy, lighter warheads, and a more robust
command, control, communications, and intelligence (C3I) system.
A new missile, the three-stage, solid fuel, mobile DF-31, is the
program’s mainstay.. China is also developing a modified version
of the DF-31, the DF-31A.. the H-6 [bomber] may gain new life as
a platform for China’s emerging cruise missile capability..
Although talking disarmament at the UN, China is violating its
NPT obligations, and the conclusions of the 2000 NPT Review Conference.
France
France is modernizing and upgrading its nuclear arsenal, and has
adapted its nuclear doctrine to give a more important role to nuclear
forces in military policy. President Chirac said:
.. our security is now and will be guaranteed above all by our
nuclear deterrent.. Deterrence must also enable us to face the threats
against our vital interests by regional powers equipped with weapons
of mass destruction.. [this] is the best guarantee against threats
born of the proliferation, whatever their means of delivery.
New French nuclear missile submarines continue to enter service.
The purchase of the first M51 missiles will happen in 2004. They
will be equipped with a new warhead, the Tete Nucleaire Oceanique
(TNO). Development of the ASMP-A, air launched nuclear missile,
continues apace. This missile will carry the Tete Nucleaire Aeroportee
(TNA), another new warhead. This increases France’s nuclear
weapons capabilities, and, according to the French National Assembly,
will assure France’s status as a NWS until 2040.
French vertical proliferation puts France in breach of its NPT
obligations and the Conclusions of the 2000 Review Conference. Its
nuclear use doctrine undermines France’s negative security
assurance (NSA), an essential part of the Treaty regime.
Russian Federation
The Russian Federation maintains a considerable nuclear arsenal,
despite deep cutbacks. Under START II Russia had agreed to de-MIRV
its nuclear missiles, but has now decided to retain SS-18s and SS-19s
with multiple warheads until at least 2016. President Putin has
said the SS-19s could be deployed until 2030.
Production of the Topol-M (SS-27) continues. Some analysts believe
that it is this missile that President Putin said would be equipped
with Maneuverable Re-Entry Vehicles (MARV) to counter US ballistic
missile defenses.
Since 1999 Russia has claimed the right to use nuclear weapons
in response to the use of chemical or biological weapons.
All this represents steps in violation of Article VI, of the treaty
as a whole, and of the Russian NSA.
UK
The UK has recently finished the Trident modernization programme,
and adapted this force for tactical nuclear missions against potential
proliferators. This change has expanded the times when the UK could
use nuclear weapons. Prime Minister Blair refused to rule out their
use against Iraq last year.
The UK is actively upgrading and expanding its facility at Aldermaston
to make it possible to design, develop and build a replacement for
Trident, a decision on which will be made in the next Parliament.
This includes a laser facility to simulate nuclear test explosions.
As such, the UK cannot be said to be in compliance with Article
VI of the Treaty, or with the 2000 Review Conference Conclusions.
Its NSA is also deeply flawed.
United States
We turn our attention to the most egregious offender, the United
States of America. Current U.S. policy strikes at the heart of the
NPT and the wider non-proliferation regime. Recent developments
contravene NPT principles including irreversibility of disarmament;
a diminishing role for nuclear weapons in defense policy and the
need to take concrete steps to reduce arsenals, the ABM Treaty,
the CTBT, negative security assurances.
The administration is pursuing design work on new nuclear weapons,
as well as new capabilities for existing weapons. The Robust Nuclear
Earth Penetrator, a new “bunker-buster” variant of the
B83 or B61, will move from design to development in the 2005-2006.
Other advanced concepts include nuclear weapons tailored for specific
targets. Other upgrades include improvements to existing missiles,
and a survey of concepts for future missiles. The next generation
of land-based nuclear missiles is under study. Matched to these
new warheads and delivery vehicles are planned improvements in the
Strategic War Planning System.
All these weapons are designed for use under the policy of counterproliferation,
as elaborated in the National Security Strategy, the National Strategy
to Combat Weapons of Mass Destruction and the Nuclear Posture Review.
The administration is also preparing for a return to nuclear testing
– enhancing staffing, equipment and training in weapons labs
and at the Nevada Test Site (NTS). The US ability to conduct simulations,
tests and research in the laboratory under the name of Stockpile
Stewardship is being developed to give the US the capacity to design
new nuclear weapons without the need for nuclear testing.
Further, the administration is planning construction of a new nuclear
bomb factory – named the Modern Pit Facility. Another bomb
plant at Los Alamos National Laboratory is nearing production. The
US will be able to build between 200 and 500 new bombs per year
when these two facilities are both active.
The US is in flagrant breach of the NPT. It has abandoned good
faith attempts to end the arms race and to negotiate disarmament.
The SORT Treaty is a fraud, requiring no action before midnight
on December 31, 2012, and terminating a minute later. Thousands
of warheads will remain in storage ready to be reactivated in days,
weeks or months.
Changes in US nuclear doctrine have dramatically extended the role
given to nuclear weapons. The process has reached fulfillment under
the Bush administration since the last Review Conference. The US
now reserves the right to use nuclear weapons against facilities
which it even suspects of containing biological or chemical weapons
or their means of production or delivery. This counterproliferation
policy is the main means by which the United States envisages the
disarmament of other nations. It does not envisage its own nuclear
disarmament. As the Nuclear Posture Review makes clear, nuclear
weapons will be part of the US arsenal until at least 2070 –
the 100th anniversary of the entry-into-force of the NPT. This is
unacceptable.
Conclusion
Mr Chairman, we submit that recent developments have rendered the
threat to this treaty, and to the whole non-proliferation regime,
most serious and extreme.
In a world filled with distrust, fear, asymmetrical power and proliferating
deadly weapons, the answer to security is not nuclear apartheid
with the haves developing new technology, threatening the have-nots.
National security is now an oxymoron. There is only universal security
or universal insecurity. Nuclear weapons provide only an illusion
of security.
This Preparatory Committee should recommend that the Review Conference
specifically identify and condemn instances of vertical proliferation
by the NWS.
The PrepCom should also recommend to the Review Conference the
convening of a Summit meeting on nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation.
That Summit would be tasked with the creation of an International
Nuclear Disarmament Organization. This body must be given the appropriate
political and legal authority, matched with abundant resources,
to create a plan that would eliminate all nuclear weapons from the
world’s arsenals and to monitor this nuclear-free status for
the foreseeable future.
As a good faith step, the world’s nuclear weapon states,
acknowledged or unacknowledged in this Treaty, should end the design
and development of new nuclear weapons and cease deployment programmes,
and do so before the Review Conference convenes next year.
If this Treaty is not to collapse, and the spectre of nuclear war
rise to haunt us all, the time for such dramatic action has arrived.
To work towards disarmament, make transitions by reducing tension
and replacing military approaches and use of threat and coercion
with nonviolent forms of force economic, political, social,
moral, educational, psychological, aesthetic. The NWS, especially
the US, have the responsibility, and the ability, to take the lead
in reducing this sword of Damocles that hangs over us all by taking
the initiative building security through mutually assured survival.
A Living Document: Reaffirming
the 13 Steps
Delivered by Sarah Estabrooks, Project Ploughshares
Convened by Project Ploughshares, RCW/WILPF, and Nuclear Age Peace
Foundation (NAPF)
The gravity of the current state of international disarmament and
nonproliferation is not lost on anyone in this room. We heard already
about the vertical proliferation undertaken by the Nuclear Weapon
States (NWS) and about the horizontal proliferation threat that
is seeping across the globe. We know all too well about the situation
in Geneva, and we see how the stalemate in the CD seems to have
infected other disarmament machinery, including the Disarmament
Commission here in New York.
Often, we hear CD members invoke the achievements of the past –
including the CTBT and the CWC – as inspiration for new progress.
Just a few weeks ago, the Chair of the UNDC urged that blocked body
to seek inspiration from the Commission’s past successes in
the field of Nuclear Weapon Free Zones and conventional weapons.
In the same vein, we urge NPT States Parties to recall your own
success, achieved in this very same hall only four years ago. The
quasi-miracle of the consensus surrounding the 13 Practical Steps
to disarmament should not be easily discarded, especially in such
a harrowing time for the international peace and security regime.
In this presentation, we will examine the origin of the 13 Steps,
to understand how this important agreement was accomplished. Though
not legally binding, the 13 Steps remain the best tool for measuring
NWS progress in the fulfillment of their Article VI obligation to
disarm. As we are but one year away from the next Review Conference,
it is a useful, exercise to blow the dust off of the 2000 Final
Document and hold it up as a mirror to the NWS, in which their commitment
to nuclear disarmament will be reflected. Finally, we will urge
States Parties to reaffirm the 13 Steps as a living document, susceptible
to evolution and change, to reflect new developments while charting
a course to a world free of nuclear weapons
Background to the 13 Steps
In the lead-up to the 2000 Review Conference, hopes for significant
progress on nuclear disarmament were slim. There had not been a
consensus-based final document since the 1985 Review. The United
States Senate had become the first legislative body in the world
to reject ratification of the overdue Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty,
India and Pakistan had conducted full-scale nuclear weapon tests,
and the 1999 PrepCom dispersed with no consensus recommendations
to the Review Conference.
Faced with such a grim outlook, many States Parties, as well as
the Chair, Ambassador Baali of Algeria, took the bull by the horns,
and held intensive consultations throughout the months leading up
to the conference. New and old alliances put forth collective calls
for a renewed commitment to nuclear disarmament, offering concrete,
substantive proposals for consideration.
The successful outcome of the 2000 Review Conference was, hailed
by UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan as a "historic consensus"
marking "a significant step forward in humanity's pursuit of
a more peaceful world". Speaking on behalf of the NAC, Mexico’s
Ambassador Antonio de Icaza, heralded the 13 Steps for allowing
"what has always been implicit (to) now become explicit and
this act both reinforces and revitalizes the Treaty.”
It could be argued that the success of the Sixth Review Conference
was brought about by the fear held by many – including the
NWS – that the Treaty was disintegrating. Arguably, the situation
we face today is decidedly worse. Past threats persist, including
questions over nonproliferation compliance and a “continuing
erosion of multilateralism” (as recognized in GA resolution
58/44). Furthermore, NWS have taken steps to increase the political
and military value of nuclear weapons, instead of moving to disarm.
If we are to acquire a renewed commitment to disarmament in 2005,
it is imperative that states engage in broad consultation once again.
We commend Ambassador Sudjadnan for undertaking intensive consultations
over the course of the past year, and we hope that the Chairman-designate
to the 2005 Review will do the same. We stand ready to assist both
Chairs in any way that we can.
In this process, we also strongly encourage the NNWS to cooperate
through diplomatic alliances, to propose progressive, concrete recommendations
as a unified voice.
The 13 Steps as a Tool for Measuring Progress
In order for the 13 Steps to remain a living document – that
is, one with relevance, importance, and utility for the current
challenges facing the international security regime – we must
continually employ it as a means to assess our progress and plot
our future steps.
To assess progress since 2000, we will briefly discuss some of
the key developments.
Nearly a decade after its adoption in the Conference on Disarmament,
the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty is not yet in force. Only
32 of the 44 Annex II States’ whose ratifications are required
for entry-into-force have done so. The US has continued its affront
on the CTBT, refusing to put it forward for Senate ratification
a second time, after the rejection in 1999. Its intentions to remain
outside the Treaty were made clear at the General Assembly in 2003
when it was the only country to oppose draft resolution L.52 on
the CTBT, stating that it “does not support the Comprehensive
Test-Ban Treaty and will not become a party to that Treaty.”
Although the US has pledged to uphold a testing moratorium, its
steps to reduce the timeline required for testing to resume at the
Nevada Test Site, from 36 to 18 months, are contrary to the spirit
of the moratorium and the intention of the CTBT, as is continued
underground subcritical testing.
Progress towards the Step 3 call for a ban on the production of
fissile material has been thwarted by the deadlock of the Conference
on Disarmament. While there was unanimous support for the 2003 UNGA
draft resolution on the creation of an ad hoc committee within the
CD to negotiate the FMCT (L.49), the US submitted an explanation
of vote in which it stated: “I wish to point out, however,
that the United States is reviewing specific elements of our policy
regarding an FMCT, and our joining consensus on this resolution
is without prejudice to the outcome of that review.”
After the first session of the Conference on Disarmament for 2004,
for the sixth consecutive year, a programme of work has not yet
been approved by the CD, blocking any progress on the issues up
for negotiation. The establishment of a subsidiary body on nuclear
disarmament, as called for in Step 4, seems to be nowhere in sight.
Even progress on an FMCT, an issue which many refer to “as
ripe for negotiations” has not advanced. France and the US
are encouraged to endorse the A5 proposal, joining the wide support
for this plan of action.
The U.S. has rejected irreversible reductions in favor of “flexibility”,
as inferred by U.S. Secretary of State Colin Powell in his testimony
on the Strategic Offensive Reductions Treaty (SORT) before the Senate
Foreign Relations Committee [July 2002]. SORT thus represents a
repudiation of the Step 5 obligation to uphold the principle of
irreversibility.
The hard-won “unequivocal undertaking,” as outlined
in Step 6, devolved into another empty promise. Not a single NWS
has demonstrated this unambiguous duty.
The United States quashed Step 7 in June of 2002, when it withdrew
from the ABM Treaty, nullifying the START processes the very next
day.
The three parties to the Trilateral Initiative, which must be implemented
under Step 8, announced in 2002 that negotiations of the technical,
legal and financial groundwork had ‘fulfilled’ the Initiative’s
requirements. However, no legally binding instrument has been established
to implement the measures to bring excess weapons-grade nuclear
materials – in both the US and Russia – under IAEA verification.
That said, bilateral and plurilateral initiatives targeting primarily
the Russian stockpiles of excess fissile materials have made important
steps, such as the Cooperative Threat Reduction program and the
G8 Partnership. We would urge states parties, particularly the US
and Russia, to incorporate such measures into a broader multilateral
verification framework under IAEA controls.
Since the last PrepCom there has been little progress on the disarmament
measures outlined in Step 9 specifically for NWS, indeed recent
trends suggest there has been regression on nuclear disarmament
goals. Steps to reduce the salience of nuclear weapons in the NWS’
national security policies are essential to proceed with disarmament.
We have also seen little progress under Step 10, requiring placement
of excess fissile materials under IAEA safeguards. We encourage
those states parties who have yet to do so – and only 39 have
– to bring into force an Additional Protocol as soon as possible.
Step 11, which reaffirmed the ultimate goal of general and complete
disarmament, has been grossly jeopardized by rising military budgets,
the continued stalemate of the Conference on Disarmament, the lack
of a space weapons ban, the collapse of efforts to create a verification
protocol for the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention, and the
general trend away from multilateral approaches to ‘coalition
of the willing’ measures. Despite past progress in the field,
including the Landmine Ban, these trends suggest that general and
complete disarmament is still a distant goal.
In the interest of transparency and accountability, Step 12 obliges
all states to provide regular reports on implementation of Article
VI and paragraph 4 (c) of the 1995 Decision on “Principles
and Objectives for Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament”.
Progress on this new measure has been modest, but the scope and
content of the reports submitted to date has been encouraging. We
urge more states to commit to this important transparency tool.
Step 13 calls for the further development of verification capabilities
with regard to nuclear disarmament. The UK initiative to research
such technologies is a welcome measure and we anticipate the final
report on this work at the 2005 conference. The role of the IAEA
in verification of peaceful nuclear activities must be supported
through both financial and political commitments to the safeguard
and verification regime.
Conclusion
Looking back, our assessment shows few signs of forward movement
on the obligations made in 2000, and indeed multiple steps backward.
An abject lack of political will to pursue disarmament, paired with
an obsession with perceived proliferation threats, has tipped the
balance of the NPT agreement away from the real threat to our world:
the 30,000 nuclear weapons held by a handful of states, which, until
they are eliminated, guarantee continued instability rather than
“undiminished security for all."
Reneged promises, such as those undertaken at the 2000 Review Conference,
must not set the precedent for international arms control and disarmament.
As you prepare your recommendations for 2005, we urge you to reconfirm
your commitment to the 13 Steps, as a symbol of the world’s
unrepentant desire for the permanent elimination of nuclear weapons,
and a strategy for the way forward.
A
Fresh Look at Vertical Proliferation - Ballistic Missiles, Missile
Defenses, and Space Weaponization
Delivered by Charlotte Wohlfahrt, International Law Campaign
Convened by International Network of Engineers and Scientists Against
Proliferation (INESAP)
Six decades ago, one country envisioned acquiring decisive military
advantage over the rest of the world by building and monopolizing
nuclear weapons. But it didn’t take long before other countries
followed the US example. The presumed strength turned into the nightmare
of nuclear arms races, overkill, and the prospect of mutual annihilation.
To date, trillions of dollars have been spent by nuclear weapon
states on optimizing warheads, delivery systems, and the infrastructure
required for their use. Today, we are repeating this dangerous example
and extending it into space.
Only by keeping the full spectrum of weapon systems in mind can
disarmament be achieved. Part of this picture is the need to restrict
the military use of space. The growing dependence of high-tech military
forces on satellites results in a vicious circle of threat (or perceived
threat), protection, defense, offense, and counter-offense. Weaponization
of space by some states would encourage other, less technologically
advanced countries, to counter asymmetrically – and nuclear
weapons would certainly be one of the options, for example, to destroy
ground stations and thus disable the command and control infrastructure
for space weapons. Even if nuclear weapons were ruled out, other
means to offset the space advantage would be found.
It is not a coincidence, therefore, that Article VI of the Non-Proliferation
Treaty (NPT) obligates the member states to “a Treaty on general
and complete disarmament under strict and effective international
control”. This was confirmed at the 2000 NPT Review in Step
#11 of the 13 practical steps: “Reaffirmation that the ultimate
objective of the efforts of States in the disarmament process is
general and complete disarmament under effective international control.”
Missile Defenses – Bound for Proliferation
Rather than fulfill their disarmament obligations under the NPT,
some countries have directed their energy into building missile
defenses. Russia still maintains a small protective shield around
Moscow, which had been allowed under the now-defunct Anti-Ballistic
Missile Treaty. The US, however, has higher ambitions: global systems
deployed on land and on sea, in air and in space. President Bush
said a few years ago that “Defenses can strengthen deterrence
by reducing the incentive for proliferation.”(1)
The opposite is probably true. A recent report shows that construction
of the Russian missile defense system in the 1960s provoked the
US not only to considerably increase the numbers of its nuclear
systems but spurred it to increase the quality of its arsenal by
developing multiple independently targetable re-entry vehicles,
the so-called MIRVs.(2) MIRVs were poised
to be eliminated under START-II, but now we observe their speedy
revival.
In response to US missile defense programs, China is said to be
developing new missiles for MIRVs. China will also increase the
number of its missiles and may eventually place its nuclear weapons
on constant alert.
Russia tested a hypersonic weapon just a few weeks ago. The prototype
was proven to maneuver quickly in altitude and in direction while
in orbit, thereby making “any missile defense useless”,
as a senior Russian general commented after the test. Furthermore,
the US encouraged Russia to maintain the high alert status of its
nuclear arsenal to counter Russian missile defense fears, thus increasing
the risk of an inadvertent or unauthorized nuclear strike.
We can also anticipate a missile defense arms race. Australia and
Japan have already decided to participate in US missile defense
programs. Canada and the UK are in negotiating their involvement.
The US is conducting a survey of where in Europe it could deploy
interceptors for its ground-based system. NATO is doing a feasibility
study for its own system – extending the scope beyond the
tactical range. Israel co-operates with the US on its Arrow system.
India wants to buy the Israeli system. Russia keeps the Moscow system
running and offers SS-300s for sale.
Here at international fora, governments speak only of horizontal
proliferation, while the US itself is actively engaged in serious
vertical proliferation of missile defense schemes. The Pentagon’s
Defense Science Board defied a defense appropriation ban to examine
the use of nuclear weapons in missile defense. The Pentagon also
has efforts under way to develop miniature kill vehicles, up to
a dozen of which could be carried by one interceptor. That means
MIRVing missile defense!
Space – Field for Future Arms Races?
We all are aware of the close link between missile defense and space
weaponization, and it has been made even clearer by the latest “US
Air Force Transformation Flight Plan.” One example out of
many might suffice to make the case:
A Ground Based Laser is envisioned for the future. This system “would
propagate laser beams through the atmosphere to Low-Earth Orbit
satellites to provide robust defensive and offensive space control
capability.” As if this weren’t enough, an additional
component (3) “will significantly extend
the range of both the Airborne Laser and Ground-Based Laser by using
airborne, terrestrial, or space-based lasers in conjunction with
space-based relay mirrors to project different laser powers and
frequencies to achieve a broad range of effects from illumination
to destruction.”(4)
Further systems described in the Air Force document are:
- Air-Launched Anti-Satellite Missiles “to intercept satellites
in low earth orbit” (thus creating space debris that would
then threaten all space assets);
- the Counter Satellite Communications System “to deny and
disrupt an adversary’s space-based communications and early
warning” plus a Counter Surveillance and Reconnaissance System
“to deny, disrupt, and degrade adversary space-based surveillance
and reconnaissance systems” (both depriving the adversary
of its ability to know what is going on and consequently increasing
the risk of a full-scale (nuclear) strike);
- a Hypersonic Cruise Vehicle able to “reach time-critical
targets up to 9,000 nautical miles away within two hours with payloads
up to 12,000 pounds”;
- Hypervelocity Rod Bundles – the so-called “Rods from
God” to “provide the capability to strike ground targets
anywhere in the world from space”; and many more.
Obviously, under the current Bush administration, the previous restrictions
on using space offensively have been thrown overboard at an incredible
pace. In the words of Air Force Space Command: “The major
question in fielding offensive counterspace systems is the political
will to do so.” (5)
A recent study found that the use or the possibility of the use
of space weapons could trigger a nuclear response from the other
side. (6)Moverover, if warfare were extended
to outer space, commercial satellite investments would be greatly
endangered. Accordingly, the looming weaponization of space must
not be simply dismissed as a crazy fantasy of the military “boys
with their toys.”
If the US continues to work on anti-satellite weapons and eventually
deploys them, Russia and China – who have both declared a
moratorium on ASAT testing – may do the same. India will not
sit by. In such a scenario, I dare say that even the European Union
would move to weaponize space. US attempts to prevent such proliferation
would give further rise to security tensions.
Recently, a syllogism echoed through some military and political
circles that those who control low-earth orbit control near-earth
space; that those who control near-earth space dominate Earth; and
that those who dominate Earth determine the destiny of mankind.
(7)It might well be true that those who control
space determine the destiny of humankind – but most likely
in a very negative way.
Rather than enter into a new arms race in space and destabilize
the security environment even more, disarmament and a ban on missile
defenses and space weapons are the proper solution. Therefore, the
current initiatives to negotiate a space weapons ban are of utmost
importance. On June 2002, China and Russia introduced a Joint Working
Paper with “Possible Elements of a Space Weapons Treaty”
to the Geneva Conference on Disarmament (CD). The paper was sponsored
by several other countries and led to intensive discussion. As a
result, in 2003 China and Russia felt encouraged to follow up by
introducing a “Compilation of Comments and Suggestions”
to the Working Paper. This initiative deserves your strongest support.
We also applaud the Canadian efforts to develop a “new comprehensive
approach seeking to integrate space security issues with the international
community’s need for security and equitable access to space
for peaceful purposes”, which has recently been presented
at a seminar in Geneva. (8)
Over the years, NGOs have also contributed constructively to the
debate, suggesting, for example, “a comprehensive approach
to deal with missiles and [ ] a ‘framework’ agreement
to restrict the development, testing, and deployment of all ballistic
missiles and missile defenses” two years ago. (9)And
a scientific “Proposed Treaty on the Limitation of the Military
Use of Outer Space” even dates back to NGO efforts of 1984.
(10)
Our proposals
Last year we offered specific proposals to help prevent an arms
race with missiles, missile defenses, and space weapons. (11)Rather
than repeat those recommendations in detail here, let me just list
them in short:
- Stop testing missiles and missile defense systems.
- Initiate negotiations for an international treaty banning tests
of ballistic missiles and of missile defense systems.
- Initiate negotiations for a global treaty banning ballistic missiles
and missile defense systems.
- Prohibit any research, development, testing, building, and deployment
of weapons for use in space.
The time is ripe for disarmament in all its aspects, including the
prevention of further steps toward missile defenses and space weaponization.
---------------------------------------------------------
References
(1)Office of the Press Secretary, May 1, 2001, “Remarks
by the President to Students and Faculty at National Defense University”;
<http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2001/05/20010501-10.html>.
(2)Hans M. Kristensen, Matthew G. McKinzie, and Robert S. Norris,
„The protection paradox“, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientist
March/April 2004, pp. 68-77; <http://www.thebulletin.org/issues/2004/ma04/ma04kristensen.html>.
(3)Namely the Evolutionary Air and Space Global Laser Engagement
(EAGLE) Airship Relay Mirrors.
HQ USAF/XPXC Future Concepts and Transformation Division, “The
U.S. Air Force Transformation Flight Plan”, November 2003;
<http:///www.af.mil/library/posture/AF_TRANS_FLIGHT_PLAN-2003.pdf>.
(4)Air Force Space Command, “Strategic Master Plan FY06 and
Beyond”, October 1, 2003; <http://www.peterson.af.mil/hqafspc/library/AFSPCPAOffice/Final%2006%20SMP--Signed!v1.pdf>.
(5)Jeffrey Lewis, “What if Space Were Weaponized? Possible
Consequences for Crisis Scenarios”, CDI, March 2004; <http://www.cdi.org/PDFs/scenarios.pdf>.
(6)Evrett C. Dolman, in his book “Astropolitik. Classical
Geopolitics in the Space Age“ (Frank Cass Publishers, 2002),
states: “Who controls low-earth orbit controls near-earth
space. Who controls near-earth space dominates Terra. Who dominates
Terra determines the destiny of humankind.”
(7)Speech of Canadian Foreign Minister Bill Graham to Conference
on Disarmament, March 16, 2004; see <http://www.reachingcriticalwill.org/political/cd/speeches04/16MarchCanada.pdf>.
For more information on Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space
(PAROS), see <http://www.reachingcriticalwill.org/legal/paros/parosindex.html>.
(8)Andrew Lichterman, Zia Mian, M.V. Ramana and Jürgen Scheffran,
“Beyond Missile Defense”, Briefing Paper #8 of the International
Network of Engineers and Scientists Against Proliferation (INESAP),
April 2002; < www.inesap.org/pdf/Briefing8_02.pdf>.
(9)Horst Fischer, Reiner Labusch, Eckart Maus, and Jürgen Scheffran,
“Proposed Treaty on the Limitation of the Military Use of
Outer Space”, in: J. Holderen and J. Rotblat (eds.), “Strategic
Defences and the Future of the Arms Race, St. Martin’s Press,
New York, 1997; reprinted in INESAP Information Bulletin #20, August
2002; <http://www.inesap.org/bulletin20>.
(10)Regina Hagen, “Nuclear Disarmament and Ballistic Missile
Elimination Go Hand in Hand”, NGO presentation at the 2004
NPT PrepCom; < http://www.reachingcriticalwill.org/legal/npt/NGOpres2003/Missiles.htm>.
Beyond the NPT: Recent
Initiatives to Prevent Proliferation
Delivered by Rhianna Tyson, RCW
Convened by Lawyers Committee on Nuclear Policy (LCNP) and RCW/WILPF
We need not take precious minutes to explain what everybody in
this room already knows: that the NPT and entire international disarmament
regime is at its greatest crisis in history. In addition to the
familiar threats of vertical and horizontal proliferation, the trends
of which continue at an alarming rate, the international community
is now also faced with the possibility of terrorist acquisition
of nuclear, biological, and chemical (NBC) weapons. While some NWS
are looking at new ways of interpreting Article IV, the majority
Non-Nuclear Weapon States continue to look doubtfully upon Article
VI, the promise made by the NWS some thirty odd years ago that remains
unfulfilled even in the new millennium. In its current fragile state,
States Parties to this Treaty are looking beyond the NPT, searching
for more effective solutions to the growing trend of nuclear proliferation,
both vertical and horizontal.
With so much at stake, an assessment of these recent initiatives
must be nuanced. As NGOs have insisted over the years, unilateral,
bilateral and plurilateral initiatives can all make vital contributions
to disarmament and non-proliferation. Let us walk briefly through
some of the developments.
Nuclear Suppliers’ Group
In his February 11 speech, President Bush proposed that the Nuclear
Suppliers Group deny uranium enrichment and plutonium reprocessing
equipment to countries which do not yet possess it. This proposal
is remarkable and welcome in one respect: it amounts to an admission
that the U.S.-initiated Atoms for Peace program of the 1950s, later
built into Article IV of the NPT, was a mistake. However, if executed
in a peremptory fashion, it could contribute to slow-motion disintegration
of the NPT. A far better proposal to thwart the dangers posed by
fissile materials is to create international controls on such technology
through a multilateral agreement, as proposed by IAEA Director-General
Mohamed ElBaradei.
Many are quick to dismiss this approach, citing a lack of incentives
for States to enter into such an agreement. But set against the
backdrop of a negotiated Fissile Materials Cut Off Treaty, internationally
controlled fissile material stockpiles would not only strengthen
the role of the IAEA, as most in this room repeatedly call for,
but it would also greatly restrict the potential of these dangerous
materials falling into the hands of non-state actors, or NNWS looking
to renege on their treaty obligations. All States should also implement
their disarmament commitments, and work cooperatively on the development
of non-nuclear sources of energy, both of which would help to lift
the world out of the dilemmas and risks of the nuclear age.
Proliferation Security Initiative: Like the proposal regarding
the Nuclear Suppliers Group, PSI reflects an evolving and welcome
understanding of the NBC-weapon threat. In essence, it regards NBC-weapon
related shipments as contraband. The law, however, has yet to catch
up with this concept. States parties to the NPT, CWC, and BWC are
required, explicitly or implicitly, not to transfer NBC weapons
to anyone. But a right of interception does not necessarily follow.
The issue of “dual-use materials” is another contentious
point raised by the practice of interception.
Assuming that a shipment is reasonably suspected to contain NBC-weapon
contraband, there are steps which states are entitled to take under
existing international law to prevent or intercept it. They can
regulate activity in their ports. They can obtain the permission
of the flag state to engage in interdiction. And so on. It remains
the case, though, that provocative acts, on the high seas, in straits,
in international airspace, are possible, and indeed are contemplated,
at least abstractly, by some PSI participants. They would not be
sanctioned by the Law of the Sea Convention and other law, and indeed
could be contrary to such law as well as the UN Charter’s
prohibition on use of force and guarantee of state sovereignty.
It needs to be clearly acknowledged that in some cases, interceptions
will require approval of the Security Council or sanction through
other legitimate, treaty-based mechanisms. In the larger picture,
it is not acceptable to hold that NWS can deploy nuclear-armed submarines
in the world’s oceans, or deploy nuclear bombs on other states’
territories, while at the same time claiming the right to interdict
other States’ NBC-weapon shipments.
Security Council resolution
The resolution now under consideration will reinforce and expand
obligations under the NPT, CWC, and BWC to prevent non-state actor
acquisition of and trafficking in NBC weapons, materials, and means
of delivery. It will also apply those obligations to non-state parties.
It clearly is responding to a real need, dramatically illustrated
by the Pakistan-based nuclear proliferation network involving businesses
in several countries and a scientist, A.Q. Khan, allegedly acting
without governmental authority.
But the resolution also raises profound questions about the future
of disarmament/non-proliferation regimes and indeed of international
law. It reflects the one-sided emphasis on containing, rather than
eliminating, NBC weapons, especially nuclear weapons. The Security
Council resolution contains other troubling aspects.
First, issues raised by the resolution merit careful scrutiny and
deliberation of the kind inherent in multilateral negotiations.
The resolution would generally impose obligations upon states with
regard to NBC-weapon "related materials", missiles and
other “unmanned systems” of delivery, and “non-state
actors,” yet provides no full and precise definition of those
terms. International oversight of implementation is needed, yet
whether the Security Council will create an adequate mechanism for
this purpose is in doubt. A rational and legitimate lawmaking process
requires in-depth negotiation with the participation of affected
states. The resolution is likely to be more effective if subsequent
efforts to extend the web of legislation controlling the spread
of NBC weapons is achieved through negotiated international agreements
in which all states may have their say.
Second, a resolution requires political acceptance if it is to
be effectively implemented. The highly unrepresentative Security
Council, dominated by the nuclear-armed P5, is not the best institution
to elicit such acceptance, especially with respect to NBC-weapon
measures as to which hypocrisy and double standards will rightly
be charged.
Third, there is nothing in the UN Charter that confers the authority
on the Security Council to adopt global legislation concerning generalized
threats. On the contrary, the Charter contemplates multilateral
agreements entered into by states as the primary mode of global
lawmaking, with the General Assembly promoting this process by making
recommendations (Art. 13). The role of the Security Council is to
address particular situations threatening peace and security.
To address the disarmament deficit, and to avoid future reliance
on the Security Council as a global lawmaker, States must work to
revitalize the existing NBC-weapon treaty regimes and to create
new multilateral agreements – on non-state actors, fissile
materials, a biological weapons verification regime, and more.
Responding to Suspected Proliferation
Some cases of horizontal proliferation – Iraq, Libya, the
DPRK – have been handled partially or even largely outside
the context of the NPT/IAEA and the Security Council. There may
be good reason for this in a given case, for example the DPRK. Nonetheless,
this approach means that treaty-based mechanisms are not developed
and may atrophy, while doctrines of reliance on unilateral and plurilateral
measures, even including preventive war, are reinforced. The context
and capabilities for addressing vertical proliferation – for
promoting disarmament – are not adequately evolving. It is
important, therefore, to push, even when inconvenient or time-consuming
or otherwise momentarily disadvantageous, for maximum use of the
IAEA and the Security Council in responding to suspected proliferation.
Additional mechanisms should also be considered: a permanent NPT
body, and a UN-based inspectorate, drawing on UNMOVIC capabilities,
able to supply expertise regarding biological weapons and missiles,
and to supplement as needed the work of the IAEA and the OPCW. One
bright spot in recent years is that UNMOVIC proved its efficacy
and the value of international cooperation. In the development of
any or all of these mechanisms, it must always be kept in mind that
the aim of the NPT is the elimination of all nuclear arsenals.
Preventive War
Let us acknowledge the elephant in the room, the most significant
instance of rejection of multilateralism. In the United States,
the specter of the Baathist regime someday acquiring nuclear arms
was decisive in selling the war on Iraq. Unless the world is to
face decades of wars and threats of war in response to suspected
or real acquisition of nuclear arms by new states, all states will
have to accept, not rhetorically but practically, that preventing
proliferation requires the elimination of nuclear arms everywhere.
Conclusion
The threats posed by NBC weapons continue to mount. And they will
continue to mount so long as a few States maintain their false “right”
to their possession. Creative thinking and new approaches to combat
these threats is welcome and needed, yet these new initiatives demand
careful attention. Most importantly, they should not supplant the
coordinated and sustained efforts by all actors within the international
community to work for the total abolition of NBC weapons.
The Human Tragedy of
Proliferation and Nuclear Rearmament
Convened by International Physicians for the Prevention of
Nuclear War (IPPNW)
Delivered by Dr. Ron McCoy
The primary goal of the NPT and of all efforts to rid countries
and the world of nuclear weapons is to prevent the human catastrophe
that would inevitably result from the use of even a single nuclear
weapon. Yet the Treaty today is faced with a daunting array of challenges:
national security strategies that confer permanent status to nuclear
weapons; the testing and development of new generations of nuclear
weapons for new and destabilizing missions; their acquisition by
non-nuclear States (and non-state actors) no longer willing to accept
the prevailing nuclear apartheid.
Despite the important agreements reached at the NPT Review Conference
in 2000, the threat posed by nuclear weapons has increased. When
we ask you to consider the human implications of the choice between
proliferation and non-proliferation, between disarmament and a perpetual
enslavement to nuclear weapons, we are really presenting you with
the choice between two futures. Only one of these futures is acceptable
or worth pursuing. The NPT will only be an effective tool in that
pursuit if the States Parties commit themselves to the urgent task
of revitalizing the Treaty as both a non-proliferation and a disarmament
agreement. At its heart, this is a choice between hope and hopelessness.
We submit to you that we can no longer put off making this choice.
We know what almost 60 years under the nuclear shadow have done
to the hundreds of thousands of victims, whether they be hibakusha,
downwinders, nuclear industry workers, or communities in the Global
South and elsewhere who have been deprived of true health and security
because of the enormous amount of resources squandered on acquiring,
testing, and developing nuclear weapons. In a more general sense,
we are all victims of the preparations for nuclear war, because
we are all held hostage to the ever present threat of extinction.
The atomic bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki were devastating
and cruel. In an instant they created many tens of thousands of
fatalities and several hundred thousand surviving victims whose
terrible injuries have extended over generations. To achieve the
abolition of nuclear weapons, those victims have told their stories
of terror and suffering, believing that this is the only way to
save human beings from the crisis of extinction. We wish to honor
the lives and the voices of the hibakusha here and now. Even more
important, we urge the nuclear weapon states and the non-nuclear
States Parties to the NPT to listen to their experiences, to learn
from them, and to embrace continued human survival by abandoning
nuclear weapons and the ambition to acquire them.
Tragically, the world seems to be careening toward disaster. With
a dangerous and painfully arrogant US nuclear policy as the model
and the driving force, nuclear weapons are seen by far too many
countries as conferring a political status contrary to the spirit
of the NPT, which has sought their stigmatization. The counter-proliferation
strategies championed by the Bush administration and supported by
several other governments, while they contain some useful elements,
serve in the end to reinforce a nuclear double standard. According
to the administration, the weapons themselves are not the threat
to our survival, but only their ownership by "evildoers."
The "evildoers" themselves, of course, are defined as
such by the sole remaining nuclear superpower and its allies, thus
turning nuclear proliferation -- and the need for aggressive counter-proliferation
measures -- into a self-fulfilling prophecy.
What will happen in a future where nuclear testing resumes in the
US and other nuclear weapon states in order to facilitate the development
of a new generation of nuclear weapons with battlefield uses? Where
additional countries rebel against nuclear apartheid and start testing
and developing nuclear weapons and delivery systems of their own?
Where national security is ultimately measured by the capacity to
destroy, rather than by the willingness to resolve the inevitable
conflicts through negotiation and diplomacy, without resort to arms?
Where investments in the health, education, and development of communities
are sacrificed in order to sustain nuclear weapons programs that
bankrupt all legitimate paths to global security?
We can predict with confidence -- and from experience -- that a
resumption of nuclear weapons production and testing will have a
direct and destructive impact on the communities surrounding the
test sites. IPPNW and IEER documented these health and environmental
impacts in a series of studies published in the 1990s, and we have
reviewed the damage in previous statements before this body. Rather
than go over old ground, we wish to focus here on two sites that
have had troubled histories and that could become a source of new
health and environmental disasters if the global pursuit of nuclear
weapons expands and continues.
We are extremely concerned, as other speakers have mentioned, that
the decade-long testing moratorium may be broken by the US, which
is even now bringing its nuclear weapons manufacturing complex up
to speed in preparation for additions to its arsenal. The Savannah
River Site (SRS) -- a 310-square-mile complex of closed nuclear
weapons facilities and decontamination activities located in South
Carolina -- made plutonium and tritium for atomic weapons from 1950
to 1990. SRS is now a leading contender for a new weapons plant
that would construct up to 900 new plutonium warhead "pits"
annually. This will inevitably increase radiation exposure to the
public -- as much as 2.6% above existing radiation levels from all
facilities at SRS. [3] The environmental and human impacts of this
deadly business are tragic, because we are robbing from the future
when we damage the environment with nuclear waste.
The shallow groundwater at SRS is severely contaminated with tritium,
TCE, and other pollutants. While the water in the Savannah River
is still within drinking water standards, radioactive tritium has
already been found in drinking water more than 100 river miles downstream
from SRS at Beaufort, SC. SRS is out of compliance with the federal
Clean Air Act. [1] Recent evidence indicates that radioactive pollution‹
cesium 137, strontium 90 and cobalt 60‹ is between 20 and
100 times background downstream of the old atomic weapons facilities,
depending on how one measures natural background relative to fallout
from atmospheric testing. [2]
Cancer, of course, is linked to ionizing radiation. A half century
of radioactive contamination is causing an invisible yet real epidemic.
The cumulative impact of new plutonium plants and past contamination
at SRS would result in more death and disease to the people in this
region.
While India and Pakistan are not States Parties to the NPT, their
role in global proliferation cannot be ignored, especially since
the infrastructure for testing and producing nuclear weapons poses
grave threats to the Indian and Pakistani people. We cite here the
damage caused by uranium mining in India, where a good deal of new
information has come to light during the past year or two.
Uranium ore has been mined and processed in Jaduguda, in Bihar
State, for some 30 years. Local NGOs have surveyed area villages
and have reported 70 cases of infants born with congenital deformities,
of which 60 were in villages close to the plant operated by the
Uranium Corporation of India. Children in the affected areas are
sometimes born with polydactyl (extra fingers or toes) and syndactyl
(fused or missing fingers and toes) appendages. Dr. Surendra Gadekar,
of the Gujarat-based NGO Sampoorna Kranti Vidyalaya Vedchhi, has
attributed the unusual increase in birth defects, as well as increased
rates of lung cancer and silicosis, to occupational exposures.
New mines proposed for the Nalgonda district will only compound
the problems. Exposure to radioactive-decay products and heavy metals
affects the brain, kidneys, liver, and other organs. Long term environmental
damage results from radioactive tailings and the dumping of 99.8%
of the mined ore, which seeps into soil and groundwater. The Nagarjunasagar
dam is very near one of the new mining sites and is likely to be
contaminated with uranium from storm water runoff. Radioactive dust
and tailings will probably contaminate a new reservoir that will
supply drinking water to Hyderabad, and could affect both human
and wildlife health.
The public -- not only in the US and in India but in all countries
where nuclear materials are processed -- is routinely denied information
about health hazards related to plant operations and waste disposal.
Such callous disregard is all too typical of official attitudes
and behaviors when the acquisition of nuclear weapons, rather than
human health and well being, is the object of policy.
If the human costs associated with the pursuit of nuclear weapons
were tabulated in full we would be appalled. But such accountings
are almost never made, even in part, and the victims are usually
abandoned to suffer in the shadows. In 1997, for example, the US
National Cancer Institute NCI projected tens of thousands of additional
thyroid cancers as a result of years of atmospheric nuclear testing,
yet no funds have been dedicated to identifying, monitoring, or
treating the most vulnerable populations. In short, nuclear weapons
are instruments of genocide unlike any others. They are weapons
not just of mass destruction, but of ultimate destruction.
The proliferation of all types of weapons of mass destruction (WMD)
has always been a threat to international peace and security, but
this threat has increased since the 2000 NPT Review. The nuclear
weapons breakout by India and Pakistan, the recent revelation of
A. Q. Khan's black market in nuclear technology, and the nascent
weapons programs in North Korea and Libya, are a wake-up call to
the international community. Yet in addressing proliferation, there
is a parallel need to address and implement disarmament, because
disarmament and non-proliferation are two sides of the same coin.
The axiom of proliferation is indisputable: the possession of nuclear
weapons by any state is a constant stimulus to other state and non-state
actors to acquire them.
To physicians, the deliberate use of disease as a weapon of war
is particularly repugnant, but even more repugnant is the use of
nuclear weapons. In a nuclear war, there can be no meaningful medical
response. Long-term radiation effects could blight unborn generations;
civilization itself could come to an end.
One of the most disturbing justifications being offered by the
Bush administration for continued US reliance on nuclear weapons
and, indeed, for the development of new types of nuclear weapons
with specific battlefield uses, is the intent to provide a nuclear
response to chemical and biological weapons threats. (This intent,
by the way, was echoed by Israel -- another nuclear weapon state
that is not a Party to the NPT -- during the weeks preceding the
US-led invasion of Iraq.) This has led to a tendency to group nuclear,
chemical, and biological weapons together into an amorphous category
called "weapons of mass destruction." We do not wish to
minimize the horrors of chemical and biological weapons or to suggest
that the threat of their use by terrorist groups or State parties
to armed conflict is insubstantial or unworthy of serious response.
Nuclear weapons, however, are in a class of their own and the threat
they pose must under no circumstances be equated with the threat
posed by chemical and biological weapons. Nor should they be linked
with chemical and biological weapons as part of an interchangeable
strategy of deterrence or retaliation.
Chemical warfare agents, such as mustard gas, lewisite, sarin,
and tabun, can cause a range of lethal and non-lethal effects from
blistering and nausea to respiratory tract damage, seizures, and
paralysis. More than 100,000 tons of toxic chemicals used during
the First World War caused the deaths of 90,000 soldiers and more
than a million casualties. The use of chemical weapons by Iraq during
its 1980-88 war with Iran resulted in hundreds of documented deaths
and injuries; Iran has claimed as many as 100,000. Iraqi aircraft
shelled the Kurdish village of Halabja, in northern Iraq, with chemical
weapons on March 16, 1988, killing 5-8,000 people and injuring 7,000.
There is also evidence of Iranian use of chemical weapons.
In 1932, Japan attacked several Chinese cities with biological
agents including anthrax, cholera, shigellosis, salmonella, and
plague, killing at least 10,000 people. An anthrax epizootic in
1979 and 1980 during the Zimbabwe civil war took 182 lives and may
have been deliberate. About 5,000 people were exposed to inhalation
anthrax in Sverdlovsk in 1979 -- the result of an aerosol emission
from a military biological facility. About 70 people died. Depending
on the biological agent used and the effectiveness of dispersal,
a city of 500,000 people might suffer anywhere from a few hundred
to several thousand deaths and tens of thousands of injuries.
Such effects certainly warrant characterizing chemical and biological
weapons as "weapons of mass destruction." Nevertheless,
the consequences of nuclear weapons are exponentially greater. Moreover,
there is no medical response to nuclear warsomething that is
not universally true of chemical and biological attacks. The explosion
of a single modern nuclear warhead over a major city could cause
hundreds of thousands -- even millions -- of deaths in a matter
of moments. Blast, burn, and radiation injuries among the survivors
would overwhelm any possible medical response. Long term health
consequences, including leukemias and other cancers would affect
the survivors and their children throughout entire lifetimes. Other
genetic effects would persist across generations. Hospitals and
other medical infrastructure would be destroyed in the overall carnage,
rendering the kind of medical response that would be available in
the aftermath of a chemical or biological attack virtually inconceivable.
Vast areas of land stretching out from the epicenter of a nuclear
explosion would remain uninhabitable for years, while contamination
from radioactive fallout would persist in some places for hundreds,
or even thousands of years, causing new illnesses in future generations.
An all-out nuclear war involving a significant number of the weapons
that are currently held by the nuclear weapon states could initiate
a nuclear winter, threatening the extinction of human and countless
non-human species.
To categorize nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons together
under the single rubric "weapons of mass destruction,"
without making these fundamental distinctions of scale of destructive
effect, betrays a lack of understanding. To do so for the political
purpose of defining uses for nuclear weapons against chemical and
biological threats -- for example, nuclear-armed bunker busters
designed to destroy underground chemical or biological weapons facilities
-- or to threaten nuclear retaliation against a chemical or biological
attack, is a cynical betrayal of the global responsibility to ensure
that these weapons are never used again.
Paradoxically, the world's largest nuclear power is even now caught
up in the tragic aftermath of a war that it sought out on the pretext
that Iraq had nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction.
Neither the US nor the UK would rule out the use of their own nuclear
weapons in the run up to the war. Moreover, the invading forces
fired at least 1,000 tons -- possibly 2,000 tons or more -- of depleted
uranium shells during the 2003 war against Iraq, as compared with
350 tons in 1991. While not nuclear weapons, DU munitions contaminate
the environment where they are used with a radioactive and toxic
chemical stew that has been implicated in childhood cancers and
other illnesses reported among troops and civilians. Seen in this
context, DU weapons are part of a continuum of radiological, chemical,
biological, and, finally, nuclear weapons that flies in the face
of NPT goals. We therefore urge NPT Member States to sponsor a General
Assembly resolution condemning the use of DU weapons and all uranium-tipped,
radiological weapons.
The path toward the future in which the shadow of nuclear war is
forever lifted requires bold steps that must be taken today.
First, the nuclear double standard has to end, and the process
of complete global nuclear disarmament has to begin. It is long
past time for the nuclear weapon states to concede that the fundamental
problem with nuclear weapons is the existence of the weapons themselves,
not the intentions of their owners. In plain language, the United
States, Russia, China, France, the UK, Israel, India, and Pakistan
must stop making excuses for their own nuclear arsenals while pretending,
to varying degrees, that proliferation is the only real problem.
Second, the CTBT must enter into force, and all forms of nuclear
testing, including sub-critical testing, must be prohibited. This
body should explicitly condemn the creation of new justifications
for a new generation of nuclear weapons that will become the excuses
for new rounds of nuclear test explosions.
Third, the States parties to the NPT and the participants in all
disarmament and arms control forums must insist upon the separation
of nuclear weapons from chemical and biological weapons in both
policy and rhetoric. At the same time, the States Parties to the
NPT must recognize that the weakening of verification and enforcement
measures related to the treaties prohibiting chemical and biological
weapons have a negative impact on prospects for nuclear non-proliferation
and disarmament. The reliance on nuclear weapons for security creates
insecurity and fuels not only the proliferation of nuclear weapons,
but also the desire for biological and chemical weapons. Wherever
possible, those concerned with nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation
agreements should make common cause with those responsible for implementing
the Biological Weapons Convention and the Chemical Weapons Convention,
in pursuit of effective and mutually reinforcing systems for verification
and enforcement.
Finally, the NPT itself must be transformed into a true disarmament
and non-proliferation treaty, as was the intent of the States Parties
in 2000 when they committed themselves to an "unequivocal undertaking"
to rid the world of nuclear weapons. Negotiations on a time-bound
framework to eliminate nuclear weapons by 2020 must begin no later
than the close of the 2005 NPT Review.
[1] Comments re: Part 70 Air Quality Permit No. TV-0080-0041, US
Department of Energy, Westinghouse Savannah River Company-Savannah
River Site, BREDL, November 21, 2002
[2] Under A Cloud: Fallout from the Savannah River Site, The RadioActivist
Campaign, October 2003
[3] MOX Fuel Fabrication Facility Environmental Report, Revision
1 & 2, NRC Docket No. 070-03098, DOE Contract DE-AC02-99-CH10888
Diplomacy of cities
and promoting peace
Delivered by Mayor Olexandr Omelchenko, Kyiv, Mayors for Peace
Convened by MfP
Let me first of all extend my gratitude to the Mayor of the City
of Hiroshima, due to whose initiative we have gathered today in
the Headquarters of the United Nations Organization.
We are here confronting one of major questions of existence of humanity
– for the sake of peace! Usually the mayors of cities spend
the greater part of their working hours on the decision of more
mundane problems of roads, transport, medicine, and meeting the
budget in their cities. Being a mayor is a very humane, peaceful
profession. But when we speak about the diplomacy of cities, we
must acknowledge the important political role of mayors. Although
economic problems require the most attention and effort, global
questions affecting the survival of humanity are in no way distant
from municipalities in all countries.
Peace comes before everything else. The cities of all the countries
need clear skies above. And our meeting today, I am convinced, will
confirm the unanimity with which societies of cities from different
continents defend peaceful, good-neighborly relations.
A nuclear weapon is viewed by us, in the first analysis, as a
factor of instability, a threat that carries in itself a frightful,
mortal danger for all humanity. To deprive nations and the whole
world of nuclear weapons, preventing by this means a human catastrophe,
is the primary objective of the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty,
the document in support of which we are all here today. Without
any exaggeration, the question is a choice for humanity between
hope and hopelessness. Unfortunately, despite the historical agreement
attained at 2000 NPT Review Conference we find that the threat stemming
from nuclear weapons has grown.
Declared in the 1980s to be factor inhibiting global conflicts,
on the modern stage a nuclear weapon is more like a genie escaped
from a bottle. Numerous shocking facts about nuclear technologies
going out of control would stir up the world public if they were
known. Irresponsible weapons merchants, research workers lacking
in elementary ethical principles driven by pursuit of money, are
putting the world on the brink of nuclear conflict. Unprecedented
illegal operations are bringing us closer to the arming of terrorist
groups and criminal regimes. What if the rumors that Al Qaida already
possesses a nuclear weapon are confirmed? Just thinking about the
subsequent chain of events is terrifying.
I ask myself, how did all this become possible? Why were international
institutions especially created for the control of nuclear potential
focusing on a careful search for weapon of mass destruction in Iraq,
where none have been found, but missing all the real trade in nuclear
materials and technologies? Why was Ukraine repeatedly blamed for
illegal trade in weapons, though each time the accusations proved
to be groundless? And in the meantime, other states shamelessly
profiteer through various weapons to sow death on our planet.
Kyiv, as well as Hiroshima and Nagasaki, is aware of the consequences
of a nuclear explosion at a level more profound than words. Incurable
wounds were the heavy consequences of military bombing and gross
human error that resulted in massive radiation contamination of
large territories.
The whole world will always respect the memory of the victims
of the first atomic bombings of these two Japanese cities. And similarly
humanity remembers the frightful Chernobyl tragedy that took numerous
human victims and rendered 30 square kilometers useless for human
inhabitation. The explosion of the Chernobyl Nuclear Power Plant
harmed the ecological balance in the region, adversely affecting
the health of Kyivers. The negative consequences of this failure
are found in other regions of the state and in neighboring countries.
The scale of the disaster would have been considerably greater,
but for the courage of Ukrainian firemen, soldiers, rescuers, and
builders. Day and night the exhausting fight to tame the blazing
nuclear reactor went on.
Chernobyl presented many tests of courage and professionalism for
the firemen: Pumping out "heavy" water from beneath the
unstable reactor, with hydrogen gases threatening at any moment
to explode; overcoming fires in cable tunnels; and decontaminating
the plant. What did all those participating in this operation experience
in those days? They express this feeling in these few words: “It
was like being at war".
The dramatic effect of the Chernobyl catastrophe is beyond comparison.
The deeds of the firemen saved millions of people. It is hard even
to imagine what the consequences could have been if the heroes of
Chernobyl had not controlled the hazards. These events are unequaled
in human history.
550 capital fire guards took part in managing the catastrophe
at the Chernobyl Nuclear Power Plant; 121 firemen were awarded with
orders and medals for bravery and heroism.
That frightful grief that people experienced in Ukraine and among
our Japanese friends was enough to forever imbue us with an intense
wish for peace throughout the world. Ukraine proved its sincere
aspiration for world peace by becoming the first state to voluntarily
give up its nuclear weapons. Professing the principles of peaceful
collaboration, Ukraine relied on international guarantees of security
and assertions from world society to help in the clean-up of the
consequences of the Chernobyl tragedy. The USA and our European
partners spoke with a single voice at that time, firmly assuring
us of all forms of assistance. Unfortunately, the steps required
to meet our needs were not taken as decisively as our giving up
of the weapons. In this connection, permit me to briefly remind
you of the basic facts.
First the Chernobyl question was included in the agenda at the
spring session of the 1990 the Economic and Social Council of the
UN. As a result, the General Assembly adopted Resolution 45/190,
which called on member States “to mobilize support for extending
international cooperation to mitigate the consequences of the Chernobyl
disaster”
Since then UN continues to devote much attention to the Chernobyl
question.
On May 21, 1999, the Government of Ukraine and the European Commission
signed an agreement that stipulates a substantial payment to indemnify
the fuel deficit during the period between the closing of the Chernobyl
nuclear power plant and the introduction of a new nuclear power
station to be financed by EBRD and charged to Euroatom credits.
What was done concretely on implementation of this obligation?
In the year of 2000, the European Union granted from the Program
TACIS the first tranche for the delivery of fuel in the amount of
25 million euros. After the first tranche during February-April
2001, the purchase of 374 million cube meters of gas, which was
used for the generation of electric power at the Zaporozhian and
Vuglegirskiy thermal power stations, was financed. The volume of
electric power produced under this grant was 27.5% of the average
annual output of the Chernobyl Atomic Power Station. I would like
to draw your attention to the fact that this was not even a third
of what we lost.
During his visit to Ukraine in November 2000, President of the
European Commission Romano Prodi once again confirmed the obligation
of the EU to help Ukraine in the closing of CAPS and promised to
make a grant in a sum 65 million euros. But the sum of the first
and second grant payments made up only 45 million. In addition to
them about 16 million US dollars were granted for debt liquidation
for electric power from coal.
Please note that the Program of indemnification of fuel deficit
is the biggest non-permanent grant for the necessities of supply,
which was given at any time by the EU to one of partner-countries
of the TACIS Program. Together the total sum of financial obligation
of the EU within the framework of assistance to Ukraine in connection
with the closing of the Chernobyl Atomic Power Station amounts to
about 1.2 billion euro. That means that we were actually given less
than was promised.
At the same time, expenses for the coming 15 years for the removal
from service of the remaining three power units of the station and
the program of social defense are estimated in 1.5 billion US dollars.
In addition, Ukraine must introduce new power generating capacity,
the volume of investments for this construction will be a very considerable
sum.
As can be imagined, when we conduct our speeches about the control
of nuclear weapons and the peaceful coexistence of people, adherence
to one’s word by all sides is of utmost importance. Our common
democratic house will not be strong, if we leave our partners in
trouble after giving them hope of receiving aid.
The reality is that, despite official pledges, Ukraine in the
end remained face to face with the consequences of disaster.
The State authority jointly with Kyiv city authority are working
on a solution of whole complex of questions related to the Chernobyl
disaster.
On April 25, 1992, the Chernobyl Museum was opened. In four years
it acquired the status of a National Museum. The exposition is dedicated
to helping people understand the post-Chernobyl situation; to pay
attention to the lessons the Chernobyl catastrophe taught in all
spheres of life; and not to give to the world the slightest possibility
of forgetting these lessons.
Within the framework of the municipal program "Turbota"
social and financial help is provided to the persons who suffered
from the Chernobyl catastrophe. The program provides for: financial
and medical aid; preventive measures and health improvement; transport
for disabled persons. "Turbota" funds the development
of the career-guidance center for disabled children (“Find
Yourself Center”), established on the basis of International
Charity Fund "Help for the Children of Chernobyl".
One of the main factors in guarding the health of the city population
is the development and introduction of the measures regarding warnings
and reduction in electromagnetic and radioactive exposure of the
population. Harmful radioactive contamination – mainly caused
by the Chernobyl tragedy of 1986 - is widespread in the Kyiv region.
The half-life for some elements is well over a hundred years. A
great number of the artificial radioactive elements have been absorbed
by the land as a consequence of the failure of the Chernobyl Nuclear
Plant. Despite the passage of eighteen years, investigation into
the consequences of the disaster remains as urgent as ever.
Kyiv is a flourishing, historic city that overcame the crisis of
the transitional period and is successfully developing today. About
a million square meters of real estate are becoming available every
year. The unemployment rate among Kyivers is the lowest in Ukraine
being close to zero point five per cent – a very low level
even for Europe. Such a level was possible because of an effective
employment policy of the city. Last year’s economic transformations
initiated and supported by Kiev city authorities made it possible
to create almost twenty seven thousand additional jobs in Kiev enterprises,
firms and organizations. And the number of positions created in
2004 appears to be almost two thousand already. So it is obvious
that the dynamics are positive. Kyiv transformed itself into an
attractive place for labor resources from all over Ukraine. A progressive
economy provides more workplaces than the inhabitants of Kyiv actually
fill. Today, as a result, there are over twenty thousand vacancies
in the database of the City Service for employment.
New homes are being constructed, the budget is being met successfully,
there is a need for workers--what can better testify that the city
lives and develops? Modern shopping and office centers, rest areas
are being built, all the infrastructure is developing. The quality
of life is getting better. Cathedrals, historical sites and architectural
masterpieces are being restored solely by the City. All this regenerates
a genetic memory of an industrious and talented Ukrainian nation.
Definitely such confident steps are due greatly to the strong economic
basis. Our city economy provides about 11% of Ukrainian gross domestic
product, supporting its continual elevation at about 6% each year.
Our successes in the city’s development provides the secure
top position of Kyiv in the investment rating of regions of Ukraine,
which are being calculated annually by the “Institute of Reforms”
Independent Research Organization supported by the World Bank.
About 17% of general capital investments in the country goes to
the City of Kyiv. The total volume equals 27% of total gross domestic
product, which is quite an achievement. However we are not going
to stop here. We are aiming to develop to a higher level, to compete
with the capitals of neighboring Eastern European countries, like
Budapest, Warsaw, Prague, Sophia, and Bucharest. Even today, Kyiv
in some aspects stands in line with the abovementioned cities, and
in some aspects, it even surpasses them. This is acknowledged by
numerous foreign guests and specialists who visit and work in Kyiv.
The economy of the capital of Ukraine includes an extraordinarily
wide spectrum of industries. Our industrial complex includes about
485 large and medium companies supported by over 4.5 thousand small
enterprises, where productivity increased by 14.5% in 2003 and even
more in the preceding year. Our industrial production is valued
at $2.3 billion, which accounts for 6% of all national industrial
production.
The city is a large center of foreign trade on a national scale,
providing one-fifth of the combined value of external trade. The
export of goods and services by Kyiv firms has grown to $2.6 billion.
An event that took place last year we see as a well-deserved reward
to our city. The capital of Ukraine was granted the title “European
region of the year for 2005.” We were chosen from among 20
other candidates by an international jury.
Nevertheless, the Chernobyl tragedy is with us to stay. It serves
as a tragic symbol of the defenselessness of cities before nuclear
technology. While making daily efforts to make our cities better,
we must always remember that looming evil capable of destroying
in the blink of an eye everything that was created by the hard work
of previous generations. Nuclear weapons, international terrorism,
technological failures combine today to create a mutual threat to
peace and to the peace of mind of our citizens.
With apologies to the mayors of the American cities present in
this hall, I must point out that it is the US Government that is
proposing a fatal thesis regarding the use of small-yield nuclear
wepons, the so-called mini-nukes. Bombs and shells with depleted
uranium were widely used in former Yugoslavia, Afghanistan and Iraq.
Surely this is not a price one is forced to pay for victory. The
world scientific community speaks with one voice to highlight the
heavy ecological impact in regions of armed conflict.
Completing my address I would like to once again underscore the
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