Reaching Critical Will

Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT)

Conference on Disarmament

General Assembly First Committee

UN Disarmament Commission

Special Session on Disarmament

STATEMENT
by the Delegation of Ukraine to the Third session of the Preparatory Committee
for the 2005 NPT Review Conference
(26 April -7 May 2004)

Mr. Chairman,
May I start by congratulating you on your election as Chairman of this session of the PrepCom for the 2005 NPT Review Conference. The delegation of Ukraine is prepared to work in cooperation with other delegations in order to achieve the successful outcome of the current session.

Mr. Chairman,
Distinguished delegates,
Given the current global security situation Ukraine views this PrepCom session and the upcoming NPT Review Conference as vital to identifying the ways to efficiently counter grave threats that the global nuclear nonproliferation regime and the NPT itself have faced over the last few years. In this regard our delegation will be working towards elaborating specific recommendations to the Review Conference on the relevant issues as provided for by the Decision 1 of the 1995 NPT Review Conference. We strongly encourage other delegations to follow suit.

Mr. Chairman,
As ever before, Ukraine proceeds from the understanding that the NPT remains a key tool in preventing proliferation of nuclear weapons and upholding strategic stability in the world. Now let me draw the attention of the delegates to the fact that this year Ukraine will mark the 10th anniversary of its accession to the NPT. Ukraine’s landmark decision to forswear its nuclear capability and accede to the mentioned Treaty contributed significantly to the enhancement of the international nonproliferation regime and of the global security.
Unlike in the mid-90s, when some progress was achieved in countering both horizontal and vertical proliferation, the world today continues to be challenged, both globally and regionally, by the increasing risk of the spread of materials, equipment and expertise for manufacturing nuclear weapons as well as of their acquisition by terrorist organizations.
Such circumstances point to the urgent necessity of preserving the NPT’s viability and enhancing its efficiency. In Ukraine’s opinion, this task can be accomplished through ensuring unequivocal implementation by all NPT Member States of the decisions made by the 1995 and 2000 Review Conferences, including the Principles and Objectives for Nuclear Nonproliferation and Disarmament and the 13 practical steps towards nuclear disarmament.
In this regard, Ukraine hails Libya’s landmark decision to renounce its WMD programs, including nuclear one, and to accede to the CTBT as well as to cooperate closely with the international community to this end.
At the same time, the situation on the Korean peninsular continues to cause concern. Ukraine shares a deep conviction that the DPRK should relinquish its nuclear ambitions and resume its cooperation with the IAEA. This country should return into compliance with its obligations under the NPT and the IAEA Safeguards agreement without delay. The international community, on its part, should keep looking for the ways to finally put an end to the crisis in order to prevent a hard blow to the NPT-based regime. Ukraine stands for an early settlement of the crisis by politico-diplomatic means, which we do not believe to be exhausted. In this regard, Ukraine welcomes the continuation of the multilateral dialogue on the issue.
To meet the current challenges the world community should fully employ existing legal and institutional mechanisms, first of all the UN machinery, as well seek some new ways to inhibit the spread of nuclear weapons, related materials, equipment and technology. In this respect, Ukraine welcomes the adoption of the EU Strategy against Proliferation of WMD. We highly appreciate efforts to expand international cooperation within the G-8 Global Partnership – the initiative in which Ukraine wishes to take part.
Recent developments in the field of nuclear nonproliferation once again point to the urgent need for further enhancing the IAEA capability to verify declared nuclear activities and especially to detect and deter clandestine nuclear activities. This can be accomplished through faithful and universal application of the strengthened safeguards system, with an Additional protocol being its central part. Ukraine fully endorses measures envisaged by the Additional protocol. As of to date, Ukraine is in the process of completing domestic legal procedures necessary to bring the Protocol into force.
Ukraine notes with satisfaction the entry into force of the Strategic Offensive Reductions Treaty. Strict implementation of the Moscow Treaty will pave the way to attaining the NPT disarmament goals and will facilitate the enhancement of international stability. In its turn, Ukraine, as a State that has contributed considerably to the cause of nuclear disarmament within the START I framework, believes that the reductions in nuclear arsenals under the Moscow treaty should be irreversible. We also call upon the two nuclear weapon states to pursue reduction of non-strategic nuclear weapons in accordance with the 1991/1992 Presidential Nuclear Initiatives.
Unfortunately, despite the above mentioned positive trends in nuclear nonproliferation and disarmament, we have to admit that the progress in implementing the practical steps for the systematic and progressive efforts towards the nuclear disarmament, as set forth at the 2000 NPT Review Conference, remains far from desired. Prospects of the CTBT entry into force still look gloomy. As a full-fledged party to the CTBT, Ukraine urges the states that still remain holdouts from the Treaty to accede to it. We commend utmost restraint in conducting nuclear test explosions, exercised by the nuclear weapon states non-parties to the CTBT. We hope that they will further keep in line with their commitment to maintain the global nuclear weapon test moratorium.

We firmly believe it is necessary to spare no effort in order to surmount protracted political impasse in the CD and to commence negotiations on the Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty (FMCT).
Ukraine believes that legally binding security assurances by the nuclear-weapon-states to the non-nuclear weapon states parties to the NPT will significantly strengthen the nuclear non-proliferation regime by eliminating plausible incentives for pursuing nuclear capabilities. We strongly encourage NWS to reconfirm their commitments laid out in the relevant UNSC resolutions and the decisions of the 1995 and 2000 NPT Review Conferences.
In conclusion, let me express a strong hope for the constructive work within the ongoing Preparatory Committee session in order to achieve fruitful results.
Thank you.