STATEMENT
by the Delegation of Ukraine to the Third session of the Preparatory
Committee
for the 2005 NPT Review Conference
(26 April -7 May 2004)
Mr. Chairman,
May I start by congratulating you on your election as Chairman of
this session of the PrepCom for the 2005 NPT Review Conference.
The delegation of Ukraine is prepared to work in cooperation with
other delegations in order to achieve the successful outcome of
the current session.
Mr. Chairman,
Distinguished delegates,
Given the current global security situation Ukraine views this PrepCom
session and the upcoming NPT Review Conference as vital to identifying
the ways to efficiently counter grave threats that the global nuclear
nonproliferation regime and the NPT itself have faced over the last
few years. In this regard our delegation will be working towards
elaborating specific recommendations to the Review Conference on
the relevant issues as provided for by the Decision 1 of the 1995
NPT Review Conference. We strongly encourage other delegations to
follow suit.
Mr. Chairman,
As ever before, Ukraine proceeds from the understanding that the
NPT remains a key tool in preventing proliferation of nuclear weapons
and upholding strategic stability in the world. Now let me draw
the attention of the delegates to the fact that this year Ukraine
will mark the 10th anniversary of its accession to the NPT. Ukraine’s
landmark decision to forswear its nuclear capability and accede
to the mentioned Treaty contributed significantly to the enhancement
of the international nonproliferation regime and of the global security.
Unlike in the mid-90s, when some progress was achieved in countering
both horizontal and vertical proliferation, the world today continues
to be challenged, both globally and regionally, by the increasing
risk of the spread of materials, equipment and expertise for manufacturing
nuclear weapons as well as of their acquisition by terrorist organizations.
Such circumstances point to the urgent necessity of preserving the
NPT’s viability and enhancing its efficiency. In Ukraine’s
opinion, this task can be accomplished through ensuring unequivocal
implementation by all NPT Member States of the decisions made by
the 1995 and 2000 Review Conferences, including the Principles and
Objectives for Nuclear Nonproliferation and Disarmament and the
13 practical steps towards nuclear disarmament.
In this regard, Ukraine hails Libya’s landmark decision to
renounce its WMD programs, including nuclear one, and to accede
to the CTBT as well as to cooperate closely with the international
community to this end.
At the same time, the situation on the Korean peninsular continues
to cause concern. Ukraine shares a deep conviction that the DPRK
should relinquish its nuclear ambitions and resume its cooperation
with the IAEA. This country should return into compliance with its
obligations under the NPT and the IAEA Safeguards agreement without
delay. The international community, on its part, should keep looking
for the ways to finally put an end to the crisis in order to prevent
a hard blow to the NPT-based regime. Ukraine stands for an early
settlement of the crisis by politico-diplomatic means, which we
do not believe to be exhausted. In this regard, Ukraine welcomes
the continuation of the multilateral dialogue on the issue.
To meet the current challenges the world community should fully
employ existing legal and institutional mechanisms, first of all
the UN machinery, as well seek some new ways to inhibit the spread
of nuclear weapons, related materials, equipment and technology.
In this respect, Ukraine welcomes the adoption of the EU Strategy
against Proliferation of WMD. We highly appreciate efforts to expand
international cooperation within the G-8 Global Partnership –
the initiative in which Ukraine wishes to take part.
Recent developments in the field of nuclear nonproliferation once
again point to the urgent need for further enhancing the IAEA capability
to verify declared nuclear activities and especially to detect and
deter clandestine nuclear activities. This can be accomplished through
faithful and universal application of the strengthened safeguards
system, with an Additional protocol being its central part. Ukraine
fully endorses measures envisaged by the Additional protocol. As
of to date, Ukraine is in the process of completing domestic legal
procedures necessary to bring the Protocol into force.
Ukraine notes with satisfaction the entry into force of the Strategic
Offensive Reductions Treaty. Strict implementation of the Moscow
Treaty will pave the way to attaining the NPT disarmament goals
and will facilitate the enhancement of international stability.
In its turn, Ukraine, as a State that has contributed considerably
to the cause of nuclear disarmament within the START I framework,
believes that the reductions in nuclear arsenals under the Moscow
treaty should be irreversible. We also call upon the two nuclear
weapon states to pursue reduction of non-strategic nuclear weapons
in accordance with the 1991/1992 Presidential Nuclear Initiatives.
Unfortunately, despite the above mentioned positive trends in nuclear
nonproliferation and disarmament, we have to admit that the progress
in implementing the practical steps for the systematic and progressive
efforts towards the nuclear disarmament, as set forth at the 2000
NPT Review Conference, remains far from desired. Prospects of the
CTBT entry into force still look gloomy. As a full-fledged party
to the CTBT, Ukraine urges the states that still remain holdouts
from the Treaty to accede to it. We commend utmost restraint in
conducting nuclear test explosions, exercised by the nuclear weapon
states non-parties to the CTBT. We hope that they will further keep
in line with their commitment to maintain the global nuclear weapon
test moratorium.
We firmly believe it is necessary to spare no effort in order to
surmount protracted political impasse in the CD and to commence
negotiations on the Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty (FMCT).
Ukraine believes that legally binding security assurances by the
nuclear-weapon-states to the non-nuclear weapon states parties to
the NPT will significantly strengthen the nuclear non-proliferation
regime by eliminating plausible incentives for pursuing nuclear
capabilities. We strongly encourage NWS to reconfirm their commitments
laid out in the relevant UNSC resolutions and the decisions of the
1995 and 2000 NPT Review Conferences.
In conclusion, let me express a strong hope for the constructive
work within the ongoing Preparatory Committee session in order to
achieve fruitful results.
Thank you.
