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Statement by the Kyrgyz
Republic
Preparatory Committee of the Parties to
the Treaty on the Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons
New York April 27, 2004
Mr. Chairman:
Allow me to join the previous speakers in congratulating you on
your assumption of the chairmanship of the third session of the
Preparatory Committee. Under your leadership, this meeting, we hope,
will play a significant role in shaping the future of the global
nonproliferation regime at a crucial moment in its history.
At this session, the Preparatory Committee has the important task
of striving to produce a consensus report containing recommendations
to the Review Conference. This will be a difficult endeavor given
the number of serious challenges confronting the regime. It is essential,
however, that this Preparatory Committee address these threats directly
if one is to avoid undermining the credibility of the review process.
One of the Treaty's key strengths lies in the opportunity it provides
States Parties to respond to proliferation challenges through diplomatic
means. We must avail ourselves of this opportunity and design innovative
but practical measures to promote the full implementation of the
Treaty and its universality. My delegation pledges to work with
you, Mr. Chairman, to achieve these goals.
At the 2000 NPT Review Conference, the Kyrgyz Republic applauded
the adoption of the final document. This document laid out a pragmatic,
forward-looking set of objectives for the nonproliferation regime.
Four years later, we must acknowledge that our initial high expectations
remain, at best, only partly fulfilled.
Mr. Chairman,
My delegation shares the views of many States Parties that the
program of 13 practical steps for nuclear disarmament has not, for
the most part, been met, and in some instances has actually experienced
regression. The Conference on Disarmament remains stalled, little
headway has been made in bringing the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty
into force, the ABM Treaty has been repudiated, there is no visible
progress in negotiating a Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty, and, if
anything, nuclear weapons have acquired a greater role in the security
policies of some Nuclear Weapons States.
Although the May 2002 Moscow Treaty represents some progress toward
reducing strategic nuclear weapons, it unfortunately does not address
the serious proliferation and nuclear terrorism threats posed by
non-strategic nuclear weapons. It is my delegation's hope that this
session of the Preparatory Committee will assess the implementation
of the practical steps toward disarmament adopted at the 2000 Review
Conference and discuss means to accelerate the reduction of all
categories of nuclear weapons in a transparent and irreversible
fashion.
Mr Chairman,
A positive nonproliferation development in recent years has been
the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones in Africa and Southeast
Asia. Nuclear weapon-free zones now cover nearly the whole of the
Southern Hemisphere, in addition to Antarctica, the seabed, and
outer space. As nuclear-weapon-free zones have expanded geographically,
they have also become stronger instruments of nonproliferation.
In 1999, the United Nations Conference on Disarmament recognized
the important role played by these zones and reached consensus on
a set of guidelines for their establishment as important complimentary
instruments to the NPT.
The Kyrgyz Republic is pleased to note the significant and continuing
progress that has been achieved recently toward establishment of
a nuclear weapon-free zone in Central Asia. In September 2002, the
five Central Asian states announced that they had negotiated the
text of a draft treaty establishing a Central Asian nuclear weapon-free
zone. The Central Asian states are now actively consulting with
the P-5 about the final text of the treaty and the modalities of
its implementation. The Kyrgyz Republic hopes that the treaty will
be signed as soon as possible. The five Central Asian states are
united in their belief that the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free
zone in our region, on the basis of arrangements freely arrived
at between our states, and taking into account its special characteristics,
will strengthen peace and security at the regional and global levels.
Mr. Chairman,
In the aftermath of the 9/11 terrorist attacks, all Member States
recognize the importance of taking effective measures to prevent
possible terrorist acquisition and use of weapons of mass destruction.
Adequate safeguards and physical protection of nuclear materials
and facilities remain the first line of defense against nuclear
terrorism. The Kyrgyz Republic strongly endorses the International
Atomic Energy Agency's efforts to strengthen the international safeguards
system. In this regard, the Kyrgyz Republic is pleased to report
that on 3 February 2004 its safeguards agreement with the International
Atomic Energy Agency entered into force. The Kyrgyz Republic also
supports ongoing efforts to strengthen the Convention on Physical
Protection of Nuclear Material in order to address the new challenges
posed by terrorism. The international community must redouble its
efforts to control radioactive materials and, in particular, to
recover and securely dispose of so-called “orphaned”
radioactive sources, which could be exploited by terrorists to develop
radiological weapons.
Reducing terrorist threats requires strict procedures for the safe
handling, transport, storage, and disposal of sensitive nuclear
material. This session of the Preparatory Committee should consider
taking new steps to reinforce export controls and help combat illicit
trafficking in nuclear materials. Attention also must be given to
mitigating the environmental consequences of past and present nuclear
weapons programs. As noted in the Final Document of the 2000 NPT
Review Conference, which received consensus support, there have
been exceptional instances in which serious environmental consequences
have resulted from uranium mining and associated nuclear fuel-cycle
activities in the production of nuclear weapons.
This often overlooked environmental problem caused by nuclear weapons
production and borne by the Kyrgyz Republic and other states, is
another reason why we attach such great importance to the work of
this Preparatory Committee. We would like to reiterate the call
made at the 2000 NPT Review Conference for all Governments and international
organizations that have expertise in the field of cleanup and disposal
of radioactive contaminants to consider giving appropriate assistance
as may be requested for remedial purposes in these affected areas.
The Kyrgyz Republic also would like to draw attention to the important
but underutilized role education can play as a disarmament and nonproliferation
tool. My delegation shares the opinion expressed in UN General Assembly
Resolution 57/60, adopted without a vote in fall 2002, which recognized
that “the need has never been greater for disarmament and
nonproliferation education.” Only through education can we
hope to resolve security challenges without relying upon weapons
of mass destruction or the threat or use of force. We urge this
committee to give priority attention to this task.
Mr. Chairman,
There is a natural temptation for institutions, especially international
ones, to follow routine, and to view change with suspicion, if not
fear. This tendency is reinforced in the context of the NPT by the
much slower than anticipated spread of nuclear weapons. States Parties
must be careful, however, to resist this temptation to conduct "business
as usual." The world has changed too dramatically in recent
years. Today, non-state actors as well as nation states pose serious
proliferation threats; nuclear weapons use is not out of the question;
and the fabric of nonproliferation agreements and guidelines is
frayed and may well unravel. Nonproliferation strategy and tactics
must take account of these new realities. This Preparatory Committee
session affords States Parties an unusual opportunity to take concrete
and substantive steps to ensure that the principles and objectives
of the Treaty are fulfilled. Unless we seize the opportunity, we
place in jeopardy the future of the Treaty and the nonproliferation
regime.
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