



# NORWAY

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STATEMENT

BY

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AT

THE GENERAL DEBATE  
OF THE THIRD SESSION OF THE PREPARATORY COMMITTEE  
FOR THE 2005 REVIEW CONFERENCE OF THE PARTIES TO  
THE TREATY ON THE NON-PROLIFERATION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS

NEW YORK, 27 APRIL 2004

Mr. Chairman,

Allow me first to congratulate you upon assuming this important function. Let me also take this opportunity to thank the chairmen of the two previous sessions of the Preparatory Committee.

Norway associated itself with the EU-statement that Ambassador Ryan made yesterday. I will therefore limit myself to a few complementary remarks.

We have a lot of hard work ahead of us. Since the 2000 Review Conference the NPT has come under growing pressure. This Preparatory Committee is an opportunity to reverse this trend that we can not afford to miss. We must ensure that these next two weeks are as productive as possible, so that we can make specific recommendations to the Review Conference next year on as many issues as possible.

We have a joint responsibility to ensure that the NPT remains an effective tool in our efforts to halt the spread of nuclear weapons, and to reduce the stockpile of such weapons. In light of new threats to our security this work is more important than ever.

Our task these next two weeks is to prepare the ground to ensure that the 2005 Review Conference reconfirms our joint commitment to protect, preserve and strengthen the integrity and authority of this vital instrument.

Mr. Chairman,

Outstanding compliance matters with a number of countries pose a serious challenge to the integrity of the treaty. Recent disclosure of clandestine networks capable of furnishing equipment for developing complete nuclear weapon programs underlines more than ever the urgent need for reinforcing compliance with the obligations and commitments under the Treaty.

Verification mechanisms should be strengthened, and violators should have to suffer the consequences. In this regard the UN Security Council has an important role to play.

The 2005 Conference should confirm that only countries that have signed and implemented the Additional Protocol will be allowed to import materials and equipment for civilian nuclear programs. International cooperation on export controls of sensitive materials should be strengthened. We must consider concrete measures to enhance physical protection. There must be no loopholes for illicit trafficking of nuclear materials. All nations have a responsibility to develop credible national security systems.

We must explore ways to engage the non-state parties in non-proliferation, while we at the same time urge these countries to join the NPT promptly as non-nuclear weapons states and without conditions.

Non-proliferation and disarmament are two sides of the same coin. Irreversible reductions of existing stockpiles are the best guarantee that weapons do not fall into the wrong hands. More progress in nuclear disarmament, including tactical nuclear weapons, is therefore essential.

We must also ensure that weapons grade material does not fall into the wrong hands. The Conference on Disarmament must commence the negotiations on a multilateral treaty banning production of fissile materials for weapon purposes without any further delay. The question of existing stocks of fissile materials must also be addressed.

Norway regrets that the CTBT has not yet entered into force. The current moratorium on nuclear-weapon-test explosions cannot replace the value of the legally binding commitment provided by the CTBT.

Negative security assurances by the five nuclear-weapons states to the non-nuclear weapon states can further strengthen the nuclear non-proliferation regime. This issue must be addressed in the process leading up to the Review Conference, as we all agreed in 2000.

Mr. Chairman,

The NPT community must be able to respond to compliance matters and other challenges to the Treaty. Today the NPT lacks institutional machinery to protect adequately the interests of the States Parties. It is high time we overcome the institutional deficit of the NPT.

Norway therefore supports the proposal to hold Annual Conferences of States Parties. My delegation is ready look into the question of having a bureau of the review process as a standing bureau of the the Treaty. Such a bureau should, however, neither replace nor duplicate the mandate of the Security Council.

An improved institutional machinery would need support services. We have an open mind on who should carry out this task. It would, however, seem logical to make use of the UN Department of Disarmament Affairs.

Overcoming the institutional deficit of the NPT is also an effective contribution to revitalise the multilateral approach to disarmament, arms control and non-proliferation. These efforts and the process to revitalize the First Committee of UN General Assembly are two sides of the same coin.

An institutional strengthening of the NPT would also have a positive impact on transparency matters. In this respect my delegation recalls that all States Parties are obliged to provide regular reporting. This commitment is particularly relevant for the nuclear-weapon States.

To conclude Mr. Chairman,

The NPT is a cornerstone of the global security architecture. We, the States Parties to the Treaty, have to do our utmost to protect this crucial instrument. The best way is to ensure a positive outcome of this Preparatory Committee, so that the 2005 Conference results in a strengthened non-proliferation regime.