

## STATEMENT

**by the delegation of the Russian Federation  
at the Third Session of the Preparatory Committee  
for the 2005 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty  
on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT)**

**on Article III of the NPT**

Distinguished Mr. Chairman,

An effective system of international safeguards is one of the key elements of the Non-Proliferation Treaty ensuring confidence in the member states' compliance with the principal Treaty obligations and a necessary level of trust in pursuing international cooperation in the peaceful uses of atomic energy. In this connection, of great importance is the IAEA safeguards activity improving their effectiveness.

The Russian Federation is providing assistance towards strengthening the IAEA safeguards system through annual financing of the national program for scientific and technical support of the safeguards. Within the framework of this program we regularly conduct international courses in the area of accounting and control of nuclear materials and training courses for the IAEA inspectors, as well as assist in the development and application of new methods of analysis for safeguards purposes. Russia consistently supports universalization of the Additional Protocol to the safeguards agreements. This document not only expands the Agency verification potential but is also an important instrument of ensuring openness of the NPT member states' nuclear programs.

We welcome ratification of the Additional Protocol by the Republic of Korea and the United States and expect an early completion of the ratification process by the states of the European Union. For its part, Russia hopes for an early completion of its ratification process. Regrettably, 14 non-nuclear-weapon states parties to the NPT,

which have sizable nuclear activities, have not yet signed the Additional Protocol. We urge them to do so as soon as possible.

The Russian Federation supported the IAEA Board of Governors' decision to increase the regular budget for safeguards purposes. At the same time we are convinced that the IAEA must not lessen its efforts to optimize the safeguards systems but rather, given the growing number of the countries that ratified the Additional Protocol, should intensify its efforts to move towards integrated safeguards. First of all, this should concern countries with a developed nuclear fuel cycle, such as Japan, Canada, the Republic of Korea, and, after the ratification of the Additional Protocol, a number of Euratom member states.

Mr. Chairman,

We believe it is necessary to further enhance the multilateral mechanisms of export control in the nuclear area - the Nuclear Suppliers Group and the Zanger Committee. In our view, they make it possible to establish the procedure for and agreed control of movement of such sensible goods as the nuclear export items, without prejudice to international cooperation in the peaceful uses of atomic energy. I would like to stress the importance in this context of the NPT Article III, paragraph 2. This can only be achieved on condition of effective accounting and control of nuclear materials and export control procedures implemented at the national level.

Russia is continuously improving its export control legislation. Bilateral and multilateral consultations on this issue contribute to enhancing transparency of the export control system, exchange of experience and establishing a dialogue with the countries that are not members of the Nuclear Suppliers Group.

Unfortunately, however, even the constantly improving IAEA safeguards system and strengthening national legislations can not always prevent loss of control by a state over its nuclear materials and equipment and, accordingly, their illegal proliferation. Special attention should be given to the problem of suppression of illicit trafficking of nuclear materials and equipment through the "black" market channels. Yesterday the

UN Security Council unanimously adopted resolution 1540 seeking to prevent WMDs and proliferation-sensitive materials getting into the hands of non-state entities, first of all for terrorist purposes. Russia has taken an active part in negotiating this resolution.

An important element of the non-proliferation regime is ensuring reliable physical protection of nuclear materials and installations.

An updated Convention on Physical Protection of Nuclear Materials is called upon to become an effective instrument of strengthening the nuclear non-proliferation regime, and this is why it is important to complete the process of negotiating amendments to this Convention.

Despite the fact that it has been possible to agree upon the majority of the amendments to 1980 Convention, there still remain differences on a number of key articles. The convening of the Diplomatic Conference must be made strictly contingent on a consensus with respect to these outstanding articles. The search for solutions should be pursued with the participation of all the states concerned within the framework of the IAEA. Otherwise effectiveness and productiveness of the Diplomatic Conference itself would be called into question.

Recently, because of growing terrorist threat one has to pay careful attention to the safety and security of radioactive sources. One of effective instruments for dealing with this problem is the Code of Conduct in this area approved by the 47<sup>th</sup> session of the IAEA General Conference. Russia is scrupulously abiding by its provisions.

In March 2003, Vienna was the venue of a representative international conference titled "Safety and Security of Radioactive Sources" held under the patronage of Russia, the US and the IAEA. It reaffirmed the importance of ensuring reliable safety and security of these sources, adequate control over their use, storage and disposition. Special attention should be given to the search for and achievement of safety and security of "orphaned" sources.

In this context, we would like to note the trilateral initiative by Russia, the US and the IAEA which has been implemented since 2002. As of now, 15 expert missions have

been prepared and conducted in states of the former Soviet Union. Based on the results of these missions, measures have been taken to improve the systems of accounting, control and physical protection of radioactive installations and sources. We believe it necessary to ensure adequate international technical and financial assistance to these efforts.

One of the most important elements of implementing the NPT provisions is the activity seeking possible exclusion of materials usable for producing nuclear weapons from the civilian sector. Russia, the US and the IAEA are jointly proceeding with concrete measures to return to Russia the fuel from the Soviet-made research reactors. Since 2001 to 2004 the research reactors' highly enriched fuel has been brought back to Russia from Bulgaria, Romania and Serbia and Montenegro. I would like to make special mention of the recent successful operation involving removal of fresh nuclear fuel from Libya.

Yet, bringing the highly enriched uranium for research reactors to Russia can only be looked upon as a first step. If the leadership of the countries which possess such fuel is agreeable, more work has to be done to convert reactors to the use of low enriched uranium fuel and bringing to Russia the irradiated nuclear fuel. Presently work is ongoing to prepare for the first such operation to bring spent fuel to Russia from Uzbekistan.

It is only through a comprehensive and systemic approach to the fulfillment by the NPT member states of their obligations under Article III of the Treaty will we be able to feel confident in the peaceful thrust of national nuclear programs, adequately respond to the new threats and challenges and prevent undeclared nuclear activities.

Thank you Mr. Chairman.