First session
Vienna, 30 April-11 May 2007
Working paper on cluster 2 issues submitted
by the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland
1. The United Kingdom fully supports the paper tabled on behalf of the European Union by the delegation from Germany on the issues of relevance to this cluster. We would like to add a few national comments on issues of particular importance to us.
2. The United Kingdom agrees that a comprehensive safeguards agreement together with the additional protocol represent today’s verification standard. The United Kingdom hopes that this meeting will send a clear message to the Board of Governors of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) so that recognition of this important principle is properly accepted and codified.
3. In reaction to the events in Iraq and the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea in the early 1990s, the IAEA safeguards regime was revised. The United Kingdom believes that the safeguards regime should be subject to continuous review. The Agency should have the best possible resources and tools. This should include looking at new technologies, new techniques and new sources of information so that the Agency is allowed to develop its methods.
4. It is in our collective interest for IAEA to continue to improve the effectiveness and efficiency of the safeguards system. The introduction of integrated safeguards as soon as possible in a large number of States, particularly those with significant nuclear activities, would make an important contribution in this direction. In this regard, the effectiveness of the safeguards system is considerably enhanced through the conclusion of an additional protocol.
5. The Agency can only draw the broader conclusion that all nuclear material in a State is in peaceful use once the additional protocol is in force. Once this conclusion has been drawn, integrated safeguards can be properly implemented in a State and benefits can be obtained in both effectiveness and efficiency improvements.
6. In 2006 the Security Council adopted resolution 1673 (2006), which extended the mandate of the Committee established by the Security Council in resolution 1540 (2004). We believe that full implementation of resolution 1540 (2004) will raise the international bar on export control legislation and cooperation, while being fully in line with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) regime. It singles out no particular nation for criticism, but requires us all to reach a minimum standard. Not all nations are equally able to fulfil this requirement. For this reason the United Kingdom continues to offer assistance to States to help implement resolution 1540 (2004), and encourages all States Parties to the NPT to do likewise within their capacity. We support the development of a coordinated process for the implementation of resolution 1540 (2004) that sets out the measures to be implemented and outlines implementation priorities and how they will be put in place; it should develop best practice, and offer assistance through an effective donor network. We hope that this Preparatory Committee will strongly endorse such steps.
7. Any State engaged in a programme of clandestine procurement for nuclear-weapon purposes, in contravention of NPT undertakings, should follow the example set so strongly by Libya in 2003 and renounce the pursuit of nuclear weapons and dismantle and destroy any facilities or equipment associated with such a programme.
8. Along with many others, we have continued to have strong, and increasing, concerns about the proliferation implications of Iran’s nuclear programme. We continue to work with European Union partners to develop long-term arrangements that would help to rebuild international confidence in Iran’s nuclear activities and plans. But Iran has chosen to ignore these offers to assist it in returning to compliance with its obligations, and in developing a modern nuclear-power programme. Most recently it has chosen to ignore the mandatory requirements of the Security Council made in resolutions 1696 (2006), 1737 (2006) and 1747 (2007) with respect to its nuclear programme. We deplore the stance taken by Iran in defiance of the wishes of the international community and demand it now comply with the Security Council, and with IAEA — including through allowing full access to all IAEA inspectors, and the installation of appropriate monitoring equipment in its nuclear facilities. It should also immediately and without demur suspend all enrichment-related and reprocessing activities while agreements on long-term solutions are worked out. In this context, the E3+3 Governments have reiterated their continued commitment to seeking a negotiated solution with Iran, and that the far-reaching proposals made by the E3+3 in June 2006 remain on the table as a possible basis for such a negotiated solution.
9. We would like to see Iran working actively with the IAEA secretariat to resolve all outstanding questions surrounding its programme. We would also like Iran to comply with all Board of Governors’ requests, including, in particular, reconsideration of its decision to construct a heavy-water moderated research reactor in Arak. Such a reactor design poses a significant proliferation threat.
10. The United Kingdom deplores the explosion by the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea of a nuclear device on 9 October 2006. We urge it to return to compliance with its commitments under the NPT and IAEA safeguards agreement. We urge it too to comply fully with Security Council resolution 1718 (2006) and to implement the commitments of the September 2005 Joint Statement. We call on it to cease further threatening activities, to declare all past nuclear activity and to dismantle completely, verifiably and irreversibly its nuclear programme at the earliest opportunity.
11. The United Kingdom underlines its support for the principle of nuclear-weapon-free zones. It seeks to play an active and constructive role as a nuclear-weapon State in their development. The United Kingdom has signed and ratified protocols to the zones which cover Latin America and the Caribbean — the Treaty of Tlatelolco; Africa — the Pelindaba Treaty; and the South Pacific — the Rarotonga Treaty. We hope the Association of Southeast Asian Nations will soon agree to resume consultations with the nuclear-weapon States so that the Protocol to the South-East Asian Treaty, the Treaty of Bangkok, can be agreed and ratified.
12. We were disappointed that the Treaty on a Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone in Central Asia was signed on 8 September 2006 without conclusion of consultations over the text of the Treaty, and in the full knowledge that serious issues would preclude ratification of the Protocol by the United Kingdom. Despite our best efforts, since we last had consultations in 2002, it has not proved possible to persuade the Central Asian States to discuss this issue further. But the creation of a purported nuclear-weapon-free zone that gives primacy to previous security arrangements, and that does not live up to the vision of article VII of the NPT in assuring the total absence of nuclear weapons, left us with no option. We urge early ratification of the Treaty by the States of the zone so that we can again seek to resolve our differences over these issues.
13. The United Kingdom reiterates its support for a Middle East zone free of weapons of mass destruction as originally set out in the 1995 resolution on the Middle East adopted at the 1995 Review and Extension Conference of the Parties to the NPT and reaffirms its commitment to achieving the implementation of the zone. The United Kingdom has consistently supported the First Committee of the General Assembly calling for such a nuclear-weapon-free zone and also supports Assembly resolution 61/103 on the risk of nuclear proliferation in the Middle East. In this respect, we continue to call on Israel, and all other non-signatories to the Treaty, to ratify the NPT as non-nuclear-weapon States. The United Kingdom has also taken steps with other countries in the region to establish the conditions for a zone free of weapons of mass destruction. Together with our European partners we have carried out extensive lobbying activity to secure adherence by States in the Middle East to key non-proliferation agreements. The United Kingdom has again, on the occasion of this Preparatory Committee, submitted a report on the activities in which it has engaged to work towards full implementation of the zone.
14. The United Kingdom is committed through the EU Strategy against Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction to the universalization of multilateral treaties and universal compliance with those instruments. We will continue to work hard, nationally and internationally with partners, friends and colleagues, in order to ensure that these instruments, and the NPT in particular, remain relevant to current challenges, and strengthened in order to combat them effectively.
