First session
Vienna, 30 April-11 May 2007

                Cluster I

                Working paper submitted by Norway

                Moving the disarmament agenda forward

1.      Nuclear disarmament and nuclear non-proliferation serve the same objective, namely, that of removing the availability of nuclear arms. The close interlinkage between disarmament and non-proliferation was truly reflected in the Principles and Objectives for Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament adopted at the 1995 Review and Extension Conference.
2.      Norway holds the view that credible and effective non-proliferation measures must be in place to reach the common objective of a world free of nuclear weapons.
3.      At the same time, the total elimination of nuclear weapons cannot be achieved without accelerating and deepening the disarmament process. While there has been a considerable reduction in nuclear arsenals since the end of the cold war, there is still a widespread sentiment that the disarmament process is not moving swiftly enough. There is a fear that the world might be heading towards a second nuclear era.
4.      The time has come to redouble efforts and identify a steady course by which the States parties to the NPT, in particular the nuclear-weapon States, can achieve the overall disarmament objectives of the Treaty. This requires taking stock of the situation today while building on the achievements from 1995 and 2000.
5.      Norway encourages nuclear-weapon States to continue reducing the operational status of their weapons as agreed at the 2000 Review Conference.
6.      Norway calls for a renewed effort to foster an international atmosphere conducive to moving the disarmament agenda forward.

                The need for further reductions

7.      There are still more than 27,000 nuclear warheads and thousands of tons of weapons-grade material in the world. The real danger of these weapons or materials falling into the hands of terrorists testifies to the urgency of getting the numbers and quantities down.
8.      Much has been achieved since the end of the cold war. Agreements such as the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START) and the Moscow Treaty (SORT) will lead to further cuts. START will expire in 2009, while SORT will be up for renewal in 2012. It is encouraging that the United States of America and the Russian Federation have initiated consultations on the extension of START. Norway hopes that those talks will lead to continued reductions on the basis of key disarmament principles, such as irreversibility, transparency and verification.
9.      Norway continues to encourage the United States and the Russian Federation to take incremental steps in dealing with non-strategic nuclear weapons with a view to fully implementing the Presidential nuclear initiatives of 1991/92 and to reach a legally binding arrangement.
10.     Irreversible reductions and the destruction of nuclear arsenals and stockpiles of weapons-related material are also a clear expression of the intention to reduce the role of nuclear weapons in security policies.
11.     Norway would also encourage other nuclear-weapon States to continue their efforts in preparing for reductions in their arsenals.
12.     Norway welcomes the steps already taken by some nuclear-weapon States in moving excess military stocks to civilian purposes. This demonstrates that nuclear disarmament can facilitate the right to peaceful use.
13.     Norway is however disappointed that the Trilateral Initiative has never been implemented. Norway encourages the nuclear-weapon States and IAEA to reconsider implementation of this important initiative or to explore possible new arrangements. The technical, procedural and judicial frameworks developed under the Trilateral Initiative seemed to provide a good basis for future disarmament verification efforts.

                Capping future production

14.     It is highly discouraging that the international community has not moved forward on a much-needed fissile materials cut-off treaty. For more than 10 years, negotiations on such a treaty has been considered the next step on the multilateral disarmament agenda.
15.     Until a fissile materials cut-off treaty is in place, it is vital that nuclear-weapon States declare or reconfirm their moratoriums on the production of fissile materials for nuclear-weapon purposes. Norway urges all nuclear-weapon States that have not already done so to declare a moratorium at the earliest time.
16.     The Conference on Disarmament now seems to have come closer to commencing negotiations on a treaty without preconditions and on the basis of the proposal of the six Presidents. Norway strongly urges all member States participating in the Conference on Disarmament to demonstrate maximum flexibility and finally break the impasse of the Conference.
17.     From a Norwegian perspective, a fissile materials cut-off treaty would cap future production of weapon materials and hence be a most effective measure to prevent further nuclear arms races. As such it would send a clear message of a further diminished role for nuclear weapons in the future.
18.     A fissile materials cut-off treaty should also provide for verification provisions and address the issue of stocks. While Norway is sensitive to concerns that verification may be less than perfect, it is also notable that, over the years, considerable experience has been gained in the field of verification. Non-nuclear-weapon States are already bound by a de facto treaty with verification. Several nuclear-weapon States have already placed some of their civilian installations under IAEA supervision. In France and the United Kingdom, all civilian enrichment and reprocessing facilities are available for EURATOM and IAEA safeguards. Given that some of the existing military facilities might be decommissioned in the future, verification would seem even less difficult.
19.     A fissile materials cut-off treaty that also deals with existing stocks of fissile materials would undoubtedly strengthen the disarmament dimension of such a treaty. Until that is agreed, Norway encourages nuclear-weapon States to place material designated as no longer required for military purposes under the IAEA verification regime.
20.     The announced nuclear test carried out by the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea last year demonstrates the urgency in achieving an entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty. Norway urges all annex II countries to ratify the Treaty in a timely manner.
21.     Pending an entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty, the international community must sustain the non-test norm. Nuclear-weapon States must maintain their test moratoriums. The Treaty organization must be supported, both politically and financially, in completing the international monitoring system. While such steps are important, Norway reiterates that they cannot replace the importance of having a legally binding test ban in force.

                Nuclear-weapon-free zones and negative security assurances

22.     Norway regards nuclear-weapon-free zones on the basis of established United Nations guidelines as a major contribution to achieving a world free of nuclear weapons. Such zones would lead to enhanced regional confidence and stability, which are essential conditions for further arms reduction.
23.     The concept of regional nuclear-weapon-free zones is also an important feature of the overall global non-proliferation architecture.
24.     Such zones would facilitate the process of achieving legally binding negative security assurances. In this way, regional nuclear-weapon-free zones contribute to our agreed objective of reducing the role of nuclear weapons in security policies.
25.     Norway hopes it will be possible to move forward on the question of promoting nuclear-weapon-free zones. A Korean Peninsula without nuclear weapons would be an important disarmament achievement, as would a zone free of weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery in the Middle East.
26.     Negative security assurances would also contribute to the Treaty by reducing the attractiveness for States to acquire nuclear arms, thereby furthering non proliferation. Negative security assurances also contribute to nuclear disarmament by removing the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons against non nuclear-weapon States. This would in turn lead to a diminished role of nuclear arms in security policies.
27.     Norway has supported the commencement of negotiations to reach legally binding negative security assurances within the NPT. In the meantime, Norway calls upon nuclear-weapon States to abide by their unilateral security assurances given in the Security Council in 1995.

                Transparency

28.     Transparency is an essential confidence-building measure. It is vital that nuclear-weapon States demonstrate their will to fulfil their disarmament obligations. Recent consultations in the Conference on Disarmament have demonstrated that there is a widespread perception that more could be done in this field.
29.     Although enhanced transparency is an obligation for all States parties, nuclear-weapon States have a particular responsibility in this respect. Norway appreciates the reports submitted by the nuclear-weapon States in the previous Review Cycle and welcomes the reports to be submitted in the 2010 Review Process.