Reaching Critical Will

Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT)

Conference on Disarmament

General Assembly First Committee

UN Disarmament Commission

Special Session on Disarmament

First session
Vienna, 30 April-11 May 2007

Cluster II

Working paper submitted by Norway

Supporting nuclear disarmament

1. Nuclear non-proliferation is essential for maintaining international peace and stability. Non-proliferation is a precondition for achieving our goal of a world free of nuclear weapons.
2. The NPT has established a fundamental norm by emphasizing verification and confidence-building. Given new security threats it is imperative to strengthen the non-proliferation dimension of the NPT. This should be a prime task for the review process.

Addressing current proliferation challenges

3. Norway remains deeply concerned about the nuclear activities of the Islamic Republic of Iran. Recent developments including the announcement of an enhanced pace of enrichment activities, will make it even more difficult to find a political solution to the nuclear dispute. Norway urges Iran to comply with the international demands made by a unanimous United Nations Security Council.
4. Norway strongly deplored the nuclear test carried out by the DPRK last fall as well as the missile test last summer. Norway has on a number of occasions underlined that the DPRK is bound by its NPT obligations. The six-party negotiations in Beijing must ensure a nuclear-weapon-free Korean Peninsula. It is now vital to secure full implementation of the February accord in Beijing. Norway expects the DPRK to dismantle its nuclear programme under the supervision of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA).

Addressing weaknesses in the non-proliferation regime

5.      Despite impressive achievements, there are still loopholes in the international non-proliferation regime. Weaknesses in the regime that allowed an illicit network to operate and even flourish, must be addressed during the review process.
6.      The international community must give IAEA the necessary political and financial support to carry out its crucial task of administering international safeguards to ensure that nuclear technology for peaceful purposes is not diverted to nuclear weapons programmes.
7.      Norway regrets that the IAEA Committee on Safeguards and Verification has not been able to live up to its expectations. This Committee could have identified ways to overcome constraints in the international safeguards regime. It is important to enable IAEA to better collect relevant data, be better equipped with advanced technologies and further advance its network of cooperation with qualified laboratories.
8.      Safeguards and verification is at the heart of a credible non-proliferation regime. Norway remains convinced that a robust regime can be best achieved through a universal adherence to Comprehensive Safeguards and the Additional Protocol. Nearly 10 years after the Model Additional Protocol was adopted, it is in force in only 78 States. Norway calls upon those countries which have not done so to ratify and implement the Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement and the Additional Protocol without delay.
9.      It is the view of Norway that the Additional Protocol should be the condition for taking part in peaceful nuclear cooperation. Norway hopes this review process will forge a consensus on the need to universalize this crucial safeguards instrument.
10.     Norway recognizes that some countries with no or minor civilian nuclear programmes may find it too cumbersome to sign and implement comprehensive safeguards. Norway expects them to ratify and implement the revised Small Quantities Protocol.
11.     Norway underlines the importance of the benefits derived from integrated safeguards. This approach allows for cost saving, while at the same time enhancing assurances that civilian nuclear programmes are for peaceful purposes only. So far only 12 countries have qualified for integrated safeguards. Norway hopes the number will increase in the coming years.
12.     Security Council resolution 1540 (2004) calls on all United Nations Member States to establish and enforce effective domestic controls to prevent the proliferation of nuclear, chemical or biological weapons and their means of delivery. This resolution serves our collective security. It is important that all NPT States parties implement this resolution in good faith.
13.     Norway has supported the United Nations in promoting adherence and implementation by providing financial support and organizing international and regional workshops. There is a need for enhanced partnerships between donors and countries in need of assistance to put in place appropriate national legislation as well as enforcement.
14.     In this respect export controls play a crucial role. Export controls should not be seen as a constraint but rather as a facilitator for peaceful nuclear cooperation. This review process should foster a common understanding that nuclear export controls are a legitimate, necessary and desirable means of implementing the obligations of States parties under article III of the Treaty.
15.     Norway supports consideration on a more regular basis on the relevance of the list of items triggering IAEA safeguards and the procedures for implementation in the light of developments in technology, proliferation sensitivity, and changes in procurement practices. Norway calls for enhanced voluntary cooperation among States on guidelines to their nuclear-related exports. Norway underlines the important contribution by the Zangger Committee and the Nuclear Suppliers Group in sustaining the NPT norm.
16.     Norway also views the Proliferation Security Initiative as well as the Group of Eight Global Partnership Against the Spread of Weapons and Materials of Mass Destruction as important in supporting the NPT norm.

Nuclear terrorism

17.     A key objective of Security Council resolution 1540 (2004) is to prevent non State actors from acquiring nuclear weapons as well as nuclear materials and relevant technologies. Nuclear terrorism represents a fundamental security threat.
18.     It is vital that the Convention on Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism is fully universalized. This also applies to the revised Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material. Norway calls for full support and implementation of all relevant IAEA codes of conduct and guidelines.
19.     Norway has on a number of occasions expressed its support for the IAEA Nuclear Security Fund. It is important that IAEA’s activities in nuclear security receive sustained and predictable funding.
20.     Norway is in particular pleased with IAEA activities to assist countries which are converting their civilian nuclear research reactors from using highly enriched uranium to low enriched uranium. Indeed, large quantities of fissile materials pose significant proliferation risks. The emerging threat of nuclear terrorism makes it even more imperative to address the challenges posed by civilian use of highly enriched uranium.
21.     Last year Norway organized an international symposium on minimization of highly enriched uranium in the civilian sector. There was broad agreement that it is technically feasible to convert most civilian reactors and isotope production facilities from highly enriched uranium to low enriched uranium. It was also noted that there is a convergence of views that it is possible and desirable to support voluntary cooperation on such conversion.
22.     In addition to global instruments, partnerships are emerging that address the dangers of nuclear proliferation and nuclear terrorism. Norway takes part in the Proliferation Security Initiative. Norway is contributing with considerable funds to the Group of Eight Global Partnership Against the Spread of Weapons and Materials of Mass Destruction. Norway supports the Global Threat Reduction Initiative as well as the European Union strategy against proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. Norway also welcomes the new Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism.

Sustaining the non-proliferation regime

23. Norway considers the Comprehensive Test-Ban Treaty and a future fissile material cut-off treaty as integral parts of a credible nuclear non-proliferation regime. Nuclear-weapon-free zones are also serving this purpose. Norway is also convinced that negative security assurances will reduce the attractiveness of acquiring nuclear weapons and hence contribute to consolidating the non proliferation regime.