

NGO Presentations
to the second session of the Preparatory Committee of the 2010 NPT Review Conference
28 April–9 May 2008, Geneva

Introduction

Convenor: Peter Weiss, President of the Lawyers' Committee on Nuclear Policy, and former President and current Vice President of the International Association of Lawyers Against Nuclear Arms

Speaker: John Burroughs, Lawyers' Committee on Nuclear Policy

The Chinese word for crisis consists of two characters, one representing danger and the other opportunity. This truism is particularly applicable to the current phase of the nuclear dilemma. The danger as well as the opportunity are in several ways greater than ever. Let me mention some of them:

- The current nuclear arsenals include weapons with many times the yield of the bombs the United States dropped on Hiroshima and Nagasaki. The most numerous warhead in the US arsenal has nearly seven times the yield of the Nagasaki bomb. The largest warhead in the Chinese arsenal has more than 250 times the Nagasaki yield. Try to imagine what devastation weapons with seven times and more the power of the Nagasaki explosion could cause if dropped on population centers or anywhere else on this globe.
- The new strategic doctrines of some of the nuclear weapons powers go considerably beyond the old ones. They envisage, for instance, the use of nuclear weapons in the event of “surprising military developments.” At least on paper, the conventionalization of nuclear weapons is in full swing.
- States possessing nuclear weapons are less committed to their elimination than they used to be, despite the clear requirements of NPT Article VI and the Advisory Opinion of the International Court of Justice. Speaking to reporters in Mumbai on March 4, 2008, General Kevin Chilton, the commander of US strategic forces, said: “I believe we are going to need a nuclear deterrent ... for the remainder of this century, ... I think what we need is a modernized nuclear weapon to go with our modernized nuclear platforms.”
- At the same time, the desire of some non-nuclear weapon states as well as non-state actors to “join the club” is becoming well nigh irresistible. Multilateral, universally applicable management and ownership of technology to make nuclear fuel—or nuclear bombs—have yet to be established, and Global Nuclear Energy Partnership-type proposals would promote reprocessing of spent fuel and use of plutonium-based nuclear fuel.

Now for a look at the bright side:

- The current situation in the Korean peninsula, which not long ago threatened to erupt into a full-scale war, demonstrates that nuclear diplomacy can work, even as between two determined opponents.
- Recent statements by high officials familiar with the nuclear question, including Dr. Blix, Dr. ElBaradei and a number of delegates to the Conference on Disarmament, have been made with a tone of urgency not heard before; they bring to mind Dr. King's phrase about “the fierce urgency of now.”
- Perhaps most important is the number of new and influential voices from all shades of the political spectrum—including former Cold Warriors like Sam Nunn and Henry Kissinger—calling for a nuclear weapons-free world. This is, of course, music to the ears of those of us in civil society who have been pursuing this goal for over half a century, despite its somewhat elitist tone. But never mind, we activists are used to this sort of thing: the people lead and eventually the leaders follow.

I thank you for this opportunity to be heard, on behalf of myself and my colleagues who will now address the details in which the devil is said to reside.

Appeal of the Hibakusha

Convenor: Yayoi Tsuchida, Japan Council against Atomic and Hydrogen Bombs (GENSUIKYO)

Speaker: TANAKA Terumi, Japan Confederation of A-and H-Bomb Sufferers Organizations (HIDANKYO)

Mr. President, distinguished delegates and NGO friends,

Thank you very much for giving me this opportunity to speak before you on behalf of HIDANKYO, the Japan Confederation of A-and H-Bomb Sufferers' Organizations.

My name is TANAKA Terumi and I am Secretary General of HIDANKYO. HIDANKYO is the only national organization of the survivors of Hiroshima and Nagasaki atomic bombing. We denounce the inhumanity and illegality of nuclear weapons and work to achieve the state compensation for the A-bomb damage, and to abolish all nuclear weapons from the world.

I am a survivor of the Nagasaki A-bombing of August 9, 1945. I was 13 years old and was inside my house located at 3.2 kilometers from the blast center. Suddenly I felt a brilliant flash. While feeling that flash changing colors from white to blue, orange and red, I lost consciousness. After a while, I found myself under several panes of glass blown by the blast. Miraculously, I did not suffer heavy injuries. Though I had to go through hardships as the Hibakusha (A-bomb survivor), anyhow I could survive and today speak before you as a living witness of the incident.

However, I lost five of my family members all at once—my grandfather, uncle, two aunts and a cousin, university student who had been back from his school in Tokyo. Hit by intense heat rays, they were burned directly or trapped under the clashed house and burned to death. My uncle, who escaped instant death without any apparent injuries eventually died with high fever, and destruction of his body cells by radiation. With my own hands, I cremated the body of my aunt in the field, who survived only a few days after the bombing with heavy burns. This sad experience at the age of 13 and the scenes of A-bomb hell on the ground keep coming back to me vividly even after about 63 years.

I would like to introduce to you Ms. SASAMORI Shigeko, a survivor of the Hiroshima. She was also a 13 year old student. When she was about to start the building demolition work located at 1.5 kilometers from the ground zero, the heat rays and hot blast suddenly attacked her. Though heavily burned on her face and the upper half of the body, she narrowly escaped death. She now lives in the U.S. and continues to speak out on the atrocity of nuclear weapons and call on the world to abolish all nuclear weapons. It is impossible for her to bear witness on her experience in only a few minutes. So I cordially ask you to make opportunities to listen to her experience, sufferings and life.

The United States dropped the atomic bombs on Hiroshima and then Nagasaki in August 1945, in the closing days of the Second World War, when a total surrender by Japan was only a matter of time. The two bombs instantly destroyed the two cities, threw hundreds of thousands of civilians into the furnace, killing more than 200,000 people in the cruelest ways. All of these deaths were parents, children, brothers, sisters or friends for us survivors and irreplaceable loved ones.

The atomic bombs left those who barely survived the hell with radiation-induced aftereffects and wounds in their bodies and mind. They continue to suffer and die even after about 63 years.

The U.S. government still carries on its surveys on several tens of thousands of Hibakusha started during the period of occupation, which reveals the seriousness of the continuing damage from radiation.

Bearing the pains of unhealing scars, the Hibakusha have survived and continued to call, "Such sufferings should never fall on anyone, anywhere in the world" and "Abolish nuclear weapons now!" During these years, the Hibakusha have never claimed for "revenge" or "retaliation". Out of our own experience, we know that if a third nuclear weapon should be used, it would mean the end of humans and all life on this planet.

Nuclear weapons must never be allowed to exist. We must abolish them urgently. They are the weapons of devil, and cannot coexist with humans.

Despite our appeals, there are still more than 20,000 nuclear weapons in the world. We the Hibakusha cannot bear this fact, and we cannot sit still. Those pro-nuclear forces, especially the United States, still try to take every opportunity to use nuclear weapons. The danger of nuclear weapons being used is still with us.

With the possession of nuclear weapons by India, Pakistan and Israel, the NPT regime is at a crisis. We the Hibakusha

strongly request all the States of the world to sincerely implement the obligations under the NPT. We urge the Nuclear Weapons States to implement the 13 steps agreed at the 2000 NPT Review Conference, especially, their unequivocal undertaking to eliminate their nuclear arsenals.

To our encouragement, we are witnessing the shift of current and growing international opinion in favor of nuclear disarmament and abolition. In addition to long-term effort and initiatives made by the New Agenda Coalition and Non-Aligned Movement to achieve the abolition of nuclear weapons, a call “Toward a Nuclear-Free World” was made twice in 2007 and 2008 by senior leaders on nuclear policy of the U.S., including Mr. Henry Kissinger. This has reverberated in the whole world and inspired anti-nuclear peace forces globally. It was followed by the initiative of the government of Norway that convened the international conference for “Achieving the Vision of a World Free of Nuclear Weapons.” All these moves give great inspiration to us Hibakusha.

The Hibakusha welcome and support the conclusion of a treaty totally banning nuclear weapons as proposed in the Vision 2020 of the Mayors for Peace. The Model Nuclear Weapons Convention has already been tabled before the debates at the NPT and the U.N. If the countries of the world abide by and sincerely implement their international commitments, we can open the path to achieve a nuclear weapon-free world.

We request that the 2010 NPT Review Conference will set the path and goal to achieve the abolition of nuclear weapons, and start multilateral negotiations to this end. Hand in hand with the anti-nuclear peace movements in Japan and of the world, we pledge to do our utmost for the success of this NPT Conference.

Lastly, nearly 63 years have passed since the nuclear weapons were actually used. Both in Japan and internationally, the knowledge about this fact is fading among people. We ask all the governments of the world to educate their peoples about the inhumanity and devilish nature of nuclear weapons through learning the facts about the A-bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, and build up the will to abolish them. Please listen to the witnesses of the Hibakusha, and pass on the Hibakusha’s experiences to future generations as the legacy of the human community.

For preventing another Hibakusha, and for the survival of human beings:
No More Hiroshimas! No More Nagasakis!
No More Hibakusha! No More War!

Renewal vs. Disarmament: Update on Disarmament Compliance

Convenors: Michael Spies, Lawyers' Committee on Nuclear Policy; Ray Acheson, Reaching Critical Will of the Women's International League for Peace and Freedom

Speaker: Michael Spies, Lawyers' Committee on Nuclear Policy

In this presentation, we will focus on what we consider not only the most disturbing regressions but also positive developments in nuclear disarmament since the 2007 PrepCom, in order to provide context for the presentations that will follow.

The Nuclear Weapon States: Two Narratives

There are two competing narratives of the compliance of the NPT nuclear weapon states with their obligations to achieve nuclear disarmament under Article VI. According to the first narrative, the overall trend of global nuclear arsenals continues to be quantitatively downward, which is welcomed. In their statements to the multilateral disarmament fora, the nuclear weapons states claim this trend demonstrates their adherence to their disarmament obligations. However, there is a second and perhaps more important narrative. Arguably, this trend is a result mostly of economic considerations, the ongoing qualitative improvement of existing weapon systems, and the deployment of newer, more capable systems. Since the end of the Cold War, this trend has also been accompanied by large-scale investment in an increasingly globalized military-nuclear economy, driven by high technology elites that demand a long-term commitment to military-industrial spending that far exceeds Cold War levels. At the end of this cycle of reductions, the numbers of weapons will plateau in the thousands and this new number will represent the permanent balance of terror.

The following survey fleshes out the latter narrative:

United States

On 4 March 2008, General Kevin Chilton, Commander of US Strategic Command told reporters that he believes the United States will need nuclear weapons for the remainder of the 21st century, including modernized nuclear weapons to go with modernized delivery systems.¹ The warhead and delivery system modernizations referred to by General Chilton have been long under way, and continued throughout 2007.

Despite congressional cancellation of funding for the Reliable Replacement Warhead (RRW), Congress created a new program continuing research on the basis of studies completed on RRW, leaving the door open for possible new warheads. In the shadow of this debate, in 2007 the United States continued life extension programs to modernize its existing stockpile and, in some cases, improve their military capabilities.

In 2007, the United States continued to rebuild capacity to produce plutonium triggers and, for 2008, Congress continues to fund construction of a new plutonium facility at Los Alamos National Laboratory. In 2007, a decade-long effort to reestablish interim pit production at Los Alamos bore fruit. On 27 September 2007, the United States certified the first W88 warhead containing a replacement plutonium pit—this was the first such pit to be manufactured by Los Alamos in 18 years.

Throughout 2007, the United States continued a series of multi-billion-dollar modernization efforts related to its strategic delivery systems. Congress appropriated more than a billion dollars in 2008 for modernization and life extension of the Trident II D5 submarine-launched ballistic missile, to extend its service life through 2042 and to upgrade the missile's electronics, guidance, and reentry systems. The United States also continued a \$7–8 billion effort to modernize its Minuteman III intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs), intended to improve the system's guidance, propulsion, and reentry systems, and to support its deployment through 2020 when the United States is expected to deploy a new delivery system.

Another disturbing trend has been the development of long-range delivery platforms for conventional use. In January 2007 the US Navy wrapped up an 18 month booster demonstration program of a new submarine-launched intermediate-

¹ "As we look to the future—and I believe we are going to need a nuclear deterrent for this country for the remainder of this century, the 21st century—I think what we need is a modernized nuclear weapon to go with our modernized delivery platforms." General Kevin Chilton, Commander of US Strategic Command, quoted in "US needs nuclear weapons for rest of century: general," Agence France-Presse, 4 March 2008.

range ballistic missile related to the Prompt Global Strike program.² Although the Navy requested additional funding to continue this work in 2008, amid domestic and international criticism of this conventional Trident concept, Congress limited the program in 2008 to research and development on a broader range of prompt global strike concepts.³

Russia

Russia maintains the largest nuclear stockpile and asserts a posture of “minimally sufficient” deterrence, envisioning the retention of nuclear weapons for the foreseeable future.

Throughout 2007, Russia continued to reduce the size of its nuclear stockpile, dismantling more than 35 of its Topol road-mobile ICBMs. These reductions, however, will be partially offset by the continued deployment of newer, more capable road-mobile Topol-M missiles. In February 2008, the Strategic Rocket Forces announced deployment of 11 new Topol-Ms by the end of 2008, which would bring the total number of deployed Topol-Ms to 65 by the end of 2008.⁴ Russia may place multiple warheads on its Topol-Ms after the expiration of START in 2009. In addition, Russia has also begun consideration of developing a new ICBM.⁵

In April 2007, Russia launched the first of its new Borey-class of nuclear ballistic missile submarines, with a second expected to come online in 2008. In 2006 Russia began construction of a third Borey-class SSBN and plans to eventually begin a fourth. After repeated test failures in 2006, Russia certified its new Bulava SLBM for manufacture in 2007, conducting a partially-successful test of the missile. The missiles are to be deployed aboard the Borey-class submarines.

In January, after delays, Russia completed its first Tu-160 supersonic strategic bomber in almost eight years, bringing its total to 15. It also continues to slowly modernize its strategic aviation fleet.

Like the other nuclear weapon states, Russia continues to actively modernize its delivery systems and it maintains a robust testing program. In 2007, Russia conducted several tests of its Topol-M, including two configured with multiple independently targetable reentry vehicles. Russia has announced plans to conduct 11 missile test-launches in 2008, indicating it would double this rate after 2009.⁶

China

China continues to be the only NPT nuclear weapon state that is both qualitatively and quantitatively adding to its nuclear arsenal. An annual US intelligence report stated China’s nuclear arsenal had increased by about a third since 2006 due to deployment of new intercontinental- and intermediate-range ballistic missiles, as well as nuclear-capable cruise missiles.⁷

In 2007, NGO experts reported China had launched two additional Type 094 SSBNs, bringing its total to three.⁸ US intelligence predicts China “will likely” build up to five additional Type 094 submarines by 2010.⁹ China’s new sea-launched ballistic missile, the JL-2, is not expected to be ready for deployment before 2010.

2 As stated in US Defense planning and budget documents, the purpose of this program is to develop next generation strategic weapons to allow the United States to strike at any place on the globe within an hour.

3 Congress consolidated funding for related to Air Force and Navy prompt global strike programs into a single defense-wide program for research and development of “promising technologies” related to propulsion and guidance systems, mission planning, reentry vehicle design, modeling and simulation efforts, and launch system infrastructure. Congress provided \$100 million for this purpose for 2008.

4 Colonel General Nikolai Solovtsov, commander of Russia’s Strategic Rocket Forces, quoted in “Topol-M deployment in 2008,” Russian strategic nuclear forces, 27 February 2008, www.russianforces.org/blog/2008/02/topolm_deployment_in_2008.shtml

5 Pavel Podvig, “The truth about Russia’s military ‘resurgence,’” *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists*, 29 January 2008.

6 Planned launches in 2008 include training and life-extension tests of the SS-25, SS-19, and SS-18 missiles, and two more development tests of the Topol-M. “Rocket forces launch plans for 2008,” Russian strategic nuclear forces, 27 February 2008, www.russianforces.org/blog/2008/02/rocket_forces_launch_plans_for.shtml.

7 According to the report, new deployments included: less than ten 7200km-range DF-31s and less than ten 11,200km-range DF-31As, the latter of which has reportedly not been flight-tested; and 10–20 1800km-range DF-21s. The report also indicated China deployed 50–250 DH-10 cruise missiles, which can carry either a conventional or nuclear warhead, on 20–30 launchers. “Annual Report to Congress: Military Power of the People’s Republic of China, 2008,” Office of the Secretary of Defense, www.fas.org/nuke/guide/china/dod-2008.pdf.

8 Hans Kristensen, “Two More Chinese SSBNs spotted,” *FAS Strategic Security Blog*, 4 October 2007, www.fas.org/blog/ssp/2007/10/two_more_chinese_ssbn_spotted.php.

9 US NGOs have expressed skepticism about this claim, however. Cf. Hans Kristensen, “Chinese Nuclear Arsenal Increased by a Third Since 2006, Pentagon Report Indicates,” *FAS Strategic Security Blog*, 6 March 2008, www.fas.org/blog/ssp/2008/03/chinese_nuclear_arsenal_increased.php.

France

On 21 March 2008, at a ceremony to launch the fourth of its newest class of SSBNs, President Sarkozy announced a reduction in France's air-based nuclear forces and called for pursuit of nuclear disarmament steps at the 2010 NPT Review Conference. These reductions are welcomed, as are France's high-level affirmations of disarmament.

While France says it has reduced the size of its nuclear stockpile to half that of its Cold War arsenal, however, it also continues to modernize its nuclear forces. France has arrived at the deployment phase of a major effort to renew both its sea- and air-based nuclear capability.

France is continuing a posture of deploying four SSBNs. In March 2008, France launched its fourth Le Triomphant-class SSBN, which is expected to replace the last Le Redoutable/L'Inflexible-class SSBN. France also expects to begin taking delivery of new SLBMs with new warheads in 2010, for deployment aboard its submarines.

The French Air Force is expected to take delivery of its first squadron of the new Rafale F3 nuclear fighter-bomber in 2008. The French Navy is expected to take delivery of the carrier-based version of the Rafale F3 in 2009. The planes are to be equipped with a new cruise missile, the ASMP-A, which France expects to deploy aboard its Mirage 2000N fighter-bombers in late 2008. The cruise missiles, equipped with a new warhead, are expected to be deployed on the Rafale F3 around 2010.

United Kingdom

The United Kingdom's disarmament record has been arguably the brightest among the nuclear weapon states. Yet it has already set into motion its plans to retain nuclear weapons at least through mid-century.

The UK parliament decided in March 2007 to endorse the government's plans to begin development of new SSBN, to begin deployment by 2024. As part of that decision, the United Kingdom will participate in the US programs, described above, to modernize and extend the service life of its Trident II D5 missile system to 2042.

The Government's 2006 Defense White Paper, which also recommended replacement of the Trident missile submarines, also recommended the reduction of the UK stockpile to 160 warheads. Unlike the most recent US-Russia bilateral arms reductions agreement, the warheads withdrawn from the stockpile will be dismantled, making these reductions permanent.¹⁰

Our question to the United States, Russia, China, France, and even the UK—which we hope you will ask again and again during this PrepCom and the entire Review cycle—is “In what specific ways do these nuclear modernization programs fulfill your disarmament obligations under Article VI of the Treaty?”

Positive Developments: Increased Transparency

These prevailing trends aside, in addition to arsenal reductions there have been some positive developments that should be acknowledged. At last year's PrepCom, three nuclear weapon states provided detailed information about the size and composition of their nuclear arsenals, which is a welcome transparency measure we hope is repeated this year by all five nuclear weapon states. Last year, the delegations of the nuclear weapon states also increased their level of interaction with civil society, engaging in a number of briefings and exchanges. We also hope this trend continues as such exchanges promote transparency and can contribute to the substance of deliberations leading into the 2010 Review Conference.

We are very interested in UK government initiatives to turn Britain into a “disarmament laboratory” and were particularly heartened by the election in May 2007 of a majority in the Scottish Parliament committed to getting rid of Trident and making Scotland—and the world—nuclear weapon free. We hope that the Scottish government's newly-convened working group on “A Scotland Without Nuclear Weapons” can carry these nuclear free aspirations further, and believe that Scotland's desire to become nuclear free should be supported by all states parties to the NPT.

We apologize for the brevity of this analysis of positive developments, and wish there were more to report.

¹⁰ “The warheads that will be withdrawn from service won't simply sit on a shelf as a hedge against a future scenario – they will be truly dismantled.” Statement by UK Ambassador John Duncan to the 2007 NPT Preparatory Committee, 8 May 2007.

Nuclear Weapons Operational Readiness/Operating Status

Convenor: John Hallam, Nuclear Flashpoints

Speaker: John Hallam, Nuclear Flashpoints

In an important development, in early December 2007, the United Nations General Assembly adopted a resolution on “Decreasing the operational readiness of nuclear weapons systems,” with 139 in favour, 3 against, and 34 abstentions. The resolution, co-sponsored by Chile, New Zealand, Nigeria, Sweden, and Switzerland, attracted controversy and attention, despite its careful wording.

The initiative was announced in Wellington by the New Zealand Minister for Disarmament Hon. Phil Goff on 30 August 2007 at a press conference with Dr. Hans Blix, Chair of the Commission on Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD). It followed a strong NGO campaign on the issue of operating status and recommendations from a number of highly authoritative bodies including the WMD Commission (Recommendation 17), and an appeal signed by 44 Nobel prizewinners.

Interest in the draft UN resolution was clear from the high turn-out to a panel on operational status of nuclear weapons held on 17 October, which featured New Zealand Ambassador Don Mackay, Swedish Counselor Magnus Hellgren, and de-alerting advocates Steven Starr and John Hallam, coordinator of the 44-nobels international appeal on operational status of nuclear weapons.

(Another such panel will take place 10:00am-1:00pm on 6 May in the NGO room.)

Of particular interest and concern to the audience of diplomats, UN officials, and civil society were the reports of incidents where high alert status could have resulted in a nuclear exchange by accident or miscalculation, the information on possibilities for infiltration of nuclear command systems by terrorists, and the new models of severe climatic change from the use of even a small number of nuclear weapons.

More recently, the sponsors of the L29 resolution on operational readiness, Chile, New Zealand, Nigeria, Sweden and Switzerland, made a joint statement in the Conference on Disarmament at an informal session, in which they reiterated the importance of progress on the operational readiness of nuclear weapons systems and expressed optimism that progress on this issue may be possible.

The reason so many people have urged that nuclear weapons be taken off launch-on-warning is that there have been numerous incidents involving mishaps with nuclear command and control systems. Examples include: computer glitches; confusion regarding the close resemblance between high clouds over North Dakota and launch-to-surveillance satellites; and an incident concerning a Norwegian weather research rocket in which the ultimate issue at stake was the possible use of the core strategic inventories: the silo-based missile forces of the U.S. and Russia

Dr. Bruce Blair, former Minuteman ICBM Launch Control Officer and now President of the World Security Institute, clearly rebutted the US. denial, made at the 2007 UNGA First Committee, of its having forces on 'hair-trigger alert.' Dr. Blair countered that U.S. standard operating procedures still envisage massive retaliation to a presumed strike in timeframes that allow only for rote, lightning-fast, checklist-based decision-making. Such decisions could starkly affect the survival of civilization.

Dr. Blair argued, “Both the United States and Russia today maintain about one-third of their total strategic arsenals on launch-ready alert. Hundreds of missiles armed with thousands of nuclear warheads—the equivalent of about 100,000 Hiroshima bombs—can be launched within a very few minutes.”

Dr. Hans Kristensen, Director of the Nuclear Information Project of the Federation of American Scientists, also effectively rebutted U.S. claims that U.S. nuclear forces are planned and postured to provide the President with maximum decision time and flexibility. Dr. Kristensen noted that the most important aspect of U.S. strategic planning since the end of the Cold War, the Global Strike Mission, deepens the U.S. commitment to keep U.S. nuclear forces on high-alert. In fact, it even includes the possibility of the pre-emptive use of U.S. nuclear forces against adversaries (nuclear and non-nuclear) perceived to be planning the use of WMD.

Recent and previous work on the climatic effects of nuclear exchanges suggest that major climatic impacts from a nuclear exchange start with less than 200–400 warheads used for the destruction of cities. The “climate effects” paper you will hear later on will give more of the details that are literally chilling. The most recent work by Mills and Toon on a hypothetical India-Pakistan nuclear exchange suggests that as few as 100 warheads used for the destruction of large cities

will have a massive global climatic impact.

The possible use of between tens, and thousands, of nuclear warheads, as a consequence of madness, malice, miscalculation, or malfunction is both a catastrophe beyond imagination, and is completely avoidable.

Coordinated actions and agreements to lower the operational readiness of nuclear weapons systems would be both a major step toward the goal of nuclear weapons abolition and a vital interim measure that would vastly decrease the likelihood of an accidental end to civilisation. So would taking other measures that would decrease the chance of accidental nuclear weapons use, such as the implementation of the Memorandum of Understanding establishing a strategic stability centre, three times announced by the US and Russian governments but never implemented.

Unfortunately the recent 'strategic framework' document issued by Presidents Putin and Bush in Sochi does nothing to advance this particular issue, though it talks of a post-START agreement. The incorporation of measures to lower the risk of nuclear weapons use into a post-START agreement would be helpful.

I urge everyone here who takes seriously the preambles of so many resolutions in which nuclear weapons are said to be a threat to human survival, to give the issue of operating status or operational readiness the highest priority.

I especially urge them to lend their governments' authority both to the efforts by Chile, New Zealand, Nigeria, Sweden, and Switzerland, and to the efforts of other governments—India, Japan, NAM—to press for a lowering in operational readiness of nuclear weapons systems. This is a call that needs to be made in NPT Prepcom working papers and in end of the year statements to the General Assembly as well as in votes. To this end, there needs to be maximum cooperation between different groups.

I also particularly urge both official nuclear weapons states and others that have nuclear weapons systems to take on board repeated votes by UN bodies and to revise their doctrines and operational procedures so that the “notice to fire” of nuclear weapons systems is measured in days, weeks and months rather than minutes, and to take whatever other measures will avoid an accidental apocalypse.

I conclude by reminding us all that the only truly safe nuclear weapon is one that does not exist.

Climate and Health Effects of Regional Nuclear War

Convenors: John Loretz, International Physicians for the Prevention of Nuclear War; Ira Helfand, MD, IPPNW, Physicians for Social Responsibility-USA; Steven Starr, Lobbyist, Physicians for Global Survival-Canada; John Hallam, Editor, Nuclear Flashpoints

Speaker: Dr. Gunnar Westberg, IPPNW

The prospect of a nuclear winter—a catastrophic global cooling caused by the release of smoke and soot from the explosion of thousands of nuclear weapons and resulting in the collapse of the Earth's life supporting ecosystems—contributed greatly to the realization by the US and the former Soviet Union that a nuclear war could not be won and must not be fought.

While that danger now seems remote, it has not disappeared. US-Russian arms accords have reduced by two-thirds the total number of nuclear weapons in the world's arsenals since nuclear winter was first described in the 1980s. Nonetheless, there are still more than 25,000 nuclear weapons in the world, enough to precipitate nuclear winter several times over.

Until recently, however, there was an unexamined assumption that a smaller, regional nuclear war, while it would cause unacceptable millions of casualties and unprecedented local devastation, would not produce ecological effects at the global level. Those assumptions have been proven false in new research studies conducted by climate scientists who have concluded that a nuclear war involving no more than 100 Hiroshima-sized nuclear weapons—about 0.3% of the global nuclear arsenal—could have terrifying, long-lasting effects on the global climate.

In this presentation, we will summarize very briefly the findings of US scientists Richard B. Turco, O. B. Toon, Alan Robock, and their colleagues^{11, 12, 13} as well as public health implications derived from their research by International Physicians for the Prevention of Nuclear War. We urge you to read the full studies, and we would be happy to refer you to online sites where you can obtain them.

The studies looked at the consequences of a possible regional nuclear war in South Asia, using numbers of weapons currently estimated to exist in the combined arsenals of India and Pakistan. This scenario is only exemplary. In addition to the nine countries that already possess nuclear weapons, 32 own sufficient fissionable nuclear materials to construct them, placing several other regions of the world at risk of nuclear war on the scale described here should the non-proliferation regime unravel.

Population and economic activity in India and Pakistan are congregated in megacities, which probably would be targeted in a nuclear conflict. An examination of the likely outcome of a nuclear exchange in South Asia involving the 100 15-kt weapons available in the combined Indian and Pakistani arsenals shows that such an exchange could have devastating immediate effects, killing 20 million people, a number equal to half of all those killed worldwide during the six years of World War II. In addition, there would be tremendous economic consequences with the megacities exposed to atmospheric fallout likely abandoned indefinitely.

As horrible as these regional effects would be, however, they might well be dwarfed by the global climate consequences of this conflict.

Smoke and soot from urban firestorms caused by the multiple nuclear explosions—1–5 million metric tons—would rise into the upper troposphere and, due to atmospheric heating, would subsequently be boosted deep into the stratosphere. The resulting soot cloud would block the sun leading to significant cooling and reductions in precipitation lasting for over a decade. Within 10 days following the explosions, there would be a drop in average surface temperature of 1.25° C. Over the following year, a 10% decline in average global rainfall and a large reduction in the Asian summer monsoon is predicted. Even 10 years out, there would be a persistent 0.5° C average surface cooling. In a matter of days, temperatures around the Earth would become colder than those experienced during the pre-industrial Little Ice Age

11 Toon, Owen B., Richard P. Turco, Alan Robock, Charles Bardeen, Luke Oman, and Georgiy L. Stenchikov, 2007: Atmospheric effects and societal consequences of regional scale nuclear conflicts and acts of individual nuclear terrorism. *Atm. Chem. Phys.*, 7, 1973-2002.

12 Robock, Alan, Luke Oman, Georgiy L. Stenchikov, Owen B. Toon, Charles Bardeen, and Richard P. Turco, 2007: Climatic consequences of regional nuclear conflicts. *Atm. Chem. Phys.*, 7, 2003-2012.

13 Helfand, I An assessment of the extent of projected global famine resulting from limited ,regional nuclear war, *Royal Society of Medicine*, October 3, 2007.

(which occurred from approximately 1400 to 1850).

To make matters even worse, such amounts of smoke injected into the stratosphere would cause a huge reduction in the Earth's protective ozone. A study published in April by the National Academy of Sciences, using a similar nuclear war scenario involving 100 Hiroshima-size bombs, shows ozone losses in excess of 20% globally, 25–45% at midlatitudes, and 50–70% at northern high latitudes persisting for 5 years, with substantial losses continuing for 5 additional years. The resulting increases in UV radiation would have serious consequences for human health.

The sudden climate changes predicted by these studies would have a significant impact on agricultural production. The growing season would be shortened by 10 to 20 days in many of the most important grain producing areas in the world which might completely eliminate crops that have insufficient time to reach maturity. Large quantities of food might also need to be destroyed and significant areas of crop land might need to be taken out of production because of radioactive contamination.

There are currently more than 800 million people in the world who are chronically malnourished and several hundred million more live in countries which are dependent on imported grain. Even a modest, sudden decline in agricultural production could trigger significant increases in the prices for basic foods and hoarding on a global scale, both of which would make food inaccessible to poor people in much of the world. While it is not possible to estimate the precise extent of the global famine that would follow a regional nuclear war, it seems reasonable to fear a total global death toll in the range of one billion from starvation alone. Famine on this scale would also lead to major epidemics of infectious diseases, and would create immense potential for war and civil conflict.

As of mid-August of last year, global grain stocks were approximately 322 million tons with annual consumption at 2,098 million tons. Expressed as days of consumption world grain stocks are therefore approximately 49 days, lower than at any point in the last 50 years, and dramatically lower than the 100 to 120 days of consumption available in the 1980's and 1990's. These stocks would not provide any significant reserve in the event of a sharp decline in global production. In this setting we would expect to see much greater rises in grain prices worldwide. These price increases would put a crippling burden on whole countries which import large portions of their food supply and would make food unaffordable for hundreds of millions of individuals who are already malnourished precisely because of their inability to afford adequate food even at current world prices. In addition we would probably see hoarding on a global scale. In the event of a regional nuclear war, the grain exporting states would be faced with major crop losses and the prospect of bad harvests for the next several years. It is probable that they would refuse to export whatever grain surplus they might have, retaining it instead as a domestic reserve.

It is, of course, impossible to estimate with accuracy the full extent of the global famine that would follow a regional nuclear war. But it seems reasonable to conclude that few of the 800 million people who are already malnourished would survive if their already substandard intake decreased by even 10% for a whole year. If the crop failures and resulting food shortages persisted for several years their fate would be sealed.

Two other issues need to be considered as well. First, the vast megacities of the developing world, crowded, and often lacking adequate sanitation in the best of times, would almost certainly see major outbreaks of infectious diseases; and illnesses such as plague, which have not been prevalent in recent years, might again become major health threats.

Second, an immense potential for war and civil conflict would be created by famine on this scale. Within nations where famine is widespread there would almost certainly be food riots, and competition for limited food resources might well exacerbate ethnic and regional animosities. Among nations, armed conflict seems highly likely as states dependent on imports adopt whatever means are at their disposal in an attempt to maintain access to food supplies.

It is likewise impossible to estimate the additional global death toll from disease and further warfare that this "limited" regional nuclear war might cause but, given the worldwide scope of the climate effects, the dead from these causes might well number in the hundreds of millions.

These findings, while they need to be elucidated and refined, argue for a fundamental reassessment of the role of nuclear weapons in the world, and should inform the deliberations and proposals of this NPT Review cycle. If even a small nuclear war could trigger a global catastrophe, the only viable response is the complete abolition of nuclear weapons.

Missiles, Missile Defense, and Space Weaponization

Convenor: Jürgen Scheffran, IANUS/Zintl Institut

Speaker: Regina Hagen, International Network of Engineers and Scientists Against Proliferation

The emerging missile threat and missile race

Although the missile threat was reduced after the end of the Cold War, missile proliferation and its link to weapons of mass destruction (WMD) remains an international security concern. Nuclear weapons could potentially be delivered by a number of systems, including aircraft, ballistic missiles, cruise missiles, artillery and unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), as well as a wide range of low-technology options, such as civilian cars, ships or even suitcases.

Ballistic missile technology has spread to more than 30 countries, many of which have access only to Scud variants of short range (below the “Scud barrier” of 1000 km). Other than the NPT-recognized nuclear weapons states, only North Korea, India, Iran, Israel, and Pakistan have produced or flight-tested intermediate-range ballistic missiles with a range of between 1,000 km and 5500 km (the “INF barrier”). Iran denies intentions to build nuclear weapons. For the time being, only the five nuclear weapon states—the USA, Russia, the UK, France and China—have intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs). All those states continue to develop and test their missile arsenals. More countries have access to missile technology, such as Germany and Japan, but did not follow that path.

To overcome the Scud and INF barriers is a challenging and costly task, particularly as key components (e.g. accurate guidance, composite materials, thrust vector control, reentry technology) are not easily available on the market. Instead of going ballistic, countries could rely on cruise missiles which cost much less and are easier to acquire and to maintain, require less training and logistical support, and perform with better accuracy and reliability than ballistic missiles. Even more accessible are UAVs which have a high civil–military dual-use potential, and which are relatively cheap, available and easy to handle.

The use of artillery rockets and UAVs by Hezbollah against Israel demonstrates that the use of such weapons no longer is the exclusive privilege of technologically advanced state armies; it has become an option for low-tech states and non-state actors. This represents a significant addition to the missile threat.

Without adequate arms control strategies broadly supported by the international community, the risks of missile proliferation are likely to increase as long as technical capabilities are spreading and regional conflicts provide incentives to acquire advanced weapons. The United States seeks to counter the missile threat with preemptive strikes and missile defense, both of which are fuelling the missile arms race. There is an intensified drive to develop and deploy missile defense systems, despite widely-held skepticism over whether a multi-billion-dollar missile defense system actually will diminish the missile threat. Despite having spent more than \$110 billion on missile defense since 1985, the United States still does not have a reliable and tested architecture in place.

Several NATO member states and European companies are developing missile defense systems in cooperation with the United States, as are non-NATO states, including the Republic of Korea, Japan, Australia and Israel. India recently tested a system designed to intercept short and medium-range missiles. This activity is underway despite the fact that strategic missile defense still is not a proven technology and has yet to be tested in operationally realistic conditions.

Missile defense has potentially negative impacts on prospects for the reduction and elimination of nuclear forces. One example is the controversy over the US plan to deploy a missile defense system on two new military bases in Poland (for interceptors) and the Czech Republic (for a radar installation), purportedly intended to defend against Iranian missiles. Russia has objected strongly to this plan, arguing that the system could be used against its ICBMs and thus would undermine strategic stability. The controversy contributed to Russia’s decision to “suspend” implementation of the Conventional Forces in Europe Treaty and the threat to abandon the 1987 INF Treaty, and has prompted belligerent statements that Russia would target the missile defense sites.

This demonstrates that military responses to the missile threat, such as nuclear deterrence, preemption, counter-proliferation and missile defense, may aggravate the risks and provoke proliferation rather than prevent it. An offense-defense missile race could undermine international stability and disrupt regional balances. Removal of these weapons is an urgent issue on the international agenda.

Towards international missile control

To reduce the emerging missile threat, the time to take political action is now. The NPT preamble emphasizes “the elimination from national arsenals of nuclear weapons and the means of their delivery pursuant to a Treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control,” but the NPT does not further specify how this ultimate goal could be achieved for delivery systems.

Besides US-Russian agreements, there are no treaty constraints on the acquisition, development and deployment of missiles. The Missile Technology Control Regime, (MTCR) largely based on export controls among potential missile suppliers has been able to slow down or even end some missile programmes, but its effectiveness is limited if motivation to acquire missiles persists.

Limited efforts to curb missile proliferation have been undertaken, such as the Hague Code of Conduct, the Proliferation Security Initiative, and UN Security Council Resolution 1540. More far-reaching ideas, like the Russian proposal for a Global Control System and a Global Monitoring System on missile technology, have not been implemented. The UN Panels of Governmental Experts on Missiles have failed to reach agreement on substantive recommendations. It is unlikely that really effective measures to stop missile proliferation will be taken absent progress on limiting, reducing, and eliminating existing holdings, particularly those of the original nuclear weapons states. However, in recent years, arms control and disarmament have not been seriously considered for missiles, and other delivery systems have also been largely neglected.

The key for further progress is to find mechanisms that restrain both capabilities and motivation to acquire missiles. At the 1986 Reykjavik summit, Presidents Reagan and Gorbachev considered proposals for global elimination of ballistic missiles which were revisited after the end of the Cold War, for instance in the Zero Ballistic Missiles concept put forward in 1993 by the Federation of American Scientists and supported by Paul Nitze and others. In 1996, the Canberra Commission called for a “global treaty controlling longer range ballistic missiles” and, as an interim step, exploration of a missile flight test ban. Test restrictions would effectively prevent new missile designs and limit modification of traditional technology. To address concerns about asymmetries and discrimination, a “missile freeze” could cover offensive and defensive missiles.

The feasibility of missile control has been explained in *Beyond Missile Defense*, a 2002 briefing paper of the International Network of Engineers and Scientists Against Proliferation. The US-Soviet/Russian arms control experience shows that the deployment and storage of missiles can be monitored by satellite, and their destruction per agreement can be verified by on-site inspection. Missile tests can be monitored, and much of the infrastructure for missile development—e.g., production facilities, test ranges, missile containers—is susceptible to monitoring. An intermediate step towards a global missile ban would be a global INF Treaty.

In addition to controlling the weapons, building international and regional security regimes, combined with political and economic cooperation, would provide incentives to diminish reliance on missile arsenals. Regional approaches for arms control could include confidence-building measures like launch notification and exchanges of information, establishment of data centers, conversion programs. Diplomatic initiatives are required to reduce the role of ballistic missiles in critical regions (Northeast Asia, South Asia, Middle East) and to develop an international norm against ballistic missiles. The importance of regional approaches to disarmament and confidence building was demonstrated in South America (Argentina and Brazil) and South Asia (India and Pakistan).

A control regime on ballistic missiles could be extended to the international control of ballistic missile defenses, reversing the US withdrawal from the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty in 2002 and fulfilling the 2000 NPT commitment to the preservation and strengthening of that treaty. The terms of a new treaty could be made more precise and verifiable and/or be universalized. Such limits would relate to the altitude, relative distance and velocity of interceptor tests, and to limits on laser brightness or to the aperture of sensors and mirrors.

Prevention of an arms race in outer space

Control of missiles and missile defenses links to prevention of the weaponization of outer space, especially due to the close relationship between ballistic missiles and space launchers and the possibility that missile defense programs will pave the way for the full-fledged weaponization of space. While challenging, on-site monitoring of space rocket programs can minimize the risk that they will contribute to ballistic missile development. The case for a regime to control and monitor space launchers is greatly strengthened in the context of preventing an arms race in outer space. Since man-made objects in orbit would enter space through space launchers, a monitoring system at space launch facilities could not only search for indications of ballistic missile use, but also for the space-weapon usability of the payload. This would provide increased transparency concerning space activities in general, and would effectively exclude

the deployment and testing of space weapons using ground-based space launchers.

Since both missiles and missile defenses have a capability to attack satellites, their control relates directly to the protection of space-based objects. Destruction of satellites using ground or sea-based missiles or anti-missiles was demonstrated by the United States and the Soviet Union in the 1980s, and by China in 2007 and again the United States in 2008.

Outer space has been widely acknowledged as a common heritage of humankind, which should be used for the benefit of all countries. The international community has long been calling for the prevention of an arms race in outer space, seeking to strengthen international space law and arms control in space by introducing provisions against the weaponization of space. Russia and China presented a “draft treaty” in February 2008 at the Conference on Disarmament that was rejected by the United States, which continues to seek space dominance. Vulnerabilities and threats would be considerably increased with advanced space weapons, such as maneuverable space mines, micro-satellites, kinetic kill vehicles, chemical and nuclear explosives, or particle, microwave and laser beams. Transforming space from the “common heritage” of mankind into a “high frontier” for space warfare where weapons are used “to, from, in and through” space, contains considerable risks for all states, including the United States.

To avoid these risks, the transition from the militarization to the weaponization of space needs to be prevented. Comprehensive space arms control would seek to ban weapons against objects in space and from objects in space against any target, and would prohibit development, testing, and deployment of such systems altogether before more advanced weapons are tested or become operational. A comprehensive approach could integrate risk reduction measures and partial agreements in a phased approach. This would be also attractive to the general public and require an unprecedented degree of international cooperation.

Proposal for Nuclear Cooperation with India: A Nonproliferation Disaster

Convenors: Daryl Kimball, Arms Control Association; Philip White, Abolition 2000 US-India Deal Working Group

Speaker: John Loretz, International Physicians for the Prevention of Nuclear War

As we mark the 40th anniversary of the opening for signature of the nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT), global system for controlling and eliminating nuclear weapons is under severe stress. This presentation addresses a fundamental challenge to the treaty: the July 2005 proposal to carve-out a country-specific loophole in global nonproliferation norms and standards to allow a handful of nuclear supplier states to engage in nuclear cooperation with India, which is one of the few remaining NPT hold-out states.

We believe that each NPT state party has a role and responsibility to actively help ensure that any proposed nuclear cooperation with India, or with any other country outside the NPT, should be fully consistent with the treaty and all NPT Review Conference decisions, as well as United Nations Security Council resolution, the established practices of the IAEA safeguards system, and international nuclear disarmament and nonproliferation agreements, principles, and norms.

This presentation represents the views of more than 130 experts and nongovernmental organizations from 23 countries, including the President of the 1995 NPT Review and Extension Conference. It is based on a letter dated 7 January 2008 that was sent by these organizations and individuals to over 60 governments.

The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Board of Governors may soon be asked to consider a new “India-specific” safeguards agreement that would cover a limited number of additional “civilian” reactors. Shortly thereafter, the members of the 45-nation Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) will be asked to take a position on the Bush administration’s proposal to exempt India from longstanding NSG guidelines that require full-scope IAEA safeguards as a condition of supply. This would open the door for the United States and others to engage in nuclear trade with India for the first time since India detonated a nuclear device in 1974 that used plutonium harvested from a heavy water reactor supplied by Canada and the United States in violation of bilateral peaceful nuclear use agreements.

Contrary to the claims of its advocates, the proposed arrangement fails to bring India further into conformity with the nonproliferation behavior expected of other states. India’s commitments under the current terms of the proposed arrangement do not justify making far-reaching exceptions to international nonproliferation rules and norms. Consequently, the proposed arrangement would damage the already fragile nuclear nonproliferation system and set back efforts to achieve universal nuclear disarmament.

We your government and this meeting of NPT states parties has a responsibility to consider the full implications of the proposed agreement and to play an active role to help ensure that this controversial proposal does not:

- further undermine the nuclear safeguards system and efforts to prevent the proliferation of technologies that may be used to produce nuclear bomb material;
- in any way contribute to nuclear proliferation and/or the expansion of India’s nuclear arsenal; or
- otherwise grant India the benefits of civil nuclear trade without holding it to the same standards expected of other states parties of the NPT.

Please consider the following:

1) India is seeking “India-specific” safeguards over the additional facilities it has declared “civilian”. Indian officials insist that the continuation of these safeguards depends upon the continued supply of nuclear fuel from foreign suppliers. India may also assert that it has the option to remove certain “indigenous” reactors from safeguards if foreign fuel supplies are interrupted, even if that is because it has resumed nuclear testing. Such interpretations would be unprecedented and should be rejected whether they might be included in the actual safeguards agreement or accompanying statements.

As part of the final document of the 1995 NPT Review and Extension Conference, all NPT states parties endorsed the principle of full-scope safeguards as a condition of supply. A decision by a subset of the NPT states parties – the 45-nation NSG – to exempt India from this requirement for India would contradict this important element of the NPT bargain.

It should also be noted that the several countries that are parties to the Treaty of Pelindaba and the Treaty of Rarotonga

have made further commitments not to provide any source or special fissionable material to any NPT non-nuclear-weapon state unless the recipient state is under comprehensive IAEA safeguards.

We urge your government to actively oppose any arrangement that would give India any special safeguards exemptions or would in any way be inconsistent with the principle of permanent safeguards over all nuclear materials and facilities.

2) India pledged in July 2005 to conclude an Additional Protocol to its safeguards agreement. Given that India maintains a nuclear weapons program outside of safeguards, facility-specific safeguards on a few additional “civilian” reactors provide no serious nonproliferation benefits. States should insist that India conclude a meaningful Additional Protocol safeguards regime before the NSG takes a decision on exempting India from its rules.

3) The United States has put forward a draft NSG guideline that would allow NSG states to continue providing India with nuclear supplies even if New Delhi breaks its nuclear test moratorium pledge. Indian officials say they want changes to NSG guidelines that do not impinge upon their ability to resume nuclear testing. The U.S. proposal on India at the NSG would, in the case of a resumption of nuclear testing by India, make the suspension of nuclear trade optional for NSG members. Such an approach would undercut the international norm against nuclear testing and make a mockery of NSG guidelines. Nuclear supplier states should be immediately terminated if India resumes nuclear testing for any reason.

4) India is seeking exemptions from NSG guidelines and IAEA supply guarantees that would allow supplier states to provide India with a strategic fuel reserve that could be used to outlast any fuel supply cut off or sanctions that may be imposed if it resumes nuclear testing. The U.S.-India bilateral nuclear cooperation agreement includes political commitments to support an Indian strategic fuel reserve and an “India-specific” fuel supply arrangement. If nuclear supplier states should agree to supply fuel to India, they should do so in a manner that is commensurate with ordinary reactor operating requirements.

5) India is seeking and the United States has proposed an NSG guideline that would open the way for other nuclear suppliers to transfer sensitive plutonium reprocessing, uranium enrichment, or heavy water production technology to India even though IAEA safeguards cannot prevent such technology from being replicated and used in its weapons program. U.S. officials have stated that they do not intend to sell such technology, but other states may. Foreign-assisted enrichment and reprocessing, even if ostensibly confined to the civilian program, could help India in its military programs because Indian technicians could adapt civilian assistance to the weapons program through reverse engineering. So long as India maintains an unsafeguarded weapons program, no such technologies be transferred to India.

6) Absent a decision by New Delhi to halt the production of fissile material for weapons purposes, foreign fuel supplies would allow India not only to continue but also to potentially accelerate the buildup of its stockpile of nuclear weapons materials. This would not only contradict the goal of Article I of the NPT, but it would also foster further nuclear competition between India and Pakistan. India’s stated support for a global, verifiable fissile material cut-off treaty is welcome, but insufficient, especially given the decade-long gridlock in Geneva that has held up negotiations on the cut-off.

7) UN Security Council Resolution 1172 calls on India and Pakistan to sign the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) and stop producing fissile material for weapons, among other nuclear risk reduction measures. Your government is bound by the UN Charter to support the implementation of this resolution and states at this meeting should reiterate their commitment to the prompt realization of its goals.

Conclusion

The initiative for nuclear cooperation with India threatens to undermine the nuclear nonproliferation regime by granting India the benefits of nuclear commerce only accorded to NPT states parties, while securing no meaningful constraint on the growth of its nuclear weapons stockpile or commitment by India to accept the legal equivalent of the obligations set forth in Articles I and VI of the NPT.

We call on all NPT states parties to judge the proposal for nuclear cooperation according to the commitments they have made under the treaty and in the context of NPT Review Conferences, and according to the obligations imposed by UN Security Council resolutions passed in the aftermath of the May 1998 Indian and Pakistani nuclear tests. Rather than create exceptions to the rules of behavior expected of responsible states, NPT states parties should reaffirm the need for universal adherence to the treaty and for nuclear disarmament.

Individual Endorsements of Jan. 7, 2008 letter (organizations listed for identification purposes only)

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Pauline Mitchell
Campaign for International Cooperation and Disarmament
Melbourne (Australia)

David Noonan and Dave Sweeney
Nuclear Free Campaigners
Australian Conservation Foundation (Australia)

Cam Walker
National Liaison Officer, Friends of the Earth Australia

Dr Sue Wareham OAM
President
Medical Association for Prevention of War (Australia)

New Zealand

Dr Kate Dewes (Coordinator) and
Commander Robert D Green (Royal Navy (Ret'd))
Disarmament & Security Centre (Christchurch, New Zealand)

Barney Richards
National Secretary
Peace Council Aotearoa New Zealand

North America

Canada

Sr. Mary-Ellen Francoeur
President
World Conference of Religions for Peace (Canada)
Paul Hamel (President) and Phyllis Creighton (Secretary)
Science for Peace (Toronto Canada)

Dr. Jennifer Simons
Simons Foundation (Canada)

Laura Savinkoff
Boundary Peace Initiative (Canada)

Jessica West
Program Associate
Project Ploughshares (Waterloo, ON, Canada)

Physicians for Global Survival (Canada)

StopWar.ca (Canada)

United States of America

Rochelle Becker
Executive Director
Alliance for Nuclear Responsibility (San Luis Obispo, Ca,
USA)

John Burroughs

NGO Presentations—NPT PrepCom 2008—Check against delivery

Executive Director, Lawyers' Committee on Nuclear Policy
(New York, USA)

Glenn Carroll
Coordinator, Nuclear Watch South (Atlanta, USA)

David Culp
Legislative Representative
Friends Committee on National Legislation (Quakers)
(Washington, D.C. USA)

Mary Davis
Director of Yggdrasil, a project of Earth Island Institute
(Lexington, KY, USA)

Keith Gunter
Citizens' Resistance at Fermi Two (Monroe, MI, USA)

David Hartsough
Executive Director
Peaceworkers (San Francisco, CA, USA)

Alice Hirt
Don't Waste Michigan (Holland, MI, USA)

Michael J. Keegan
Coalition for a Nuclear Free Great Lakes (Monroe, MI, USA)

David Krieger
President, Nuclear Age Peace Foundation (New York, USA)

Terri Lodge
Coordinator

Arms Control Advocacy Collaborative (USA)

Michael McCally, M.D., Ph.D.
Executive Director
Physicians for Social Responsibility (Washington D.C., USA)

Christopher Paine
Director, Nuclear Program
Natural Resources Defense Council (Washington, D.C., USA)

Jon Rainwater
Executive Director
Peace Action West (Berkeley, California, USA)

Don Richardson, M.D.
Western North Carolina Physicians For Social Responsibility
(Asheville, NC, USA)

Susan Shaer
Executive Director
Women's Action for New Directions (Washington, D.C.,
USA)

Alice Slater (New York, USA)
Convener, Abolition 2000 Sustainable Energy Working Group

Jennifer O. Viereck,
Director, HOME: Healing Ourselves & Mother Earth (Tecopa,
CA, USA)

Sisters of St. Francis Center for Active Nonviolence (Clinton,
Iowa, USA)

Egyptian Council for Foreign Affairs Statement

Convenor: Mohamed I Shaker, Egyptian Council for Foreign Affairs

Speaker: Mohamed I Shaker, Egyptian Council for Foreign Affairs

Mr Chairman,

I am greatly privileged to have the opportunity to speak in this meeting on behalf of my organization, The Egyptian Council for Foreign Affairs (ECFA), and among distinguished representatives of leading and well established NGOs devoted to disarmament and arms control.

My organization is greatly concerned about the state of implementation of the NPT. There is certainly a regression in disarmament and arms control. The promise of Article VI of the NPT is very far from being fulfilled. In reality, we are facing a state of non-compliance on the part of the nuclear-weapon States Party to the NPT, no less serious, than non-compliance with other provisions of the NPT and the potential threats of horizontal proliferation.

We do not lack mechanisms to deal with disarmament. We lack, however, the political will to advance forward on disarmament and more particularly nuclear disarmament. The Conference on Disarmament in Geneva should be fully activated and entrusted to deal with leading issues ranging from fissile cut-off to non use or threat of use of nuclear weapons and to the weaponization of the outer space among many issues that deserves urgent attention. Above all, real nuclear disarmament should be on the top of the Conference's agenda.

In the area of international cooperation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy and the exercise of the inalienable right enshrined in Article IV of the NPT, we are faced with cartel like export control regimes that were not even anticipated in the making of the NPT or when the Treaty came into force. A constructive dialogue is badly needed between suppliers and users that will engender understanding and acceptability and more importantly guarantee the supply of nuclear material and equipment needed smoothly.

We welcome all the initiatives pertaining to supply assurances. In fact, we have multiple choices that should generate confidence and market stability. However, none of the initiatives deals with the guarantee supply in case of interruption of supply for political reasons. This is the crux of the matter and a reliable mechanism to deal with this issue should be established preferably within the IAEA. The lack of such mechanism may encourage the establishment of multilateral and multinational fuel cycles that would guarantee to its participating members the supply and give them a voice in making decisions concerning their own economic development, a right that many of them do not enjoy today being at the receiving end and at the mercy of the suppliers.

Being from the Middle East, the Egyptian Council for Foreign Affairs (ECFA) is also concerned about the state of implementation of the Middle East Resolution adopted by the 1995 Review and Extension Conference of the NPT as a part of the package extending the treaty indefinitely. It was sponsored by the Depositary Governments: Russia, UK and the USA. They bare the responsibility in the implementation of this resolution. We hope to see great progress in establishing a zone free of weapons of mass destruction in the Middle east, which is the main goal of this resolution. Efforts in this direction, should start without further delay. The Israeli nuclear-weapon capabilities and the ongoing debate on the Iranian nuclear programme necessitate this urgency. Our Council would be in favour of convening an international conference under the auspices of the UN and sponsored by the three Depositary Governments to be well prepared for. Such a preparation should not await or depend on the outcome of the Middle East peace process. The two Parallel ventures should inter-changeably benefit from the progress made by each. A final agreement on a Middle East WMD zone would certainly be a crucial element of a new, secure, and stable Middle East.

Lastly, the Egyptian Council for Foreign Affairs (ECFA) is joining six other NGOs and leading personalities from the seven Countries members of the New Agenda Coalition in forming a new NGO group devoted to disarmament and arms control. We will meet tomorrow 30 April and hope to come up with a statement or a communiqué that would reflect our views and outline our future endeavours.

Thank you.

Youth Statement

Covenantors: Nina Eisenhardt and Martin Hinrichs, Ban All Nukes generation

Speakers: Giorgio Alba and Ka-man Kong, Ban All Nukes generation

Ambassador Yel'chenko, distinguished delegates, ladies and gentleman,

I thank you and the NGO community for inviting us to speak at this conference, one that is of crucial importance for the survival of future generations.

Today, I speak for those who have to bear the consequences of decisions governments are making decisions based on current power relationships but which will have an impact far into the future. I speak for the innocent youth of the world who might not have the same expertise as you on nuclear weapons, but who are committed to playing a responsible role in this world and who have the right to demand a safe life free from constant nuclear threat.

And we, the youth present at this meeting, are representing those young people who want to make their voices heard. All over the world the youth take all kinds of actions to show their clear and determined opposition to the continuation, renewal and modernisation of nuclear arsenals:

- This is the fourth time we have spoken at an NPT conference.
- In Germany, many young people have called for an end of the nuclear sharing and a withdrawal of the nuclear weapons based in their country.
- In Faslane, Scotland, hundreds of youth blockaded the British nuclear base to demonstrate against the renewal of British nuclear weapons.
- In California, US students carried out hunger strikes against nuclear research.

These youth are well informed, far sighted, and determined to make a difference.

Despite their commitment and integrity, they are not taken seriously enough by decision-makers. It is important to integrate the younger generation into the decision making process.

Thus, young people should be heard and their demand for a nuclear-free world should not be ignored.

Young people do not believe that nuclear weapons ensure peace. Nuclear weapons kill and harm not only when they are used, but by their mere existence.

Can this be justified?

Can a government answer for the consequences of uranium mining, the health problems, poverty, and civil wars ruining the lives of defenceless indigenous people?

Can governments answer for why they spend millions of dollars on nuclear weapons instead of standing together to save millions of people from starving in poverty?

Can a government answer for the damage to the environment by the consumption of natural resources used in production of these needless weapons, the thoughtless dealing with fissile material and the health and environmental consequences of nuclear tests—which are still not conclusively prohibited.

Can a government answer for the policy of nuclear deterrence—the threat to murder millions of children, women and men—people as innocent as their and your own children and family members—just to secure national interests?

No. These questions cannot be answered for.

Exposing the human race to the danger of its complete annihilation is not justified or justifiable.

We as youth are convinced that only the complete abolition of nuclear weapons can secure our survival and generate a world based on peace and cooperation rather than conflict and terrorism. The already existing proposal for a Nuclear

Weapons Convention is the right way towards this goal. The youth present at this meeting will give an example for negotiations towards this Nuclear Weapons Convention in a simulation game on the 3rd May.

We believe that a Nuclear Weapons Convention is possible.

It is also increasingly demanded by international law:

Article VI of the NPT and the Advisory Opinion of the International Court of Justice from 1996 contain a clear obligation to achieve comprehensive nuclear disarmament.

For me it is unbelievable that today, in our reality where most people from all over the world are living, loving, and working together in the same places, regardless of their races and religions, the representatives of these people and their countries are still unable to see what is clear in every child's eye: regardless of the country in which they are born, people are in the same way men, women, mothers, fathers, grandpas and grandmas as you are or will you be.

All of them, all of us, all of you have the right to live without fear—in a world free of nuclear weapons.

We must use the memory of the victims and survivors of nuclear weapons to inspire us to achieve this goal. Remember the horrible pictures of hundreds and thousands of innocent human beings burned by the apocalyptic fire of the two bombs in Hiroshima and Nagasaki. Only two bombs. Small in relation to the thousands of weapons which are ready to use at this very moment.

Seeing this picture in front of my eyes, I, in the name of all future generations, call upon you as representatives of your states: move your mind, move your heart! Move forward to reach a safe and nuclear free world!

If you say this is impossible: please imagine the face of your true love, of your children, of children from all over the world and think twice if you are still willing to repeat your answer.

Please move your hearts and act!

Thank you.

Earth: WMD-Free and Climate Stable Planet; Or Arid Plutonium Plantation?

Convenor: Mary Olson, Nuclear Information and Resource Service

Speaker: Annelise Ebbe, Women's International League for Peace and Freedom

It is time to celebrate that many leaders are calling for the abolition of weapons of mass destruction (WMDs)—including the growing call from within the nuclear weapons states for those nations to get rid of nuclear weapons.ⁱ This growing consensus is worthy of embrace!

Unfortunately, contrary to what was likely the intention of Article IV of the Non-Proliferation Treaty, the expanding mandate to promote nuclear technology for the generation of electric power will doom this effort to *failure*. As has been well reported in the major media, uranium enrichment technology will transform uranium feedstock into either reactor fuel, or at high levels of enrichment material for nuclear weapons. Less reported is the fact that every nuclear power and research reactor using low-enriched uranium fuel produces plutonium as a by-product—that can be recovered in considerable quantitiesⁱⁱ via reprocessing of the irradiated fuel. The world has witnessed that all forms of plutonium can be used to make weapons.ⁱⁱⁱ Therefore both fuel production and fuel use make nuclear energy a “starter-kit” for nuclear weapons production. Promoting the spread of nuclear power is effectively promoting the spread of nuclear weapons capacity.

Recognition of this situation has engendered a contradictory response from leaders. Instead of turning away from enrichment and reprocessing, the new Global Nuclear Energy Partnership (GNEP), initiated by the United States^{iv} and largely supported by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA)^v is an attempt to increase controls on nuclear energy since its spread is contributing to the global spread of nuclear weapons. Under the guise of offering a “consistent fuel supply,”^{vi} the program defines nuclear “supplier” states and nuclear “client” states. The suppliers are states with a developed nuclear fuel production infrastructure including uranium enrichment—and not surprisingly are primarily (but not solely) nuclear weapons states. Enriched uranium fuel or even mixed oxide (MOX) plutonium fuel would be supplied to “client” states, effectively as a lease agreement. The “supplier” states would then retrieve the plutonium-laced highly radioactive waste back from the “client.”^{vii}

This plan is effectively a global plutonium plantation with the “supplier” states reaping the harvest of deadly plutonium. What is the plan for this plutonium? Ostensibly to make nuclear fuel that would be supplied once again to the “clients.”^{viii}

In a brazen bending of logic, promoters of expanded nuclear power infrastructure, in a stated attempt to control the spread of nuclear weapons imply that handing client nations plutonium, or MOX (“mixed oxide”) fuel will reduce the risks of these nations obtaining plutonium for nuclear weapons proliferation. Plutonium fuel does not reduce proliferation risks—it increases the risk of diversion of this material for nuclear weapons since the “fresh fuel” bearing plutonium is not yet highly radioactive and therefore easy to handle. Further, mixed uranium and plutonium fuel (MOX) is easy to separate chemically resulting in usable fissile plutonium, unlike low-enriched uranium fuel where the only means of obtaining a greater concentration of the fissile material is via further enrichment. Another important point is that plutonium fuel is far more deadly in the event of a reactor accident, due to the greater concentrations of transuranic elements. The latent cancer deaths arising from a major reactor accident, such as Chernobyl, could be as much as double in proportion to the percentage of MOX fuel in the reactor core at the time of such an event.^{ix}

Article IV of the NPT, the mandate of the IAEA, and agreements made between the IAEA and the World Health Organization are documents of their time and reflect historically specific moments in science and in politics. Assumptions made in 1945 or 1968 about nuclear technology have to be reevaluated in a world that has experienced Chernobyl and Three Mile Island. It is high time that the people of the world have access to accurate information about these world-changing events. It is time to ensure that there is a World Health Organization that is a leader in supplying information on health, disease, and mortality in the nuclear age—not covering up the impacts of these horrendous and deadly events.^x This is ever more important as the nuclear weapons states—and others—are moving to reinvest in nuclear infrastructure at home and promoting it as the solution to nearly every crisis facing the planet.

A lesson we must learn from the last 60 years of nuclear fission: once an atom has been split, it is no longer “peaceful.” Radiation is intrinsically destructive—whether we use the destructive force to fight disease, to produce mutations intentionally or document the mutagenic impacts of routine releases from nuclear operations, or calculate the consequences of nuclear accidents and attacks. It is worth commemorating the fact that the majority of this mutagenic androgenic radioactivity—worldwide—is in the waste leftover from making electricity (more than 95%).^{xi} We have created an enormous concentration of radioactivity for which not a single nation has yet implemented a viable permanent “solution.” This planetary burden will be handed down for the next 12,000 generations^{xii} of our species. If we are lucky it

will be contained and not released into the living systems of this planet. Reprocessing only makes this mess worse, and will in the end only dilute and defer the waste problem. We must work together to end this dirty practice.

Sadly, responsible management of radioactive waste is already not the case, and tragically, it is disproportionately Indigenous Peoples who are being violated by destructive radiation from uranium mining operations on every continent. In addition to this death sentence for so many, there has been an enormous violation of human rights, Sovereignty and self-determination in the recurring targeting of Indigenous communities to take the deadly wastes resulting from the use of uranium for both nuclear weapons and nuclear power. This genocidal practice has even been “justified” by several dominant societies that produced the waste and wanted to dump it on someone else, by citing the “Earth stewardship” commitments expressed by some First Peoples.^{xiii} This immoral policy and practice must end, not expand. We must work together to ban the taking of uranium out of the ground, and clean up the areas already devastated by uranium mining and processing. It is vital to reestablishing sovereignty and self-determination in the Nuclear Age that bans on uranium mining and reprocessing be universal.

The reevaluation of Article IV and the Atoms for Peace initiative is *urgent*—not only because of the daily generation of evermore of this waste that is dangerously mutagenic forevermore—it is also urgent because the primary public reason (excuse) used by promoters to justify this contradictory and counter-productive approach to non-proliferation is a matter that is also extremely urgent: the Climate Crisis.

Just as nuclear energy is intrinsically contra-indicated as a “solution” to nuclear proliferation, so too is it a false solution to Global Climate Change. The danger of investment in false solutions—particularly very expensive ones—is that it will deter investment in real solutions such as energy efficiency in nations such as the USA and renewable infrastructure that are very much needed.^{xiv}

The recent decades of dormancy of nuclear energy^{xv} in many nuclear states can be explained by the fact that it was discovered, through experience that nuclear energy is not cheap, it is not clean, and it is not safe. In fact, the only thing that nuclear can compete with is the newly “discovered” costs associated with the Climate Crisis, which does not confer upon it an automatic stamp of approval as a preferred means to address reduction of greenhouse gas emission. In fact, expanding the nuclear generating infrastructure would take too long, cost too much, contribute additional carbon and other emissions and very possibly not perform reliably as temperatures rise and weather becomes more turbulent. Every summer since the heat wave of 2003 has seen a growing number of nuclear power stations off-line due to the ambient temperature of the cooling water supply (rivers, lakes and even the ocean have been too warm to cool the condenser in the power generating unit^{xvi}). Any claim to greenhouse gas reduction and climate stabilization by investment in new nuclear power generating should be substantiated.

The claim that nuclear is carbon neutral overlooks the enormous fossil fuel use in the construction of the reactor and the processing of the fuel.^{xvii} This carbon debt, combined with the long lead-times for siting, approval, and construction of new nuclear reactors pushes the first offset of carbon from any other source to a minimum of 20 years out—and by some calculations even farther. Given that the current world-wide supply rate for new pressurized water (Western-style) reactor vessels is only four a year^{xviii} – it becomes clear that nuclear is not qualified to address the immediacy of the climate challenge—there is no way that the leading carbon-emitting nations could cut their emissions via nuclear power in time—even if the capacity is increased—it will take too long.

Additionally, building new reactors is not qualified to combat the climate crisis on the basis of cost—efficiency buys more results in lower emissions by a factor of 7–10 and wind by a factor of 2–3.^{xix} Today, nuclear cannot compete with even the retail prices for solar panels (photovoltaic or PV power generation from the sun). The electric power capacity that would be obtained by buying a new nuclear power reactor is more than twice the cost for the same capacity from PV using *retail prices* for the photovoltaic solar cells.^{xx} There is no basis for saying that nuclear is qualified as a cost-effective “solution” to the climate crisis. Finally, in a water-stressed world, where water is warming, no thermal generating system should be treated as a preferred power source.^{xxi}

Leaders have adopted nuclear energy as a panacea—a solution for nearly every crisis; nonetheless, it will not solve nuclear weapons proliferation, it will not solve world hunger, it will not solve the climate crisis, it will not take us to Mars. It will cause cancer, birth defects, waste we do not know how to live with and WMD proliferation from that waste, and bankrupt us as the Climate Crisis worsens. It is time to reevaluate our investment in this technology and the article of this treaty which is designed to promote the spread of this unsustainable technology.

NATO's Nuclear Sharing: A Threat to the NPT

Convenors: Martin Butcher and Nicola Butler, Acronym Institute for Disarmament Diplomacy

Speaker: Julia Kramer, project coordinator of "Nuclear Weapons Policy: Learn – Experience – Participate"

NATO Nuclear Policy

Since its formation, NATO has argued that the collective security provided by its nuclear posture is shared among all members of the Alliance, providing reassurance to any member that might otherwise feel vulnerable. The most recent NATO Nuclear Planning Group Final Communiqué reaffirmed this, stating "... NATO's nuclear forces are maintained at the minimum level sufficient to preserve peace and stability. In keeping with this goal, we continue to place great value on the nuclear forces based in Europe and committed to NATO, which provide an essential political and military link between the European and North American members of the Alliance. "

NATO's Strategic Concept

NATO's Strategic Concept requires widespread participation by European Allies in collective defence planning in nuclear roles, the basing of nuclear forces on their territory and consultation in command and control arrangements. NATO nuclear forces include strategic weapons provided by the United States, France, and the United Kingdom, along with US 'sub-strategic' or 'tactical' nuclear weapons deployed in Europe. Within NATO these sub-strategic weapons are seen as symbolic of the transatlantic link between the United States and its European allies. We regard them as highly contentious and counterproductive. NATO itself argues these weapons serve a political, rather than an explicit deterrent purpose. Nuclear sharing is regarded, it seems, as a bonding experience for NATO nations. A bonding experience that violates the intent of Articles I and II of the NPT, and once the custody of the weapon is transferred from the US military to the host nation, actually violates the Treaty.

Five Non Nuclear-Weapon States (NNWS) parties to the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) – Belgium, Germany, Italy, The Netherlands and Turkey – participate in nuclear sharing arrangements with the United States. These countries host US B61 'gravity' bombs that, in the event of nuclear war, could be delivered by aircraft and pilots belonging to the host nations. The United Kingdom also hosts US nuclear weapons, USAF aircraft and pilots. Previously Greece also participated in nuclear sharing, but in 2003 US nuclear weapons were reportedly withdrawn from the country. The secure storage vaults for the nuclear weapons are still maintained, however, allowing for possible return of the B61 bombs in the future. Authoritative sources state that Poland has been quietly suggesting within NATO that it would be willing to participate in nuclear sharing. This would contravene assurances given to Russia before Poland joined NATO by both NATO and the United States, and would be a serious blow to the global non-proliferation regime.

Many in Europe question this nuclear sharing. We welcome recent moves by parliamentarians, particularly in Belgium, but also in Denmark, Germany, and the Netherlands, calling for the removal of NATO nuclear weapons from Europe. Mayors near all the deployment sites in Europe have called for the removal of the nuclear weapons from their communities.

Article I of the NPT states that:

Each nuclear weapons State Party to the Treaty undertakes not to transfer to any recipient whatsoever nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices or control over such weapons or explosive devices directly or indirectly.

Article II imposes a complementary obligation on NNWS not to "receive the transfer" of nuclear weapons. NATO nuclear sharing appears to breach these obligations. NATO argues that nuclear sharing is compatible with the NPT, based on a US interpretation that it does "not involve any transfer of nuclear weapons or control over them unless and until a decision were made to go to war, at which time the treaty would no longer be in effect". Since the mid-1990s, this interpretation has become increasingly controversial. At the 1995 NPT Review Conference, Mexico asked for clarification on whether nuclear sharing breached Articles I and II. Mexico's concerns were taken up by the Non-Aligned Movement. Several proposals questioning the US interpretation were put forward for inclusion in the Committee's final report, including:

The Conference notes that among States parties there are various interpretations of the implementation of certain aspects of Articles I and II which need clarification, especially regarding the obligations of nuclear weapon States parties...when acting in cooperation with groups of nuclear-weapon States parties under regional arrangements...

In 1998, Egypt proposed that “the 2000 Review Conference state in clear and unambiguous terms that Articles I and II of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons allow for no exceptions and that the NPT is binding on States Parties at all times”. This mirrored the language of the final document of the 1985 Review Conference in which States Party to the NPT agreed by consensus that Articles I and II apply “under any circumstances”. No NATO states dissented from that consensus.

In 1999, the New Agenda Coalition (NAC) proposed that, “all the articles of the NPT are binding on all States Parties and at all times and in all circumstances”.

The 2000 NPT Final Document contains a number of commitments relevant to NATO Member States:

- * the need for further unilateral reductions in nuclear arsenals;
- * increased transparency;
- * further reduction of non-strategic nuclear weapons;
- * measures to further reduce the operational status of nuclear weapons systems; and
- * a diminishing role for nuclear weapons in security policies.

In 2005, the Non-Aligned Movement opening statement given by Malaysia as well as Egypt’s opening remarks both questioned the NATO nuclear sharing arrangement.

Despite this continued criticism within the NPT context, and even though the 1985 statement which is now part of the NPT’s legal ‘acquis’, NATO’s Strategic Concept describes nuclear weapons as the “supreme guarantee” of Allied security, and the practise of nuclear sharing continues. Recent figures published by the Federation of American Scientists indicate that the number of U.S. nuclear warheads based in Europe has been cut from about 480 to around 350, with the withdrawal of nuclear weapons from Ramstein in Germany. NATO does not publish any figures on the numbers of nuclear weapons based in Europe.

NATO’s nuclear posture has also proved a major obstacle to progress in negative security assurances (NSAs) as proposed by the 1995 Review Conference, and rules out any possibility of a Nuclear Weapon Free Zone in Europe. According to NATO Secretary General Guy Roberts, proposals to extend official NATO policy to allow for the use of nuclear weapons against the use or even the threat of use of chemical, biological and radiological weapons are “.. a key current issue for us..”, but are still controversial. An attempt to include pre-emptive use of nuclear weapons against a WMD-armed adversary in the NATO CMX 2002 exercise was so controversial with European nations (other than the UK and Turkey) that the exercise was terminated early. Rather than strengthening NSA’s and the non-proliferation regime, NATO is aiming to weaken them further.

In conclusion, while NATO welcomed and endorsed the results of the 2000 NPT Review Conference, there has been no significant change in nuclear posture based on the 2000 agreements.

Mr. Chairman,

These nuclear weapons sharing arrangements are a major impediment to the fulfilment of the objectives of the NPT. We believe it is time for them to be openly and systematically challenged and for Nuclear Weapons States and Non-Nuclear Weapons States in Europe to abide by their respective obligations under the Treaty. Removal of US nuclear weapons from Europe will increase the credibility of NATO non-nuclear weapons states calling for disarmament and non-proliferation, and strengthen the NPT. Most of the European nuclear sharing nations will have to decide soon whether to procure a new generation of dual capable aircraft for the nuclear mission, or whether these new aircraft should be purely conventional in nature. This presents NATO’s nations with an excellent opportunity to live up fully to their obligations under Articles I and II, and to answer the call of civil society in these nations, who urge for nuclear weapons to be removed from their territories, such as the 67,248 Italian citizens who asked for Italy to become a nuclear weapon free zone on 27 March 2008.

We urge that:

1. This PrepCom recommends to the 2010 NPT Review Conference the reaffirmation of the 1985 Review Conference language that the Treaty is binding in all circumstances, and that the 2010 Review Conference further states that Articles I and II of the Treaty allow for no exceptions.
2. All remaining US nuclear weapons are withdrawn from Europe. These weapons are

militarily obsolete and are no longer relevant to transatlantic relations.

3. NATO conducts a review of its Strategic Concept including a diminished role for nuclear weapons and a commitment to no first use of nuclear weapons as first steps to their complete removal from European soil.

4. The United States and Russia negotiate a verifiable treaty on the elimination of all substrategic, or tactical, nuclear weapons.

Gender and Nuclear Disarmament

Convenor: Felicity Hill, Women's International League for Peace and Freedom

Speaker: Ray Acheson, Reaching Critical Will of the Women's International League for Peace and Freedom; Tim Wright, International Campaign Against Nuclear Weapons

Gender and nuclear weapons—what are the connections?

The first nuclear weapons explosions, called Little Boy and Fat Man, open our story. More recently, when one country tested nuclear weapons, the leader said, “We had to prove that we are not eunuchs.” A newspaper at the time showed a cartoon that had “made with Viagra” stamped across a weapon.

These meanings were not invented out of thin air. These kinds of names, images, and jokes rely on widespread assumptions and associations about gender, in this case, linking political and military power with sexual potency and masculinity.

Note the use of the word masculinity. It's worth belabouring one point a little in order to eliminate completely the idea that “Margaret Thatcher” or “Indira Gandhi” are counter arguments to what follows. Feminist international relations theorists are very loud and clear about this point—we are *not* talking about biology, we *are* noticing the use of stereotypes in policy processes and thinking, we *are* talking about ideas, pervasive, embedded ideas, but we are *not* saying that there is anything inherently warlike in men or peaceful in women. We are talking about masculinity and femininity and how they are *valued* and *defined* in our cultures today.

People in every culture have biologically male or female bodies, but what it means to be “masculine” or “feminine” is different for different cultures and changes over time. What it means to be a “real man” or a “good woman” changes also, and there are strong ideas communicated about these stereotypes and roles around war and war planning—look at any propaganda poster depicting heroic men protecting good women who keep the home fires burning and take up roles that the fighting men usually occupy.

Gender also functions as a symbolic system: our ideas about gender permeate and shape our ideas about many other aspects of society beyond male-female relations—including politics, weapons, and warfare. Just as the cartoons and ideas cited above communicate attitudes and assumptions, adjectives like strong, rational, prudent, active, and objective are associated with masculinity, whereas words such as weak, irrational, impulsive, passive, subjective, and emotional are associated with femininity.

One example you might have heard before will serve to show how gender stereotypes affect the ways in which nuclear weapons are culturally associated with strength, power, and masculinity. It will also introduce the arguments we will make about how policy debates—the way you diplomats and governmental officials interact, behave, and negotiate—is limited and distorted by these gender stereotypical ways of thinking, which have been normalized and legitimized after decades of practice.

A white male physicist, who is a member of a group of nuclear physicists, told the following to Dr. Carol Cohn:

Several colleagues and I were working on modelling counterforce nuclear attacks, trying to get realistic estimates of the number of immediate fatalities that would result from different deployments. At one point, we re-modelled a particular attack, using slightly different assumptions, and found that instead of there being 36 million immediate fatalities, there would only be 30 million. And everybody was sitting around nodding, saying, “Oh yeah, that's great, only 30 million,” when all of a sudden, I *heard* what we were saying. And I blurted out, “Wait, I've just heard how we're talking—*only* 30 million! *Only* 30 million human beings killed instantly?” Silence fell upon the room. Nobody said a word. They didn't even look at me. It was awful. I felt like a woman.

The physicist added that henceforth he was careful never to blurt out anything like that again.

This story is not simply about one individual, his feelings and actions; it illustrates the role and meaning of gender discourse in the defence community. This example should not be dismissed as just the product of the idiosyncratic personal composition of that particular room; it is replicated many times and in many places.

The impact of gender discourse in that room (and countless others like it) is that some things get left out from professional deliberations.

Certain ideas, concerns, interests, information, feelings, and meanings are marked in national security discourse as feminine, and thus devalued. They are therefore very difficult to speak, as exemplified by the physicist who blurted them out and wished he hadn't. And if they manage to be said, they are also very difficult to hear, to take in, and work with seriously. For the others in the room, the way in which the physicist's comments were marked as feminine and devalued served to delegitimize them; it also made it very unlikely that any of his colleagues would find the courage to agree with him.

If at the PrepCom you were to really express concern about human bodies, if you were to express an emotional awareness about the suicidal, genocidal, and ecocidal, desperate human condition that has created and maintained the means to destroy the planet, if you were to discuss the human reality behind the sanitized abstractions of death and destruction in security and strategic deliberations, you would be transgressing a code of professional conduct.

For the majority in this room, that is the male diplomats, your colleagues might look at you like you were a woman, they might question your masculinity, and you might be seen as soft and wimpish. For a minority in this room, that is the female diplomats, your colleagues might look at you AS a woman, and mean it as a put down, and that is something that as intelligent, skilled people, you wish to avoid, because that means you are not being a good diplomat, rather that you are impulsive, uncontrolled, emotional, upset.

The statement, "I felt like a woman," and the physicist's subsequent silence in that and other settings, are completely understandable. To find the strength of character and courage to transgress the strictures of both professional and gender codes and to associate yourself with a lower status is very difficult.

But what are the advantages of considering gender issues?

1. Gender analysis provides tools—not all of the tools you need, but some of the tools—to address why nuclear weapons are valued, why additional states seek them, keep them, and why leaders are motivated to resort to dominance and the use of force to obtain policy objectives. Possessing and brandishing an extraordinarily destructive capacity is a form of dominance associated with masculine warriors (nuclear weapons possessors are sometimes referred to as the "big boys") and is more highly valued than the feminine-associated disarmament, cooperation, and diplomacy.
2. Ignoring this doesn't make it go away. Instead, by recognising that there is a problem, it becomes possible to confront traditionally constructed meanings and redefine terms such as "strength" and "security" so that they more appropriately reflect the needs of all people. The anxious preoccupation with affirming manhood and masculinity can cease if we recognise and address this problem in politics. The dangerous and illusory idea that security can be achieved through militarized, weaponised strength has not worked, we do not enjoy security, even those armed to the teeth. Humanity is chronically insecure, under developed, under educated, under fed, and over-weaponised. Insecure. Security and strength defined through weapons is not security; this model has failed, terribly.
3. Gender awareness also shows that participating in self-censorship, as the physicist in the example above did, is understandable, but very counter-productive. The effect of such self-censorship is to exclude a whole range of relevant inputs as if they did not belong in discussions of "hard" security issues because they are too "soft" (i.e. feminine).

The role of men and a certain kind of masculinity in dominating the political structures that organise wars and oversee security matters is beginning to be questioned. In 2000, the Security Council adopted resolution 1325.¹⁴ Since the adoption of this resolution, these issues have been newly and more deeply understood. Governments and NGOs have undertaken some laudable work to implement it. We have seen some more highly competent and intelligent women appointed to engage in security and disarmament issues—of course we would like to see more in this room today.

In 2006, the Weapons of Mass Destruction Commission chaired by Hans Blix acknowledged gender issues when they stated, "Women have rightly observed that armament policies and the use of armed force have often been influenced by misguided ideas about masculinity and strength. An understanding of and emancipation from this traditional perspective might help to remove some of the hurdles on the road to disarmament and nonproliferation."

The association of weapons with masculinity, power, prestige, and technical prowess has a direct effect on policy

14 <http://www.peacewomen.org/un/sc/1325.html>

decisions and negotiations and is a hurdle on the road to disarmament and non-proliferation. The concept of “mastering” or “dominating” the nuclear fuel cycle and relying on nuclear energy is likewise associated with the masculine characteristics of prestige and technical prowess, while the arguments to phase out nuclear power and rely on the “benign” power of the sun, wind, tides, and heat from the Earth, are seen as feminine and weak.

Decision-makers and negotiators working within a “radioactively realist” context of power optimization are working in a paradigm which is also gendered. In a “realist” perspective on international relations, all states seek as much power and potential to dominate as possible. This is especially true in the nuclear age, where many governments have come to believe that security requires the ability to militarily dominate and control. Within this security paradigm, weapons are necessary because security can only come through the ability to obliterate the other, and to command control of any relationship through the threat or use of force. In personal interactions, this sort of fearful controlling is called abuse and a crime, but from a realist geopolitical perspective, it is called “hard security” and wise policy.

Gender stereotypes that promote the value of weapons of terror are a problem at the heart of international relations and national security policies, obstructing progress towards the goal of the majority of states and citizens: the total elimination of the world’s nuclear arsenals.

Mayors' Statement

Convenor: Aaron Tovish, Mayors for Peace

Speakers: Mayor Tadotoshi Akiba, City of Hiroshima, Japan; Mayor Luc Dehaene, City of Ypres, France;

Three topics:

- No NWS willing to rule out attacking cities – moral bankruptcy of MAD (Akiba)
- UN Disarmament Decade – DD for ND (Luc Dehaene)
- 2020 Protocol – short intro: urge them to come to Wednesday session (VanK?)

THE CENTRALITY OF CITIES

Almost exactly five years ago, here in the Palais, I addressed you as I am doing today. I announced that Mayors for Peace would be launching an emergency campaign to ban nuclear weapons. During these five years the membership of Mayors for Peace has more than quadrupled. In January we proudly declared 2020 Mayors for the 2020 Vision. Today we have more than 2200 city members, with two or three cities joining us every day, and we are entering the third phase of our campaign. My colleagues will describe how we foresee the lead-up to the 2010 Review Conference and the decade beyond. I am here to assure you that we have not lost sight of, or enthusiasm for, our objective of a nuclear-weapon-free world by the year 2020. I invite you to attend tomorrow's lunchtime session, *2010- 2020: from Survival to Success* to hear and discuss our plans in greater detail.

Mr. Chairman,

Today I am asking this body to perform the God-like act of creating time. Unless you give us the time we need, we will be unable to tackle the Earth-threatening environmental issues and other serious problems that confront us. You have the power. In fact, it is your obligation to give us this time. That is the intention of the international community as set forth in the NPT and confirmed by the Advisory Opinion the ICJ handed down in 1996, which clearly stipulates that all governments are “under obligation to pursue in good faith negotiations leading to nuclear disarmament in all its aspect under strict and effective international control.” Without nuclear disarmament soon, we will have no time to solve our real problems.

The two most serious immediate threats to human evolution are environmental degradation and weapons of mass destruction. Our collective need to curb human capacity for violence and destructive effects on our ecosystem demands a rapid and decisive shift away from selfish, competitive struggles for dominance toward mutual, cooperative problem solving. And yet, the only phenomenon more obvious than this pressing need is the utter inability of national governments to respond with anything that even resembles a solution to these problems. Mayors for Peace is growing because cities are drawn into the vacuum created by failure at the national level to accept reality.

Hiroshima, responding to the most reliable scientific recommendations we have received, is committed to reducing our CO2 emissions by 70% by 2050. We are doing this because it is necessary, regardless of national-level irresponsibility, and we are not alone. Around the world, cities are working to reduce emissions far beyond national requirements. They do this at great risk to their local economies because their residents want to do what is right.

Unfortunately, the public remains largely unaware of the danger of nuclear weapons. For example, most are unaware that certain nuclear-weapon states are developing tactical nuclear weapons designed not for deterrence but for combat use. They are unaware that Arab League foreign ministers declared on March 8 that if Israel admits to having a nuclear weapon, the Arab states will drop out of the NPT and make weapons of their own. They are unaware that a low-level smuggler in Russia was recently found to be carrying highly enriched uranium. They are unaware that the NPT is on the brink of collapse and nuclear weapons are poised to spread swiftly throughout the world.

National governments certainly must be aware of the nuclear threat, but you act as if you have all the time in the world. Perhaps national leaders are high and mighty enough to assume they will survive any catastrophe that may occur. We mayors, however, live down in the valley with our people, where facts and reality play a more powerful role in decision-making.

On October 31st, 2007, United Cities and Local Governments, representing cities throughout the world, took up the Mayors for Peace rallying cry. Declaring with us that “Cities Are Not Targets!” they expressed full support for our Campaign. This year, according to the UN Population Fund, the majority of humanity now resides in cities. Therefore, I can say with complete conviction that our message to you today is spoken on behalf of the majority of humanity. No

governmental delegation here can rightfully make such a claim, so I respectfully ask that you heed our message.

In June 2006, the US Conference of Mayors, representing 1139 American cities, called on the United States and Russia to renounce their Cold War policies of Mutually Assured Destruction. The threat of inflicting grossly indiscriminate and disproportionate casualties among noncombatant populations has never been morally or legally acceptable, but with the end of the Cold War and the emergence of a global terrorist threat, such a policy is utterly futile and foolhardy. At our urging, the US Conference of Mayors wrote to the Ambassadors of Russia and China asking them to openly declare that they would never again target US cities. They simultaneously asked the US Government to provide such assurances to Russian and Chinese cities. The cities of the world have lived far too long with the Sword of Damocles hanging over our heads. We demand its removal.

In January 2007, delegations of US mayors visited the embassies of Russia and China in Washington. They were received with all due courtesy; China took the opportunity to reiterate its policy of no first use, but could offer no assurances regarding retaliatory strikes. The US State Department met with the mayors but, when it came to targeting, the officials deferred to the Defense Department, which, for its part, refused to even meet with mayors, saying that all discussion of targeting policy is top secret. When the mayors tried to clarify that we were not trying to determine what was targeted, just what was NOT targeted, the officials were not moved.

In October 2006, I wrote to the Heads of Government of the nine states thought to possess nuclear arms, asking them to explicitly rule out the targeting of cities and to ensure that their armed forces were rigorously trained to disobey any order to use a nuclear weapon in lethal proximity to cities. Only one country had the courtesy to reply: the United Kingdom, perhaps because in July 2006 an international delegation of mayors had already begun a dialog with the UK Foreign Ministry on this subject.

At that meeting, the first reply we were given was that British forces are de-alerted and de-targeted, so not to worry. While we approve of de-alerting and de-targeting, those policies do not address our central concern: should the occasion ever arise to re-alert and target the missiles, could we be assured in advance that cities would not be among the potential targets. The disconcerting reply we got to this was that cities would not be targeted “as such.” By this logic major transportation junctions or fuel depots can be targeted “as such” and if cities happen to be in the vicinity of such junctions and depots – as they invariable are – well tough luck for the city.

In the ensuing correspondence, we encountered the assertion that whatever the targeting policy was, we could rest assured it was “in conformity with international humanitarian law.” Well, that was clearly not good enough. As the International Court of Justice made abundantly clear, nuclear weapons are by their very nature indiscriminate; thus everyone has good reason to feel threatened by them unless explicitly and convincingly assured to the contrary. Threatening to commit an illegal act is itself illegal, all the more so when mass destruction is at play.

In the end, the British Government’s response was that any discussion of what is not targeted would diminish the deterrent value of the nuclear weapons. So, rather than diminish a dangerous and obsolete deterrence policy, Britain would place itself on the wrong side of international law and in the morally reprehensible position of threatening what I have called “civicide” -- the obliteration of civic life and the endangerment of civilization itself.

In 2004 the US Conference of Mayors declared: “Weapons of mass destruction have no place in a civilized world.” Why is it that national governments are unable to arrive at the same obvious conclusion?

I do not mean to single out Britain. The US declined any discussion of targeting policy based, no doubt, on similar delusions of deterrence; it could well be that, in their silence, Beijing, Delhi, Islamabad, Moscow, Pyongyang, and Tel Aviv share this delusion. They all apparently consider the threat to annihilate whole cities to be acceptable and even necessary. We do not.

We [have just heard][will soon hear] from IPPNW about the catastrophic impact of a limited nuclear war. Only at the national level can there be such abstract assertions about one hundred cities being completely incinerated in a nuclear exchange in the Asian Subcontinent. We cities are the ‘firewood’ that has been unwittingly gathered by our civilizations for the great nuclear firestorms. In a world of cities, nuclear weapons endanger everyone, at least indirectly through catastrophic climate change. Why is it so difficult for national governments to come to grips with this reality and free us all from this threat?

The Rand Corporation did a study for US Homeland Security on catastrophic terrorism. In choosing a city for destruction, the study picked Long Beach, California, the US megaport. What it found after ‘gaming’ the scenario 20 days out from the explosion was that in 20 days we would not even begin to get a handle on the GLOBAL ramifications

of such an attack. The massive economic and social problems would continue to spread and intensify. The productivity of the US economy would sharply decline, drawing the entire world with it into economic turmoil and a deep depression.

The Rand study confirmed what Mayor Itoh of Nagasaki said at the 2004 PrepCom. “Civilization and nuclear weapons cannot co-exist indefinitely.” So why, when we know how high the stakes are, do we continue to gamble?! Why should cities and the whole world economy [continue to] be held hostage to this madness even one day longer?

We are preparing for the UN Disarmament Decade as if our lives depend on it. I challenge each one of you to strive in good faith to match our sense of urgency and purpose. You know as well as I do that Unless strong, substantive moves toward disarmament are made in the next two years, nuclear weapons will spread throughout the world. The decision is upon you. Will you act in good faith to eliminate these heinous and totally unnecessary threats to our survival, or will you allow them to spread, most certainly to be used? If you do not move effectively to achieve a nuclear-weapon-free world by 2020, you will be partially responsible for the nuclear catastrophe I have no doubt will befall us before that date. I urge you not to underestimate the gravity and urgency of this decision.

TOWARD A DECISIVE DECADE FOR NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT

It is my role to describe for you the third phase of the 2020 Vision Campaign. We want to convey this information to you because phase three [which] will be centered on the NPT review process. At this session, in 2009, and at the NPT Review Conference, we and many other NGOs will be urging you to think and act boldly. In particular, Mayors for Peace, through its 2020 Vision Campaign, will be challenging you to think in terms of the next TWO review cycles, all the way through to 2020. That year will be the 50th anniversary of the NPT, the 75th anniversary of the atomic bombings, and a fitting moment to proclaim that the promise of the Treaty has at long last been fulfilled.

Occasionally, the difficult work of disarmament gets an unexpected boost. On the strength of initiative the UN Ambassador of Sierra Leone, who rallied the Non-Aligned Movement behind the concept of an International Decade for Disarmament, 2010-2020, the 61st UN General Assembly called for preparations to begin. Many Western countries were skeptical. The previous three Disarmament Decades had been notable mainly for their lack of results. Why repeat this sorry story?

For Mayors for Peace, the answer is simple: success is possible if we all begin preparing NOW. To that end, we have translated the 2020 Vision into a ‘2020 Protocol’, which we have named the Hiroshima-Nagasaki Protocol. The [next speaker] will provide more detail on that document, which has been made available to you here. Suffice it to say now that this Protocol, if adopted during the review process, would ensure optimal conditions for actual nuclear disarmament from 2010 to 2020.

Today, five years after we took up our goal, 2020 no longer seems so distant. Indeed, looking back over the way the last five years have been shamefully squandered, many are tempted to believe that our 2020 deadline is too tight. But we refuse to meekly accept the same criminal neglect for another 2 or 12 years. Given the risks described by Mayor Akiba, we need to move immediately.

The process of working together to reinforce positive trends is the essence of Good Faith. Here we remind every State – including the non-nuclear-weapon States Parties to the NPT and nuclear-armed States not parties to the NPT – that they are under the legal obligation identified by the International Court of Justice to strive in good faith toward “measures leading to nuclear disarmament in ALL its aspects under strict and effective international control.”

There is, of course, a proposal already in existence that comprehensively addresses all aspects of nuclear disarmament. I refer to the model Nuclear Weapons Convention circulated by Costa Rica and Malaysia at the first Preparatory Committee meeting in Vienna. How many States Parties have given this document the close attention it deserves? How many have shared their views on it with the international community? How many have suggested revisions to make it acceptable to all? I hereby ask those that have not taken such steps to explain how they can claim a good-faith approach to their Article VI obligations.

The Hiroshima-Nagasaki Protocol features the Nuclear Weapons Convention as one of TWO ways parties could fulfill their obligations. The other is a Framework Agreement, in which all the elements that need to be in place at the commencement of a nuclear-weapon-free world would be identified early on and a plan would be developed to systematically and progressively address each element such that the necessary agreements are reached and actions are taken.

Above all, the Hiroshima-Nagasaki Protocol challenges you to make a genuine commitment to the results that emerge from the 2010 Review Conference. In 2005, we witnessed a disturbing phenomenon. A major player – I refer of course to the United States, but it could be another country next time – sought to dismiss the hard-fought and carefully crafted results of 2000 and even 1995. Unless the results achieved in this review cycle are immunized against that kind of backtracking, what is the point of this whole exercise? The Hiroshima-Nagasaki Protocol, as a legally binding instrument on a par with the NPT itself, would leave no room for doubt about the lasting value of its acceptance.

Mayors for Peace looks forward to working closely with governments to ensure the 2010 Review Conference gets results that represent a convincing, irreversible step toward nuclear disarmament. Nothing less is acceptable because nothing less will spare us and future generations from the pain and suffering that will surely follow if we fail.

If we succeed, we will have set in motion a decisive decade for nuclear disarmament. With this happier prospect in mind, [W]e hope that next year in the UNDC all governments will contribute constructively to elaborating an ambitious agenda for the International Decade for Disarmament.

THE HIROSHIMA-NAGASAKI PROTOCOL AND THE MAYORS' APPEAL

It is my privilege to introduce to this august body our 'modest' proposal for fulfilling the promise of the NPT by the year 2020: the Hiroshima-Nagasaki Protocol. While Mayors for Peace takes full responsibility for the specific form in which I will now present it to you; we wish stress the fact that many groups and individuals provided invaluable advice. Let me also state clearly that we do not expect this to be the last word on the matter. It is you governments who must give the Protocol its final form.

[Tomorrow][After this session], there will be a lunchtime meeting in the Assembly Hall, sponsored by the Mexican Delegation and co-organized by Mayors for Peace and the Middle Powers Initiative. We encourage you to attend that session for a lively and thorough discussion of this and other important proposals.

The basic thrust of the Hiroshima-Nagasaki Protocol is a commitment to negotiations on ALL aspects of nuclear disarmament such that an overarching approach to achieving and maintaining a nuclear-weapon-free world can be crafted to gain the enthusiastic support of all key players and world opinion. The Protocol is framed as a direct complement to the NPT, but by virtue of being a separate agreement, the Protocol is open to States that are not parties to the NPT.

A novel feature of the Protocol is that it identifies two fundamental aspects of nuclear disarmament—the realm of policy and the realm of arsenals. The policy aspect covers primarily the acquisition of weapon systems and threats to use the weapons already acquired. We refer to 'arsenals' in the classic sense of both the arms themselves and the means of their production and deployment. The Protocol identifies two distinct target dates for successfully achieving consensus and results on these two aspects of nuclear disarmament: 2015 and 2020, respectively.

Article I of the Protocol requires immediate action: all acquisition activity is to cease immediately and all threats to use nuclear weapons, including preparations to carry out such threats, must also stop. These bold measures would provide convincing evidence of good faith, establishing a firm basis for nuclear-armed states to approach the long and complex negotiations ahead. The 2015 target date allows for the codification of this state of non-acquisition and non-threat in legally binding and verified form.

Article I also stipulates what could be called a 'clampdown' on nuclear weapons and weapons-usable nuclear materials. This involves physically removing weapons from delivery vehicles and arranging for safe and secure storage, so it would not be realistic to demand that it occur immediately. The Protocol calls for this to be done "at the earliest possible date." It does not involve the physical destruction of weapons or material, however, so it should be achievable well before 2015. The objective of the clampdown is to radically reduce the danger of mistaken or unauthorized use of nuclear weapons by state actors or otherwise.

By 2015, the remaining task will be to physically dispose of the arsenals. The policy of non-acquisition will ensure at least that the problem is not continuing to grow. The non-threat policy will underscore the inutility of the remnants. Mayors for Peace selected 2020 for its Vision five years ago because experts could show that the existing dismantlement facilities were capable of completing the entire job by or even before that date. Since dismantlement has – to the credit of some nuclear-weapon states – continued, the 2020 target date is still valid. We see no reason to afford the disarmament process any more time than absolutely necessary.

The Protocol's preamble points out, first and foremost, that the discriminatory nature of the NPT was never meant to be

permanent. Article I would end the active discrimination inherent in further acquisition and threats. Article II would eliminate the inequality that has, for decades, allowed the nuclear-weapon states to exploit their discriminatory advantages. Highlighting discrimination is meant to serve two purposes:

- to assure those whose patience has been wearing thin that an end to their second class status is [is] in sight, and
- to impress upon those who have become accustomed to enjoying the privileges of discrimination that those days are over.

The Protocol is missing one important element: conditions for entry into force. Here we would only counsel that, keeping good faith and the urgency of the problem in mind, States should be prepared to display maximum flexibility on this challenging issue.

Over the coming twelve months, mayors around the world will be signing on to a Cities' Appeal that will ask you to take up the Hiroshima-Nagasaki Protocol in the review process. In line with our original vision of a Nuclear Weapons Convention being negotiated by 2010, we call for all negotiations envisioned in the Protocol to be complete by the 65th UN General Assembly. This schedule is tight, but given the global threat underscored by Mayor Akiba, is it not worth an all-out effort? We think so, and by this time next year, you will see just how intensely mayors and citizens worldwide share that assessment.

Thank you very much.

Conclusion

Convenor: Peter Weiss, Lawyers' Committee on Nuclear Policy, former President and current Vice President of IALANA, the International Association of Lawyers Against Nuclear Arms.

Speaker: John Burroughs, Lawyers' Committee on Nuclear Policy

In the last 90 minutes we have tried to present to you both the horror and the hope of the nuclear dilemma: Why the continued existence of nuclear weapons is incompatible with a just and peaceful world, why it impinges even on such central values as gender equity, protection of the environment and a just global economy. At the same time, in the preceding presentations and in the recommendations shortly to be offered, we are putting before you a number of steps apt to reduce and embark on the elimination of the nuclear danger. The most important of these is the commencement of good faith negotiations for the adoption of a nuclear weapons convention, a model of which has been produced by civil society and made available to diplomats.

Please note that the recommendations do not aim to comprehensively cover all aspects of disarmament and non-proliferation. Without devaluing standard measures like the test ban, a fissile materials treaty, and verified and deep reductions, this year we decided to focus on other areas for action, some of which, for example missiles and missile defenses, do not receive enough attention.

One point which needs to be made at the conclusion of the presentations concerns the relationship between nuclear weapons and war. It used to be conventional wisdom that nuclear weapons served to deter both conventional and nuclear war, although empirical evidence for the validity of this proposition is entirely lacking. On the other hand, there is now ample evidence that the fear of nuclear proliferation has itself become a principal cause of war.

It was the false belief in Saddam Hussein's nuclear ambitions that led to the disastrous and still ongoing war in Iraq. It was saber rattling of the all-options-are-on-the-table variety that brought the West close to war with Iran and, earlier, with North Korea. And it is the fear of the acquisition of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction by so-called rogue states which has led five of the most senior western military commanders to call for a "grand strategy" including preemptive nuclear strikes.

With the end of the cold war, deterrence has become instigation.

At the beginning of his new book, *The Seventh Decade—The New Shape of Nuclear Danger*, Jonathan Schell, the author of *The Fate of the Earth*, which first alerted the world to the dreadful nature of nuclear weapons, has this to say: "The nuclear age has entered its seventh decade. If it were a person, it would be thinking about retirement." We of civil society respectfully but urgently call on you to take the steps which will bring about, in the shortest possible time, the retirement of nuclear weapons from the world scene.

Recommendations

Convenor: Ray Acheson, Reaching Critical Will

Speaker: Susi Snyder, Women's International League for Peace and Freedom

We urge all governments in non-nuclear weapon states, and all responsible voices in those states possessing nuclear weapons, to unconditionally reject all arguments that are put forward for the continued existence of nuclear weapons. The point cannot be made often enough, or insistently enough, that nuclear weapons provide only the illusion of security and that no country has the right to maintain such an illusion by holding all of humanity hostage to the threat of mass extermination.

We urge all governments to support negotiations of a Nuclear Weapon Convention leading to the elimination of all nuclear weapons. We encourage them to explore the legal, political, and technical elements required to achieve and maintain a nuclear weapons free world, using the Model Nuclear Weapons Convention, prepared by civil society, as a guide. We recognise that the abolition of nuclear weapons will be achieved through a combination of negotiated agreements, national implementation measures, and the comprehensive rejection of nuclear weapons by civil society, political institutions, and legal authorities—we urge all governments to engage in this process with sincerity and determination.

We urge the immediate cessation of all programs for the research, design, development, and production of nuclear weapons and any new construction of infrastructure for that purpose, with provision for intrusive verification of the nuclear weapon development sites.

We urge governments to continue providing detailed information about the size and composition of their nuclear arsenals and on their actions to implement the provisions of the NPT each year of the NPT review process as required by Step 12 of the 13 Practical Steps for the implementation of Article VI adopted by the 2000 NPT Review Conference, which calls for, “Regular reports, within the framework of the NPT strengthened review process, by all States parties on the implementation of Article VI and paragraph 4 (c) of the 1995 Decision on 'Principles and Objectives for Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament,' and recalling the Advisory Opinion of the International Court of Justice of 8 July 1996.” We ask governments who have not yet done so to submit these details as formal reports and encourage all other governments to increase their submission of formal reports to the NPT review process as a fulfillment of their obligations and as a transparency and confidence-building measure.

We urge all nuclear weapon states to stand down their nuclear forces, taking them off high alert. We encourage the governments of these states to be transparent about the status of their nuclear forces.

We urge all governments to reduce their missile stockpiles, to cease design and production of new missiles, and to cease or refrain from developing “missile defense” technologies. We also call on governments to stop the use or threat of preemptive strikes, counter-proliferation, and “missile defense” in response to the threat of missile proliferation, as these practices fuel the missile arms race and undermine human and international security.

We further urge governments to cooperate to develop mechanisms that restrain both capabilities *and* motivations to acquire missiles and “missile defenses”. Capabilities could be constrained through a global treaty controlling the development of ballistic missiles, a missile flight-test ban, and a “missile freeze” on offensive and defensive missiles. Motivations could be constrained through building international and regional security regimes, combined with political and economic cooperation, to provide incentives to diminish reliance on missile arsenals.

We urge all governments to seek and support a comprehensive arms control agreement for outer space that will ban the placement of weapons in outer space and prohibit the development, testing, and deployment of weapon systems that would attack outer space objects, including anti-satellite weapons that are currently being developed under the guise of “missile defense”. Such an agreement should prevent the use of space as a platform for anti-satellite, anti-missile, and air- and ground-strike systems. We believe that a comprehensive arms control agreement could integrate risk reduction and code of conduct measures in a phased approach.

We urge all governments to consider the full implications of the US-India Deal and to play an active role to help ensure that this controversial proposal does not further undermine the nuclear safeguards system and efforts to prevent the proliferation of technologies that may be used to produce nuclear bomb material; in any way contribute to nuclear proliferation and/or the expansion of India's nuclear arsenal; or otherwise grant India the benefits of civil nuclear trade without holding it to the same standards expected of other states parties of the NPT.

We urge all governments to actively oppose any arrangement that would give India any special safeguards exemptions or would in any way be inconsistent with the principle of permanent safeguards over all nuclear materials *and facilities* and to insist that India conclude a meaningful Additional Protocol safeguards regime *before* the NSG takes a decision on exempting India from its rules. We urge all nuclear supplier states to terminate their supply to India if India resumes nuclear testing for any reason. We further urge all governments to support the implementation of Security Council resolution 1172, which calls on India and Pakistan to sign the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty and stop producing fissile material for weapons, among other nuclear risk reduction measures, and to reiterate their commitment to the prompt realization of its goals.

We call for the end of nuclear weapon sharing. We urge all nuclear weapon states to comply with Article I of the NPT, which prohibits them from transferring nuclear weapons or control over such weapons to any recipient. We likewise urge all non-nuclear weapon states to comply with Article II of the NPT, which imposes a complementary obligation on them not to “receive the transfer” of nuclear weapons. We urge that all remaining US nuclear weapons are withdrawn from Europe; that NATO conducts a review of its Strategic Concept including a diminished role for nuclear weapons and a commitment to no first use of nuclear weapons as first steps to their complete removal from European soil; that the United States and Russia negotiate a verifiable treaty on the elimination of all non-strategic, or tactical, nuclear weapons; and that this PrepCom recommends to the 2010 NPT Review Conference the reaffirmation of the 1985 Review Conference language that the Treaty is binding in all circumstances, and that the 2010 Review Conference further states that Articles I and II of the Treaty allow for no exceptions.

We urge governments to consider what controls over nuclear technology are necessary in order to sustain a nuclear weapon free world, including establishment of an International Renewable Energy Agency (IRENA), as initiated by the German government together with 60 other governments at a conference in April 2008. In addition, we call for a prohibition on the production of plutonium and highly enriched uranium. We note, however, that the phase-out of nuclear power is the only truly proliferation-proof solution. While Article IV of the NPT refers to an “inalienable right” of non-nuclear weapon states to develop nuclear energy for “peaceful purposes,” this right must be exercised in conformity with international law and is subject to limits based upon the environmental and security rights of other states and the health and welfare of succeeding generations. The “inalienable right” to nuclear energy should be understood in the context of the NPT bargain, and not as a claim that it is a fundamental aspect of sovereignty. Furthermore, this NPT-derived “right” can and should be superseded by the development of clean, safe, sustainable means of energy production—enabling the world to provide for its energy needs without resort to fossil fuels or nuclear power.

We call for a global moratorium on uranium mining and milling as an urgently needed public health intervention that will also contribute to progress on disarmament and non-proliferation.

We urge delegates to consider gender issues in their deliberations and to use the tools of gender analysis to better understand motivations and to reassess the values traditionally assigned to certain perspectives, concerns, and ideas about peace, security, and disarmament. We further encourage governments to incorporate a gender perspective into their policies and practices and to implement Security Council resolution 1325 by ensuring increased participation by women at all decision-making levels, particularly in institutions and bodies dealing with security and disarmament.

We urge delegates to continue and increase their level of interaction with civil society at multilateral disarmament conferences through formal and informal briefings, exchanges, and roundtables. We also urge delegates to press for increased civil society attendance and participation at all multilateral disarmament conferences, including the Conference on Disarmament and the NPT review process.

List of Participating Organizations

Abolition 2000

Acronym Institute for Disarmament Diplomacy

Arms Control Association

Ban All Nukes generation

Citizens' Nuclear Information Center

Egyptian Council for Foreign Affairs

Fridens-und Begegnungsstätte Mutlangen e.V.

Global Security Institute

Greenpeace International

International Campaign Against Nuclear Weapons

International Network of Engineers and Scientists Against Proliferation

International Physicians for the Prevention of Nuclear War

Japan Confederation of A- and H-Bomb Sufferers Organizations (Nihon Hidankyo)

Japan Council Against A & H Bombs (Gensuikyo)

Lawyers' Committee on Nuclear Policy

Le Mouvement de la Paix

Mayors for Peace

Nuclear Age Peace Foundation

Nuclear Flashpoints

Nuclear Information Research Service

Nuclear Weapons Non-Proliferation & International Safeguards System

Physicians for Global Survival-Canada

Physicians for Social Responsibility-USA

Un Futuro Senza Atomiche

Women's International League for Peace and Freedom

World Council of Churches

Zintl Institut

END NOTES FOR NUCLEAR POWER PRESENTATION

- ⁱ See for instance: “Toward a Nuclear-Free World.” Wall Street Journal, January 15, 2008. Op/Ed by George Shultz, William Perry, Henry Kissinger and Sam Nunn. Posted as of April 10, 2008 at: http://online.wsj.com/article/SB120036422673589947.html?mod=opinion_main_commentaries
- ⁱⁱ A typical 1000 MegaWatt nuclear power reactor produces almost 300 Kg of plutonium a year. See: <http://www.nirs.org/factsheets/plutbomb.htm> and Dr. Arjun Makhijani, January 22, 2001. Plutonium End Game (outline), page 19 – A Brief History of Commercial Plutonium, web posted at: <http://www.ieer.org/reports/pu/peg.pdf> See also: David Albright and Lauren Barbour: Separated Inventories of Civil Plutonium Continue to Grow, May 1999. Posted at: <http://www.isis-online.org/publications/puwatch/putext.html>
- ⁱⁱⁱ For instance the United States, India and North Korea have tested nuclear devices derived from reactor materials.
- ^{iv} See: <http://www.gnep.energy.gov/>
- ^v See: <http://www.iaea.org/NewsCenter/News/2007/gnep.html>
- ^{vi} For instance, see: <http://www.stanleyfoundation.org/resources.cfm?id=289>
- ^{vii}
- ^{viii} For a detailed critique of the flaws of this program see Dr. Edwin Lyman, “Global Nuclear Energy Partnership: Will it Advance Nonproliferation, or Undermine It?” posted at <http://www.npec-web.org/Frameset.asp?PageType=Single&PDFFile=20060700-Lyman-GNEP&PDFFolder=Essays>, the reader is also invited to watch for the June edition of Scientific American (also available on-line) for an article by Dr. Frank von Hippel of Princeton University.
- ^{ix} Dr Edwin Lyman, now at the Union of Concerned Scientists has published a series of papers on his findings on MOX source term. An example is “The Impact of the Use of Mixed-Oxide Fuel on the Potential for Severe Nuclear Plant Accidents in Japan” October, 1999, posted at: <http://www.nci.org/j/japanmox.htm>.
- ^x For a current critique of the WHO and Chernobyl, see Alison Katz, “Chernobyl: the Great Cover-up” in the April 2008 Le Monde diplomatique, web posted at: <http://mondediplo.com/2008/04/14who>
- ^{xi} For instance see: US Department of Energy, Integrated Spent Fuel Database, 1994, pie chart on page 47. This report pertains to the USA which is only about ¼ of the global inventory – but most other nations with nuclear energy will have an even greater percentage of total radioactive waste from the generation of electric power.
- ^{xii} Convention is 10 – 20 half-lives for the period of hazard. This is actually a very short estimate for the period of hazard posed by the constituents of this waste.
- ^{xiii} For instance the US Nuclear Waste Negotiator in 1993 addressed the National Council of Native Americans and invoked the speech attributed to Chief Seattle and the practice of planning for the Seventh Generation. Similarly the Pangea plan for a global dump on Indigenous Land in Australia invokes the long-term stewardship of the aboriginal culture.
- ^{xiv} See Amory Lovins, “More Profit With Less Carbon” September 2005, Scientific American for a comparison of greenhouse gas reduction from renewable energy and energy efficiency compared to investment in new nuclear power generating capacity.
- ^{xv} See graph on page 2 of “Nuclear Facts” posted at: <http://www.newint.org/issue382/facts.htm>
- ^{xvi} Here is a selection of news reports of nuclear power reactors being taken off-line due to elevated temperatures of the cooling water supplies:
- May 20, 2007 “Climate Change Puts Nuclear Energy in Hot Water” International Herald Tribune, <http://iht.com/articles/2007/05/20/business/nuke.php?page=2>
- June 8, 2007 “Court Blocks Yankee’s Warm Water Discharge” Rutland Herald (VT) <http://www.rutlandherald.com/apps/pbcs.dll/article?AID=/20070608/NEWS04/706080387> July 31, 2007 “US Heat Wave...” Bloomberg.com <http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=20601087&sid=aNtzVaLCaNc8&refer=home>
- August 17, 2007 “TVA Reactor Shut Down: Cooling Water Drawn From River Too Hot” reported on WAFF48 News <http://www.waff.com/global/story.asp?s=6944527> and “Heat Wave Ignites Problems in ET” Knoxnews <http://www.knoxnews.com/news/2007/aug/18/heat-wave-ignites-problems-in-et/>
- August 23, 2007 “Rising Temperatures Undermine Nuclear Power’s Promise” Union of Concerned Scientists <http://www.nirs.org/climate/background/ucsrisingtemps82307.pdf>
- July 30, 2006 “Heat Wave Shuts Down Nuclear Power Plants” The Observer (London) <http://observer.guardian.co.uk/world/story/0,,1833620,00.html>
- July 27, 2006 “Heat Wave Shows Limits of Nuclear Energy” IPS <http://www.ipsnews.net/news.asp?idnews=34121> August 10, 2006 “Hot Temps Chill Nuclear Power’s Appeal” Christian Science Monitor, posted at <http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2006/08/10/tech/main1881980.shtml>
- ¹⁹ Summary of findings given in: <http://www.nirs.org/reactorwatch/mox/nirmscguirecatawbacontentions.htm>

²⁰ U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, "Severe Accident Risks: An Assessment for Five U.S. Nuclear Power Plants," NUREG-1150, 1990.

²¹ For a review of French reactors off line due to heat listen to NPR's Morning Edition August 21, 2007: <http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=13818689>
Although many of these articles are about US reactors, France has had reactors off-line many summers since the 2003 heatwave that forced a record number to idle. Sweden too has reported reactors off-line or at low power due to warm water.

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^{xviii} There is one maker of pressurized water reactor vessels in the world today – Japan Steel works. The out-put of these enormous forged steel containers is currently 4 a year. See: Yoshifumi Takemoto and Alan Katz, "Samuri-Sword Maker's Monopoly May Cool Nuclear Revival" Bloomberg.com March 13. Posted at: <http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=20601109&sid=aaVMzCTMz3ms&refer=exclusive>

^{xix} Amory Lovins is one source – see note xiv.

^{xx} See Olson, Mary 2008 "Got Solar!" Web posted at: <http://www.nirs.org/southeast/gotsolar.pdf>

^{xxi} For a brief on nuclear power and water, see Union of Concerned Scientists "Got Water?" by David Lochbaum. 2007. Posted at: http://www.ucsusa.org/clean_energy/nuclear_safety/got-water-nuclear-power.html