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STATEMENT BY
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OF THE REPUBLIC OF INDONESIA TO THE UNITED NATIONS, WTO,
AND OTHER INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS IN GENEVA

AT THE SECOND SESSION OF THE PREPARATORY COMMITTEE FOR THE 2010 REVIEW
CONFERENCE OF THE STATE PARTIES TO THE TREATY ON THE NON-PROLIFERATION OF
NUCLEAR WEAPONS

GENEVA, 28 APRIL 2008 ~~29/04/08~~

Mr. Chairman,

Allow me first of all, on behalf of my delegation, to congratulate you on your election as the Chairman of this preparatory meeting. Let me also assure you of our utmost support for your stewardship in ensuring a fruitful and productive outcome of this meeting toward the preparation of the 2010 NPT Review Conference.

My delegation would like to associate itself with the statement of the Group of NAM States parties to the NPT.

[Non-proliferation and international security]

This Prepcom meeting provides another opportunity to ensure the credibility and relevance of the Treaty. Indeed, in response to the current proliferation challenges and in order to avoid another debacle at the 2010 Review Conference, the nuclear non-proliferation regime must be strengthened.

The Treaty must continue to be the corner stone of the global non-proliferation regime. The three pillars of the Treaty have to be implemented in a balanced and non-discriminatory manner. In order for the Treaty to be able to respond with current proliferation challenges, its 'grand bargain' shall be maintained and implemented, thus reinforcing the relevance and purpose of the Treaty.

In dealing with threats and challenges posed by the existence and proliferation of nuclear weapons, the urgency to address compliance to and verification of the Treaty has become more critical. In this regard, the role of the IAEA as the most competent and reliable body shall be further reinforced.

Meanwhile, the tendency for the Security Council to judge compliance and to act as an enforcer of the NPT needs to be urgently rectified. There is no doubt this inclination has a political motivation, as the Council will not in anyway act in a similar manner on non-compliance to Article VI. It has also become a source of concern that the expansion of the Security Council involvement in this field risks to undermine the authority of the IAEA.

Mr. Chairman,

[Nuclear disarmament and security assurances]

The world continues facing serious threats posed by the continued existence of thousands of nuclear warheads both in stockpiles and high-alert status, as well as of their possible use. In addition, more sophisticated and advanced nuclear weapons are also being developed by some NWS in order to maintain their nuclear deterrence.

The steps taken to address such threats are inadequate. While nuclear weapons were more widely available in the post Cold-War era, their strategic importance now is irrelevant. And yet they have become more dangerous. These are compelling reasons for renewed efforts by NWS to reduce the size of their nuclear arsenals and review the role of nuclear weapons in their security doctrines.

Over the past few years, there has been growing political momentum to achieve the goal of a world without nuclear weapons into practical actions among States. However, nuclear disarmament should not only be seen as reducing the number of weapons, but also in preventing those that do exist from use. Indeed, addressing the role of nuclear weapons in the contemporary world should be a central part of our agenda in the next Review Conference.

The convening of the "International Conference on Nuclear Disarmament", initiated by Norway held in Oslo last February, clearly represents this significant momentum. The growing political support by recognized international figures, as appeared in the two famous articles in the Wall Street Journal, also signifies the urgent necessity to establish a world free of nuclear weapons.

Considering that almost the world's nuclear warheads belong to the US and Russia, the future of arms control and disarmament therefore lies in their hands. They have a special responsibility and obligation to demonstrate leadership toward achieving the goal of a world free of nuclear weapons. Consequently, their bilateral agreements to control and reduce strategic and non-strategic nuclear warheads should be implemented in a transparent, verifiable and irreversible manner. Without their strong leadership, other NWS would be reluctant to fully implement their nuclear disarmament obligations and commitments.

In this context, the adoption of a new NATO Strategic Concept, which among others contains policies for the retention of nuclear weapons, in fact contradicts the NPT's obligations for nuclear disarmament. Therefore, we support any actions to remove and dismantle tactical nuclear weapons from territories of NNWS which are members of NATO.

Pending the total elimination of nuclear weapons, NWS should provide security assurance to NNWS, and that nuclear weapons will never be used against them. There is an urgent need to translate security assurances by NWS into a universal, unconditional and legally binding treaty. At the same time, NWS should commit that there would be no 'new and usable' weapons that could trigger a new nuclear arms race.

In the 1995 NPT Review and Extension Conference, in return of the indefinite extension of the NPT, the NWS had promised not to conduct further nuclear testing, which finally brought into the conclusion of the CTBT in 1996. Therefore, in fulfilling their promise, the immediate decisions by the remaining NWS to ratify the CTBT would have positive impact on progress towards the entry into force of the CTBT.

[Safeguards and Peaceful uses of nuclear energy]

As a faithful State party to the NPT, Indonesia has fully complied with Article III of the Treaty by putting Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement (CSA) and the Additional Protocol (AP) in force. We recognize the extensive efforts made by the IAEA in strengthening safeguards and verification system with a view to make the Agency respond effectively to emerging proliferation challenges.

Over the past years, the role of nuclear power has been shaped by many factors, such as growing energy needs, the availability of other energy sources, environmental dimension, nuclear safety and proliferation concerns as well as advancement of nuclear technology. With regard to energy security, we are compelled to keep our options open to alternative sources of energy, including nuclear energy, as it is fully guaranteed by Article IV of the Treaty. It is noteworthy that this has been specifically crafted to fully recognize the right of each State party to develop nuclear energy, as long as it is aimed and used not to produce nuclear weapons, and under the full integrated safeguards of the IAEA.

Meanwhile, there are views that the spread of sensitive nuclear technology may also be a potential risk of proliferation that has led to discussion on the need to revisit multilateral approaches to the nuclear fuel cycle. Since the past five years, some proposals with regard to the assurance of supply of nuclear fuel cycle have been put forward by State or group of States, including the one recommended by the IAEA Expert Group.

In this context, we are of the view that the concern related to nuclear proliferation and the alleged sensitivity of nuclear technology are not in any way discouraging certain peaceful nuclear activities, as well as restrict the inalienable right of all states to develop all aspects of nuclear science and technology for peaceful purposes.

In principle, Indonesia is open to and fully understands the rationale behind all the proposals on nuclear fuel cycle as long as the process would be conducted in a non-discriminatory, multilaterally-negotiated, comprehensive and transparent manner under the auspices of the IAEA. But one crucial principle has to be upheld in which any arrangement shall not undermine "the letter and spirit" of Article IV of the NPT.

Mr. Chairman,

[Nuclear-weapon-free-zones]

The establishment of nuclear-weapon-free-zones (NWFZ), which covers more than 100 States in five different regions, reflects the most tangible commitment by NNWS to support the provisions of the NPT. However, to achieve an effective NWFZ, it will largely depend on the requirement to which NWS have to strictly adhere to all provisions of the Treaty establishing such zone.

Together with other Southeast Asian countries, Indonesia initiated a resolution in the UN General Assembly last year entitled "Treaty on the South East Asia NWFZ (Bangkok Treaty)". The resolution, among others, encourages States parties to the Treaty to work towards resuming direct consultations with NWS with a view to ensuring the early accession of the NWS to the Protocol of the Treaty.

There is also a need to promote relations and cooperation between the existing NWFZs, as recommended by the Conference of States parties to NWFZs in Tlatelolco in 2005, to discuss ways and means to strengthen the effectiveness of NWFZs.

In the context of NPT, with the recent political and security development in the Middle East, there is a strong reason to move tangibly for establishing a nuclear-weapon-free-zone in the Middle East in accordance with the 1995 NPT Review and Extension Conference resolution on the Middle East, as well as the UN Security Council resolutions 487 and 687.

Mr. Chairman,

[Compliance]

As we are at the second stage of preparatory work towards the 2010 Revcon, all States parties need to reiterate their obligations to fully comply with all provisions of the Treaty. Other commitments and agreements resulted from the previous Review Conferences must also be upheld and implemented.

It would be unfair to insist the NNWS to comply with their non-proliferation obligations, while the NWS have failed to honor their disarmament obligations and commitments. The application of 'double standard' in the implementation of NPT would only further undermine the integrity and the validity of the Treaty.

In addressing the overall questions on compliance to the nuclear non-proliferation regime, renewed commitments and new approaches are required. All States parties need not only ways and means to deal with the current threats and challenges, but also they should restrain from focusing only on one pillar of the NPT bargains.

Mr. Chairman,

[Closing]

Like the previous Preparatory Committees, we believe that this meeting should provide a good opportunity for the States parties to actively engage in both procedural and substantive aspects, so as to lay a solid foundation for a successful Review Conference in 2010.

Only through exerting sufficient political will and exhibiting a consistency to uphold principles, and avoiding double standards, the principles and objectives of the Treaty can be achieved, and a successful Review Conference in 2010 can be concluded.

I thank you Mr. Chairman.

