

**Statement by Ambassador Kari Kahiluoto,
Permanent Representative of Finland to the Conference on Disarmament**

**2008 Non-Proliferation Treaty Preparatory Committee
CLUSTER I**

- Mr. Chairman, I am speaking on behalf of Finland, Sweden, Lithuania, Switzerland, Ukraine and Austria.
- Mr. Chairman, I have taken the floor to address the issue of non-strategic nuclear weapons.
- The unilateral, but reciprocal, initiatives of the US and Soviet, later Russian Presidents in 1991/1992 were very important, even groundbreaking steps in nuclear disarmament and arms control. They had a significant influence on the environment for nuclear disarmament and beyond.
- After more than 15 years we consider it justified to call for enhanced focus on and interest in the issue of non-strategic nuclear weapons in the context of the NPT Review Process and in the bilateral US - Russian nuclear arms reduction talks. Non-strategic nuclear weapons are an integral part of the discussion on fulfilment of the goals set forward in Article VI of the NPT. No nuclear weapon system should be considered immune from treaty-based and verifiable nuclear disarmament.
- There are indications that non-strategic nuclear weapons are being considered as battlefield weapons to counter or complement to conventional forces. There are also indications of plans to develop new types of non-strategic nuclear weapons. Such a development would go against commitments made in the NPT framework including in the Final Document of the 2000 NPT Review Conference.
- Although the 1991/1992 Presidential Nuclear Initiatives (PNI) were an important step forward, much has been left unfulfilled and should be addressed before the 2010 NPT Review Conference. The PNI's were not codified as binding legal instruments, they lack a formal verification system, they are not irreversible, implementation has not been fully transparently disclosed or monitored and, first and foremost, the PNI's have not removed the category of land-based non-strategic nuclear weapons from operational nuclear doctrine. The time has come to strengthen the commitments on non-strategic nuclear weapons and to codify them in the Post-START context as a demonstration of fulfilment of the objectives of Article VI of the NPT and of the rule of law. A first step towards their reduction and elimination could be consolidation and withdrawal to central storage.
- The 1991/1992 PNI's were by definition a bilateral undertaking by the US and the Russian Federation. Developments since call for a broader approach, also reflected by the proposal to impart a global character to the INF regime. The NPT Review Process provides a framework to move these two issues forward, but first steps by codifying the bilateral US/RF 1991/1992 PNI's would set an important example and precedent.
- We welcome the recent increased focus on non-strategic nuclear weapons, as expressed in two influential Wall Street Journal articles by four esteemed American statesmen and as reflected in the Chairman's Summary by Ambassador Amano of Japan of the 1st NPT Prepcom last year, and as embodied in recommendation 21 of the Weapons of Mass Destruction Commission. We believe that this Prepcom should convey a clear message of the importance of treaty-bound disarmament measures regarding non-strategic nuclear weapons.

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