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Statement by the representative of the Islamic Republic of Iran before
the Second Session of the Preparatory Committee of 2010 Review
Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of
Nuclear Weapons
30 April, 2008

Nuclear Disarmament

Mr. Chairman,

I am pleased to avail myself of the opportunity to express the position of my delegation on the nuclear disarmament and Article VI of the NPT. I would like to assure you the full support and cooperation of my delegation for the long-sought cause of the realization of a total elimination of nuclear weapons in the world.

The NPT regime constitutes an integrated and balanced package of rights and obligations according to which the nuclear-weapon States undertake not to transfer and develop nuclear weapons and commit to practical steps towards nuclear disarmament.

In 1978, the final document of the special session devoted to disarmament confirmed nuclear disarmament as the highest priority on the disarmament agenda. In 1995, the NPT Extension Review Conference renewed the commitment of the nuclear-weapon States in the field of nuclear disarmament.

In 2000, the Review Conference adopted a number of practical steps, including the *“unequivocal undertaking by the nuclear-weapon States to accomplish the total elimination of their nuclear arsenals leading to nuclear disarmament under article VI of the Treaty”*. During this Review Conference, the nuclear-weapon States also committed themselves to *“the further reduction of non-strategic nuclear weapons, based on unilateral initiatives and as an integral part of the arms reduction and disarmament process”*. In spite of that, the nuclear-weapon States have taken no practical steps to reduce tactical nuclear weapons.

Today, what non-nuclear-weapon State parties to the NPT are expecting is the consideration of the national reports of the nuclear weapon States with

respect to their implementation of article VI of the Treaty, including their measures taken for in the implementation of the agreed practical steps.

Since the 2000 NPT Conference, despite the obligations under article VI and undertakings by the nuclear weapon States in 1995 and 2000, developments in the area of nuclear disarmament have not been promising. Failures and non-compliance towards achieving the goal of the complete nuclear disarmament still threaten international peace and security:

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- The continued development and deployment of thousands of nuclear warheads in the stockpiles of the nuclear-weapon States,
- The non-entry into force of the START II agreement,
- The reluctance to pursue the START III negotiations,
- The abrogation of the ABM Treaty as among the serious setbacks to the implementation of the agreements of the NPT 2000 Conference,
- The Reductions, as stipulated in the Moscow Treaty on Strategic Offensive Reductions in 2002, which are far below the international expectations for real steps towards the total elimination of nuclear weapons. It does not go beyond the decommissioning of nuclear weapons, and parties do not have any obligation to destroy their nuclear weapons. It lacks any verification mechanism and, therefore, does not take into account the principles of "increased transparency", "diminishing role for nuclear weapons" and "irreversibility", which the nuclear-weapon States agreed upon at the 2000 NPT Conference.

- The US Nuclear Posture Review provides for the development of new types of nuclear weapons,

- The possible use or threat of use of nuclear weapons against non-nuclear weapon States and targeting nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapon States parties to the Treaty, in contravention of the assurances given by the nuclear weapon States at the time of the conclusion of the NPT and its indefinite extension.

- The allocation of hundreds of millions of dollars to projects aimed at developing mini-nuclear weapons or the so-called bunker busters, by labeling them the simple research programs.

And recently, France has announced the addition of a new nuclear-armed ballistic missile-carrying submarine to its nuclear arsenals. The French president is quoted as saying "French nuclear forces are a key element in Europe's security." It appears that this country in defiance of its international obligations is seeking to find and define new roles and missions for its nuclear forces in order to justify the continued retention of them in the post-cold war era. In so doing, they have even resorted to irresponsible methods

despite the explanation of the UK representative yesterday

such as manipulation of intelligence and fear to promote programs that their people would otherwise not support.)

Furthermore, the UK Trident Project caused a major dilemma whether Britain is not ready to be treated like the majority of other states and comply with treaty obligations that mean relying on the nonproliferation regime or it wants to keep nuclear deterrence for an unknown period which can go well beyond at least 2050.

Mr. Chairman,

In spite of these threatening and unfortunate facts, the Preparatory Committee and the 2010 NPT Review Conference have an urgent task to address the concerns of the non-nuclear-weapon States emanating from the development and deployment of new nuclear weapons and their means of delivery by the nuclear-weapon States. These concerns need to be alleviated by considering a decision on the prohibition of development and the production of any new nuclear weapons, particularly mini-nukes, as well as a ban on the construction of any new facility for the development, deployment and production of nuclear weapons and their means of delivery in home and foreign countries.

Moreover, real concerns of the international community over vertical proliferation of nuclear weapons, the transfer and deployment of nuclear weapons in territories of non-nuclear-weapon States, lowering the threshold of resort to nuclear weapons and the danger of using such inhumane weapons in conventional conflicts and against non-nuclear-weapon States parties to the NPT, remain. Ironically, not only do some nuclear-weapon States not take steps towards the total elimination of their arsenals, and give no security assurances to non-nuclear States parties, they also threaten to be the first users.

In accordance with article I of the NPT, "Each nuclear-weapon State Party to the Treaty undertakes not to transfer to any recipient whatsoever nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices or control over such weapons or explosive devices directly or indirectly". Contrary to this obligation, hundreds of nuclear weapons and their means of delivery have been and are still being deployed in other countries and air forces of non-nuclear-weapon States train in the delivery of these weapons under the cover of military alliances. In the same context, the nuclear sharing between nuclear-weapon States and between nuclear-weapon States and States not parties to the Treaty is also a grave source of concern for NPT parties. The nuclear-

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weapon States should comply with their obligations under article I by refraining from nuclear-sharing, regardless of the pretext or the security arrangements or military alliance.

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The NPT, in its article III, paragraph 2, commits all States to refrain from the transfer of sensitive technology and materials to non-parties to the Treaty unless they are placed under the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards. Accordingly, the Prep.Com sessions and the Review Conference should reaffirm the total and complete prohibition of the transfer of any nuclear-related equipment, information, material and facilities, resources or devices and the extension of assistance in the nuclear, scientific or technological fields to non-parties to the NPT, without exception and in particular to the Zionist regime, whose unsafeguarded nuclear facilities and continued program for the development of nuclear weapons are a real threat to all countries of the Middle East and to international peace and security. The United States is being a non-compliant party in its undertakings under the provisions of the NPT by continuing nuclear-sharing with the Zionist regime and by strongly supporting this regime by keeping silence on the acknowledgement of its Prime Minister of their nuclear arsenal.

Furthermore, very recently a new agreement was signed by the director of the Israeli Atomic Energy Commission, and the chairman of the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, enabling Zionist Regime to access most of the latest nuclear data and technology available in the U.S which is another US non-compliance with the provisions of the NPT. Though it seems that the US has no shy of supporting that regime's nuclear weapon and the disclosed "top secret document dated 23 August 1974" clearly shows the role of the US in equipping Zionist Regime with nuclear weapons.

The policy of inaction of the United States and some other nuclear-weapon States in dealing with the real threats of the nuclear arsenal of the Zionist regime to regional and international peace and security in the Security Council and other relevant forums constitute an act of horizontal proliferation of nuclear weapons, adding to their vertical one.

Mr. Chairman,

The Islamic Republic of Iran has sponsored the UN General Assembly resolution 62/24 on "follow-up to nuclear disarmament obligations agreed to at the 1995 and 2000 Review Conferences of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons". According to this resolution, the

General Assembly has urged “the States parties to the Treaty to follow up on the implementation of the nuclear disarmament obligations under the Treaty agreed to at the 1995 and 2000 Review Conferences of the Parties to the Treaty within the framework of the 2010 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty and its preparatory committee.”

We continue to believe in the need for negotiations on a phased programme for the complete elimination of nuclear weapons within a specified time limit, including a nuclear weapons convention, and in this regard reiterate our call for the establishment, as the highest priority and as soon as possible, of an ad hoc committee on nuclear disarmament in the Conference on Disarmament. Such negotiations must lead to legally prohibit, once and for all, the possession, development, stockpiling of nuclear weapons by any country and provide for the destruction of such inhuman weapons. Till the conclusion of a Nuclear Weapons Convention similar to the Chemical Weapons Convention, the nuclear weapon States must honor their obligations under the NPT and immediately stop:

- Any kind of development and research on nuclear weapons,
- Any threat of use of nuclear weapons against non-nuclear weapon States,
- Any modernization of nuclear weapons and their facilities,
- Deployment of nuclear weapons in the territories of other countries,
- Maintaining their nuclear weapons in the trigger-alert situation.

The total elimination of nuclear weapons, as the only absolute guarantee against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons, has been accepted in the second paragraph of its section on Article VII of the final document of the 2000 NPT Review Conference. My government is of the view that the NPT Review Conference has a clear mandate to make a decision on negative security assurances. Therefore, my Government proposes that the Conference would establish an ad hoc committee to work on a draft legally binding instrument on this agenda. We believe that, as has been suggested by the NGO community, the Conference should adopt a decision by which “decides that the threat or use of nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapon States shall be prohibited”.

Thank You

