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**2nd Session of the Preparatory Committee
for the Review Conference 2010 of the States Parties to the
Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty**

(Nuclear disarmament)

Statement by

Ambassador Jürg Streuli

Permanent Representative of Switzerland

to the Conference on Disarmament

Geneva, 30.4.2008

Mr President,

Nuclear disarmament was an essential element in the compromise which led to the adoption of the NPT, a compromise in which the Non-Nuclear-Weapon States renounced the acquisition of nuclear weapons in return for a pledge by Nuclear-Weapon States to - I quote - "pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating to cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date and to nuclear disarmament". This procedure was regarded as the guarantee of greater security for all. It is why Switzerland particularly insists on continuing compliance with this compromise and on the implementation of Article VI of the NPT. We consider substantial progress in the area of disarmament to be the best guarantee of nuclear non-proliferation.

Mr President,

Since the 1st Session of the Preparatory Committee in 2007, a number of contrasting developments have characterised nuclear disarmament:

- on one hand, several statements by high political figures have shown that nuclear disarmament is increasingly a subject of discussion in some Nuclear-Weapon States. Likewise, the allocation of funds to the development of new nuclear weapons seems to indicate a more measured approach on the part of some Nuclear-Weapon States.
- on the other hand, these encouraging signs are contradicted by the facts. It has to be said that, in terms of substance, the efforts at nuclear disarmament made so far have not been very significant. Moreover, Nuclear-Weapon States continue to rely on nuclear weapons in their defence doctrines, and some are carrying out modernisation programmes for their nuclear arsenals, which goes against the spirit of Article VI.

Mr President,

Switzerland is aware that nuclear disarmament as advocated in Article VI remains a long-term goal. However, my country would like to stress that it is becoming increasingly difficult to accept the argumentation of Nuclear-Weapon States which

invoke the negative development of security conditions to justify their slowness in the matter of nuclear disarmament, while almost all Non-Nuclear Weapon States are experiencing the same conditions but nevertheless honour their pledge not to acquire nuclear weapons.

Switzerland remains convinced that the success of the 2010 Review Conference will crucially depend on substantial progress in the area of nuclear disarmament. My country therefore encourages the Nuclear-Weapon States to honour their commitments to nuclear disarmament as contained in the acquit of previous review conferences. These measures include in particular:

- the "Principles and objectives of nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament" of 1995, which contain inter alia:
 - the implementation of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty
 - the negotiation of a legally binding multilateral instrument on Negative Security Assurances ...
 - ... and of a Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty.
- the "Thirteen Practical Steps" of 2000, in the framework of which the Nuclear-Weapon States committed themselves "unequivocally" to nuclear disarmament, in particular by means of:
 - transparency measures in the area of tactical nuclear weapons
 - implementation of nuclear-weapon-free zones
 - nuclear de-alerting. This measure was the subject of a resolution adopted by the United Nations General Assembly in 2007. My country encourages all Nuclear-Weapon States to support the principles of this resolution.

Switzerland also encourages Nuclear-Weapon States to adopt more courageous approaches to nuclear disarmament, whether such approaches are unilateral, bilateral or multilateral, while insisting that such measures should be pragmatic and should contain the principles of transparency, irreversibility and verification:

- in this context, my country insists particularly on the urgent need for Russia and the United States to intensify their discussions in order to conclude a new bilateral disarmament agreement to replace START I as of 2009 and SORT as of 2012. Such a measure by the two States with the largest nuclear arsenals could

prompt the other Nuclear-Weapon States to display more boldness in the matter of nuclear disarmament.

- moreover the Nuclear-Weapon States could also commit themselves voluntarily or in binding form to other measures moving in the direction of nuclear disarmament, such as a general application of the "no first use" principle or a moratorium on the development of new nuclear weapons.
- finally, the prospect of the 60th anniversary of NATO in 2009 could provide an opportunity for the organisation to reassess its nuclear doctrine, including the issue of basing nuclear weapons in several Non-Nuclear Weapon States on the European continent.

Mr President,

The catalogue of measures that Nuclear-Weapon States could adopt in order to advance the cause of nuclear disarmament is a lengthy one. The ultimate long-term goal is the establishment of a system of global security that is not based on nuclear weapons but on multilateral commitments in the framework of the United Nations. To conclude, my delegation would like to stress that the goal of nuclear disarmament, although it is distant, is not fantasy. On the contrary, the real illusion is to believe that by their delays in honouring their commitment to nuclear disarmament, the Nuclear-Weapon States can expect the appeal of nuclear weapons for other states to diminish.

Mr President, thank you for your attention.