The nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) opened for signature
on 1 July 1968, and entered into force on 5 March 1970. 189
states have ratified the NPT, becoming “states parties”
to the Treaty. India, Israel, and Pakistan have not signed
or ratified the Treaty and have developed nuclear weapons
since its entry into force. North Korea did ratify the Treaty
but announced its withdrawal in 2003.
The NPT divides all state parties into two groups: those that
tested nuclear weapons before 1 January 1967 and those that
did not. The states that tested nuclear weapons before 1967
are known as official “nuclear weapon states”
and consists of the United States, Russia (originally the
Soviet Union), China, France, and the United Kingdom. The
second group is known as non-nuclear weapon states.
The NPT’s main impetus was stopping the potential rapid
proliferation of nuclear weapons to a high number of states.
Therefore, the Treaty provides a “grand bargain”
for non-nuclear weapon states: that in exchange for their
commitment to never develop or receive nuclear weapons, the
nuclear weapon states promised to eliminate their arsenals
and that non-nuclear weapon states would have access to the
“peaceful uses” of nuclear technology.
Summary of the articles
Article I: Nuclear weapon states will not transfer nuclear
weapons, nor will they assist in the development of nuclear
weapons in any way.
Article II: Non-nuclear weapon states will not acquire
nuclear weapons, nor will they manufacture such weapons.
Article III: Non-nuclear weapon states will accept inspection
of their civilian nuclear energy plants by the International
Atomic Energy
Agency and the form of such inspections shall be negotiated
by each state and the IAEA in additional protocols.
Article IV: Nothing in this Treaty shall impede states
parties’ “inalienable right” to nuclear
energy for peaceful purposes.
Article V: Benefits from peaceful nuclear explosions should
be shared all around (this article has been superceded by
the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty).
Article VI: Each party to the Treaty is obliged to pursue
negotiations on effective measures relating to cessation
of the nuclear arms race at and early date and to nuclear
disarmament. States parties also agree to pursue a treaty
on general and complete disarmament under strict and effective
international control.
Article VII: Nothing in the Treaty can stop nuclear weapon
free zones from being negotiated.
Article VIII: Sets up procedure for amendments of the
Treaty and for the review process.
Article XI: The Treaty is open for all countries, and
it will enter into force when the US, UK, USSR and 40 other
states have ratified it. The definition of a nuclear weapon
state is one that has manufactured and exploded a nuclear
weapon or other nuclear explosive device prior to 1 January
1967.
Article X: Each party has the right to withdraw from the
Treaty if it decides that extraordinary events have jeopardized
the interest of the country. A three months notice of withdrawal
must be given to all states parties of the treaty and the
United Nations Security Council.
Article XI: The Treaty is available in English, Russian,
French, Spanish, and Chinese and all languages are equally
authentic.
Previous reviews of the Treaty
NPT states parties meet every five years to “review
the progress of the Treaty”. Review Conferences convened
in 1975, 1980, 1985, and 1990.
In 1995, the Review Conference decided to extend the
Treaty past its initial 25 years, it is now an indefinite
Treaty. States parties also agreed to a package of decisions,
including a resolution calling for a nuclear weapon free zone
in the Middle East.
In 2000, states parties at the Review Conference adopted
thirteen progressive and systematic steps to implement the
nuclear disarmament obligation in the Treaty and the decisions
reached at the 1995 Conference.
In 2005, states parties failed to agree on an outcome
document, largely because of disagreement between nuclear
weapon states and non-nuclear weapon states, with the former
emphasizing the importance of strengthening nonproliferation
efforts and focusing on specific cases of actual and suspected
non-compliance with the Treaty, and the latter emphasizing
the importance of compliance with and implementation of past
disarmament obligations.
The 2010 Review
Conference
Organization of the Review Conference
The work of the Review Conference is divided up into three
main committees. Each committee will likely have a subsidiary
body focusing on one of its subjects more in depth.
Main Committee I: Implementation of the provisions
of the Treaty relating to non-proliferation of nuclear weapons,
disarmament and international peace and security, including:
Articles I and II and preambular paragraphs 1 to 3; Article
VI and preambular paragraphs 8 to 12; Article VII, with specific
reference to the main issues considered in this Committee;
United Nations Security Council resolutions 255 (1968) and
984 (1995); negative security assurances.
Main Committee II: Implementation of the provisions
of the Treaty relating to non-proliferation of nuclear weapons,
safeguards and nuclear-weaponfree zones, including: Article
III and preambular paragraphs 4 and 5, especially in their
relationship to article IV and preambular paragraphs 6 and
7; Articles I and II and preambular paragraphs 1 to 3 in their
relationship to articles III and IV; Article VII.
Main Committee III: Implementation of the provisions
of the Treaty relating to the inalienable right of all Parties
to the Treaty to develop research, production and use of nuclear
energy for peaceful purposes without discrimination and in
conformity with articles I and II, including: Articles III
(3) and IV, preambular paragraphs 6 and 7, especially in their
relationship to article III (1), (2) and (4) and preambular
paragraphs 4 and 5; Article V; other provisions of the Treaty.
What’s on the table?
The Review Conference in 2010 is an opportunity to strengthen
the nuclear non-proliferation regime and to make progress
on nuclear disarmament, but it faces many obstacles. Recent
developments, such as the conclusion of new START and high-level
rhetoric in favour of a nuclear weapon free world, have lead
to growing expectations for new opportunities for nuclear
disarmament. However, many challenges and difficulties still
remain and the NPT Review Conference must address many controversial
and other issues, including:
concrete steps for nuclear disarmament;
measures to strengthen non-proliferation objectives;
universality of the Treaty;
implementation of the 1995 resolution on the Middle East;
issues related to access to nuclear technology;
measures to address withdrawal from the Treaty;
measures to further strengthen the review process.
“Balancing” non-proliferation and disarmament
The obligation to eliminate nuclear weapons has a beginning
and end. Nuclear weapon states are required to begin negotiations
on nuclear disarmament and to conclude by getting rid of their
arsenals. The non-proliferation requirements, in contrast,
are ongoing. There is no end point. Nuclear and non-nuclear
states are often in conflict over this issue. Nuclear weapon
states assert that they have gone far enough in implementing
article VI of the Treaty (their disarmament obligation) and
that everyone else has to commit to stricter non-proliferation
measures in order to strengthen the Treaty regime. However,
most states that do not possess nuclear weapons note that:
a) nuclear weapon states have not engaged in multilateral
negotiations to eliminate their nuclear arsenals; and that
b) so far, bilateral or unilateral reductions in weapons or
force status have been accompanied by modernization or increased
investment in nuclear weapon programmes, which undermines
the reductions and perpetually delays disarmament.
Debate has been characterized by a divide between those states
which advocate strongly for measures to prevent the further
proliferation of nuclear weapons and those which call for
concrete action on nuclear disarmament. The result has been
what former UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan referred to as
“mutually assured paralysis”.
Suggested talking points: Nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation
measures need to be pursued simultaneously. New and innovative
steps (not just reaffirmation of past commitments) on both
disarmament and non-proliferation are required. The commitment
to disarm must be demonstrated by verifiable, irreversible,
and transparent reductions of nuclear weapons and must not
be conditioned upon further investment in nuclear weapon programmes
or modernization/refurbishment of the existing stockpiles.
The Review Conference should call for the initiation of preparatory
work for a nuclear weapons convention or framework agreement
as a way to ensure full implementation of the NPT.
Universalization of the Treaty
In 1995, states parties affirmed that universal adherence
to the Treaty is an urgent priority. They have routinely called
on India, Israel, and Pakistan to accede to the Treaty as
non-nuclear weapon states, which none are willing to do under
present circumstances.
Suggested talking point: States parties should emphasize
that there are fundamental principles of nuclear disarmament
and non-proliferation that are universal in scope, which could
be drawn from the preamble of the NPT. On this basis, the
Review Conference could invite all non-party states to apply
comprehensive IAEA safeguards on all their civilian nuclear
activities, cease manufacturing nuclear weapons and related
materials, and join in negotiations of a nuclear weapons convention.
NWFZ in the Middle East
The issue of universalization is also connected to the resolution
on the Middle East that was agreed upon in 1995, in which
state parties decided to work for a weapons of mass destruction
free zone in the Middle East. Many states in the region argue
that not enough is done to bring Israel into this process
or to establish this zone. During this review cycle, the Egyptian
delegation has suggested that the NPT convene an international
conference in 2011, which would negotiate the establishment
of a nuclear weapon free zone in the Middle East, and appoint
a standing committee of NPT officials to make preparations
and conduct regional consultations.
Suggested talking point: States parties should agree
at this RevCon to convene an international conference on the
Middle East to launch negotiations on Middle East nuclear
weapon free zone, involving all states of the region and other
key players.
Nuclear energy and fuel cycle
Most NPT states parties want to preserve their access to nuclear
technology for “peaceful purposes” and their right
to develop aspects of the nuclear fuel cycle for these purposes,
which are guaranteed by article IV of the Treaty. However,
some states are worried about the dangers of proliferation
and the safety of nuclear materials associated with each country
having indigenous fuel cycle capacities. Proposals are on
the table for “multilateralizing” the fuel cycle
but some developing countries are worried this will limit
their access to nuclear fuel for political reasons.
Suggested talking point: Governments should work for
establishment of a multilateral framework for the production
of nuclear fuel that precludes the construction of nationally-controlled
fuel cycle facilities and transitions existing facilities
to international control, pending the phase-out of nuclear
power. This should be done in a way that does not allow for
politicization of nuclear fuel access. At the same time, because
of the health, environmental, and proliferation risks of nuclear
energy, governments and industry should phase-out nuclear
energy and increase their support for the development of commercially
viable renewable and non-carbon emitting sources of energy.
Governments should cease their promotion of nuclear power.
Withdrawal
Many states are interested in elaborating appropriate responses
to Treaty withdrawals, especially concerning how to deal with
nuclear material received for peaceful purposes as a non-nuclear
weapon state. However, some governments see the focus on withdrawal
as an effort to take away their sovereign rights to withdraw
from the Treaty.
Suggested talking point: States parties should ensure
the long-term viability of the Treaty by addressing root causes
of nuclear proliferation, including by solving regional issues,
ending security policies based on the contagious doctrine
of nuclear deterrence, and take concrete steps to achieve
universal adherence to the treaty.
Strengthening the review process
Some states parties argue that there is a lack of institutional
support for the NPT and that the strengthened review process,
instituted in 1995, has not fully lived up to its promises.
They suggest that a standing secretariat and other initiatives
could assist in implementing decisions and strengthen the
NPT regime. As opposed to other WMD treaties like the Comprehensive
Test Ban Treaty, Chemical Weapons Convention, and the Biological
and Toxin Weapons Convention, the NPT does not have a secretariat
or support unit to carry on the work of implementing the Treaty
in between Review Conferences. Furthermore, there is limited
continuity between review cycle chairs and the preparatory
committees currently do not take decisions or carry forward
substantive work in between sessions, which means the Treaty
can only take action every five years.
Suggested talking point: States parties should strengthen
the institutional capacity of the NPT by establishing an annual
cycle of short meetings (which would have decision-making
authorities), increase continuity between review cycles, and
consider ways to increase support for the UN to provide support
for the meetings of states parties.
Recommendations
from Beyond arms control: challenges and choices for nuclear
disarmament
In the lead-up to the 2010 Review Conference, Reaching Critical
Will coordinated, edited, and published a book by twenty-five
non-governmental experts who critically examine the mainstream
discourse of nuclear weapons, highlighting the prospects and
potential pitfalls for nuclear disarmament in the current
world order. The following recommendations have been pulled
from this book, Beyond arms control: challenges and choices
for nuclear disarmament.
Recommendations on modernization and investment in nuclear
weapons
If the danger of nuclear war is to be eliminated, ceasing
to plan and build for an eternal nuclear threat must come
early, not late, in the process, and it will have to be
linked to a more general demilitarization and demobilization
of US, Russian, European, and other major military forces.
Therefore:
All states possessing nuclear arsenals should halt
research, development, testing, and component production
while reductions of arsenals are in progress, not afterwards.
They should also declare that they will not design,
develop, or produce new-design nuclear warheads, or
modify or modernize existing warheads to add military
capabilities.
Relevant production and research facilities should
be subjected to an intrusive verification regime at
the earliest possible time.
Civil society and government leadership in non-nuclear
weapon states need to recognize the dangers of uncritically
endorsing the rhetorical “vision” espoused
by the Obama administration, four horsemen, and other
nuclear elites, and instead push forward a concrete
agenda for nuclear disarmament to be pursued in tandem
with non-proliferation measures. Within this concrete
agenda for nuclear disarmament, these actors should
recognize the paradoxically pro-nuclear weapon aims
of the United States that can be accomplished through
ratification of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT)
or the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START) under
current conditions.
Taking this into account, disarmament NGOs in the
United States and other nuclear weapon states should
rigorously oppose funding for nuclear weapons research,
design, and production and should oppose construction
of any new nuclear weapons complex facilities as a condition
of CTBT or START ratification. If this cannot be accomplished,
perhaps it would be best to forgo ratification of these
treaties entirely, focusing instead on budget and infrastructure
developments within nuclear weapon states.
Recommendations on the elimination of nuclear weapons
Nuclear-armed governments should reaffirm the NPT unequivocal
undertaking to accomplish the total elimination of nuclear
arsenals and reaffirm the principles of transparency, verification,
and accountability in fulfilling disarmament obligations
and agreements. They should commit to regular reporting
on nuclear warhead and delivery system arsenals, fissile
material stockpiles, spending on nuclear forces, and steps
and plans for disarmament.
Nuclear-armed states should reduce nuclear arsenals in a
manner that supports concurrent general disarmament of “conventional”
forces.
The US and Russian governments should reduce their arsenals
on their own in a transparent and verified manner. To build
a more stable bilateral relationship, and to move toward
global nuclear disarmament, unilateral and bilateral reductions
should achieve the following:
maintain transparency and predictability;
mandate steady reductions in all nuclear warheads,
deployed and reserve, strategic and non-strategic;
mandate reductions in strategic delivery systems,
whether for nuclear or non-nuclear weapons, and prohibit
multiple warhead missiles;
require verified dismantlement of all excess warheads
and delivery mechanisms;
provide for international monitoring in addition to
bilateral verification, to establish accountability
to the entire community of states; and
reach levels of total warheads low enough to allow
the next phase to encompass other states possessing
nuclear arsenals. All warheads—deployed, spare,
reserve, awaiting dismantlement, etc.—must be
counted in the total. The total likely will need to
be in the hundreds on each side to attract meaningful
participation from other possessor states, which should
be consulted on this key point.
All governments should:
renounce and/or oppose nuclear sharing arrangements
and “extended nuclear deterrence”;
commit to preparatory work for a nuclear weapons convention
or framework agreement.
Citizens should encourage their governments to work towards
a nuclear weapons convention (NWC) and educate each other
about the benefits of abolishing nuclear weapons globally.
Civil society groups should push the goal of a NWC into
the mainstream and onto the negotiating agenda, where they
can engage with governments on the legal, technical, and
political aspects of such a convention. Before the Review
Conference, civil society groups should push governments
to identify the need for some sort of nuclear prohibition
treaty in their statements and working papers. After the
Review Conference, civil society groups should participate
in the Nuclear Abolition Action Day on 5 June 2010 to inspire
and keep up the momentum for a NWC.
The NWC and the elimination of nuclear weapons must be
grounded in a broader movement toward political, economic,
and social justice and equity in which the majority of the
world’s people are empowered to live a healthy, dignified,
and productive life. The elimination of nuclear weapons
must serve as the leading edge of a global trend towards
demilitarization and redirection of military expenditures
to meet human needs and restore the environment.
When thinking about their work, government representatives
working on nuclear disarmament issues should consider what
might be learned from recent international initiatives to
address the human impacts of other weapons. These include
the Ottawa and Oslo processes on antipersonnel mines and
cluster munitions respectively, which each “reframed”
the discourse and acceptability of these weapons in broader
terms than before. Although these are, of course, very different
from the nuclear disarmament context, focusing on evidence
of the human impacts of weapons alongside their purported
military advantages or technical characteristics, engaging
civil society, shifting the burden of proof for the continued
acceptability of a weapon onto users and producers, and
building legitimacy through inclusion of a diverse range
of actors were all important to success on these issues.
These factors also helped in overcoming the obstacles in
traditional multilateral forums preventing effective progress
in addressing the problems the existence and use of such
weapons create.
Civil society actors should also consider lessons from
other international initiatives to deal with armed violence,
with attention to those related to campaigning and building
alliances. Gaps between various communities, like those
between practitioners active in disarmament and those working
in areas such as development, public health, and the environment
should be bridged. Greater informal dialogue and a common
vocabulary would help.
Both governments and civil society should develop a discourse
that draws attention to the impact of the development, production,
deployment, and use of nuclear weapons rather than accepting
untested claims or assumptions favouring inertia.
Recommendations on nuclear sharing
NATO’s non-nuclear members should cease equipping
their aircraft and training to use US nuclear weapons in
times of war. This would be timely and economically attractive,
since all nuclear sharing nations must replace their aging
fleets of aircraft over the next decade, and could use this
opportunity to reorient defence budgets while giving up
the anachronistic nuclear role.
As part of its Strategic Concept review, NATO should remove
US tactical nuclear weapons from Europe and end the policies
of nuclear sharing and deterrence based on the potential
first use of nuclear weapons. NATO should use this decision
in a leverage strategy to persuade Russia to mothball and
eliminate its tactical nuclear forces as well.
These actions should be publicly announced to contribute
to a positive atmosphere at the NPT. NATO members should
then initiate a further programme of action to strengthen
the NPT, including committing to the goal of a nuclear weapon
free world and practical steps to achieve this aim.
To begin this process, at the 2010 Review Conference,
NPT states should strengthen the Treaty by declaring that
it is binding on all state parties “under any circumstances”.
NATO member states should issue a joint declaration accepting
this and stating their intention to comply promptly.
The US and UK governments should end their exchange of
nuclear weapons information and materials in the interest
of respecting their obligations under the NPT and promoting
rather than deterring disarmament and non-proliferation.
Other governments and civil society should hold the US
and UK governments accountable to their obligations under
the NPT and should encourage the US and UK governments to
promote disarmament by ending their nuclear sharing arrangements.
The US and UK governments should instead increase their
collaboration on verification, non-proliferation, and disarmament
technologies.
Recommendations on nuclear energy
Governments should increase their support for development
of commercially viable renewable and non-carbon emitting
sources of energy, and for energy conservation. They should
join the International Renewable Energy Agency and work
for a rapid transition to the widespread and sustainable
use of renewable energy worldwide.
Governments should work for establishment of a multilateral
framework for the production of nuclear fuel that precludes
the construction of nationally-controlled fuel cycle facilities
and transitions existing facilities to international control,
pending the phase-out of nuclear power.
Governments and industry should phase-out nuclear power
and refrain from promoting nuclear power as a means to combat
climate change.
Decisions about the expansion of nuclear power should
be made with the explicit understanding that the technology
used to generate nuclear electricity is intrinsically, and
under the present circumstances, inextricably, linked to
the ability to make nuclear weapons.
Actors should refrain from engaging in trade and cooperation
on nuclear power technologies that flout carefully crafted
non-proliferation norms, which will only strengthen the
linkage between nuclear power and nuclear weapons.
NPT member states should establish an explicit prohibition
on nuclear cooperation with non-states parties.
Governments should focus efforts on developing decentralized
and local sources of energy rather than promoting nuclear
power, which is not the most efficient form of energy for
poor populations. Decentralized and local sources of energy
also provide a better chance of building an environmentally
sustainable, socially equitable world, empowering the majority
to live a healthy dignified and productive life.
Citizens should work with each other and their governments
to promote a carbon-free, nuclear-free future: see www.carbonfreenuclearfree.org
for information and ideas.
Recommendations on creating a nuclear weapon free zone
in the Middle East
Governments in the region need to undergo a renewed assessment
of the threats they perceive from each other and of the
best approaches to defusing these threats. They should address
each other’s prevailing concerns with an aim to bolstering
confidence that their security concerns can be addressed
through the political process and show flexibility to create
a real political opening. As a starting point, all governments
in the region should make unilateral categorical commitments
to no possession or no first use of WMD.
Outside powers also have a responsibility in identifying
and solving these threat perceptions and should particularly
focus on avoiding doublestandards, inconsistent polices,
and practices that contribute to conflict in the region.
Any country considering a nuclear power programme should
undertake a comprehensive and critical review of potential
proliferation, economic, environmental, and health consequences,
as well as alternatives such as renewable energy. The potential
contribution of wind and solar energy sources in the Middle
East deserve increased support for research and development.
All governments should examine the possibility of a verified
suspension of their fuel cycle activities as a confidence-building
measure, including the exploration of creative verification
mechanisms that prevent the disclosure of sensitive or proliferation-prone
information while establishing and maintaining confidence
in adherence to commitments.
The political peace process should provide opportunities
for addressing the human, social, and psychological elements
that undermine security, including the opportunity to voice
historical grievances. For example, governments and/or non-governmental
organizations could establish a forum for airing past injustices;
identify mechanisms for the promotion of social development
and human rights; and undertake joint economic programmes
around sustainable energy for the region.
In the NPT context, all NPT states parties should consider
steps that could pave the way toward implementing the 1995
Middle East resolution, such as convening a conference to
explore the conditions necessary for achieving a zone in
the Middle East free of nuclear and other weapons of mass
destruction and appointing a standing NPT body to follow-up
intersessionally and support efforts toward these ends.
Recommendations for the Iranian nuclear situation
Within the United States and the E3 countries, opinion
leaders and the public need to educate themselves and vigorously
challenge the prevailing consensus among most political
and media elites that Iran is either arming itself with
nuclear weapons, or is on the verge of doing so.
Iranian leaders can exhibit more genuine cooperation with
the IAEA and transparency around their uranium enrichment
programme. Instead of belatedly disclosing new programmes,
Iran’s government needs to exercise good faith in
informing the Agency as soon as a decision to proceed with
construction is taken. Whether or not such late disclosure
is “technically” consistent with prior agreements,
Iran’s situation is beyond such fine lines and its
leaders must exhibit good faith.
The United States and Iran need to continue engaging in
direct talks without preconditions and with the participation
of European and Russian negotiators, to achieve a result
that is consistent with national rights under the IAEA.
Iran should reaffirm its prior Non-Aligned Movement statements
and its official and secular commitments to forswear atomic
weapons and promote regional and universal nuclear disarmament.
The cycle of sanctions premised upon Iran’s pursuit
of nuclear enrichment should be suspended.
The IAEA must remain technically neutral, employ sound
expertise, and resist efforts to expand its jurisdiction
based upon infl uence by the declared nuclear weapon states.
The US and Iran should take steps to de-militarize the
Persian Gulf, particularly in the Strait of Tiran.
The legal non-proliferation regime, and the NPT in particular,
must be rigorously examined to address the permanence of
nuclear weapon institutions and to discount the value of
such weapons in international relations.
Southeast and South Asian nations, without exception,
should commit to a specific programme to defuse nuclear
tensions and avoid a catastrophic arms race, accompanied
by a commitment by the nuclear superpowers to honour such
programmes and not introduce nuclear weapons in the region
or sponsor/assist local nations to stockpile theirs.
Recommendations on missiles, missile “defence”,
and space weapons
The United States should abandon its quest to maintain
long-term military supremacy through modernization and development
of missiles and other strategic delivery systems, anti-missile
systems, and possible deployment of space-based weapon systems.
As a starting point, the United States should re-join the
Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty.
All governments should support the establishment of international
controls on delivery systems and anti-missile systems as
part of a global process of reducing and eliminating nuclear
forces, banning weapons in space, limiting strategic weapons
generally, and implementing a policy of “non-offensive
defence”.
To this end, governments should pursue a global treaty
controlling missiles, and, as an interim step, explore a
missile flight test ban, which would prevent new missile
designs and limit modification of traditional technology.
Governments should work with commercial and civilian space
operators to develop best-practice “rules of the road”
for outer space activities. They should also commit to transparency-
and confidence-building measures guiding space activities
while simultaneously discussing the nuts and bolts of a
legally-binding treaty that would prohibit the weaponization
of outer space.
Recommendations for changing conceptions of security
and nuclear weapons
Governments and NGOs should make nuclear disarmament the
leading edge of a global trend towards demilitarization
and redirection of military expenditures to meet human and
environmental needs.
The financial and human resources currently used to develop
and maintain nuclear weapons systems should be used instead
to meet social and economic needs consistent with the United
Nations Millennium Development Goals.
Only a comprehensive view of disarmament based on human
security will lead to progress toward an equitable and secure
nuclear weapon free world. The concept of security should
be reframed at every level of society and government, with
a premium on universal human and ecological security, multilateralism,
and a commitment to cooperative, nonviolent means of confl
ict resolution. Civil society should actively seek to create
a new discourse for nuclear abolition advocacy that illuminates
the relationship between nuclear weapons and the structures
that maintain them and that identifies the benefi ciaries
of nuclear weapons. Governments should reframe their approach
to disarmament, employing a humanitarian perspective rather
than a military one.
Nuclear disarmament activists should link their eff orts
with those of activists working on a broad range of issues
to draw a complete picture of security, peace, and justice,
forging a stronger, more unified call for human and ecological
security.
NGOs should call on governments, the UN Security Council,
and civil society to report on ways and means for implementing
Article 26 of the UN Charter.
All governments should contribute data annually to the
UN Instrument for Reporting Military Expenditure and the
UN Register for Conventional Arms and constructively participate
in efforts to enhance and upgrade both instruments.
All government and civil society representatives should
consider gender issues in their deliberations and use the
tools of gender analysis to reform traditional behaviours
and values expressed in negotiations and discussions on
nuclear weapons.
All governments should implement UN Security Council resolution
1325, including through increasing the participation by
women at all decision-making levels, particularly in institutions
and bodies dealing with security and disarmament.
Acronym
decoder
ABM Anti-Ballistic Missile BTWC Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention CTBT Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty CWC Chemical Weapons Convention DPRK Democratic People’s Republic of Korea E3 France, Germany, United Kingdom E3+3 China, France, Russia, United Kingdom, United
States, Germany (aka P5+1) EU European Union FM(C)T Fissile Materials (Cut-off) Treaty HEU Highly Enriched Uranium IAEA International Atomic Energy Agency ICBM Intercontinental Ballistic Missile ICJ International Court of Justice ICNND International Commission on Nuclear Non-Proliferation
and Disarmament INF Intermediate Nuclear Forces Treaty LEU Low-Enriched Uranium MDA Mutual Defence Agreement NAM Non-Aligned Movement NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organization NFU No First Use NGO Non-Governmental Organization NNWS Non-Nuclear Weapon State NPT Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty NSA Negative Security Assurance NSG Nuclear Suppliers Group NWC Nuclear Weapons Convention NWFZ Nuclear Weapon Free Zone NWS Nuclear Weapon State P5 China, France, Russia, United Kingdom, United States P5+1 China, France, Russia, United Kingdom, United
States, Germany (aka E3+3) PAROS Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space RCW Reaching Critical Will RRW Reliable Replacement Warhead START Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty TCBM Transparency and Confidence-Building Measure UN United Nations WILPF Women’s International League for Peace
and Freedom WMD Weapons of Mass Destruction WMDFZ Weapons of Mass Destruction Free Zone
Resources
Reaching Critical Will: www.reachingcriticalwill.org
NPT News in Review: daily newsletter produced during the NPT
Review Conference
All statements, working papers, reports, and other primary
documents and information
Online calendar of events, updated in real time
International Campaign to Abolish Nuclear Weapons (ICAN):
Ideas for promoting a nuclear weapons convention
Acronym Institute for Disarmament Diplomacy:
Daily blogging from the Review Conference
