

NWS 2: Russian Federation

1. Amount, Location, and Operational Plan of Nuclear Weapons

Strategic Offense Weapons

Category/Type	Weapon System	Launchers	Warheads*
ICBMs	SS-18 (144), SS-19 (137), SS-24 (36), SS-25 (360), SS-27 (29)	706	3,011
SLBMs	SS-N-18 (96), SS-N-20 (40), SS-N-23 (96)	232	1,072
Bombers	15 Blackjack, 32 Bear-H6, 31 Bear-H16 (AS-15 ALCMs, AS-16 SRAMs, bombs)	78	868
Total Strategic Offense			~5,000
Strategic Defense Weapons			
SAMs	SA-5B Gammon, SA-10 Grumble	1,200	1,200
Total Strategic Defense			1,200
Land-based Non-strategic			
Bombers and fighters	Backfire (105), Fencer (280) (AS-4 ASM, AS-6 ASM, AS-16 SRAM, bombs)	385	1,540
Total Land-based Non-strategic			1,700
Naval Non-strategic			
Attack aircraft	Backfire (45), Fencer (50) (AS-4 ASM, bombs)	95	190
SLCMs	SS-N-9, SS-N-12, SS-N-19, SS-N-21, SS-N-22	--	240
ASW weapons	SS-N-15, SS-N-16, torpedoes, depth bombs	na	210
Total Naval Non-strategic			540
TOTAL			~8,400
* Assumes an operational stockpile with spares. An equal number are retired and/or awaiting dismantlement.			

from the Natural Resource Defense Council, <http://www.nrdc.org/nuclear/nudb/datab13.asp>, (2002)

Deployment Storage Sites

Missile Sites (19):

Aleysk, Dombraovskiy, Kartaly, Ushar, Kozelsk, Tatischevo, Bershet, Kostroma, Krasnoyarsk, Drovyanaya, Irkustsk, Kansk, Nizhniy, Tagil, Novosibirsk, Teykobo, Vypolzovo, Yoshkar-Ola, Yurya

Design Laboratories:

Arzamas, Chelyabinsk

Warhead Production(Assembly) Facilities (4):

the Elektrokhimpribor Combine in Lesnoy (Sverdlovsk-45), the Instrument-Making Plant in Trekhgornyy (Zlatoust-36).

<http://www.nti.org/db/nisprofs/russia/weafacl/overview.htm>

Nuclear Powered Submarine Bases:

Rybachy, Vladimir Bay, Paylovsk

Decommissioned Submarine Bases:

Rybachy, Zavety Ilyicha, Vladimir Bay, Bolshoi Karmen, Paylovsk

Storage and/or Decommissioning Facilities:

Military Unit 95051, Bolshoi Karmen, Military Unit 40752

Shipyard and/or Submarine Repair Facilities:

Gonyak, Bolshoi Karmen, Chazhma Bay

www.nrdc.org/nuclear/tkstock/p1-52.pdf

The Role of Nuclear Weapons in National Security Strategies

In 2000, Moscow issued the National Security Concept paper, an update from the original Concept published under Boris Yeltsin in 1997.

The 1997 policy stated that nuclear weapons could be used only “in a threat to the very existence of the Russian Federation as a independent sovereign state.” In 2000, the “very existence” language was removed, thereby allowing for nuclear weapon use in any conflict when “all other measures...have been exhausted or proven ineffective.”

The cornerstone of current Russian nuclear policy focuses on defending the country from a nuclear attack by NATO. On March 25, 2004, Defense Minister Sergei Ivanov announced that Russia is considering revising its nuclear policy in light of NATO expansion and its “current offensive military doctrine,” according to an Interfax report.

http://www.interfax.ru/e/B/0/28.html?id_issue=9683208

2. Activities specifically undertaken in accordance with Article VI of the NPT

Nuclear Weapons Reductions

Under START I, Russia reduced lowered the number of its deployed strategic delivery systems down to 1136 units, and the number of warheads down to 5518. START I remains in force until December 5, 2009.

Under the Strategic Offensive Reductions Treaty (SORT, or Moscow Treaty), Russia agreed to limit the number of warheads to 2,200 by December, 2011.

Program Truncations

Since 1991, more than 30% of nuclear munitions of tactical sea-launched missiles and naval air force have been eliminated, and all tactical nuclear munitions previously deployed outside Russia have been brought back to its territory and are being eliminated.

Systems Retired

Under the INF Treaty, ground-based missiles of two classes – medium range (from 1000 to 5500 Km) and shorter-range (from 500 to 1000 Km) missiles have been eliminated.

Nuclear Weapons Facilities Shut Down

Two former nuclear weapons assembly facilities were shut down by 2000: Avangard Electromechanical Plant in Sarov, and the Start Production Association in Zarechnyy (Penza-19).

A detailed list of Russia's downsized nuclear facilities are available at:

<http://www.ransac.org/Projects%20and%20Publications/Russian%20Nuclear%20Complex%20Conversion%20Consortium/6232003110545AM.html>

The Nuclear Threat Initiative also publishes comprehensive information on closed weapons development facilities at: <http://www.nti.org/db/nisprofs/russia/weafacl/gendevs.htm>.

3. Location and Capability of Nuclear Facilities

Power Reactors

Operational: 30

Shut Down: 4

Under Construction: 3

Decommissioned/Planned: 0

A full list of Russia's Power Reactors can be found at: <http://www.iaea.or.at/programmes/a2/>

Research Reactors

Operational: 57

Shut Down: 28

Decommissioned: 11

Under Construction: 1

Planned: 0

<http://www.iaea.or.at/worldatom/rpdb>

By 1992 at the end of the Cold War, Russia had shut down 10 of its 13 plutonium production facilities.

4. Fissile Material Holdings

Military Stocks of Fissile Materials

- Plutonium- 130 tons
- Weapons Grade Uranium Equivalent- 635 tons

Declared Excess

- Plutonium (Pu)- 50 tons
- Highly Enriched Uranium- 500 tons

Separated Civil Plutonium

- 35 metric tons (projected quantity by 2010)

<http://www.isis-online.org>

Cumulative Plutonium Discharges from Civilian Power Reactors

- Pu discharges- ~ 89 tons

Estimated Amounts of Plutonium Contained in Spent Civil Reactor Fuel

- Pu contained in spent fuel at civil reactors- 47 metric tons
- Pu contained in spent fuel at reprocessing facilities- 4 metric tons

<http://www.ceip.org/files/projects/npp/resources/SpentPlutoniumChart.htm>

5. Nuclear Activities

Nuclear Cooperation Programs

Iran: Russia has plans in place to build an atomic reactor at Bushehr, Iran. These plans were interrupted following the IAEA's resolution calling on Iran to sign the Additional Protocol and to allow full transparency. This agreement was approved by Russia's parliament in December, 2001.

China: Russia has sold civilian nuclear energy technology, including light water reactors, a fusion research reactor, and a safeguarded enrichment facility to China, although the details of this nuclear assistance are not well known. John Holum, former Undersecretary of State for Arms Control and International Security, speculated that Russia is working with China on a fast-breeder reactor, technology-sharing that could contribute to Chinese MIRV capabilities. Mr. Holum also speculated that Russia is conducting joint research on a secret nuclear center in China.

<http://www.ransac.org/Issues/Russian%20International%20Nuclear%20Cooperation/russia-iran-china.html>

India: In April, 2003, ITAR-TASS reported that the Russian Corporation TVEL will deliver nuclear fuel to India, a deal worth \$400 million that will last until 2010. Russia provides the total design and technical supervision of the project, and will also control shipment, storage, and loading of the fuel. The fuel is intended for the Kudankulam plant. http://www.bellona.no/en/international/russia/nuke_industry/cooperation/channel15203n25s0.html

Latin America: Following a mission to Latin America in 2001, the Russian Foreign Ministry declared that Russia is ready to share Russian nuclear technology and expertise with Mexico, Argentina, and Brazil. <http://english.pravda.ru/usa/2001/06/04/6878.html>

E.U.: On February 3, 2004, Former vice Prime Minister Victor Khristenko announced that Russia and EU would soon begin talks on natural and enriched uranium deliveries from Russia, and that negotiations may be complete by May 1st.
http://www.bellona.no/en/international/russia/nuke_industry/co-operation/32852.html

Slovenia: The Foreign Ministries of Slovenia and Russia are still working out the details of Russian nuclear fuel sales to Slovenia.
http://www.bellona.no/en/international/russia/nuke_industry/co-operation/31471.html

Indonesia: On August 16, 2003, Russia issued Decree no. 592 that approves the first intergovernmental cooperative agreement between Russia and Indonesia on the peaceful uses of atomic energy. Cooperation includes: development, design, construction and operation of research reactors and nuclear power plants including small power plants that comprise the floating nuclear power units, and R&D; high-temperature gas-cooled reactors for industrial purposes; the use of atomic energy for desalination of sea and artesian water; hydrogen production; production and application of radioisotopes, facilities and accelerators for irradiation in medicine and industry; administrative and scientific personnel training and retraining; the state regulation of nuclear and radiation safety. The agreement is to be concluded for 10 years with automatic extension for the next five-year period. http://www.bellona.no/en/international/russia/nuke_industry/co-operation/31260.html

Romania: In March, 2003, Russian Prime Minister Mikhail Kasyanov announced that Russia will provide a loan to Romania for the construction of two nuclear reactors.
http://www.bellona.no/en/international/russia/nuke_industry/co-operation/channel15203n25s0.html

Non-Proliferation Cooperation Programs

The Cooperative Threat Reduction program began in 1991 to help safeguard and secure fissile materials and other materials used in nuclear, chemical, or biological weapons.

Russia is also the main recipient of monies pledged through the G8 Global Partnership initiative, in which the G8 countries (U.S., Japan, Germany, France, U.K., Italy, and Canada,) pledged \$20 billion over 10 years to secure fissile materials in the FSU.

The Nuclear Cities Initiative started in 1998 in cooperation with the United States downsize Russia's nuclear complex and reduce its capacity.

6. International Nonproliferation Efforts

Treaties Signed and Ratified, Date of Deposit

Agreement Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on Notification of Launches of Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles and Submarine-Launched Ballistic Missiles, 31 May 1988
Antarctic Treaty, 2 November 1960
Certain Conventional Weapons Convention, 10 June 1982
Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty, 30 June 2000
Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, 5 March 1970
Outer Space Treaty, 10 October 1967
Partial Test Ban Treaty, 10 October 1963
Sea Bed Treaty, 18 May 1972
Strategic Offensive Reductions Treaty, 6 March 2003
Treaty of Pelindaba Protocol, *not yet deposited*
Treaty of Rarotonga Protocol, 21 April 1988
Treaty of Tlatelolco Protocol, 8 January 1979

Russia has signed but not yet ratified the IAEA Additional Protocol.

Multilateral Groups

Conference on Disarmament
Hague Code of Conduct
Missile Technology Control Regime
Nuclear Suppliers Group
Wassenaar Arrangement
Zangger Committee

7. Positions Taken in International Fora on Various Issues of Nuclear Disarmament

Nuclear threat: "The ways of eradicating these threats are well-known. These include further universalization of the existing non-proliferation regimes, the strengthening of international verification instruments, and the introduction of safe technology in nuclear production and energy. By and large, it is renunciation by States of excessive arsenals and military programmes capable of undermining the politico-military balance and trigger an arms race." - President Vladimir Putin, addressing the General Assembly, September, 2003.

Nuclear Disarmament: "For Russia the issues of nuclear arms reduction are a priority. Our country not only declares its commitment- as the ultimate goal- to the complete elimination of nuclear weapons and to the conclusion of a treaty on comprehensive and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control but also takes steps

in the sphere of nuclear disarmament.” – Statement during general debate of the 2003 PrepCom.

Negative Security Assurances: “Russia still attaches an exclusive importance to an unconditional implementation of negative security assurances to non-nuclear weapon states that nuclear weapon states provided in 1995. This provision is fixed in the military doctrine of the Russian Federation.” – Statement during general debate of the 2003 PrepCom.

NWFZ: “We positively assess the process of creation of nuclear weapon free zones in various regions of the world that gained a noticeable potential. The establishment of the zones free from nuclear weapons is by itself an important measure of disarmament. Forming the zone the states seek strengthening the regional and international security, increasing the level of mutual trust and agreement. At the same time they accomplish another, not less important task- acting in the spirit of NPT Article VII they make an essential contribution into the development and consolidation of the nuclear weapon non-proliferation regime. Such a logical combination of mutually complimentary factors determines the significance of all the NWFZs taken together and each of them separately.” – Statement during general debate of the NPT PrepCom, 2003.

“Russia consistently supports the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones. Security assurances by the Russian Federation extend now to more than 100 States which have acceded to the relevant NWFZ agreements.” – Ambassador Sergey V. Lavrov, addressing the GA First Committee on October 9, 2003.