International desire and demand for the elimination of nuclear
weapons have existed since nuclear weapons themselves have
existed. A recent publication, Security and Survival: The
Case for a Nuclear Weapons Convention, argues for a treaty
to prohibit and eliminate nuclear weapons as part of the political
process that will lead to the goal of nuclear weapons abolition
(see information on back page). Security and Survival
includes a review of the political context, a revised and
annotated version of the Model Nuclear Weapons Convention
released in 1997 and distributed as a UN discussion document,
and a range of comments addressing questions critical to the
feasibility and functioning of a Nuclear Weapons Convention
(NWC).
The release of the Model NWC and the publication of Security
and Survival have generated reactions to critical questions
such as enforcement, international security, deterrence, terrorism,
health and environment, nuclear energy, nuclear knowledge,
reversibility, conversion, research, and more. The NWC
Monitor is a continuation of the debate surrounding these
questions, as well as the concept and content of a future
Nuclear Weapons Convention. (See inside back page for information
on submitting contributions.)
The contributions to the NWC Monitor reflect a range
of topics and opinions. Some look at the consequences of past
policies, some examine the present political environment,
and others look at future requirements of a Nuclear Weapons
Convention. All are responses to the critical political, legal,
or technical questions that must be addressed to make complete
nuclear disarmament possible.
In this issue, Section 1 looks at Nuclear Disarmament
Today: Setbacks, Next Steps, and the Ultimate Goal. The
contributions to this section examine policy within the current
security environment, identify some of its shortcomings, and
suggest immediate measures that would facilitate nuclear disarmament.
They help bridge the rhetorical and largely artificial gap
between incremental approaches to nuclear disarmament and
the comprehensive approach suggested by a Nuclear Weapons
Convention. The discussion and examples contained in "International
Security: Signs of Change and Conflict" look at policies
and debates within the nuclear weapon states. These provide
the background against which it is necessary to evaluate progress
on nuclear disarmament today.
Section 2 provides an update of the Public and Political
Profile for a Nuclear Weapons Convention, including policies,
perspectives, and actions of governments, parliamentarians,
non-governmental organizations, and the general public. This
section reviews official and unofficial discussion and consideration
given to the NWC throughout the world.
Section 3 covers issues related to the Implementation
and Verification of a Nuclear Weapons Convention. The
contributions to this section, for the most part, respond
directly to elements of the Model Nuclear Weapons Convention
contained in sections 2 (Model NWC) and 4 (Verification) of
Security and Survival, and to the concerns often voiced
that a Nuclear Weapons Convention could not adequately address
the dangers of terrorism or breakout.
Section 4 looks at Scientific Responsibility in the Nuclear
Age and the role of scientists, both in the past as shapers
of the nuclear age and in the future as potential contributors
to a non-nuclear world. The technical aspects of large-scale
comprehensive and irreversible nuclear disarmament are not
being adequately explored and developed today. Strategic planning
for nuclear disarmament would entail academic and industry
support at least on the scale of today’s nuclear weapons
facilities and academic support institutions, from political
science to nuclear science. This requires the awareness and
commitment of scientists globally, in order both to drive
and implement government decisions to pursue universal nuclear
disarmament.
The international security environment today might appear
discouraging for nuclear disarmament advocates. However, the
Nuclear Weapons Convention — as a goal, as an indication
of change in global security policy, and as a catalyst to
further change — does not depend exclusively on arms
control and short-term incremental progress. Efforts toward
next steps in arms control and non-proliferation are conceivably
blocked precisely because they have avoided the fundamental
underlying dilemma posed by nuclear weapons: whether a global
security regime based on threat of mass destruction, unevenly
distributed, is consistent with global survival.
As outlined in Section 5, Social Context and Political
Change, a commitment to the elimination of nuclear weapons
and irreversible steps toward that goal require a fundamental
change in this concept of security. Some change is inevitable
because a security policy based on force projection, yet grounded
in a larger community that aspires to the rule of law, necessarily
carries internal contradictions and conflicts of interest.
There are simply too many competing trends to maintain the
illusion of "stability" that nuclear deterrence
and strategic balance presumably create. These trends include
real and potential proliferation of weapons of mass destruction,
missile technology, regional conflicts, and terrorism. Some
forces of change will come from outside the security system
in the form of social and environmental movements reacting
to institutions and policies that benefit from the connection
between militarization and economic and political power.
The argument that it is premature to prepare for a Nuclear
Weapons Convention rings particularly hollow in light of ongoing
preparations to shape the international security environment
of the future around nuclear weapons. The US Quadrenniel Defense
Review, which presents a thorough examination of the entire
US defense structure, recognizes the role of the present in
shaping the future:
In order to support [its] national security strategy, the
US military and the Department of Defense must be able to
help shape the international security environment in ways
favorable to US interests, respond to the full spectrum of
crises when directed, and prepare now to meet the challenges
of an uncertain future. These three elements — shaping,
responding, and preparing — define the essence of US
defense strategy between now and 2015.
Likewise, a future world free of the threat of nuclear weapons
requires planning and preparation, beyond incremental measures
based only on what appears immediately feasible. It requires
breaking out of current defense thinking, shaping the
international security environment in ways favorable to global
interests, responding to crises with means other than
force, and preparing for large scale nuclear disarmament
and reduced reliance on the threat of mass destruction as
a security doctrine.
