Introduction

Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT)

Conference on Disarmament

General Assembly First Committee

UN Disarmament Commission

Special Session on Disarmament

Introduction

International desire and demand for the elimination of nuclear weapons have existed since nuclear weapons themselves have existed. A recent publication, Security and Survival: The Case for a Nuclear Weapons Convention, argues for a treaty to prohibit and eliminate nuclear weapons as part of the political process that will lead to the goal of nuclear weapons abolition (see information on back page). Security and Survival includes a review of the political context, a revised and annotated version of the Model Nuclear Weapons Convention released in 1997 and distributed as a UN discussion document, and a range of comments addressing questions critical to the feasibility and functioning of a Nuclear Weapons Convention (NWC).

The release of the Model NWC and the publication of Security and Survival have generated reactions to critical questions such as enforcement, international security, deterrence, terrorism, health and environment, nuclear energy, nuclear knowledge, reversibility, conversion, research, and more. The NWC Monitor is a continuation of the debate surrounding these questions, as well as the concept and content of a future Nuclear Weapons Convention. (See inside back page for information on submitting contributions.)

The contributions to the NWC Monitor reflect a range of topics and opinions. Some look at the consequences of past policies, some examine the present political environment, and others look at future requirements of a Nuclear Weapons Convention. All are responses to the critical political, legal, or technical questions that must be addressed to make complete nuclear disarmament possible.

In this issue, Section 1 looks at Nuclear Disarmament Today: Setbacks, Next Steps, and the Ultimate Goal. The contributions to this section examine policy within the current security environment, identify some of its shortcomings, and suggest immediate measures that would facilitate nuclear disarmament. They help bridge the rhetorical and largely artificial gap between incremental approaches to nuclear disarmament and the comprehensive approach suggested by a Nuclear Weapons Convention. The discussion and examples contained in "International Security: Signs of Change and Conflict" look at policies and debates within the nuclear weapon states. These provide the background against which it is necessary to evaluate progress on nuclear disarmament today.

Section 2 provides an update of the Public and Political Profile for a Nuclear Weapons Convention, including policies, perspectives, and actions of governments, parliamentarians, non-governmental organizations, and the general public. This section reviews official and unofficial discussion and consideration given to the NWC throughout the world.

Section 3 covers issues related to the Implementation and Verification of a Nuclear Weapons Convention. The contributions to this section, for the most part, respond directly to elements of the Model Nuclear Weapons Convention contained in sections 2 (Model NWC) and 4 (Verification) of Security and Survival, and to the concerns often voiced that a Nuclear Weapons Convention could not adequately address the dangers of terrorism or breakout.

Section 4 looks at Scientific Responsibility in the Nuclear Age and the role of scientists, both in the past as shapers of the nuclear age and in the future as potential contributors to a non-nuclear world. The technical aspects of large-scale comprehensive and irreversible nuclear disarmament are not being adequately explored and developed today. Strategic planning for nuclear disarmament would entail academic and industry support at least on the scale of today’s nuclear weapons facilities and academic support institutions, from political science to nuclear science. This requires the awareness and commitment of scientists globally, in order both to drive and implement government decisions to pursue universal nuclear disarmament.

The international security environment today might appear discouraging for nuclear disarmament advocates. However, the Nuclear Weapons Convention — as a goal, as an indication of change in global security policy, and as a catalyst to further change — does not depend exclusively on arms control and short-term incremental progress. Efforts toward next steps in arms control and non-proliferation are conceivably blocked precisely because they have avoided the fundamental underlying dilemma posed by nuclear weapons: whether a global security regime based on threat of mass destruction, unevenly distributed, is consistent with global survival.

As outlined in Section 5, Social Context and Political Change, a commitment to the elimination of nuclear weapons and irreversible steps toward that goal require a fundamental change in this concept of security. Some change is inevitable because a security policy based on force projection, yet grounded in a larger community that aspires to the rule of law, necessarily carries internal contradictions and conflicts of interest. There are simply too many competing trends to maintain the illusion of "stability" that nuclear deterrence and strategic balance presumably create. These trends include real and potential proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, missile technology, regional conflicts, and terrorism. Some forces of change will come from outside the security system in the form of social and environmental movements reacting to institutions and policies that benefit from the connection between militarization and economic and political power.

The argument that it is premature to prepare for a Nuclear Weapons Convention rings particularly hollow in light of ongoing preparations to shape the international security environment of the future around nuclear weapons. The US Quadrenniel Defense Review, which presents a thorough examination of the entire US defense structure, recognizes the role of the present in shaping the future:

In order to support [its] national security strategy, the US military and the Department of Defense must be able to help shape the international security environment in ways favorable to US interests, respond to the full spectrum of crises when directed, and prepare now to meet the challenges of an uncertain future. These three elements — shaping, responding, and preparing — define the essence of US defense strategy between now and 2015.

Likewise, a future world free of the threat of nuclear weapons requires planning and preparation, beyond incremental measures based only on what appears immediately feasible. It requires breaking out of current defense thinking, shaping the international security environment in ways favorable to global interests, responding to crises with means other than force, and preparing for large scale nuclear disarmament and reduced reliance on the threat of mass destruction as a security doctrine.