A Scientific Expert Group Could Prepare Grounds for a Nuclear Weapons Convention

Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT)

Conference on Disarmament

General Assembly First Committee

UN Disarmament Commission

Special Session on Disarmament

A Scientific Expert Group Could Prepare Grounds for a Nuclear Weapons Convention

The role that scientists and engineers played in developing the CTBT suggests the role they might play in preparing the grounds for a future NWC.

Role of scientists and engineers in establishing a (CTBT)

It took more than four decades until the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) was concluded in 1996. Scientific experts contributed significantly to the success of the negotiations. There was a parallel development of the global verification system and the political conditions for the CTBT. It is very remarkable that there were phases when the political process was in a deadlock and, nevertheless, scientific activities were carried on even with a political mandate. For some years, scientific activities kept up the momentum and prepared the grounds for political progress. This was clearly the case with the Geneva Group of Experts (1958-1960) as well as with the Group of Scientific Experts (since 1976) which formed the main basis for continuity for almost two decades until the CTBT negotiations started in 1993. The experiences gathered by these two groups are summarized in the following table.

Lessons from the Geneva Group of Experts (1958 — 1960):

Scientists were given an independent role in negotiating security issues for the first time.
Scientists negotiated before diplomats were able to negotiate.
Scientists prepared the technical basis (verification, circumvention).
Comprehensive treaty anticipated, limited achieved.

Lessons from the Group of Scientific Experts (since 1976):

The GSE had a political mandate.
Scientific members were appointed by governments.
Progress was not at all times connected to political negotiations.
At times, the GSE established a substitute for negotiations.
International coordination of national technical means was started.
The work was based on a lasting common agenda.
The work was supported by infrastructure financed through states.
The GSE created a common understanding and furthered knowledge.

From these experiences and in view of the current deadlock in nuclear disarmament one can dare conclude that scientists and engineers may have the chance to make a significant difference in preparing the grounds for a political breakthrough towards a nuclear weapon free world. It makes sense to start scientifically based work early and even when the comprehensive goal appears to be remote. The lessons learned in the experience of the four decades leading to the CTBT are encouraging and need to be carefully taken into account.

Proposals for a scientific expert group on global elimination of nuclear weapons

This year, the Conference on Disarmament (CD) may pick up the NATO-5 proposal for a working group to study ways and means of establishing an exchange of information and views on nuclear disarmament. This would be an ideal opportunity for scientists to offer their expertise and to suggest the creation of a scientific expert group on verification and other technical aspects of complete nuclear disarmament. Even without an agreement on formal political discussions on nuclear disarmament, scientists could offer to establish this working group. It would address the following critical issues:

Verification of dismantlement of all nuclear weapons.

Detection of hidden nuclear weapons.

Detection of hidden nuclear-weapons-usable material.

Detection of clandestine production of nuclear weapons.

Verification of non-development of nuclear weapons (beyond the scope of the CTBT).

In April 1998, the International Network of Scientists and Engineers Against Proliferation (INESAP) proposed to start a study process, tentatively entitled "Beyond technical verification: Transparency, verification, and preventive control for the Nuclear Weapons Convention." The main purpose of this proposed study would be to increase awareness concerning the scientific-technological constraints and boundary conditions for a way leading to a nuclear-weapon-free world. It would illuminate the verification needs and limits and it would stress especially the importance of transparency. INESAP recommended a comprehensive approach which carries the Nuclear Weapons Convention as the central element.

Martin Kalinowski

International Network of Engineers and Scientists Against Proliferation

www.th-darmstadt.de/ze/ianus/inesap.htm