Nuclear Disarmament Today: Setbacks, Next Steps, and the Ultimate Goal

Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT)

Conference on Disarmament

General Assembly First Committee

UN Disarmament Commission

Special Session on Disarmament

Nuclear Disarmament Today:
Setbacks, Next Steps, and the Ultimate Goal

Editor’s Introduction

The next logical steps in control and reduction of nuclear weapons and related technology have been identified and studied. They include bilateral reduction, deep cuts, de-alerting, fissile material register, cut-off, and ban, and possible changes in security policy such as missile technology control, no use or no first use of nuclear weapons, and deterrence. Some of these are discussed in the contributions to this section.

While other analyses debunk the theory of nuclear deterrence through logic and security considerations, Alan Cranston directly challenges the wisdom and morality of nuclear deterrence in terms that reflect the urgency of the current situation. Scilla Elworthy looks at this situation and offers a set of proposals that can take us to the next stage on the path to abolition of nuclear weapons. Waheguru Pal Singh Sidhu makes the case for de-alerting of nuclear weapons as an important immediate measure, and Hui Zhang proposes a policy of no first use of nuclear weapons as an intermediate step. Charles Ferguson argues that US plans for missile defense would undermine potential progress toward nuclear disarmament.

These comments, grounded in today’s political realities, point towards the type of policy and action that will reconfigure these realities in favor of nuclear disarmament. Progress along the lines they recommend can only contribute to the goal of nuclear abolition, but by themselves these steps do not guarantee the eventual elimination of nuclear weapons. Incremental steps, without a coherent overarching policy of nuclear disarmament, are not enough to meet the obligation to negotiate and conclude "nuclear disarmament in all its aspects under strict and effective international control."

The abolition of nuclear weapons will not necessarily follow a linear progression from arms control and non-proliferation to disarmament. A qualitative change in national security concepts is a more essential prerequisite. This change is related to concepts of self-defense and sovereignty — concepts that are fundamental to the psychological mindset of any policy maker living today, or even within the past few centuries. Today these concepts are in a state of flux, and their very foundations are being challenged. (See "International Security: Signs of Change and Conflict" in this section.)

To say that change is inevitable because of internal and external forces, however, is not to say that it will necessarily lead to abolition. But many of the qualitative changes in the policies and institutions that are likely to be challenged over the next few decades are related, directly and indirectly, to the policies and institutions that depend on nuclear weapons. So there are likely to be opportunities to further the goal of nuclear abolition at the level of policy making and also through attention to the causes and consequences of current nuclear policy.

But even the exercise of looking beyond immediate measures is often termed unrealistic and admittedly some of the next steps might appear farther away than ever in today’s political environment. As a result, initiatives that focus from the outset on the "ultimate" goal — abolition of nuclear weapons — are accused of idealism. This perspective argues that only incremental progress can pave the way for future disarmament steps, leading to the elimination of nuclear weapons. This "realistic" approach, however, tolerates dangerous political trends and current power struggles, allowing them to dictate the terms of nuclear disarmament. Is this realism, or is this fatalism?

The word "ultimate" divides arms control and abolition, deflecting the urgency of the latter and obscuring the distinction between proliferation and possession in the policies of the nuclear weapon states. Nuclear weapon states use the word "ultimate" to reconcile demands for abolition with their own possession and this makes the ultimate goal of eliminating nuclear weapons even more remote. Yet, if there is an element of good faith in the nuclear weapon states’ declared ultimate goal, then the question arises whether "ultimate" can serve as a bridge between arms control and abolition by identifying a shared goal and allowing incremental movement forward to the extent that there is a common purpose.

In other words, "ultimate" should not be used to justify the indefinite extension of the status quo, but it could be used to build consensus on the urgency and necessity of disarmament. This would require examination of the concepts that are obscured by the use of the word "ultimate" and might reconcile the step by step approach with the qualitative change necessary for nuclear disarmament to occur.