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No First Use: One Key Step Toward the NWC
Nuclear weapons have the capability to destroy all the creatures
of this Earth. As long as nuclear weapons exist, there is a danger
of accidental or deliberate use with disastrous consequences. Therefore,
the negotiation of a NWC is vital to all humanity. However, such
negotiations have not started yet because of the opposition of the
nuclear weapon states (except China). The NWC negotiations will
not make progress without these states’ participation. The
main reason for these nuclear states’ objections to NWC negotiations
is that they continue to rely on the deterrence role of nuclear
weapons, despite there being no rationale for deterrence since the
end of the Cold War. To reach the goal of the NWC, therefore, the
major steps are to reduce the deterrence role of nuclear weapons
and to render such weapons unusable.
To reduce the role of nuclear weapons, we should take some specific
and practical steps in the initial phase such as:
- Taking nuclear forces off alert and removing warheads from delivery
vehicles. The US and Russia should accept a workable de-alerting
option at first. Then the system can be extended to other nuclear
weapons states under a condition of deeper cuts;
- Committing to further reduction of nuclear weapons. The US
and Russia should implement the START-II and START-III as soon
as possible and commit to deeper cuts in their arsenals to a level
comparable to that of the other three nuclear weapon states, at
which time the latter will join in nuclear disarmament. Also it
is necessary to maintain the ABM treaty because without it deep
cuts will not be possible;
- Accepting a policy of no first use of nuclear weapons.
A global agreement on no first use (NFU) should be a key step to
decreasing the role of nuclear weapons and eventually realizing
the goal of the NWC. Among the five NWS, however, only China has
adopted the NFU policy (China is also the only nuclear weapon state
supporting the NWC); that is, it undertakes not to be the first
to use nuclear weapons at any time or under any circumstance and
not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear
weapon states or nuclear weapon free zones at any time or under
any circumstance. France, the UK, the US, and now also Russia maintain
policies that permit first use of nuclear weapons even when nuclear
weapons are not used or threatened against them. In practice, in
the post-Cold War era, there is no rationale for these states holding
the first-use policy, and NFU would be not only beneficial to international
security but also in their national interests.
A no first use policy would be an important measure to strengthen
the non-proliferation regime and to promote further reductions of
nuclear weapons. As far as non-proliferation is concerned, as long
as nuclear weapon states rely on their use for any purpose, other
nations will be tempted to develop or acquire such weapons or other
weapons of mass destruction in response. Inversely, NFU would discourage
other states from seeking nuclear weapons while the role of such
weapons is decreasing
More important, NFU would facilitate the nuclear disarmament process.
Under NFU, the military strategy of each state will be switched
from offensive to defensive. The size of the operational nuclear
arsenal whose only purpose is for retaliation should be much smaller
than that intended for first use. This would make the deeper cuts
more feasible; NFU would ban all tactical weapons to reduce the
risk of first use; NFU could limit the deployment of silo-based
MIRVs intended for first nuclear attacks; NFU would require taking
nuclear forces off alert and removing warheads from delivery vehicles;
NFU would also require not deploying a national missile defense
system, because such a system could encourage a country to use nuclear
weapons first. Consequently, as an important confidence-building
measure, the policy of NFU would make the NWC much easier to implement.
Hui Zhang
Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs
Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University
Missile Defense: A Roadblock to Nuclear Disarmament
777 UN Plaza - 6th Floor - New York, NY - 10017 - Ph: 212.682.1265 - Fax: 212.286.8211 - info@reachingcriticalwill.org
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