Scientists and the Military

A common perception is that scientists became close to the defense establishment only during the Second World War. But in reality the connections go back a long way — at least to Aristotle, who is believed to have invented giant catapults, and Galileo, who suggested that his telescope be used to spot enemy ships at a distance. In the United States, organized participation of scientists in military affairs began with the First World War. There were even earlier efforts — the National Academy of Sciences was, after all, created by Lincoln during the Civil War to aid the war effort. But they were on a relatively small scale, both in size and in scope.

One of the prominent figures in the effort to "penetrate the sanctum" of the military was George Ellery Hale, a distinguished astronomer and foreign secretary of the National Academy of Sciences. Early in his life, Hale had gone to Europe to study science and had come back with this lesson: "to accomplish great results" academies had to "enjoy the active cooperation of the leaders of the state." With the unanimous endorsement of the National Academy, a delegation of scientists went to meet President Wilson at the White House. Stressing the importance of research for defense, Hale and others argued that the Academy could plan an arsenal of science for the country. In response to the President’s official request, the National Research Council was set up, in secret, with the objective of encouraging pure and applied research for "national security and welfare."

This trend, started during World War I increased hugely during World War II and the establishment of the Manhattan Project and the development of the Radar. The Manhattan Project, more than anything else, cemented a solid relationship between scientists and the military. The decades that followed saw the economic benefits of that relationship flow to the academy in general, and the physical sciences in particular. With the Korean war, overall federal expenditures for research and development passed the $1 billion mark; by 1956, it was over $3 billion. In the physical sciences, the bulk of the funding came from the Department of Defense or the Atomic Energy Commission. Apart from the expected subjects, such as nuclear physics or electronics, there were also unexpected ones: Earth Sciences, for example, grew enormously as a result of DOD’s desire to detect nuclear weapon tests. This is not to say that each project supported by DOD or the AEC was directly related to the development of weapons or related equipment or knowledge. They were not. But the influence of this pattern of funding can certainly not be discounted.

The process of militarization of science did not necessarily change the way scientists perceived themselves and their work. An example is Arthur Compton’s characterization of the destruction of Hiroshima as "a technical reply to a technical question." Indeed, as this comment shows, there is a deliberate effort to separate out the moral and the technical in their activities and to maintain an image of scientists as somehow apolitical. The sociologist C. Wright Mills said: "These actions are not necessarily sadistic; they are merely businesslike; they are not emotional at all; they are efficient, rational, technically clean cut."

While maintaining this image of themselves, scientists, especially some of the leaders, have been busy lobbying for increased expenditure on armaments and defense related research. Having found the key to the treasury, the science establishment has to keep coming up with newer and "technically sweet" ideas to maintain this access. This technological and bureaucratic momentum does not respect arms control or any other measures of restraint.

Some Examples

The drive towards constant "technological innovation" has led to several weapons programs. In the sixties, there was the development of the MIRV (Multiple Independently-targeted Reentry Vehicles) warheads. Resulting largely from the effort to build counter weapons to the first generation of Ballistic Missile Defense Systems (such as the Nike-Zeus), the program to develop MIRV warheads built up momentum during the 1960s and became virtually unstoppable. Several scientists, including prominent members of the JASON committee (a division of the Institute for Defense Analysis whose elite scientists, mostly physicists are recruited to work on problems related to defense), tried to argue against it on the grounds that it was destabilizing. Within the bureaucracy, ACDA (Arms Control and Disarmament Agency) officials were opposed to it. But nevertheless MIRVs were developed and deployed, making the SALT treaty somewhat of a mockery.

More recent efforts are the Star Wars program and, its successor, the current ballistic missile defense programs. The list of programs is long:

1983-1993 — Strategic Defense Initiative

Kinetic Energy Weapons

Directed Energy Weapons

Airborne Laser Laboratory

Neutral Particle Beam

Charged Particle Beam

X-Ray Laser

Space-Based Radar

Recent Efforts

Theater Missile Defense:

HAWK

MEADS

Navy Area

Patriot

THAAD

Navy Upper Tier

Airborne Laser

Boost Phase Intercept

Arrow

THEL/Nautilus

National Missile Defense:

Ground Based Interceptor

Sensors

Ground Based Radar

Upgraded Early Warning Radar

X-band Radar

Space Based Infrared System

Space and Missile Tracking System

Battle Management

With such a long list of programs, one can imagine how many thousands of scientists and engineers are involved and the kind of pressure they exert. If missile defenses do end up being deployed, they would have a serious effect on the future of arms control. The struggle to oppose these has to take cognizance of the force that such lobbies they exert.

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