Nuclear Weapons Cannot Counter Terrorism

Especially in the United States, terrorism has been the "fear" icon of the 1990s, as nuclear war was for the 1980s (at least in Europe). Press the button marked "terrorist threat" using nuclear, chemical, or biological (NBC) weapons and everyone jumps. But in different directions.

American — and increasingly British and French — officials and politicians hide behind "nuclear deterrence", though the United States also seeks to deploy national missile defences. Terrorist threat has become the principal new mission for retaining nuclear weapons after the end of the Cold War. Can it work? No. By its nature, terrorism is not susceptible to the logic of deterrence, which requires an identifiable adversary, rational calculations, and the fear of the threat of overwhelming retaliation. India’s nuclear capability did not prevent fundamentalists from hijacking an Air India flight from Kathmandu in December. On the contrary, the persistent possession of nuclear weapons by a self-chosen few (now eight) countries raises the stakes and advertises the enduring attractiveness of this ultimate weapon of mass destruction.

The continued existence of nuclear weapons may also help to hype the value of biological and chemical weapons, perceived as the "poor dictator’s nuclear bomb," thereby retarding the achievement of universal adherence to treaties banning those weapons, the 1972 Biological and Toxins Weapons Convention (BWC) and the 1992 Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC). At the same time, the lack of transparency and accountability with regard to fissile materials and nuclear weapons production and stockpiles enhances the real risk of terrorists acquiring nuclear materials or bombs. Saddam Hussein was slow to make nuclear weapons because he had to develop the facilities to enrich the uranium. Nowadays, he would be more likely to buy weapons-grade uranium or plutonium, skimmed off from some inadequately monitored weapons programme, probably Russia’s.

A Nuclear Weapons Convention would lessen the threat from nuclear terrorism in two important ways: by placing rigorous controls and accounting on all nuclear programmes and materials as a first (and therefore immediate) stage in overseeing reductions and dismantlements of weapons and facilities; and by declaring nuclear weapons off limits for everyone.

In addition to accounting and controls, the production of fissile materials needs to be halted and the reprocessing and enrichment facilities dismantled. Notwithstanding the careful distinction made in the Model NWC between civilian and military purposes, addressing the commercial separation and trade in plutonium will be necessary if the world truly wants to minimise the possibility of terrorists acquiring nuclear weapon materials.

In declaring nuclear weapons "off limits," it may be objected that terrorists (in government or sub-national groups) do not particularly respect or abide by legal, moral, or political norms. Advocates of nuclear deterrence argue that terrorists would instead be emboldened by the nuclear disarming of the major powers. Even advocates of deep cuts sometimes argue that some power (the United States in its self designated role of world police-force, for example) should retain a few nuclear weapons, to deter terrorists. As suicide bombers around the world prove, some terrorists are completely prepared to die for the cause, and don’t mind how many innocent others they take with them. Even if a nuclear weapon could be aimed roughly in the direction of the terrorist’s group, friends, or allies, it would inevitably incinerate a largely innocent population. Even if the weapon managed to destroy the actual adversary, that is too high a price to pay. Such indiscriminate carnage may well not deter the terrorist, but it ought to stay the hand of the world police (a calculation the terrorists would no doubt make). So in such a situation, nuclear weapons would be unusable, and retention of a handful, pointless.

777 UN Plaza - 6th Floor - New York, NY - 10017 - Ph: 212.682.1265 - Fax: 212.286.8211 - info@reachingcriticalwill.org
This site was created by Kache Productions ©2008