International Security: Signs of Change and Conflict

Editor’s Introduction

Bilateral reduction in numbers of nuclear weapons, cutoff of fissile material, and other proposed and ongoing incremental measures are welcome and necessary, but by themselves do not challenge the strategic defense policies of the nuclear weapon states. The future is indeed uncertain, as defense planners assert, but it is also shaped by the policies of today. The question therefore is why plan only for further reliance on nuclear weapons, which will make conflict more likely, rather than for reduced reliance and eventual elimination, which will only be possible if planning at a government level actually begins.

The security policies of today in the nuclear weapon states and their allies contain fundamental inconsistencies based on selective interpretation and application of the rights of self-defense and sovereignty. One state's self-defense policy, if it includes force projection, is likely to be perceived as a threat to another state. It is fairly common — not only among states — to give oneself the benefit of the doubt but suspect others’ motives.

Assumptions about intent, aggression, and resort to force — which affect interpretation of another's actions or words — contribute to the possibility of hostility. Military planners prepare for "the worst" and seek to project a credible threat, or in some cases ambiguity, as a deterrent in the minds of real, potential, or perceived adversaries. It is not clear, however, that they adequately take into account the range of possible reactions to the threats projected. Perceived threats or uncertainty in the minds of the other might be a direct cause of reactive decisions to assume and prepare for the worst.

The statements and analyses of policy that follow indicate what nuclear weapon states are planning, what they are debating internally, and what they see as threats. These examples indicate the centrality of nuclear weapons to the security doctrines of the nuclear weapon states. They also indicate that despite their objections to negotiating a Nuclear Weapons Convention on the grounds that this involves projecting into an unknown future, policy makers of the nuclear weapon states have no problem projecting nuclear weapons into the future.

As these extracts show, nuclear weapon states continue to invest in deterrence as the basis of stability, despite the current state of flux. The US, Russia, and China recognize a substantive change in the global security environment and perceive the emergence of qualitatively new threats. The US is driven by fear of "rogue" states, while Russia and China share a view that the current international security environment has shifted dramatically, and that the greatest threat comes from the United States. The examples from France indicate possible directions that future policies might take if universal nuclear disarmament is not pursued as a viable security option. Of the official nuclear weapon states, the UK has given the most public attention, in the form of democratic debate, to the Nuclear Weapons Convention.

Statements of Policy — United States

"Nuclear forces are an essential element of US security, serving as a hedge against an uncertain future and as a guarantee of US commitments to allies."

William Cohen, Annual Report to the President and the Congress, Chapter 6, "Nuclear Forces and Missile Defenses", Department of Defense, 2000

"Our nuclear deterrent posture is one of the most visible and important examples of how US military capabilities can be used effectively to deter aggression and coercion, as reaffirmed in a Presidential Decision Directive signed by President Clinton in November 1997."

President William J. Clinton, A National Security Strategy for a New Century , The White House, October, 1998

"The fundamental challenge confronting the Department of Defense is simple, but daunting. Our armed forces must meet the demands of a dangerous world by shaping and responding throughout the period from 1997 to 2015. To do so, we must meet our requirements to shape and respond in the near term, while at the same time we must transform US combat capabilities and support structures to be able to shape and respond effectively in the face of future challenges.

"To meet this challenge, we must prepare now to meet the security challenges of an unpredictable future. As we move into the next century, it is imperative that the United States maintain its military superiority in the face of evolving, as well as discontinuous, threats and challenges. Without such superiority, our ability to exert global leadership and to create international conditions conducive to the achievement of our national goals would be in doubt."

William Cohen, The Report of the Quadrennial Defense Review, Section III, Defense Strategy, Department of Defense, May 1997

"Our nuclear posture also contributes substantially to our ability to deter aggression in peacetime. The primary role of US nuclear forces in the current and projected security environment is to deter aggression against the United States, its forces abroad, and its allies and friends. Although the prominence of nuclear weapons in our defense posture has diminished since the end of the Cold War, nuclear weapons remain important as a hedge against NBC [nuclear, biological, and chemical] proliferation and the uncertain futures of existing nuclear powers, and as a means of upholding our security commitments to allies.

"In this context, the United States must retain strategic nuclear forces sufficient to deter any hostile foreign leadership with access to nuclear weapons from acting against our vital interests and to convince such a leadership that seeking a nuclear advantage would be futile. Thus, for the foreseeable future, the United States will continue to need a reliable and flexible nuclear deterrent — survivable against the most aggressive attack, under highly confident, constitutional command and control, and safeguarded against both accidental and unauthorized use. We believe these goals can be achieved at lower force levels. Consistent with this, the United States remains committed to negotiating further reductions in US and Russian strategic nuclear arsenals consistent with the agreed START II framework once Moscow ratifies the START II treaty."

William Cohen, The Report of the Quadrennial Defense Review, Section III, Defense Strategy, Department of Defense, May 1997

Statement of Policy — Russia

The situation in the world is characterized by a dynamic transformation of the system of international relations. Following the end of the bipolar confrontation era, two mutually exclusive trends took shape. The first of these trends shows itself in the strengthened economic and political positions of a significant number of states and their integrative associations…. The second trend shows itself in attempts to create an international relations structure based on domination by developed Western countries in the international community, under US leadership and designed for unilateral solutions (including the use of military force) to key issues in world politics in circumvention of the fundamental rules of international law.

… [A] number of states are stepping up efforts to weaken Russia politically, economically, militarily and in other ways. Attempts to ignore Russia’s interests when solving major issues of international relations, including conflict situations, are capable of undermining international security, stability, and the positive changes achieved in international relations….

Russia’s national interests in the military sphere lie in protection of its independence, sovereignty and state and territorial integrity, in the prevention of military aggression against Russia and its allies and in ensuring the conditions for peaceful and democratic development of the state….

Threats to the Russian Federation’s national security in the international sphere can be seen in attempts by other states to oppose a strengthening of Russia as one of the influential centres of a multi-polar world, to hinder the exercise of its national interests and to weaken its position in Europe, the Middle East, Transcaucasus, Central Asia and the Asia-Pacific Region….

…The growing technical advantage of a number of leading powers and their enhanced ability to create new weapons and military equipment could provoke a new phase of the arms race and radically alter the forms and methods of warfare….

The Russian Federation considers the possibility of employing military force to ensure its national security based on the following principles: use of all available forces and assets, including nuclear, in the event of need to repulse armed aggression, if all other measures of resolving the crisis situation have been exhausted and have proven ineffective….

Source: Russia’s National Security Concept, issued January 10, 2000, excerpts of the text as published in Russian in the January 14 issue of Nezavisimoye Voennoye Obozreniye and translated by the US foreign Broadcast Information Service, in Arms Control Today, January/February 2000, p. 15

Analysis of Policy — Russia

A close examination of the conditions and sequence of the use of the totality of the means and methods of preventing and stopping aggression shows that the use of nuclear weapons by Russia is prompted by the onset of a situation that is critical for the existence of the state when the use of conventional forces and means in combination with non-military means proves ineffective and aggression cannot be stopped. So, the claims that Russia has allegedly lowered the ceiling of the use of nuclear weapons are incorrect. Russia does not claim broader rights than those of other members of the "nuclear club". It is important to understand that Russia commits everything to the goal of deterrence and will use the whole power of the state [to] administer a resolute and firm rebuff to the aggressor. But Russia itself will never become an aggressor, which is ensured by its legislation and the Concept of National Security.

Sergei Ivanov, Secretary of the Security Council, February 15, 2000, reprinted in Disarmament Diplomacy No. 43, January/February 2000, p. 51

Analysis of Policy — China

With the arrival of the new century, the United States has markedly stepped up its National Missile Defence (NMD) programme…. The real motive of the US Government is to make use of the country’s unrivalled economic and technological might to grab the strategic high ground for the 21^st century in both the scientific and military fields, so as to break the existing global strategic balance, seek absolute security for itself and realise its ambition for world domination.

…Since the end of World War II, the world has undergone tremendous changes. Yet, there is one important factor that has remained constant in the ever-shifting global strategic landscape: a certain degree of deterrence–along with strategic checks and balances–has always existed in the interrelationships between the major powers. No single country is strong enough to believe that it can use force to threaten the security of others without having to worry about the threat of retaliation…. However, as the only superpower with economic, technological and military capabilities that remain unmatched by any other country… the United States seems to be less and less satisfied with the status quo in international relations. What it wants is absolute security, because it is only from a position of absolute security that it can enjoy complete freedom of action in dealing with other countries. The US Government and Congress have found in NMD the best means to deliver this….

…US efforts to seek its own absolute security to the detriment of the security of others have poisoned the atmosphere of international co-operation in the field of non-proliferation, which will ultimately undermine its own security.

Though the US Government has publicly denied that China is a major target of its NMD programme, the history of missile defence programmes and the acknowledged design capabilities of NMD show that the proposed system can be directed against China and can seriously affect China’s limited nuclear capability.

Ambassador Sha Zukang, "US Missile Defence Plans: China’s View" in Disarmament Diplomacy No. 43, January/February 2000, pp. 3,4.

Analysis of Policy — France

[W]e have obviously not yet reached, and are far from reaching anything remotely resembling an international world order. In a context of growing instability, we need the stability and predictability that international agreements offer. This is not to say that we should blindly entrust our security interests only to treaties, but that we should not either throw the baby out with the bath water….

On nuclear disarmament, France has done its share. Like others, we scaled back our SSBNs. More significantly, France has become the first Nuclear Weapon State to completely dismantle its ground-to-ground nuclear systems. It is, for the moment, the sole nuclear power to have dismantled its weapons fissile materials production facilities…. Likewise, we trust that our friends and allies will recognize the importance of the concrete steps that we have already taken, while maintaining a credible deterrent.

What is the situation now? First, we can no longer take for granted the same degree of understanding among the five [nuclear weapon states] on central strategic questions…. Second, we have to acknowledge a certain number of setbacks in the field of arms control and non-proliferation…. A combination of the continuing rejection of CTBT ratification and a unilateral abrogation of the ABM treaty would seriously put in jeopardy the whole edifice of non-proliferation and arms control….

Ambassador Gerard Errera, Political Director for the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Address to Carnegie International Non-Proliferation Conference, March 16, 2000. (www.ceip.org/npp)

Discussion of Policy — France

A group of French lawmakers, military leaders and political scientists is recommending a reappraisal of France’s nuclear doctrine.

Such an assessment, which might form the basis for a European nuclear policy, could touch on nuclear arms testing, limitations to the use of nuclear weapons and anti-ballistic missile systems.

Since 1996, France has declared a moratorium on nuclear testing and fissile material production and vowed not to undertake preemptive strikes. The country now maintains a downsized nuclear force, with no more ground-based ICBMs and a reduced quantity of airborne and submarine-based nuclear weapon systems. The policy is rooted in the government’s determination to remain independent of the US and other superpowers — a stance dating back to the 1960s.

"[Current French doctrine] served a most useful role during the Cold War, 10 years ago," said Pierre Lellouche, a member of the French Assembly’s defense committee. "But this context is now in rapid flux. So why shouldn’t [the doctrine] be opened to public discussion?"

Adm. Marcel Duval (Ret.), former chairman of the defense R&D committee, urged that discussion be extended as rapidly as possible to the European level. US defense experts have severely criticized Europe’s failure to address its military shortcomings, which include coming to terms with the need to develop a common nuclear doctrine….

…French officials pointed an accusing finger at Russia for failing to approve START 2 and, in particular, at the US for refusing to ratify the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty and embarking on national and theater anti-ballistic missile systems. Gen. Henri Paris (Ret.), president of the Paris-based Democracy Club, claimed that, by moving to develop and deploy ABM systems, Washington had in effect "restarted the arms race."

The comments, made earlier this month at parliamentary hearings at the French Senate, were significant because the speakers were primarily from the opposition right-wing Gaullist party, which drew up the present nuclear doctrine….

Among the concepts proponents of debate would like to see discussed are:

• Resumption of nuclear testing….
• Acquiring an anti-ballistic missile capability….
• Expanding criteria for the use of nuclear arms [including] "active defense" and allowing preventive strikes….
• Broadening the nuclear arsenal….

Michael A. Taverna, "Policy Makers Urge Debate on French Nuclear Doctrine" in Aviation Week and Space Technology, March 20, 2000, p. 79.

Statements of Policy — United Kingdom*

On July 8, 1998 the British Secretary of State for Defence, George Robertson, announced the outcome of the Labour Government's Strategic Defence Review, which indicated some progress from the UK in the area of nuclear disarmament.

In a speech to the Conference on Disarmament on July 30, 1998, Ambassador Ian Soutar, Permanent Representative of the United Kingdom, said that:

The Review argued that "greater transparency about nuclear programmes also adds to international trust and security", and thus announced Britain's holdings of fissile materials for military purposes: 7.6 tonnes of plutonium; 21.9 tonnes of highly enriched uranium and 15,000 tonnes of other forms of uranium.

While the Review indicated that "the Government wishes to see a safer world in which there is no place for nuclear weapons," the UK clearly does not envisage giving them up any time soon or in the absence of significant moves by other nuclear powers: "while large nuclear arsenals and risks of proliferation remain, our minimum deterrent remains a necessary element of our security."

To maintain and possibly modernise this deterrent, the UK is continuing programs of research and development. George Robertson, Secretary of State for Defence, said in the House of Commons on Wednesday June 9, 1999:

Analysis of Policy — UK

On the Nuclear Weapons Convention, the UK has softened its opposition to the UN resolutions calling for negotiations leading to conclusion of a Nuclear Weapons Convention (see Section 2) by abstaining in 1998 and 1999 on operative paragraph 1, which affirms the International Court of Justice conclusion that there exists an obligation to pursue in good faith and bring to a conclusion negotiations on nuclear disarmament in all its aspects.

A number of UK officials, in informal discussions, have shown considerable interest in the Model Nuclear Weapons Convention and in the book Security and Survival: The Case for a Nuclear Weapons Convention. John Stellar a Member of Parliament (MP) and Minister of State for the Armed Forces has remarked that the book is "… a useful contribution to the international debate on how to make progress towards the global elimination of nuclear weapons."

Menzies Campbell, Liberal Democrat foreign affairs spokesman, in an article in the Guardian on March 24, 2000, warned that current developments are increasing nuclear insecurity and that there is a need for leadership from the UK "lest we slip back towards the so-called balance of terror, at a time when equilibrium is fragile and proliferation likely… Britain should be prepared to argue forcefully at the April NPT Review Conference for the negotiation of a nuclear weapons convention to match those for chemical and biological weapons, to formalise the commitment of all nuclear weapon states to nuclear disarmament."

There has been considerable debate in the UK House of Commons on the general issue of nuclear disarmament, and the more specific question of support for a Nuclear Weapons Convention. Below are excerpts from these debates.

Discussion of Policy - UK

The United Kingdom's minimum nuclear deterrent is consistent with international law. It follows that UK military personnel engaged in the operation or support of Trident are acting legally under the Nuremberg Principles. This has been made clear down the chain of command, and members of the Armed Services who seek further guidance on these issues can in the first instance do so through their chain of command.

Guidance on the Law of Armed Conflict for the Armed Services is set out in the draft Joint Service Manual on the Law of Armed Conflict (Joint Service Publication 383) currently under preparation. We aim to publish this later this year, as we pledged at the 50th Anniversary Conference of the International Red Cross in November 1999. When it is published a copy will be placed in the Library of the House. The relevant section on Nuclear Weapons was reconfirmed following the 1996 Advisory Opinion of the International Court of Justice on the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons. It reads:

"There is no specific rule of international law, express or implied, which prohibits the use of nuclear weapons. The legality of their use depends upon the application of the general rules of international law, including those regulating the inherent right of self-defence and the conduct of hostilities. Those rules cannot be applied in isolation from any factual context to imply a prohibition of a general nature. Whether the use, or threatened use, of nuclear weapons in a particular case is lawful depends on all the circumstances. Nuclear weapons fall to be dealt with by reference to the same general principles as apply to conventional weapons. However, the new rules introduced in Additional Protocol I [to the Geneva Conventions] are not intended to have any effect on and do not regulate or prohibit the use of nuclear weapons."

January 18, 2000:

I should like to refer to the proposal advanced by the Liberal Democrat spokesman, the right honourable and learned Member for North-East Fife (Mr. Campbell), during the debate on the Queen's Speech (November 22, 1999). He said that the United Kingdom could take the initiative by convening a conference of the members of the United Nations Security Council. The conference would discuss: setting up new strategic arms reduction talks — START III — involving all nuclear weapon states; reviewing all treaties, including the ABM treaty; promoting a declaration of all nuclear weapons stocks, with the aim of producing an inventory, which the UN would keep; … and engaging in serious negotiations on weapons reduction and entry into a nuclear weapons convention.

That is a serious and sensible suggestion. The United Kingdom has already taken a lead on two of the other major issues facing our species: climate change and third-world debt. As we enter the new millennium, we could give no better lead than on the crucial issue of nuclear non-proliferation.

We should also work to bring about an annual declaration of all nuclear weapons held by de facto nuclear weapons states under a UN weapons register. We should proceed with negotiations on a nuclear weapons convention to match those for chemical and biological weapons, and we should formalise the commitment of all nuclear weapons states to nuclear disarmament. We believe that an EU decommissioning agency should be established to co-ordinate EU-financed efforts to decommission the obsolete civil and military nuclear hardware of the former Soviet Union.

It is almost 39 years to the day that John F. Kennedy said in his inauguration speech as President: "Let us never negotiate out of fear — but let us never fear to negotiate. The United Kingdom can help to achieve that and the Government should take that forward.

We must examine the future — the not-too-distant future — of our own nuclear weapons, because technological change inevitably brings the possibility of technological obsolescence...The current Government have already done far more to achieve transparency in that respect than any previous UK Government or, indeed, any other Government in the world. By setting such an example to the rest of the world, we enhance our ability to tell countries such as France and even China that it is important to seize the opportunity to de-escalate. The alternative is escalation… We must strip away the mythology — that having nuclear weapons is about national aggrandisement, when, in fact, it is rooted in national insecurity. We must persuade the people of India and Pakistan that nuclear weapons do not enhance their security. However, to do that we must be open and honest about our own long-term ambitions and our desire for nuclear de-escalation.

If our country helped to halt the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, we would not only achieve a more secure future for generations to come, but contribute to the well-being of the millions who are undernourished, the children who are uneducated and the sick who are untreated. By reducing our reliance on nuclear weapons, we could take a lead in the world and set an example, especially for the underdeveloped countries.

Article 6 of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty is often said to create an obligation for a nuclear-free world. I have always argued that such an outcome would make the world safe again for conventional warfare, which has killed countless millions in years gone by, especially in the century that has just ended. Article 6 brackets a nuclear-free world with a requirement for general and complete disarmament: one is not expected to happen before the other. I would be perfectly happy with a nuclear-free world, provided that there was also general and complete disarmament. However, I advise honourable Members not to hold their breath.

Since the end of the Cold War, we have reduced the number of our operationally available warheads by 50 per cent. We have taken steps to maintain our remaining nuclear forces at a reduced state of readiness. We have been completely transparent about our stocks of nuclear material, military as well as civil. Work is in hand to develop expertise at Aldermaston in verifying the reduction and elimination of nuclear weapons and we have made it clear that, when we are satisfied with progress towards our goal of the global elimination of nuclear weapons, we will ensure that British nuclear weapons are included in those negotiations.

Legal Developments - UK

On October 20, 1999, three women who had admitted damaging Trident nuclear submarine equipment were acquitted by a Scottish judge, Sheriff Gimblet, on the grounds that deployment of the Trident nuclear system was illegal in light of the 1996 decision of the International Court of Justice. The acquittal led to a discussion in the Scottish Parliament on the legality of the deployment of Trident submarines in Scotland and the responsibility of Scotland arising from this. The Lord Advocate of Scotland then referred the case to the High Court of Justiciary to clarify the situation. Preliminary hearings were held on April 4, 2000, and the full hearing is scheduled for October, 2000.

Michael Douglas, UN Messenger for Peace, visits the UK

Michael Douglas, a United Nations Messenger for Peace, addressed a meeting of parliamentarians in the House of Commons under the auspices of the All Party Group for Global Security and Non-Proliferation and the Oxford Research Group on the evening of March 20, 2000. The meeting was packed with Members of both the House of Commons and the House of Lords and their researchers. Mr. Douglas told MPs that disputes between nations could become a "death warrant" for the world unless urgent action were taken towards complete nuclear disarmament. He referred particularly to the implementation of disarmament obligations under the NPT and the significance of the NPT Review Conference in April-May 2000. Malcom Savidge MP, Peter Hain (Minister of State at the Foreign Office), Cheryl Gillan (Conservative), and Menzies Campbell (Liberal Democrat) also spoke. Mr. Douglas later met Foreign Secretary Robin Cook to argue his point further.

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