How US Missile Defense Plans Affect China’s Nuclear Arms Control Policies: A Chinese Perspective

On September 1, 2000, the Clinton Administration opted to defer any decision on whether to deploy a national missile defense (NMD) intended to protect the United States from attacks by nuclear-tipped missiles. The new Bush administration, which assembled a pro-missile defense national security team, however, is likely to deploy missile defenses, even larger than Clinton’s version. Before taking irrevocable steps down this path, the United States should stop and consider that deploying missile defenses could have grave consequences for US-China relations, and the future of nuclear arms control.

China will regard NMD deployment as a hostile act meant to neutralize its nuclear weapons. To China, US claims that missile defenses are intended to defend US territory from missile attacks by "states of concern" and unauthorized or accidental missile launches from Russia and China do not bear scrutiny. None of the alleged "states of concern" has actually initiated deployment of ballistic missiles capable of reaching the US in the foreseeable future. Nor would the planned system guard against thousands of Russian warheads. The US NMD system under development, however technically flawed, could in principle neutralize China’s strategic nuclear deterrent. China currently has about 20 single-warhead intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) capable of reaching the United States. Even the limited initial deployment of 100 interceptors designed for 4-to-1 engagements could intercept China’s entire current arsenal.

China worries that the possible military superiority NMD could offer may allow the United States to feel it has more freedom to intervene in China’s affairs and encroach on its sovereignty, including undermining China’s efforts at reunification with Taiwan. This concern is exacerbated by US cooperative research and development of advanced Theater Missile Defense (TMD) with Japan and potentially Taiwan — the 1997 amended US-Japan Defense Cooperation Guidelines refer explicitly to "Cooperation in Situations in Areas Surrounding Japan," which could include Taiwan. Furthermore, in view of the recent noisy anti-China clamor raised by some politicians, including bombing China’s embassy at Belgrade and the recent spy plane incident, it may be natural for China to have some worries over this program. Given Chinese concerns, if the United States goes ahead and deploys even a limited system of national missile defenses, China is likely to react in ways that will hurt US-Chinese relations and harm US interests.

To retain its nuclear deterrent, China’s direct response to the US NMD could be to speed up and enhance its nuclear arsenal modernization. For instance, China's relatively slow and modest pursuit of less vulnerable mobile and solid-fueled missiles may become more urgent. China’s military planners may make a worst-case assumption of 100 % effectiveness for US missile interceptors and prepare to face the fully deployed NMD system, which may have 250 interceptors. Thus, the number of ICBMs China fields might possibly be expanded tenfold or more. Moreover, all these missiles would be deployed with decoys and other countermeasures. Given its rate of economic and technological development, China can afford the possible costs of several billion dollars and overcome any technical obstacles over the next decade or so.

Further, China could reconsider its participation in multilateral nuclear arms control treaties. Most important, perhaps, US NMD plans have already impacted negotiations on a global Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty (FMCT), which has been stuck at the UN Conference on Disarmament in Geneva since 1993. An FMCT, which would ban the production of nuclear materials for weapons, has long been seen as a key building block in nuclear disarmament and nonproliferation. The 2000 NPT Review Conference called for the CD to commence negotiations immediately on an FMCT, with a view to its conclusion within five years. China’s participation in an FMCT, however, will be critical to its success, however. Without China’s participation in the FMCT, India will not sign it, and Pakistan will not sign unless India does. Both South Asian countries and Israel are believed to be continuing to produce fissile materials for their stockpiles.

Like the other four NPT nuclear weapon states, China is believed to have stopped producing highly enriched uranium and plutonium for weapons, and China has consistently supported the FMCT negotiations. Because of its concerns about US missile defense plans, however, China has recently made clear it is not willing to start FMCT talks without also starting talks on agreements to prevent an arms race in outer space — which would include limiting US missile defenses. For China, the issues of NMD and an FMCT are inextricably linked, because China could not afford to end the production of both highly enriched uranium and plutonium for weapons if it needed this fissile material to expand its nuclear arsenal in response to US deployment of missile defenses.

China also worries that US deployment of missile defenses over Russia’s objections–which have been strenuous and persistent–could scuttle the US-Soviet ABM treaty, which limits missile defenses. Russia has announced that continued US compliance with the ABM Treaty is a condition for Russia's implementation of the START I and START II nuclear-arms-reduction treaties. An end to the START process and possible resumption of arms racing could lead to a new and very serious threat to China’s small nuclear arsenal, giving China another reason to rethink its position on the FMCT.

Moreover, a redoubled Chinese nuclear modernization effort could raise calls in China for carrying out additional nuclear tests to perfect modernized weapon designs. While such tests are barred by the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty — another key element of the global regime limiting the spread of nuclear weapons — that treaty has never entered into force, the United States has refused to ratify it, and the United States would be withdrawing from or violating the ABM Treaty to build an NMD. In that situation, China might feel well within its rights to carry out prohibited tests in response. At the same time, with the United States carrying out an action that threatened China, China might well decide to stop cooperation with the United States in other security areas — such as constraining its nuclear and missile exports, helping to convince North Korea to rein in its arms programs, and working to resolve nuclear issues in South Asia.

Eventually, failure to proceed with the nuclear disarmament process to which the nuclear weapon states are already committed under the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty would inescapably damage global efforts to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons. Thus the effect of US deployment of NMD would be a major breakdown of nuclear arms control. This would clearly not benefit any country’s security interests, including those of the United States. Should the United States run the risks posed by China’s potential responses to US deployment of NMD? The choice is for the new administration to make.

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