The Verification of a Nuclear Weapon Free World:
Closing the Gaps

Verification is crucial to achieving the goal of a nuclear weapons-free world: only if states have a high degree of certainty that all members are complying with obligations under a nuclear weapons convention (NWC) will they enter such a far-reaching agreement. The Model NWC proposes an ideal-type verification system that combines and takes further the most progressive elements from relevant international treaties.

The broad scope of the NWC, which would ban development, testing, production, possession and use of nuclear weapons, nuclear weapons materials, nuclear weapons delivery vehicles, nuclear weapons components as well as nuclear weapons research activities, necessitates a verification system that takes advantage of the strengths of many existing and future nuclear arms control regimes. Fortunately, many of the areas covered by the Convention are already subject to verification. The Convention builds on existing verification regimes for the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (CTBT), NPT safeguard agreements, US-Russian arms reduction treaties, and regional agreements (such as nuclear weapon free zones). The verification regime of a future treaty banning the production of fissile materials for nuclear weapons purposes will be another important building block in the verification of a nuclear weapon-free world. By participating in these regimes, many states are already acquiring verification-related experience, such as preparing declarations and accepting and organising on-site inspections. The experience collected in verification organisations will play an important role when an agency is established to implement an NWC.

Nuclear Warheads and Military Fissile Material: The Verification Gap

There is, however, one noticeable gap that will have to be closed if nuclear abolition is to happen in a verifiable manner: there are currently no verification arrangements in place for either nuclear warheads or military fissile materials (namely, holdings of highly enriched uranium and plutonium). While certain nuclear weapon related areas such as testing, delivery vehicles, and excess weapons materials are already subject to verification or transparency regimes, information related to warheads and warhead materials remains a tightly kept secret.

Under an NWC, all nuclear weapon states will have to declare the numbers and locations of their nuclear weapons. They will probably also be required to publish a historical account of their nuclear weapons programmes. Such a "baseline declaration" submitted by all states with a nuclear weapons programme will establish the basis from which nuclear reductions will be monitored. The NWC envisages this to happen through an iterative process of declarations by states parties as well as off-site and on-site monitoring activities, some of which can be highly intrusive.

Verification Is a Process of Learning

Agreeing on and setting up effective verification regimes is usually a long term process. This process often starts with confidence building and transparency measures which eventually evolve into more intrusive verification regimes. Especially in sensitive areas related to national security, prior experience with declaration and inspection procedures can facilitate the implementation of complex verification arrangements. For example, it took decades of political discussions and joint scientific experiments to reach an international agreement on the verification requirements for the CTBT. Likewise, the Confidence and Security Building Mechanism and the associated transparency measures negotiated under the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) umbrella were essential in preparing the ground for the verification regime of the treaty on Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE).

First Steps to Start a Confidence Building Process

Nuclear weapon states should enter a confidence building and transparency process relating to their nuclear warheads and military fissile material stockpiles now. Initiating plurilateral confidence and transparency measures at an early stage will facilitate agreement on a verification regime for an NWC at a later stage. Specifically, nuclear weapon states should acquire experience with making their nuclear weapons holdings more transparent, monitoring arrangements for their weapons and fissile material holdings, and on-site inspections.

Russia and the United States have acquired verification experience during the implementation of the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF), Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT), and Strategic Arms Reduction (START) treaties, which limit numbers and types of certain nuclear delivery vehicles and deployed nuclear warheads. Both countries have already agreed in principle on a number of additional measures that would constitute first steps in implementing transparency and confidence building measures. As part of the March 1997 Helsinki agreement, both governments have agreed that under a future START III treaty, the US and Russia would negotiate transparency measures relating to active, "reserve" and retired strategic nuclear warheads. These measures are intended to promote the irreversibility of deep reductions in warhead inventories. During the Helsinki summit, Presidents Clinton and Yeltsin also agreed for the first time to discuss tactical nuclear weapons in the context of START III, including related transparency and confidence building measures. Additionally, the Trilateral Initiative, which is under negotiation between Russia, the United States and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), would subject excess military fissile material to verification on a large scale.

It is important, however, that such a process also draws in those states that have so far not participated at all in nuclear weapons control. China, France, and the United Kingdom have no experience with any form of verification related to their military nuclear programmes. Even more challenging will be the involvement of India, Israel, and Pakistan. These non-NPT nuclear states only had limited verification experience.

Next Steps in Confidence Building and Transparency

If and when a treaty banning the production of fissile material for weapons purposes is negotiated, all these states will become participants in multilateral verification related to at least the nuclear weapons material production complex. Since it will probably be years before such a treaty is negotiated and has entered into force, however, other ways to extend bilateral transparency and confidence building mechanisms related to nuclear weapons and fissile material holdings should be initiated now. Additional next steps in this direction might include:

• a nuclear weapons register, which could provide transparency with regard to weapons holdings,
• transparency measures regarding nuclear weapons storage sites,
• a fissile material register, containing information on military stocks of fissile material,
• publication of fissile material production histories similar to the ones that have been published by the United States and the United Kingdom,
• plurilateral scientific consultations among states possessing nuclear weapons on the verification requirements of a nuclear weapon free world.

The early discussion and implementation of these and similar confidence building and transparency measures will provide a basis from which an agreement on a verification regime to monitor compliance with a nuclear weapons convention will be easier to reach. The norm of openness and transparency associated with such a regime will need to grow over time in order to achieve universal acceptance of a future NWC and its verification provisions.

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