Nuclear Weapons Convention:
Resolutions, Statements, and Analyses

AUSTRALIA

Some countries and non-government organisations have called for the negotiation of a global nuclear disarmament convention or treaty.

Australia believes that, for the time being, the main steps towards nuclear disarmament are best pursued bilaterally, between the United States and Russia, under the START process. The premature multilateralisation of the disarmament process would serve only to complicate and slow down the existing process of bilateral nuclear disarmament between the US and Russia. Once the two largest Nuclear Weapon States have reduced their nuclear stockpiles to levels roughly comparable with the other NWS, the process will become a plurilateral one — among all the recognised NWS. A nuclear weapons convention might become appropriate when all NWS have reduced their nuclear weapon holdings to quite low levels.

This approach was recognised by the Canberra Commission on the Elimination of Nuclear Weapons (August 1996), which said that "following the achievement by the United States and Russia of appropriate force levels, the next step might be to reduce the levels of all nuclear weapons states to 100 warheads each" (p 64) and that as "nuclear disarmament nears the elimination stage, consideration should be given to whether the legal obligations to sustain a nuclear weapon free world would be best given effect by the incremental approach of a number of separate instruments or through a comprehensive approach which would combine all relevant instruments into a single legal instrument — a nuclear weapons convention" (p 66).

With regard to nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation, Labor will energetically support and pursue appropriate initiatives, such as those recommended by the Canberra Commission on the Elimination of Nuclear Weapons, the Tokyo Forum for Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament, and the New Agenda Coalition, to achieve further deep reductions in nuclear armament and strengthen non-proliferation regimes as steps toward the ultimate objective of a nuclear weapon free world....

...In the longer term, achievement and maintenance of a nuclear weapon free world will require an enduring legal framework, linked to the Charter of the United Nations. Labor supports exploration of potential legal frameworks for the abolition of nuclear weapons, including negotiation of a Nuclear Weapons Convention that would ban nuclear weapons and provide a global framework for the elimination of existing arsenals.

The ALP has also indicated that consideration of a nuclear weapons convention "should not be put aside as a project for the distant future, but must be undertaken alongside other step-by-step disarmament measures."

For more information on Australian nuclear policy, contact:

CANADA

There is a growing global movement working for the elimination of all nuclear weapons.

One of the most encouraging developments in this movement has been the preparation of a Model Convention on Nuclear Weapons. The Model Convention was drafted to demonstrate what an international treaty to eliminate nuclear weapons might look like. It was circulated for discussion by the United Nations in 1997.

I have moved the following motion in the House of Commons calling for Canada to actively support the negotiation and adoption of such a convention:

For more information about the Model Convention on Nuclear Weapons, see Security and Survival: The Case for a Nuclear Weapons Convention. A copy of this document is available at the following website: www.ippnw.org

Bill Blaikie, MP
NDP House Leader
International Trade Critic
Intergovernmental Affairs Critic
Member of Parliament for Winnipeg-Transcona

Bill Graham, MP, Chairman
December 10, 1998

The Committee recommends that the Canadian Government intensify its efforts, in cooperation with like-minded States, such as our NATO allies, to advance the global disarmament and security agenda:

Canada should reaffirm its support for the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty as the centrepiece of the global nuclear non-proliferation regime and should reject any attempt to revise the Treaty to acknowledge India and Pakistan as "nuclear-weapon States" under it. It should also continue to strive to ensure that the nuclear-weapon States honour their commitments to a strengthened review process for the NPT, which will lead to an updated statement of Principles and Objectives for Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament at the 2000 Review Conference.

Canada should complete the process of ratifying the Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty as quickly as possible and urge all other States to do likewise. Should India and Pakistan refuse to accept the Treaty unconditionally, Canada should nevertheless encourage the international community to ensure the Treaty's legal entry into force.

Canada should play a strong role at the Conference on Disarmament in the forthcoming negotiations for a broad Fissile Material Cut-Off Treaty which will serve both non-proliferation and disarmament objectives.

Canada should support the establishment of a nuclear arms register to cover both weapons and fissile material as proposed by Germany in 1993.

The Government considers it premature to enter into negotiations on a nuclear weapons disarmament convention. The Government also does however recognize and accept the potential, as well as the limits, of multilateral efforts to reduce and eliminate nuclear weapons over the short and medium term. It is in this context that Canada encourages the NWS to meet their responsibilities and deliver on their commitments. While it is clear that, for the foreseeable future, it will be up to the NWS to negotiate among themselves the reduction of their nuclear arsenals, Canadians and all members of the international community continue to have a deep and abiding stake in the process.

Canada expects the NWS to engage actively on this issue and to make further progress to reduce and to eliminate nuclear weapons.

The Government also recognizes that further nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation measures will not be achieved without substantial financial investment not only by the NWS but also by the international community as a whole.

For further information on Canadian nuclear policy, contact

Physicians for Global Survival (Canada)
145 Spruce Street, Ste.
208 Ottawa, Ontario K1R 6P1CANADA
Ph: 1-613-233-1982
Fax: 1-613-233-9028
E-Mail: pgs@web.net
www.pgs.ca

CHINA

Working Paper Submitted to the 2000 NPT Review Conference

The Chinese delegation hereby submits the following proposals for inclusion in the report of Main Committee I and the final document of the 2000 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons:

1. The States Parties to the Treaty believe that the complete prohibition and total elimination of nuclear weapons and the realization of a nuclear-weapon-free world will remove forever the menace of nuclear weapons facing humankind, thus greatly enhancing international peace and security.

2. The States Parties believe that the process of nuclear disarmament is closely linked to the international security situation and the national security environment of various States. Therefore, the States Parties commit themselves to a new concept of common security based upon mutual trust, mutual benefit, equality and cooperation.

3. All the nuclear-weapon States Parties commit themselves to the goal of the complete prohibition and total elimination of nuclear weapons and to negotiate and conclude as soon as possible a convention on the complete prohibition of nuclear weapons….

www.reachingcriticalwill.org/NPTDocuments/mc1docs/chiwp.html (emphasis added).

COSTA RICA AND MALAYSIA

Working Paper Submitted to the 2000 NPT Review Conference

The Sixth Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons…

Underlining the unanimous conclusion of the International Court that there exists an obligation to pursue in good faith and bring to a conclusion negotiations leading to nuclear disarmament in all its aspects under strict and effective international control…

Concerned that those States that operate unsafeguarded nuclear facilities and have not acceded to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, retain the nuclear-weapons option,

Affirms the requirement of States parties to fulfil their obligations under the Treaty and in accordance with the 1996 advisory opinion of the Court, and to that end:

1. The States Parties agree to commence multilateral negotiations leading to the conclusion of a nuclear weapons convention prohibiting the development, testing, production, stockpiling, transfer, use and threat of use of nuclear weapons and providing for their elimination under strict and effective international control, and to invite those States that have not acceded to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons to join in such negotiations;

2. The States Parties agree to give consideration to the legal, technical and political elements required for a nuclear weapons convention or framework convention. Those elements may include:

(a) Non-discriminatory general obligations, applicable to States and non-State actors, prohibiting the acquisition, development, testing, production, stockpiling, transfer, use and threat of use of nuclear weapons;

(b) Interim control, protection and accounting of nuclear weapons and fissile material holdings;

(c) Phases and steps for the systematic and progressive destruction of all nuclear warheads and their delivery vehicles;

(d) An international organization to coordinate verification, implementation and enforcement under strict and effective international control;

3. The States Parties agree to take appropriate interim steps, including unilateral measures and the achievement of other mutually reinforcing bilateral, plurilateral and multilateral instruments to remove the role of nuclear weapons from security doctrines and to further the reduction and elimination of nuclear arsenals.

www.reachingcriticalwill.org/NPTDocuments/mc1docs/icjwp.html (emphasis added).

UNITED KINGDOM

Posted 18 April 2000. Mover: Laura Moffatt

That this House recognises that the only security from the threat of nuclear weapons is their global elimination under strict and effective international control; welcomes the fact that the United Kingdom has undertaken, under Article VI of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, to pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating to nuclear disarmament; endorses the view that the long-term viability of the non-proliferation regime requires the continued support of the United Kingdom; endorses the unanimous opinion of the International Court of Justice that there exists an obligation to pursue in good faith and bring to a conclusion negotiations leading to nuclear disarmament in all its aspects under strict and effective international control; welcomes the

Model Nuclear Weapons Convention submitted by Costa Rica to the Secretary General of the United Nations on 17th November 1997 as a work in progress setting forth the legal, technical and political issues that should be considered in order to obtain an actual nuclear weapons convention; and urges Her Majesty's Government to initiate multilateral negotiations leading to the early conclusion of a nuclear weapons convention.

Followed currently by list of 104 signatories in alphabetical order:

Diane Abbott, John Austin, Norman Baker, Tony Benn, Gerry Bermingham, Ben Bradshaw, Thomas Brake, Peter Brand, Helen Brinton, Karen Buck, Christine Butler, Dennis Canavan, Martin Caton, David Chaytor, Malcolm Chisholm, Eric Clarke, Tony Clarke, Harry Cohen, Iain Coleman, Anthony Colman, Michael Connarty, Frank Cook, Jeremy Corbyn, Brian Cotter, Ann Cryer, Lawrence Cunliffe, Edward Davey, Valerie Davey, Ian Davidson, Janet Dean, Andrew Dismore, Jim Dobbin, Julia Drown, William Etherington, Paul Flynn, Barbara Follett, Don Foster, George Galloway, Ian Gibson, Norman Godman, Donald Gorrie, Win Griffiths, John Gunnell, Evan Harris Nick Harvey, Kelvin Hopkins, Simon Hughes, Brian Iddon, Glenda Jackson Ieuan, Wyn Jones, Jenny Jones, Lynne Jones, Nigel Jones, Oona King, Archy Kirkwood, Ashok Kumar, David Lepper, Alice Mahon, Jim Marshall, John McAllion, Stephen McCabe, Christine McCafferty, Eddie McGrady, Tony McWalter, John McWilliam, Bill Michie, Andrew Miller, Austin Mitchell, Laura Moffatt, Michael Moore, Alasdair Morgan, Douglas Naysmith, Nick Palmer, Stephen Pound, Gwyn Prosser, Andrew Reed, David Rendel, Joan Ruddock, Adrian Sanders, Mohammad Sarwar, Malcolm Savidge, Philip Sawford, Brian Sedgemore, Alan Sison, Angela Smith, Geraldine Smith,

David Stewart, Ian Stewart, Andrew Stunnell, John Swinney, David Taylor, Matthew Taylor, Mark Todd, Desmond Turner, Paul Tyler, Robert Wareing, Steven Webb, Dafydd Wigley, Alan Williams, Betty Williams, Phil Willis, Mike Wood, Tony Wright

For more information about UK nuclear policy contact:

MedAct
601 Holloway Rd
London, N19 4DJ, UK
T: 44 (0)20 7272 2020
F: 44 (0)20 7281 5717
info@medact.org

The General Assembly…

1. Underlines once again the unanimous conclusion of the International Court of Justice that there exists an obligation to pursue in good faith and bring to a conclusion negotiations leading to nuclear disarmament in all its aspects under strict and effective international control;

2. Calls once again upon all States immediately to fulfil that obligation by commencing multilateral negotiations in 2001 leading to an early conclusion of a nuclear weapons convention prohibiting the development, production, testing, deployment, stockpiling, transfer, threat or use of nuclear weapons and providing for their elimination….

Stressing that the ICJ opinion was only advisory and not legally binding, the United States said the resolution used the ICJ conclusion as a justification for a nuclear weapon convention, which it could not support. Furthermore, the US stressed that it took its nuclear disarmament obligations seriously and that in its view, the ICJ opinion did not alter its obligations under Article VI of the NPT in any way. Japan abstained, saying that while it supported the ICJ advisory opinion, the resolution demonstrated the complexity of the topic. Referring to the resolution’s call for a nuclear weapon convention, Japan believed in taking practical steps before "jumping to conclusions"…

Operative Paragraph 18:

The General Assembly…

Affirms that a nuclear-weapon-free world will ultimately require the underpinnings of a universal and multilaterally negotiated legally binding instrument or a framework encompassing a mutually reinforcing set of instruments….

NWC ANALYSES

… 9. For many, deterrence is a legitimate provision, and for some it offers the preferred means of response to potential chemical and biological weapons threats. Others are concerned that the removal of nuclear weapons would require the development of enhanced conventional military (deterrent) capabilities, a situation which might serve to increase the frequency of warfare rather than to diminish it. There is a need to think about and to debate the nature of a future nuclear order, how it should be shaped and stabilised. It is likely to be based upon foreign policy considerations rather than those of defence alone or indeed the aims of the non-proliferation and arms control communities. Few would argue with the proposition that stable deterrence is essential on the road to disarmament, and that this constitutes a complex management problem which will require stable political relations if it is to be dealt with successfully.

10. The priorities to feature in such management effort should include: evaluating the wisdom of developing small nuclear weapons systems; reducing significantly numbers of tactical nuclear weapons; introducing de-alerting procedures. Some emphasise the need to place restraints on the future use of technology; policy should not be technology-driven. Consideration needs to be given to the future management and development of the nuclear industry and its potential impact upon weapons-related issues; for example, the design of future nuclear power plants should take account of non-proliferation and disarmament concerns.

11. For some, such steps do not go far enough. They propose the introduction of a Nuclear Weapons Convention (in due time) which would ban nuclear weapons worldwide. Such a convention (mirroring that already in place for chemical weapons) would involve: general obligations for all states; destruction of nuclear arsenals; ending the production of fissile material; destruction of delivery vehicles; introduction of adequate verification arrangements; promotion of transparency; a phased elimination of existing weapons; introduction of dispute-settlement arrangements. Some suggest that agreeing a timeframe for the introduction of the convention would facilitate the disarmament process; others question this view, arguing that the setting of deadlines will merely ensure that a number of countries do not participate in the project at all. In this context, it is worth noting that the achievement of these types of objectives is only likely over a considerable period of time, of perhaps half a century or more. A step-by-step approach seems most likely to yield the progress which will be necessary for the attainment of longer-term goals….

The process of negotiating a NWC would be long and uncertain. But that is, of course, no reason for not starting to discuss and refine it. It should be stressed that participation in such discussions does not imply that the final abolition of nuclear weapons has been adopted as a fixed or unchallengeable policy goal, regardless of circumstances. It would not be inconsistent with the cautious official argument of the UK Government, which is that the NWS should move incrementally to a much lower level of nuclear armaments, but that the zero option can only be contemplated when the world is a safer place. Nor does such participation require prior acceptance of the argument that failure to delegitimise nuclear weapons involves much greater risks from unconstrained nuclear proliferation than complete abolition. Indeed, neither of these arguments could be made convincing without reference to just these practicalities, with all their attendant problems and uncertainties.

In any case, the path to "zero" must necessarily pass through a LSNW [low salience nuclear world]. Several moves towards this are on the official international agenda, for example in the START talks. Thus, the first steps envisaged in a NWC are already being debated inter-governmentally, and do not involve perilously novel concepts. Indeed, most of the particular issues to be discussed in these papers have long been familiar in debate about the future of nuclear weapons, whether towards a LSNW or further to a NWFW [Nuclear Weapon Free World]. A great deal of detailed consideration has been given, by governmental and non-governmental organisations, to a variety of practical procedures such as "de-alerting", "dismantling", "verification", "monitoring compliance" etc., and to the associated qualities of "transparency", "confidence-building", "stability" and so on. By treating these as elements of a specific policy of establishing a NWFW (or a LSNW) we can bring out their real capabilities and how they relate to one another.

Moreover, one of the most difficult aspects of disarmament negotiations is the need to maintain mutually assured security and stability at every stage in a long drawn out procedure. As a chart and timetable for a path that leads ultimately to "zero", any NWC would need to provide a flexible framework for debate and decision about stopping points, alternative routes, and how to cope with unexpected events along the way.

For any initiative towards a NWC to make waves in the public, hence political, domain the dry technicalities need translation into plausible vision. Only then will policy makers and governments focus on the great hopes rather than the (always inevitable) difficulties. Intergovernmental bodies such as the New Agenda Coalition and transnational NGOs such as Abolition 2000 are already beginning to stimulate action to this effect.

The extent to which the UK’s policy is directed along a "path to zero" demands a basic understanding of the main elements of a putative NWC, showing how they fit together into a coherent step-by-step programme as part of a co-ordinated multilateral process, involving elaborate and sophisticated negotiation. Although a NWC programme could only be carried out by international agreement, it would require national implementation at every stage. People in each NWS would need to understand and become committed to the successive steps affecting their own national nuclear capabilities and facilities. In other words, it would have direct implications for all aspects of UK NW policy. As a founder NWS, the UK cannot avoid responsibility for the future place of NW in human affairs: this responsibility includes treating the procedure for their eventual abolition as a serious long-term policy theme.

How does one define "complete nuclear disarmament?" The authors of the Model Nuclear Weapons Convention believe that it should cover everything — the elimination of nuclear weapons, their means of delivery, production and testing facilities; as well as the prohibition of use, research, development, testing, production, acquisition, transfers of nuclear weapons and their means of delivery, and a number of other obligations. If such an approach is taken, a convention would incorporate, aside from measures directly related to nuclear disarmament, measures envisaged in agreements already concluded (the NPT, the CTBT) or in possible future agreements (on cut-off, on no use, etc.). Such a comprehensive approach looks attractive, but is not realistic. It is impossible to negotiate such a monstrously large agreement, and there is no need to do so. During the course of the preparation of future negotiations, it would be useful to concentrate on those issues which are definitely not covered and will not be covered by any partial agreements, namely: (1) the elimination of nuclear warheads; (2) the elimination or conversion of their means of delivery, as well as precautions against the use of dual-purpose means of delivery, particularly of aircraft, for nuclear weapon purposes; (3) the prohibition of the development and production of nuclear warheads; and (4) the prohibition of the development and production of those means of delivery that can be used only for nuclear weapons purposes. It is clear that different methods of implementation and verification are required for each of these purposes….

Can the whole scope of nuclear disarmament be covered by one agreement (a convention or treaty) or are a number of agreements needed? A single convention would allow parties to envisage coherent stages for the gradual implementation of nuclear disarmament with fixed deadlines. On the other hand, the elaboration of a comprehensive convention would be an endless process, without practical results and with inevitable deadlocks. The bilateral process required a number of agreements aimed at reducing the nuclear threat and nuclear armaments. The achievement of results in a multilateral setting would be much more complicated and slow. That is why a piecemeal approach would be more practical: multilateral partial agreements on each stage of nuclear disarmament should be negotiated and concluded one by one, each one preparing the security and political conditions for the next agreement. Of course, this does not mean that the implementation of one agreement should be a pre-condition for the negotiation of the next one. The signing of one agreement could be a sufficient trigger for the next stage. It cannot be excluded that the implementation of a later agreement might overlap the implementation of a preceding one.

Here is an illustrative scheme for such an approach.

• An agreement is negotiated on the further reduction, under international verification, of strategic armaments by the United States and Russia. It is accompanied by obligations on all nuclear weapons states to freeze the production and development of their nuclear armaments. Under this agreement all nuclear weapon states will exchange information about their nuclear arsenals, and this information will be checked through verification procedures. Those parties to the Convention which are not members of the NPT will incur obligations on nuclear non-proliferation and all parties to the agreement will be subject to obligations on the non-proliferation of missile technology.

• This agreement should also contain legally-binding obligations on the basic parameters of further measures as well as an obligation to negotiate the appropriate treaty language. The basic parameters would provide for the reduction by all nuclear weapon states of their nuclear armaments, both nuclear warheads and delivery systems of all ranges, including those which constitute for the Untied States and Russia the category of tactical nuclear weapons. Armament levels will be established on a pragmatic basis, with due account of geostrategic balances.

• As soon as the first agreement enters into force, the next one will be negotiated. In its turn, it should also include basic parameters for the following stage, with an obligation to negotiate treaty language on the basis of these parameters.

• The same procedures will be repeated again until the end of the process, at which time the nuclear weapon states will eliminate all their nuclear arsenals and all parties to the Convention, both nuclear and non-nuclear, will place all their nuclear activities under international verification.

Any NWC will have to embrace a comprehensive approach by incremental steps within a multi-path process of negotiation. The formal provisions of a Convention will need to address many of the "nitty gritty" details associated with any treaty document of this type, such as dispute settlement, entry into force, duration, financing, etc. In these matters it could largely follow the example of the other similar conventions, such as the CWC [Chemical Weapons Convention].

There would also need to be detailed provisions for: verification procedures; control of nuclear-weapons-usable material; a timetabled programme of phases for implementation; an international agency to oversee implementation and compliance.

The central feature of the whole process would be its phased schedule of implementation. The MNWC, for example, sets out a 15-year programme. In brief, this sets out the following steps, timed in years from the entry into force of the Convention:

1 year: all nuclear weapons de-alerted and removed from deployment.

2 years: all nuclear warheads removed from delivery vehicles, and all production facilities

closed down.

5 years: nuclear warheads reduced proportionately to fixed numbers, and all delivery vehicles destroyed.

10 years: all nuclear weapons-usable materials placed under international control and reactors using weapons-grade materials closed or converted.

15 years: all nuclear weapons destroyed.

This outline timetable needs to be kept in mind in all reading, debate or action relating to an NWC. Even with the addition of the years obviously required to get the Convention agreed in the first place plus the period before entry into force, it suggests that the path to abolition could be traversed in less than a quarter of a century.

It is true that some of the measures envisaged for the earlier phases are already under discussion in various international fora and amongst NGOs. The practical problems of disentangling these overlapping negotiations will obviously require close attention by policy-makers and officials as they try to set up a version of a NWC, but they should not be allowed to obscure the general picture.

Taken separately, measures such as de-alerting, declarations of no first use, fissile material cut-off, etc. can be significant steps towards the abolition of nuclear weapons. But it is their role in the comprehensive-incremental programme of the Convention that gives them collective force. This programme would need to take account of the interconnections between the various components of the global nuclear weapons complex, and suggest how they can be safely phased out in an orderly manner. It must allow, for example, for the prevention of further nuclear proliferation and for the protection of international security at every step towards "zero". The proposed timetable is to some extent arbitrary, and probably wildly optimistic. What is important is the way that it weaves together successive and parallel "denuclearisation" measures into a coherent process designed to sustain mutual confidence and security right to the end.

Any NWC is likely to recognize that this process is primarily the responsibility of the NWS. But it should also recognize that it could not be carried out in practice by even the most powerful of them acting alone, by individual NWS acting independently, or indeed without obtaining the agreement of the NNWS [non-nuclear weapon states], whose interest in international security is just as strong. As its other formal provisions will require, the implementation of the Convention — including the vital issue of the disposal of nuclear weapons-usable materials such as plutonium and highly enriched uranium — will need to be co-ordinated, overseen and verified, from the beginning, by an international agency. Indeed, these provisions need to be fully understood by the concerned public, since they are as essential to the whole process as the orderly timetable that they enable.

It has been claimed that an FMC [fissile materials cut-off] would limit the size of potential nuclear arsenals. The arsenals of the N5 [five official nuclear weapon states], already quite large, are not going to be reduced by an FMC. The size of potential nuclear arsenals will be limited only if the FMC is part of a Nuclear Weapons Convention in which all the unsafeguarded stocks of fissile material (and not merely those considered surplus to military needs), including those that will become available due to dismantling of warheads, are transferred to non-weapons use under international safeguards. Such a transfer is in any case needed in order to make the nuclear arms reductions under treaties like START irreversible; and the USA and Russia should enter into a bilateral fissile material cut-off treaty (including the fissile material available from dismantling of warheads under the START process), to solemnify their moratorium on the production of fissile material.

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