Science and Verification

Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT)

Conference on Disarmament

General Assembly First Committee

UN Disarmament Commission

Special Session on Disarmament

Science and Verification

Introduction

The decision to disarm is implemented by, among others, the scientific community, including academic institutions and industry. Their role in the pursuit of a nuclear weapon free world is to develop and apply the science of nuclear disarmament. They also shape the disarmament decision itself — its good faith application is undercut, for example, by technology-driven policies that seek maintain nuclear weapons. In a similar way, the drive for a "technical fix" — such as NMD or space weapons — to address security threats undermines disarmament efforts.

The contributions to this section discuss the role of science and scientists. Verification of a nuclear weapons free world is complicated and, although many of the elements exists or are known, there is much more work needed in this area. Exploration of these issues today, even before a framework for complete nuclear disarmament has been negotiated, can help to prepare for and bring about the day when such an agreement is reached.

Oliver Meier looks at the gaps that remain within the context of existing verification mechanisms, with a view to the requirements for a nuclear weapon free world. Two excerpts from Verification Yearbook 2000 supplement this analysis with an examination of the elements of comprehensive nuclear disarmament and an overview of societal verification, respectively.

Andrew Lichterman discusses the elements of a comprehensive missile control regime, as an alternative to missiles and missile defenses and an indication of the role the scientific community can play. An explicit expression of the choice not to pursue nuclear weapons or weapons of mass destruction are presented in the form of a pledge and a discussion of the rationale behind it.

This section also includes excerpts from a Working Paper submitted by the United Kingdom on verification of nuclear disarmament. This paper, together with a study by the British nuclear weapon facility Aldermaston, are welcome signs that at least one of the nuclear weapon states is exploring the scientific requirements of complete nuclear disarmament. Beyond the piecemeal, albeit important, work on particular verification technologies, such a "holistic" approach is crucial to building confidence in the verifiability of a nuclear weapon free world.