Verifying Comprehensive Nuclear Disarmament

For comprehensive nuclear disarmament, a high probability of detecting undeclared warheads is…indispensable, so as to create assurance that no clandestine arsenals are being maintained. An important prerequisite would be much higher transparency regarding existing arsenals, such as a comprehensive overview of all existing warheads, including tactical nuclear weapons, which, to date, have not been subject to any arms control treaty. A 1993 proposal by then German Foreign Minister Klaus Kinkel for a nuclear weapons register at the United Nations should be revived….

The nuclear reductions that have been agreed and will be negotiated soon involve only the holders of the two largest arsenals, Russia and the United States. At least all of the declared NWS and additional unofficial nuclear weapon possessors must be involved in the final moves toward nuclear disarmament. The Treaty and its verification system must be multilateral, requiring a different organisation, decision making procedures and compliance mechanisms. A major exemplar of a multilateral verification organisation is the Vienna-based International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). Nevertheless, valuable technical lessons can also be drawn from the bilateral treaties.

The task of detecting undeclared warheads cannot be undertaken solely with technical means. These can be employed when concrete evidence exists of undeclared warheads: specially trained inspectors with the relevant equipment would be able to find and catalogue warheads at an identified location. But there is no guarantee that such evidence will ever manifest itself. The following elements would, however, be important in increasing the possibility of detection:

• the highest possible level of transparency regarding production histories, above all declarations and documentation, the publication of historic documents and the possibility of interviews with former employees;
• full exploitation of all relevant technologies, particularly aerial reconnaissance and environmental measurements, and the full range of NTM [National Technical Means], including intelligence gathering;
• freedom of the press and a democratic climate, which should generate a sense of obligation on the part of individuals involved in illegal nuclear weapons activity to "whistle-blow";
• the possibility of enforcing a multilateral verification authority’s demand for clarification in the case of suspicion, through mandatory challenge inspections; and
• increased international trust, resulting from positive experiences of verification.

Taken individually, each of these factors is important for the verification of total nuclear disarmament. Together, they would improve verification to such an extent as to constitute "sufficient criteria" for effective verifiability. It would be unrealistic to expect the verification of comprehensive nuclear disarmament to be achieved in one step, but it is realistic to expect each successive step to build on past experience….

Total nuclear disarmament will only become possible after many intermediate steps have been taken. But each prepares the next, and will change both the security and security perceptions of the states involved, thereby influencing their subsequent decisions regarding further moves. In each phase, what is possible or impossible will be defined anew. The experience gained will also affect verification. An essential prerequisite for each new step is the enhancement of transparency and trust, and, as a result, trust in verification will also need to grow. It is wise, therefore, to design verification as if a nuclear weapon-free world is the objective, even though a decision as to whether it should become reality many be delayed.

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