|
The Idea of a Nuclear Weapons Convention:
A Workshop at the UK CND Annual Conference
At this year’s Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament (CND)
Conference in Leeds, England, (Sept. 16-17, 2000) and on behalf
of Abolition 2000 UK, I presented a workshop on the idea of
a nuclear weapons convention. One of the most effective plenary
talks at the conference, by Lindis Percy of the Campaign for
Accountability of American Bases, described her determined
acts of civil disobedience against the use of communications
sites in the North, at Fylingdales and Menwith Hill, for US
national missile defence (NMD) purposes. The subsequent NMD
workshop was therefore a crowd-puller, whereas the NWC workshop
spoke to a more select gathering.
I outlined the current status of the Model NWC. In the UK
Parliament, MP Laura Moffatt’s Early Day Motion 652
had attracted more than 100 signatures, but will need reintroduction
in the next Parliamentary session. A Commons Committee recently
reported on Weapons of Mass Destruction. Critical of NMD preparations,
they nonetheless accepted government arguments for retention
of Trident without comment.
I summarised the current draft Model NWC as a set of "obligations."
These were: (i) national obligations of the states party to
the treaty — both negative (not to use, threaten, develop,
or deploy nuclear weapons), and positive (to destroy existing
nuclear weapons, to submit to inspection, and to entrench
NWC provisions in domestic law); and (ii) personal obligations
of citizens of the states party — both negative (not
to engage in development or deployment of nuclear weapons)
and positive (to report violations of the NWC by their state).
Controversially, sanctions in both domestic and international
law will render those who act contrary to the NWC, or who
fail to report such actions, liable to prosecution either
locally or internationally. A new agency will organise disarmament
and will set up compliance and verification procedures. In
the event of serious problems, the UN Security Council will
face the task of securing compliance. Substantial problems
were seen as standing in the way of development of such an
NWC. It changes the concept of security ("And you all
know security is mortals’ chiefest enemy" —
Macbeth); it abolishes the idea of deterrence; it carries
with it the difficulties of possible "breakout"
by states or groups; and it increases the disposal problems
(primarily of long-lived plutonium).
I divided the dozen attendees into two parallel group sessions
to discuss: (i) the "internal" NWC problems (surmountable
or insurmountable?) including the breakout problem, verification
procedures, radioactive and other munitions disposal, and
securing a realistic timeframe; and, (ii) the "external"
NWC problems: getting the nuclear weapons powers — UK,
France, Israel, India, Pakistan, Russia, China, the USA and
NATO — to listen: what are the similarities and differences?
Each group selected a rapporteur and a "Devil's Advocate."
The latter argued against an NWC and presented the case (in
the first session — played vigorously by Bruce Kent)
that an NWC is impossible and (in the second session —
current CND treasurer Monica Frisch relished her role as defence
spokesperson for a variety of nuclear powers) that nuclear
weapons are an integral part of the strategies that have kept
the peace for 55 years. In the group reports it was apparent
that deterrence is a declining concept (hence perhaps the
decreased US interest in the ABM treaty), whereas the status
and nationalistic roles of nuclear weapons have increased.
France, unlike the UK, partially defines its national identity
by nuclear weapons possession. China’s support of an
NWC in the UN General Assembly was seen largely as a political
tactic to retain third world influence. India and possibly
Pakistan (despite the "Islamic" bomb) could be persuaded
to become parties to an NWC if NATO were on board the NPT
in a more meaningful way.
Surprisingly the group was most sympathetic (if that be the
word) to the Israeli bomb, Israel being the sole nuclear weapon
state that can convincingly argue a direct threat from its
neighbours of the kind the ICJ almost allowed as a reason
for retention. An important counterexample to the prestige
issue is given by New Zealand, where the situation is inverted.
Even right wingers are proud of an anti-nuclear New Zealand
and support prohibitions such as those keeping nuclear weapons
capable vessels away from New Zealand ports.
The "internal" problems group saw technical problems
as possibly more important than political ones. Of the latter,
they believed that job and conversion issues would be more
publicly salient than those of defence and national prestige,
at least here in the UK. The proposed NWC deals with the conversion
issue, and the need for expertise in verification and disposal
may secure a convergence of interests between the nuclear
technologists and the disarmers. Like their "external"
colleagues the "internal" problems group felt that
deterrence was now recognised as a myth (see Arundhati Roy)
but that there was a need for public education on this issue.
Breakdown of the unitary Soviet state, the rise of various
movements prepared to use violence ("terrorists"),
and diversification and miniaturisation of weaponry were seen
as making the "breakout" problem more difficult
as time went by. This argued for an early start on NWC negotiations.
Later in the meeting, John LaForge of Nukewatch and Project
ELF spoke. The hi-tech Trident programme is dependent upon
extra-low frequency sites in the forests of Wisconsin —
wires between wooden poles. Demonstrators cut down the poles,
blank the Trident computer screens, and then call the sheriff
to arrest them. In some jurisdictions, the harshness of US
criminal law has led to such civil disobedience being punished
severely. Philip Berrigan, 76 years old, was recently sentenced
to several years’ imprisonment for a symbolic act of
protest. LaForge's talk combined technical and legal information
with a comparative analysis of campaigns on both sides of
the Atlantic and the moral issues. It was one of the best
events at the meeting, and underlined the distance we need
to travel to change political and public opinion as to what
is legal and what illegal.
Both lead and second locomotives broke down on the train
journey home. I waited for my small quota of complimentary
coffee behind two women discussing the Leeds conference they
had attended. They then heard that I too had been a conferee.
We introduced ourselves. It quickly became evident that there
had been two such events that weekend. Theirs was a conference
on UFOs. I could not refrain from remarking that it was obviously
an open question as to which of us had participated in the
more fanciful event.
Peter Nicholls
Department of Biological Sciences
University of Essex, Colchester, England
777 UN Plaza - 6th Floor - New York, NY - 10017 - Ph: 212.682.1265 - Fax: 212.286.8211 - info@reachingcriticalwill.org
This site was created by Kache Productions ©2008
|