Introduction

Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT)

Conference on Disarmament

General Assembly First Committee

UN Disarmament Commission

Special Session on Disarmament

Introduction

Since the release of the model Nuclear Weapons Convention in 1997 progress toward nuclear disarmament has come to a standstill on some fronts, regressed on others, and moved forward on a few fronts. Key elements of the arms control and non-proliferation regimes that would provide a foundation for disarmament have been rejected, and others are under great strain. The interrelated nature of international security factors and the subjective aspects of threat projection and perception aggravate the prevailing sense of insecurity.

The interdependence between state and non-state use and threat of weapons of mass destruction is starkly visible these days, with almost daily warnings — "not if but when" — from authorities. The lines between state and non-state access to the means of mass destruction are blurring, and asymmetric methods of warfare undercut current concepts of military advantage and strength. Reversing these terrorizing trends requires irreversible nuclear disarmament.

Nuclear disarmament is one of the essential elements of real international security. Immediate steps include reductions in deployed and reserve nuclear weapons, irreversible destruction of those weapons removed from deployment — warheads and delivery systems, and a framework to handle fissile materials, with mechanisms such as universal safeguards and bilateral and multilateral agreements. Similar and complementary regimes should reduce both access to chemical and biological weapons materials and incentives to maintain these weapons capabilities.

Moving the international security system in this direction is possible if those measures are reinforced by new approaches to security based on prevention. A now familiar debate has named the root causes of threats to international peace and security and pointed to the tools of prevention: sustainable development, health, education, social and economic justice, and disarmament. These principles further a sustainable international security system that does not depend at its core on reacting to conflict by dominating it and maintaining eternal military superiority. Even small steps and imperfect implementation efforts in support of a preventive approach to security contribute to alternative strategies for international peace and security.

Prevention of an arms race in outer space is also essential to a sustainable international security system. Space weapons would violate the established norms of prevention of an arms race in outer space and peaceful uses of outer space, undermining planned development and environmental uses of space. The international security implications of space weaponization are infinite. Space weapons could symbolically replace nuclear weapons, or prevention could symbolize alternative security strategies.

Nuclear disarmament is necessarily part of the larger context of international security but it can be furthered by the efforts of any state — nuclear or non-nuclear, and any industry or institution or individual. The actions and messages of the powerful largely shape the security tone. But all states and an increasing number of non-state forces are also directly responsible for security at some level. Full appreciation of international security dynamics requires integrated analysis of political, legal, human rights, development, race, gender, and environmental considerations, to understand the causes of insecurity and to effect change.

This issue of the Nuclear Weapons Convention Monitor explores the technical and legal requirements of complete nuclear disarmament with attention to both immediate and long-term considerations. A roundtable discussion in Ottawa on January 10-11, 2002, examined the requirements of a nuclear weapon free world and ways to further it even during a political environment hostile to arms control, non-proliferation or disarmament.

A summary of the Ottawa roundtable follows in Section 1. The rest of this issue includes submissions to the meeting and select comments from the discussion. Section 2 looks at general considerations of verification and its phases. Section 3 examines existing and pending disarmament and verification regimes, and Section 4 focuses these considerations on fissile materials and delivery systems. The emerging themes affirm the prevailing sense of urgency and reaffirm the need to ground international security in the rule of law and to honor commitments, in Sections 5 and 6.