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1. Complete Nuclear Disarmament:
Summary of Roundtable, Ottawa, January 2002
A roundtable on "Legal and Technical Aspects of Complete Nuclear
Disarmament," hosted by The Simons Foundation with the support
of Canada’s Department of Foreign Affairs and International
Trade, took place in Ottawa on January 10-11, 2002. The roundtable
brought together governmental representatives and independent experts
to explore the legal and technical aspects of a framework for complete
nuclear disarmament. The roundtable used the model Nuclear Weapons
Convention (NWC) to explore the future requirements of a regime
for the effective and verified reduction and elimination of nuclear
weapons.
In advance of the roundtable, participants received a list of 13
open-ended questions regarding technical and legal — including
structural — aspects of complete nuclear disarmament. (See
the list of discussion questions, page 4.) The roundtable deliberately
addressed legal and technical considerations before political questions,
in order to generate new ideas and focus on the "how"
of nuclear disarmament as distinct from the more familiar discussion
of "whether" it is possible.
Discussion and Themes
All the participants strongly and publicly support the goal of complete
nuclear disarmament. Governmental participants represented non-nuclear
weapon states and non-governmental participants had published on
and promoted nuclear arms control, non-proliferation, and disarmament.
Nevertheless, there was a range of perspectives on the tactics and
strategies best suited for promoting nuclear disarmament, and the
role of a future NWC, as well as the role of a model NWC in the
current political process. In this context, the roundtable succeeded
in engaging these sympathetic skeptics in the exercise of projecting
into a future world and exploring the requirements of and obstacles
to nuclear disarmament against the background of a currently unfavorable
political environment.
Among the themes that emerged during the course of the discussions
were the following:
- Long-term goal and next steps: To what extent can a focus on the
long-term goal of nuclear disarmament facilitate the identification
and promotion of next feasible steps? Is it possibly counter-productive
— because seen as too ambitious — to discuss the end
goal? There was no singular answer to these questions, and a preliminary
conclusion appears to be that selective use of the NWC as both a
tool and as a concrete political objective is most appropriate.
NWC promoters should be sensitive to disingenuous or bad faith claims
of support, and take steps to rebut or dissociate from these, but
the NWC can be a valuable tool and litmus test of commitment to
nuclear disarmament.
- Verification and the political process: The Comprehensive Nuclear
Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) political process benefited from the extensive
research on verification that preceded conclusion of negotiations.
The NWC, or a future regime for complete nuclear disarmament, could
benefit from similar research if it helps establish the feasibility
of verifiable nuclear disarmament. The more complex and unresolved
political questions, however, make this somewhat more elusive for
some than the case of the CTBT. A few participants expressed a preference
for resolving questions of political process first.
- Societal Verification and Whistleblowers: The role of societal
verification and protection for whistleblowers was a recurrent theme.
Some saw this as the most promising approach to nuclear disarmament,
including education aimed at increasing scientific and societal
responsibility. Non-governmental monitoring and other non-treaty
based methods of promoting accountability were discussed, as was
the potential social and psychological context for citizens who
"blow the whistle" on activities that undermine nuclear
disarmament. The question of societal norms — and the value
placed on nuclear weapons — is a crucial part of this theme.
- Delivery vehicles and warheads: On the technical side, verified
reduction of delivery vehicles (particularly missiles) in addition
to warheads received much attention. The model NWC addresses delivery
vehicles in general terms, although these would be harder to hide
and therefore possibly easier to verify than warheads. More research
is needed on this question.
- Costs of disarmament: It was suggested that a thorough exploration
of the costs of disarmament would be useful. These are not fully
understood. They could also be compared to the costs of armament,
although some disarmament activities are likely to be even more
costly than the building of the weapons. The larger context, including
the political and opportunity costs from building the weapons, could
offset concerns about the economic costs of disarmament itself.
In any case the costs rise as disarmament is delayed.
- Carrots and sticks: The approach in the model NWC places an emphasis
on compliance over coercive enforcement, but it would be useful
to explore and develop additional possible incentives in order to
make compliance more attractive than non-compliance. More carrots,
as well as carrot cake, are needed. The model NWC suggests an optional
protocol for the compulsory settlement of disputes and an optional
protocol providing support for alternatives to nuclear energy.
- Non-participants: The likelihood of states that would not participate
in the political negotiation process or the implementation of a
future NWC raises critical questions about its feasibility. At the
same time, this question is not unique to the NWC — since
three nuclear weapons capable states are outside of the Non-Proliferation
Treaty regime today — and focusing on a nuclear disarmament
regime might, in fact, serve to draw in these states or, at a minimum,
help identify the source of resistance.
- Implementing agencies: There was much discussion but no general
consensus on the question of an implementing agency (or agencies)
for a future NWC. Should it be a new body, or should it build on
the existing implementation and verification bodies? Resolution
of this question will depend on political structures that emerge,
expertise and experience of existing agencies, bureaucratic culture,
concerns about duplicating efforts, and the ability to modify or
separate the mission(s) of existing bodies.
- Conspiracies, hidden arsenals and materials: An unexpected theme
that received much attention was the possibility of a conspiracy
to cheat a future NWC regime. There was a wide-ranging discussion
about the likelihood of such a conspiracy in light of the political
environment that would exist if an NWC comes into force. A related
topic, about disclosing past nuclear weapons programs (as in the
case of South Africa) raised the question of encouraging such openness
and finding ways to reward or commend the disclosure and decision
to abandon the program.
- Low levels vs. zero: There was no consensus on the relative difficulty
of verifying low levels of nuclear weapons as opposed to verifying
maintenance of a nuclear weapons free world. The perspective tended
to depend on the possible value of nuclear weapons as this would
be perceived by those with the authority and means to clandestinely
develop or maintain nuclear weapons. On the one hand, as long as
nuclear weapons exist and are known to exist, the relative numbers
would be of marginal concern in comparison to the existence of even
one weapon or the capability to develop one secretly. On the other
hand, maintaining a nuclear weapons free world once the infrastructure
had been verifiably dismantled and the nuclear option renounced
could be more straightforward than verifying a dynamic and politically
sensitive process.
The roundtable participants noted that despite the current and near-term
hostile political environment regarding treaties and multilateral
— or even bilateral — verification-based regimes and
irreversibility, it is important to maintain and develop the knowledge,
expertise, and training relevant to disarmament. It is also important
to continue to develop and support cooperative, verifiable, and
irreversible approaches to security. On a regional level, especially
in South Asia, there is an urgent need for cooperative approaches
to avert nuclear war.
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