Nuclear Disarmament and the International Control of Delivery Systems

Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT)

Conference on Disarmament

General Assembly First Committee

UN Disarmament Commission

Special Session on Disarmament

Nuclear Disarmament and the International Control of Delivery Systems

Jürgen Scheffran*

While many countries have agreed to eliminate biological and chemical weapons in the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC) and the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC), and also pledged in the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) to forgo or eliminate nuclear weapons, there is still no multinational treaty restricting the development and use of delivery systems. Although the NPT preamble emphasizes "the elimination from national arsenals of nuclear weapons and the means of their delivery pursuant to a Treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control," the NPT does not further specify how this ultimate goal could be achieved for delivery systems.

The proliferation of delivery systems is one of the critically important issues related to the overall nuclear non-proliferation agenda. Delivery systems are an important part of weapons of mass destruction (WMD), in particular, nuclear weapons. Appropriate means of delivery are required to transport a nuclear weapon from its storage or deployment area to its target in a "militarily useful" way. Sophisticated delivery systems are costly and difficult to produce, and in many cases are the most visible part of a nuclear weapon. Therefore, the control of nuclear-capable delivery systems would be an important step toward making nuclear weapons useless and reduce the threat of their use. This is especially true for ballistic missiles, which represent effective and powerful means to deploy nuclear weapons.

The new world situation has rendered the huge missile arsenals of the Cold War increasingly irrelevant and improved the conditions for effective missile controls. To reduce the missile threat and prevent destabilizing military reactions to missile proliferation such as ballistic missile defense, adequate control measures must be found. To transform the current situation into the long-term vision, not only the goal needs to be analyzed and defined, but also the current situation and the path connecting both. The agenda for moving towards a NWFW includes measures to control nuclear-capable delivery systems.

Restricting the means for delivery of WMD is essential to reduce the threat posed by such weapons. Effective control is complicated by the fact that a variety of delivery systems could potentially be used. This includes rather sophisticated delivery systems like ballistic missiles, airplanes, cruise missiles, drones, and artillery, as well as a wide range of "low-technology" delivery systems — such as civilian cars, aircraft, ships or even suitcases — which can transport nuclear or other payloads. While control in the first category could effectively restrict the military value of WMD, control in the second category would have only a minor effect compared to the enormous efforts necessary. Therefore, it is reasonable to focus control on delivery systems which are explicitly designed for their military purpose and to deal with the residual risk of low-tech means of delivery by other measures.

In the first category of specially designed delivery systems, experts emphasize the priority for control of the various delivery systems differently. Most attention has been focused so far on ballistic missiles, but for some observers the military effectiveness of ballistic missiles has been exaggerated compared to aircraft. According to a 1991 study of the Center for International Security and Arms Control, "modern aircraft are, indeed, very capable and cost-effective alternatives for ground-missions." Compared to ballistic missiles, combat aircraft with equivalent capabilities are widely distributed across the globe. There are only a few hundred ballistic missiles with ranges beyond 300 km in the hands of developing countries, compared with many thousand military aircraft beyond this range. A growing number of countries have indigenous design and production capabilities, and a range of first-rate aircraft are for sale in the international marketplace.

Although the proliferation of land-attack cruise missiles is still at a very early stage, cruise missiles potentially pose a proliferation threat comparable to that of ballistic missiles and attack aircraft, and are deserving of more non-proliferation efforts. Cruise missiles could be easier to build than advanced attack aircraft or ballistic missiles, do not require highly trained pilots nor do they place pilots at risk, could be less vulnerable than airplanes to preemptive or suppressive attacks, and are potentially very inexpensive compared to both ballistic missiles and attack aircraft. Using Global Positioning Satellite (GPS) guidance information, cruise missiles are potentially highly accurate (roughly 50 meters) and thus could be more destructive as conventional weapons — against valuable targets such as the World Trade Center or nuclear power plants — than inaccurate ballistic missiles with some WMD capability.

Compared to other nuclear capable delivery platforms, submarines can operate covertly, so that it is very difficult to monitor their location continuously. Due to their stealth, long range (more than 10,000 miles), and ability to operate submerged for extended periods, submarines are potentially able to launch strategic or tactical nuclear weapons from close to the territory of an adversary. During the Cold War, nuclear weapons were widely deployed on nuclear powered submarines. Although non-nuclear weapon states and "threshold" states do not possess such nuclear-powered submarines, it is possible that modern conventional-powered submarines could play a decisive role in future military conflicts.

In light of the variety of potential delivery systems for WMD, the present control regime is insufficient. The dominant approaches are export control by the major suppliers of delivery systems and bilateral arms control and disarmament of the former superpowers (INF Treaty, START Treaties). The current approach to curbing missile proliferation is the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR), which was initiated in 1987 with seven members. MTCR membership has grown to 32 countries. Although the MTCR has been successful in creating an international norm against missile exports and has delayed some missile programs, more significant accomplishments are impeded by problems and shortcomings.

Because of these major deficiencies, supply-side controls need to be complemented or replaced by more cooperative, demand-side solutions that go beyond the MTCR. The most effective strategy against proliferation is to create an international norm against WMD by convincing all states, without exception, to forgo the option of having WMD and related delivery systems. Appropriate measures include not only barriers such as export controls but global and regional disarmament, arms control and conflict resolution measures, security incentives as well as international economic and technology cooperation in exchange for giving up WMD.

Regional approaches for arms control could include such CBMs as launch notification and exchanges of information, including establishment of data centers; conversion programs; common seminars on military forces and strategy; regional flight test bans; a freeze on research and development of missile technologies for military purposes. The importance of regional approaches to disarmament and confidence-building was demonstrated in South America (Argentina and Brazil).

Since the different types of delivery systems are closely interrelated, it is insufficient to restrict control only to one means of delivery. As has been outlined in the 1995 INESAP Study "Beyond the NPT," an integrated approach is necessary that goes beyond the present regime. According to this study, a number of possible measures for limiting systems that could be used for nuclear delivery, could complement and facilitate the elimination of nuclear weapons:

The ballistic missile threat would be removed most effectively by the elimination of ballistic missiles, as has been suggested in 1992 by the Federation of American Scientists with the Zero Ballistic Missile (ZBM) regime. A Flight Test Ban (FTB) for ballistic missiles would be an initial step in stopping the development of new missile types. An international control body could be set up to verify that space technology is not used for the development and production of ballistic missiles.
Cruise missile non-proliferation efforts, such as the MTCR, should be continued and, if possible, expanded. However, it may be necessary to adopt arms control approaches that deal with the similarities between attack aircraft and cruise missiles, and between their underlying technology bases. Verification is difficult but not an insurmountable problem, as the INF Treaty proved.
To prevent military aircraft proliferation, states could include limits on the numbers and capabilities of military aircraft in their regional arms control regimes. A global ban on new types of combat aircraft would prevent both vertical and horizontal proliferation in a non-discriminatory way but due to the heavy involvement of such aircraft in conventional warfare all over the world such an attempt is currently unrealistic.
To address the possibility that nuclear weapons could be deployed much more widely on submarines, a first step would be the creation of an international control regime, similar to the MTCR, focusing on technologies critical for advanced submarines. Joint naval task groups operated by the UN could monitor, and if necessary, control the operation of diesel submarines during crises.

Diplomatic initiatives are required to reduce the role of delivery systems in critical regions (Northeast Asia, South Asia, Middle East) and to develop an international norm against them some of them.

Building an International Norm Against Ballistic Missiles

The most immediate candidate for control of delivery systems are ballistic missiles, which are perceived as especially threatening and provoke the development of ballistic missile defense systems. As the dangers of an offense-defence missile race become imminent, the need for an international initiative to control ballistic missiles becomes more urgent and leads to a number of potentially significant initiatives:

In recent years, the MTCR member states committed themselves to "responsible missile behaviour" and agreed on a Draft International Code of Conduct Against Ballistic Missile Proliferation, that would improve openness about development and testing, including voluntary commitments.
A related initiative is the Russian proposal for a Global Control System for the non-proliferation of missiles and missile technology. Launched in 1999 and further explored at expert level meetings in Moscow in March 2000 and February this year, the proposal acknowledges the security concerns raised by missile programmes and the need for security assurances. A Global Monitoring System would increase transparency with regard to missile launches and reduce the risk of miscalculation or misunderstanding.
A breakthrough in transparency arrangements was achieved with the establishment of the Joint Data Exchange Centre in Moscow, staffed by military personnel from the US and Russia. Signed on December 16, 2000, the US-Russian Memorandum of Understanding on Notification of Missile Launches provides for pre- and post-launch notification of all ballistic missile tests and space launches, as well as notification of failed satellite launches. Other countries can join the agreement. After Bush took office, the fate of the agreement is in jeopardy.
In 2000, Iran introduced a UN resolution on missiles which emphasized the "need for a comprehensive approach towards missiles, in a balanced and non-discriminatory manner, as a contribution to international peace and security." It requests the Secretary-General, with the assistance of a panel of governmental experts, to prepare in 2002 a report on missiles in all its aspects.

Verification

A crucial aspect in the international control and disarmament of delivery systems is verification. To exemplify the possibilities and problems, the case of verifying ballistic missile disarmament is used.

National or international technical means of verification could focus on observable rocket characteristics (number, size, range, payload, deployment mode, launch preparations, flight trajectory), which provide indications of rocket type and performance. Much of the missile-program infrastructure — such as production facilities, test ranges, tracking and communication facilities, missile containers and missile-carrying vehicles - is highly visible. The biggest complication might be the dual-use of ballistic missiles and Space Launch Vehicles (SLVs). Differentiating between both rocket types is difficult, since much of the technology is easily convertible. However, some functional differences and operational characteristics could be used to improve distinction, such as differences in the basing mode, the testing procedures, the payload, flight trajectory, guidance systems and re-entry.

A variety of technical and non-technical means of verification exist to monitor ballistic missiles and their elimination. Remote sensing in the visible, infra-red or radar spectra, based on satellites, aircraft or on the ground, allows observation of missiles and the related launch and test facilities. Some of the verification tasks can be performed by commercial satellites, which are becoming increasingly cheap and efficient. Reconnaissance overflights (under the Open Skies regime) provide an alternative to satellite monitoring for many countries and can even supply superior information. During testing and training, a rocket communicates with its operators by sending and receiving telemetry signals which can be intercepted by receivers on ground stations, vehicles and satellites. Non-encrypted telemetry provides the necessary information on missile characteristics.

To ensure adequate verification of ballistic missile elimination regimes, technical means of verification need to be accompanied by inspections. As the experiences of the UN Special Commission (UNSCOM) inspections in Iraq have shown, a regime of unimpeded fast access to suspect sites is required to detect evidence of non-compliance. Verification problems are much easier to solve when states cooperate and are willing to exchange information. Systematic inspections of all ballistic-missile-related sites can provide basic information on an initial balance. Random short-notice inspections of declared sites should be augmented by a system of challenge inspections to undeclared sites. Pre-launch inspections would ensure that no undesired payload is used.

To determine the basic payload type — in particular, to detect re-entry vehicles at the front of a rocket - without disclosing proprietary information, non-intrusive devices and techniques can be applied, such as scanning and radiographic devices. Ground-based equipment for different regions of the radiation spectrum could be mutually complementary: nuclear radiation detection could search for alpha, beta and gamma decay, indicating nuclear materials. Neutron detection would exhibit information about the types of materials used, in particular whether they include explosives. X-ray equipment could provide basic design information while preventing violation of commercial interests. In case of suspicion, more precise x-ray detection, computer tomography or — in exceptional cases — the opening of the payload in the presence of inspectors could remove uncertainties about non-compliance.

Under a comprehensive space-launch notification agreement and missile flight test ban, any non-controlled space launch would be prohibited, and the detection of any rockets outside of agreed launch pads would indicate a violation. To limit the risk of undetected activities, it would be particularly important to implement measures that prevent the transformation of space launch technology for ballistic missiles. A safeguards system for space launchers could place some of the "most critical" items under supervision by an international organization. International cooperation in civilian space programmes would also be important for containing the use of space technology for missile development.

Citizens and non-governmental organizations can play an important role in promoting, implementing and verifying missile control and disarmament. Societal verification is essential to increase the risk of detection for those who secretly build a missile capability. In order to increase public awareness, a greater public discourse on the missile problem and its resolution is required. By building a network of information exchange and debate, experts, civil society and officials could be jointly engaged in this process. Activities could include meetings and conferences involving scientists and technicians, as well as protests at, and attempts to conduct citizen inspections of, critical facilities.

Jürgen Scheffran

International Network of Engineers and Scientists Against Proliferation