What are the essential verification requirements for transition
to low levels (hundreds) of nuclear weapons?
What are the essential verification requirements for transition
from low levels to complete elimination?
What are the essential verification requirements for maintaining
a regime of nuclear disarmament while the capability and technology
are still accessible, and in later generations?
Comments
We cannot completely separate the legal and technical requirements
from the international political environment.
The focus of arms control verification regimes to date has
been on delivery vehicles rather than warheads. This has worked
for reductions to a few thousand nuclear weapons.
For further reductions, into the hundreds, we need verification
measures for warheads paralleling those for delivery vehicles,
namely: data exchange, confirmation, baseline inspections, challenge
inspections, and continuing inspections of the dismantlement process.
We also need a parallel system for fissile materials, and it
should be as comprehensive and inclusive as politically and technically
possible.
If reductions proceed without establishing a baseline of information,
we will lose important knowledge and it will be difficult to gain
confidence that warheads and fissile materials are not hidden
somewhere.
If accounting took place over 5-10 years with confidence, this
accounting could be the basis for further nuclear disarmament.
Civil society has to assume the role of governments in arms
control monitoring. This is a problem in societies that are not
open.
Hidden nuclear arsenals require maintenance by experts who
would agree to be part of a conspiracy, which is unlikely in a
democratic society.
Because of the destructive power of nuclear weapons, non-compliance
becomes more significant as we approach complete nuclear disarmament.
In an otherwise nuclear weapon free world, a single nuclear weapon
could translate into substantial political leverage.
Verification of compliance with an agreement on complete nuclear
disarmament is easier than verification of agreement on very low
levels of warhead numbers.
We need to think of phases in terms of transition — from
the current stage based on strategic offense. The 2000 NPT Review
Conference final document outlines good measures, but some of
these have been undermined.
Some elements of disarmament, arms control, and verification
could be expensive — possibly more than the weapons —
but less than their potential damage or indefinite maintenance.
