Section 2 Questions

Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT)

Conference on Disarmament

General Assembly First Committee

UN Disarmament Commission

Special Session on Disarmament

2. Verification:

General Considerations and Phases

Questions

What are the essential verification requirements for transition to low levels (hundreds) of nuclear weapons?
What are the essential verification requirements for transition from low levels to complete elimination?
What are the essential verification requirements for maintaining a regime of nuclear disarmament while the capability and technology are still accessible, and in later generations?

Comments

We cannot completely separate the legal and technical requirements from the international political environment.
The focus of arms control verification regimes to date has been on delivery vehicles rather than warheads. This has worked for reductions to a few thousand nuclear weapons.
For further reductions, into the hundreds, we need verification measures for warheads paralleling those for delivery vehicles, namely: data exchange, confirmation, baseline inspections, challenge inspections, and continuing inspections of the dismantlement process.
We also need a parallel system for fissile materials, and it should be as comprehensive and inclusive as politically and technically possible.
If reductions proceed without establishing a baseline of information, we will lose important knowledge and it will be difficult to gain confidence that warheads and fissile materials are not hidden somewhere.
If accounting took place over 5-10 years with confidence, this accounting could be the basis for further nuclear disarmament.
Civil society has to assume the role of governments in arms control monitoring. This is a problem in societies that are not open.
Hidden nuclear arsenals require maintenance by experts who would agree to be part of a conspiracy, which is unlikely in a democratic society.
Because of the destructive power of nuclear weapons, non-compliance becomes more significant as we approach complete nuclear disarmament. In an otherwise nuclear weapon free world, a single nuclear weapon could translate into substantial political leverage.
Verification of compliance with an agreement on complete nuclear disarmament is easier than verification of agreement on very low levels of warhead numbers.
We need to think of phases in terms of transition — from the current stage based on strategic offense. The 2000 NPT Review Conference final document outlines good measures, but some of these have been undermined.
Some elements of disarmament, arms control, and verification could be expensive — possibly more than the weapons — but less than their potential damage or indefinite maintenance.