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Outer Space
Developing a new outer space treaty
Negotiations on a new outer space
treaty
Conference on Disarmament
An ad hoc committee in the Conference
on Disarmament (CD) began work in 1985 to examine outer space
arms control issues, including the current legal framework. The
main space security issue, prevention of an arms race in outer space
(PAROS), has been blocked in the CD, primarily because the US delegation
believes the concept of an arms race in outer space is absurd, and
that existing legal regimes for outer space activities (ie. the
Outer Space Treaty) are adequate to handle any space security issues.
The Outer Space ad hoc committee has not met since 1994.
China and Russia have traditionally maintained that
the early establishment of an ad hoc committee is necessary to start
substantive work on PAROS, with a view to concluding a more effective
international treaty on this issue at an early date. They have submitted
numerous papers on relevant issues, including verification aspects
and existing international legal instruments. In 2007, they revised
and submitted their PAROS working paper CD/1679 for the third time.
However, both Russia and China have expressed their willingness
to allow negotiations on an FMCT to begin without simultaneously
starting negotiations on PAROS.
During 2007, substantive discussions were held on
the PAROS in the CD, which resulted in calls for a treaty to prevent
the placement of weapons in outer space (PPW) rather than a treaty
on PAROS, in order to escape the “linguistic and philosophical
debate” associated with the term PAROS. The discussions also
produced interest in developing “best practices” or
“rules of the road” for safe and responsible space operations,
and transparency and confidence-building measures that could complement
future international legal instruments regarding space security.
See statements
from the 2007 CD for more information on government perspectives.
General Assembly First Committee on Disarmament
and International Security
PAROS has been a key topic of debate at the General Assembly First
Committee in recent years. Many states have urged the reestablishment
of the CD ad hoc committee, hoping to reinvigorate debate on the
adoption of a legally-binding document relating to the weaponization
of outer space. Two draft resolutions regarding PAROS were presented
and adopted in 2007: A/RES/62/20,
the annual PAROS resolution, and a Russian initiative, "Measures
to promote transparency and confidence-building in outer space activities,"
A/RES/62/43.
Many member states believe that the annual presentation of the PAROS
resolution in the First Committee and the almost universal endorsement
of its principles have given these objectives the status of customary
law.
However, there are two states that seem unwilling
to cooperate with the international community on the issue of PAROS.
The United States and Israel have consistently abstained during
voting on the PAROS draft resolutions in First Committee. In 2005,
the US hardened its position, voting "no" for the first time. The
US argues that the existing multilateral arms control regime is
sufficient, and that there is no need to address a non existent
threat. The US said in the Conference on Disarmament on June 13,
2006, "there is no - repeat, no- problem in outer space for arms
control to solve."
The United States sent a State Department official to the CD to
make its most overt defense of its right to develop space weapons
to date. "The high value of space systems has led the United States
to study the potential of space-related weapons to protect our satellites
from potential future attacks, whether from the surface or from
other spacecraft. As long as the potential for such attacks remains,
our Government will continue to consider the possible role that
space-related weapons may play in protecting our assets." The US
maintained its rejection of the negotiation of PAROS treaty at the
2006 First Committee session.
If there was any doubt that the US might not continue
to oppose the negotiation of a PAROS treaty at the CD (or anywhere
else), the new U.S.
National Space Policy, authorized by President Bush on 31 August
2006 and released in October 2006, will nip those feelings in the
bud. For a humorous academic analysis of the new space policy,
please see Dr. Jeffrey Lewis' "New
National Space Policy, Also Silly."
Please see RCW's First
Committee Monitor for annual "progress" on negotiating
a PAROS treaty at the United Nations. In particular, see
Week
2 from 2006 for details on the new US Space Policy and its repurcussions
for PAROS in the First Committee.
Critical
Issues of PAROS
Key players
There are multiple players in the space debate, each having
a political, economic, or moral stake in the future of outer space.
The United States is one of the states that is blocking progress
of PAROS. In June 2002, the Anti-Ballistic
Missile Treaty was abrogated by the US, who argued the treaty
would restrict testing for their proposed missile defense system.
The 1997 USSPACECOM
document "Vision
for 2020" outlined a new military vision to dominate the space
dimension and integrate space forces, in order to acquire "full
spectrum dominance". The position of USSPACECOM has an influential
supporter in the current Secretary of Defense. China and Russia
continue developing working papers and sponsoring conferences on
PAROS (see their updated working
paper on PAROS from the 2007 CD session). To start negotiating
on this issue is their clear priority in the Conference on Disarmament.
Other states that have extensive activities in space include India,
Pakistan, Brazil, and the EU.
There are no weapons in outer space
The United States and the United Kingdom do not want to recognize
the importance of a treaty that prevents weaponization in outer
space since there are no weapons in outer space yet. They argue
that it's pointless to work on something that doesn't exist and
that the Conference on Disarmament should focus on other issues
like the Fissile Material Cut-Off Treaty. Many states have expressed
that it is important to take action just for that reason. It is
a much easier task to prevent an arms race in outer space then to
control it once started. Sri Lanka characterized the importance
of preventing an arms race in outer space, asking, "Can we really
afford an expensive competition in outer space when there remain
so many other challenges before as such as poverty, hunger, disease
and deprivation?"
Definitions
One of the dangers in outer space is that almost anything can
be used as a weapon. It does not take more than a tiny rock (or
a random piece of space debris) to destroy important satellites
or other devices. The United States argues that the inability to
define space weapons is the main barrier to a treaty that prevents
them.
Russia and China have produced a working paper (CD/1679)
where they discuss definitions of related concepts like Outer Space,
Space Weapons, Space Objects and Peaceful Use of Outer Space. They
also points out that a future PAROS treaty might not need specific
definitions, as it would be so difficult to reach agreement on them.
The Outer Space Treaty and the Moon Agreement do not have specific
definitions and this has not lead to any legal disputes.
Preventing the placement of weapons in outer space
During a presentation to the 2007 First Committee, Magnus
Hellgren of Sweden explained some of the different definitions
and issues that have been discussed in developing a potential treaty
on preventing the placement of weapons in outer space (PPW).
Verification
Verification of a PAROS treaty or PPW treaty would be difficult.
Even Russia and China admit that it would be a complex issue and
might have to be postponed in order to move forward with negotiations.
China stated in the Conference on Disarmament, "Due to the complex
nature of verification of outer space activities, which bears on
the security interest of all countries, as well as to technical
and financial constraints of verification, currently it is extremely
difficult to negotiate a verification provision. For the time being,
to put on hold the verification issue until conditions are ripe,
and to negotiate a treaty without verification provisions could
be a practical alternative."
Russia concurred, "Elaborating the treaty without verification measures,
which could be added at a later stage, might be a preferable option.
Transparency and Confidence Building Measures could, for a certain
period of time, compensate for the lack of verification measures
in the new treaty."
Russia and China tabled a working paper on verification
aspects of PAROS on 22 May 2006 at the CD.
Transparency and confidence-building measures
Transparency and confidence-building measures (CBMs) are a good
step towards enhancing trust and international cooperation among
states. They facilitate management of situations which could otherwise
lead to international tension. Most states acknowledge that Confidence
Building Measures do not replace verification but may function as
a start to a step-by-step approach on preventing the weaponization
of outer space. Working paper (CD/1778)
was presented by Russia and China to the CD, suggesting different
types of CBMs, including: exchanges of information, demonstrations,
notifications, consultations and thematic workshops.
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