Negotiations
of a new outer space treaty Also see the PDF
fact sheet.
For many years, a ban on weapons in outer space
has been a potential subject for disarmament negotiations
within the United Nations. Several multilateral UN fora have
taken up the issue:
United Nations General Assembly
The United Nations General Assembly is consensus-building
body, where issues of international peace and security are
collectively discussed among all UN member states. Its regular
session convenes in September of each year, and after two
weeks of General Debate, it breaks up into six specialized
committees. Every member state is entitled to participate
in each of the committees, where they consider proposals relevant
to the substantive topics covered by the committee, and recommend
resolutions for adoption by the General Assembly. While these
resolutions are not legally binding, they can be normative—that
is, they can indicate the establishment of customs, standards,
and guidelines for appropriate behavior. Resolutions adopted
by consensus also indicate substantive areas of agreement
that are ripe for negotiation and can enable the creation
of new treaties and the emergence of international legal norms.
Furthermore, they demonstrate global governmental opinion,
showing which governments support peace and security, and
which choose to remain outside of or even impede the development
of international cooperative security.
The General Assembly's work on disarmament is conducted through
one of its main committees, the First Committee on Disarmament
and International Security. Each year in the First Committee
and then again in the General Assembly as a whole, a resolution
on the prevention of an arms race in outer space (PAROS) is
introduced and adopted by an overwhelming majority of UN member
states. In fact, every country in the world votes in favor
of negotiating a treaty on PAROS—except for the
US, which has voted “NO” for the past three years,
and Israel, which has abstained. The US administration argues
that the existing multilateral arms control regime is sufficient,
and that there is no need to address a non existent threat.
As one US representative said in 2006, “there is no—repeat,
no—problem in outer space for arms control to solve.”
The PAROS resolution reaffirms the importance of the 1967
Outer Space Treaty, saying that PAROS efforts are in conformity
with that Treaty. However, the resolution also notes that
the current outer space legal regime “does not in and
of itself guarantee the prevention of an arms race in outer
space.” The PAROS resolution calls for states, especially
those with space capabilities, to refrain from actions contrary
to the objective of PAROS and to “contribute actively”
to that objective. It argues for consolidation and reinforcement
of the outer space legal regime, and says the Conference on
Disarmament (see below) is the place for a new treaty on PAROS
to be negotiated.A PAROS treaty would complement the 1967 Outer
Space Treaty, which aims to preserve space for peaceful uses,
if it prevented the use of space weapons and the
development of space-weapon technology and technology related
to so-called “missile defense.” A PAROS treaty
would also prevent any nation from gaining a further military
advantage in outer space and would hopefully reduce current
military uses of outer space.
In recent years, the UN General Assembly has started to move
beyond merely calling on the Conference on Disarmament to
commence negotiations on PAROS, to recommending measures on
transparency and confidence-building in outer space. Many
states have called on space-capable states to guarantee transparency
in their outer space activities and to engage in confidence-building
measures. In 2005, 2006, and 2007, Russia has introduced a
resolution on transparency and confidence-building measures
in outer space activities. As with the PAROS resolution, the
overwhelming majority of member states vote in favour of this
resolution, with only the US objecting and Israel abstaining.
In 2007, the UN Secretary General released a report on “Transparency
and confidence-building measures in outer space,” which
contained perspectives on the matter from Austria, Bangladesh,
Kenya, and Portugal on behalf of the European Union. The European
Union proposed the development of a comprehensive code of
conduct on space objects and space activities, and suggested
guidelines for the general principles, scope, and participation
for such a code. The EU is planning to submit a code of conduct
to the Conference on Disarmament for further consideration.
Please see RCW's First
Committee Monitor for annual "progress" on negotiating
a PAROS treaty at the United Nations.
Conference on Disarmament (CD)
PAROS has been a longstanding agenda item in the CD, the primary
body where UN disarmament treaties are negotiated. The Conference
established an “ad hoc committee” on PAROS in
1985 to examine and identify “through substantive and
general consideration, issues relevant to [PAROS].”
This committee lasted until 1994, though it made little progress.
Annual CD reports suggested that the Western group of states,
and in particular one state—presumably the United States—had
been blocking the negotiation of a treaty banning weapons
in space, or a treaty banning anti-satellite weapons, despite
having made a proposal along these lines in 1981 that helped
lead to the establishment of the ad hoc committee. The US
stated openly in 1990 that it “has not identified any
practical outer space arms control measures that can be dealt
with in a multilateral environment.”
The CD did not reestablish the ad hoc committee in 1995.
Since negotiating the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty in 1996,
the CD has been unable to reconvene any ad hoc committee or
pursue negotiations on any subject. Despite this deadlock,
certain states, particularly Russia and China, have continued
to push for the CD to negotiate measures related to PAROS.
In 2002, they submitted a joint working paper on “Possible
Elements for a Future International Legal Agreement on the
Prevention of the Deployment of Weapons in Outer Space, the
Threat or Use of Force Against Outer Space Objects.”
In 2008, Russia and China submitted a draft treaty for a
ban on weapons in outer space to the CD, based on the elements
outlined in their 2002 working paper. The US administration
dismissed the proposal out-of-hand, characterizing the offer
to make preserve space for peaceful uses “a diplomatic
ploy by the two nations to gain a military advantage.”
(See fact sheet on the draft treaty for more information.)
Please see RCW's CD
Report for annual "progress" on negotiating a
PAROS treaty at the United Nations.
UN Committee on Peaceful Uses of Outer Space (COPUOS)
Also referred to as the Outer Space Committee, COPUOS was
established in 1959 by the UN General Assembly in resolution
1472 (XIV) to review international cooperation in and devise
UN programmes related to the peaceful use of outer space,
encourage research and dissemination of information on outer
space, and consider legal issues arising from the exploration
of outer space. The Committee, which has 67 member states,
and its two subcommittees—the Scientific and Technical
Subcommittee and the Legal Subcommittee—meet annually
in Vienna and their decisions are implemented by the UN Office
for Outer Space Affairs.
In June 2007, COPUOS adopted debris mitigation guidelines,
which had been developed by a working group on space debris
in the Scientific and Technical Subcommittee over the past
few years. The guidelines include measures to be considered
for mission planning, design, manufacture, and operational
(launch, mission, and disposal) phases of spacecraft and launch
vehicle orbital stages. Member states have pledged to implement
these guidelines within their national licensing or other
applicable mechanisms “to the greatest extent feasible.”
The 2007 session of COPUOS also agreed on a draft resolution
on the practice of states and international organizations
in registering space objects to be submitted to the General
Assembly, and approved a workplan for the United Nations Platform
for Space-based Information for Disaster Management and Emergency
Response (UN-SPIDER).
Critical
Issues of PAROS
Key players There are multiple players in the space debate, each having
a political, economic, or moral stake in the future of outer
space. The United States is one of the states that is blocking
progress of PAROS. In June 2002, the was abrogated by the US, who argued the
treaty would restrict testing for their proposed missile defense
system. The 1997
document "" outlined a new military vision to dominate the
space dimension and integrate space forces, in order to acquire
"full spectrum dominance". The position of USSPACECOM has
an influential supporter in the current Secretary of Defense.
China and Russia continue developing working papers and sponsoring
conferences on PAROS (see their updated working
paper on PAROS from the 2007 CD session). To start negotiating
on this issue is their clear priority in the Conference on
Disarmament. Other states that have extensive activities in
space include India, Pakistan, Brazil, and the EU.
There are no weapons in outer space The United States and the United Kingdom do not want to
recognize the importance of a treaty that prevents weaponization
in outer space since there are no weapons in outer space yet.
They argue that it's pointless to work on something that doesn't
exist and that the Conference on Disarmament should focus
on other issues like the Fissile Material Cut-Off Treaty.
Many states have expressed that it is important to take action
just for that reason. It is a much easier task to prevent
an arms race in outer space then to control it once started.
Sri Lanka characterized the importance of preventing an arms
race in outer space, asking, "Can we really afford an expensive
competition in outer space when there remain so many other
challenges before as such as poverty, hunger, disease and
deprivation?"
Definitions One of the dangers in outer space is that almost anything
can be used as a weapon. It does not take more than a tiny
rock (or a random piece of space debris) to destroy important
satellites or other devices. The United States argues that
the inability to define space weapons is the main barrier
to a treaty that prevents them.
Russia and China have produced a working paper (CD/1679)
where they discuss definitions of related concepts like Outer
Space, Space Weapons, Space Objects and Peaceful Use of Outer
Space. They also points out that a future PAROS treaty might
not need specific definitions, as it would be so difficult
to reach agreement on them. The Outer Space Treaty and the
Moon Agreement do not have specific definitions and this has
not lead to any legal disputes.
Preventing the placement of weapons in outer
space
During a presentation to the 2007 First Committee, Magnus
Hellgren of Sweden explained some of the different definitions
and issues that have been discussed in developing a potential
treaty on preventing the placement of weapons in outer space
(PPW).
Verification Verification of a PAROS treaty or PPW treaty would be
difficult. Even Russia and China admit that it would be a
complex issue and might have to be postponed in order to move
forward with negotiations. China stated in the Conference
on Disarmament, "Due to the complex nature of verification
of outer space activities, which bears on the security interest
of all countries, as well as to technical and financial constraints
of verification, currently it is extremely difficult to negotiate
a verification provision. For the time being, to put on hold
the verification issue until conditions are ripe, and to negotiate
a treaty without verification provisions could be a practical
alternative."
Russia concurred, "Elaborating the treaty without verification
measures, which could be added at a later stage, might be
a preferable option. Transparency and Confidence Building
Measures could, for a certain period of time, compensate for
the lack of verification measures in the new treaty."
Transparency and confidence-building measures
Transparency and confidence-building measures (CBMs) are a
good step towards enhancing trust and international cooperation
among states. They facilitate management of situations which
could otherwise lead to international tension. Most states
acknowledge that Confidence Building Measures do not replace
verification but may function as a start to a step-by-step
approach on preventing the weaponization of outer space. Working
paper (CD/1778)
was presented by Russia and China to the CD, suggesting different
types of CBMs, including: exchanges of information, demonstrations,
notifications, consultations and thematic workshops.
Recent
proposals and responses Also see the PDF
fact sheet.
A treaty on the prevention of an arms race
in outer space (PAROS)
Through resolutions
and discussions
within the United Nations, a general agreement has developed
that an arms race in outer space should be prevented. However,
due to the structure of the international legal regime and
to the objection of a (very) few states, a treaty has not
yet been negotiated to comprehensively prevent the deployment
of weapons in space or to prevent an arms race in outer space.
The United States systematically argues that an arms race
in outer space does not yet exist, and it is therefore unnecessary
to take action on the issue. The rest of the international
community agrees that, because there is not yet an arms race,
now is the time to prevent weaponization of space.
A treaty on the prevention of placement
of weapons in outer space (PPWT)
Some delegations and experts have argued that PAROS is not
the most relevant term or treaty to pursue. Discussion in
the Conference on Disarmament (CD) has recently focused instead
on a treaty
to prevent the placement of weapons in outer space. Changing
the language in this way circumvents the US argument against
PAROS, though it doesn't solve questions of definitions over
where outer space begins, what type of weapons should be prohibited,
or if the treaty would be verifiable.
On 12 February 2008, Russia's
Foreign Minister, Sergey
Lavrov, addressed the Conference and presented a joint
Russia-China draft Treaty
on the Prevention of the Placement of Weapons in Outer Space,
the Threat or Use of Force against Outer Space Objects
(PPWT). It is the first draft treaty on this issue formally
introduced to the CD, though it is based on elements
proposed in a working paper to the CD in June 2002 by Russia,
China, Viet Nam, Indonesia, Belarus, Zimbabwe, and Syria.
Minister Lavrov explained the draft treaty is designed “to
eliminate existing lacunas in international space law, create
conditions for further exploration and use of space, preserve
costly space property, and strengthen general security and
arms control.”
Overview of the draft treaty
The preamble of both the 2002 paper and the draft treaty emphasizes
the need to keep outer space free from “military confrontation”
and open to peaceful uses and exploration for the “development
of humankind”. It also notes that while existing arms
control and disarmament agreements relevant to outer space
“play a positive role ... in regulating outer space
activities,” they are insufficient to “effectively
prevent the placement of weapons and an arms race in outer
space.” It argues for “examination of further
measures in the search for effective and verifiable bilateral
and multilateral agreements in order to prevent an arms race
in outer space.”
The draft treaty’s articles expand upon the elements
contained the 2002 working paper. It defines certain terms,
such as “outer space,” “outer space object,”
and “weapons in outer space.” It specifies that
the latter means
any device placed in outer space, based on any physical principle,
specially produced or converted to eliminate, damage or disrupt
normal function of objects in outer space, on the Earth or
in its air, as well as to eliminate population, components
of biosphere critical to human existence or inflict damage
to them.
It subsequently explains, “a weapon will be considered
as ‘placed’ in outer space if it orbits the Earth
at least once, or follows a section of such an orbit before
leaving this orbit or is stationed on a permanent basis somewhere
in outer space,” and describes “use of force”
or “threat of force” as meaning any hostile action
against outer space objects including, inter alia, those aimed
at their destruction, damage, temporarily or permanently
injuring normal functioning, deliberate alteration of the
parameters of their orbit, or the threat of these actions.
The draft goes on to explain that states parties to the treaty
undertake not to place in orbit “any objects carrying
any kind of weapons,” not to install them on celestial
bodies or other space structures, not to use or threaten to
use force against outer space objects, and not to encourage
any other parties to do so. It emphasizes the treaty will
not impede the rights of states parties “to explore
and use outer space for peaceful purposes in accordance with
international law.” For matters of transparency and
compliance, the draft provides for voluntary confidence-building
measures. On verification and compliance enforcement, the
draft provides for the possibility of subsequent negotiation
of an additional protocol and for the establishment of an
executive organization for the treaty, which will consider
complaints of treaty violations, organize and conduct consultations
with states parties, and “take measures to put an end
to the violation of the Treaty by any State Party.”
Analysis of the draft treaty
The draft treaty does not settle all of the questions government
and non-government experts have asked over the years, such
as:
What implications will the current militarization of space
have for this treaty? Space has been militarized since the
earliest communication satellites were launched; today, militaries
all over the world rely heavily on satellites for command
and control, communication, monitoring, early warning, and
navigation. Most states accept that “peaceful purposes
of outer space” include military uses, even those which
are not at all peaceful—such as using satellites to
direct bombing raids or to orchestrate a “prompt global
strike” capability. The use of space objects to conduct
war on Earth is not addressed by this treaty.
The militarization of space also presents many problems of
“dual use technologies”—some space objects
can be used for commercial or military purposes or as weapons.
The draft treaty does not address how it will deal with dual-use
space-based objects. Would any space object that can be maneuvered
to intentionally crash into another space object be considered
a space weapon? It is advertised as an autonomous rendezvous
space-based object intended to fix other space objects, but
its capacity to maneuver around another satellite also allows
it to disable or destroy its target.
Many experts have asserted a treaty should also ban ground-based
weapons aimed at attacking space assets, including ground-based
ballistic missile defense systems. However, intercontinental
ballistic missiles and missile interceptors, which could be
used to attack space objects, travel on a sub-orbital trajectory.
While some might travel through space, they never maintain
sufficient velocity to achieve orbit. The draft treaty says
states parties shall not “resort to the threat or use
of force against outer space objects,” but it does not
restrict the development, testing, or deployment of missile
defense systems or other ground-based anti-satellite systems,
only systems placed in orbit or installed on structures or
bodies in outer space.
The draft treaty does not ban development or testing of space
weapons, only their use. So then, would China’s test
in January 2007 of an anti-satellite weapon or the US shoot-down
of a failed satellite in 2008 be considered a violation of
the treaty? If states are allowed to continue developing and
testing weapons, won’t this defeat the stated purpose
of the treaty—which is ostensibly “strategic stability”
and “political equilibrium”.
There are many diverging opinions on verification of a PPWT:
some have argued for a normative treaty without verification
provisions, others say it cannot be effectively verified,
and some argue that verification should not be separated from
other aspects of the treaty and that it should be addressed
in the course of negotiations. The indication that verification
“may” be covered by an additional protocol suggests
the possibility of no or limited verification measures.
Media reaction
The mass media presented the introduction of the draft treaty
as a “showdown” between the United States and
Russia/China over “competing international treaties,
one banning the production of nuclear materials and the other
trying to prevent an arms race in space.” The Washington
Times quoted an unidentified US official as saying, “We
put our FMCT [fissile materials cut-off treaty] draft forward
in May 2006 and have been pushing it all along, before there
was any talk of a treaty on outer space.” This statement
is incorrect, because an ad hoc committee on PAROS was established
in the CD in 1985, the UN General Assembly has adopted annual
resolutions on PAROS with an overwhelming majority for over
twenty years (according to China’s Foreign Minister
Yang Jiechi), and Russia and China introduced possible elements
for a PAROS treaty in 2002 (see above).
The Washington Times further (mis)reported, “Now Russia
and China have linked negotiations on the FMCT” to the
PPWT. Russia and China actually used to link the two items,
and if they did so now it would be nothing new, as the Times
suggests it is. However, in 2007 Russia agreed to adopt the
compromise programme of work proposed by the CD's rotating
presidents, which called only for negotiations on an FMCT,
thus dropping its linkage to PAROS. The Chinese delegation
rejected this programme of work, and continues calling for
a “balanced and comprehensive programme of work,”
though it has not specifically demanded simultaneous negotiations
this year.
The Associated Press reported that Washington called the
introduction of the draft “a diplomatic ploy by the
two nations to gain a military advantage,” and said
Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov’s introduction
of the treaty “came with an implied threat.” It
noted Minister Lavrov’s comment “that the nuclear
arms race was started with a view to preserving the monopoly
to this type of weapons [sic], but this monopoly was to last
only four years,” implying Lavrov meant Russia would
“catch up” to the United States in developing
space weapons just as it did with nuclear weapons. However,
unreported by the Associated Press, Lavrov went on to lament
the waste of material and other resources on weapons “at
the expense of finding solutions to the problem of development.”
In addition, the Associated Press reported, “Washington
rejects the [draft treaty] because it feels it is only directed
at U.S. military technology and allows China and Russia to
fire ground-based missiles into space or use satellites as
weapons of war.” This statement exemplifies the spin
put on issues that challenge US military dominance—the
draft treaty would prohibit the use of space-based weapons
by all states parties, not just the United States, and does
not limit any state party’s use of ground-based missiles,
not even the United States’.
The Associated Press article goes on to report, “The
U.S. says it is committed to ensuring the use of space for
peaceful purposes, but insists that it will pursue programs
to ensure that its satellites and other spacecraft are protected.”
However, the US delegation stood alone in voting against
the annual PAROS resolution in the UNGA in 2005–2007,
and released a National Space Policy in October 2006 opposing
“the development of new legal regimes or other restrictions
that seek to prohibit or limit US access to or use of space,”
and arguing it will continue to “dissuade or deter others
from impeding [its right to operate in space] . . . and deny,
if necessary, adversaries the use of space capabilities hostile
to US national interests.” In addition, its programs
to “protect” its satellites and other spacecraft
include some of the most aggressive technologies yet to be
unleashed on the international community. Minister Lavrov
noted in his introduction
It is well known that there is inseparable relationship between
strategic offensive and defensive armaments ... The desire
to acquire an anti-missile “shield” while dismantling
the “sheath”, where the nuclear “sword”
is kept is extremely dangerous. And if one also places on
the balance pan the “global lightning strike”
concept providing for striking with nuclear and conventional
strategic means targets in any point of the Globe in a matter
of an hour after a relevant decision has been made, the risks
for strategy stability and predictability become more than
obvious.
Response to the draft treaty in the CD
Response to the draft in the CD has been limited, though several
delegations have publically offered their perspectives in
plenary meetings:
Argentina: On 3 March, Argentina's Foreign Minister Mr. Jorge
Taiana welcomed the draft treaty. He suggested it could be
fruitful to establish an ad hoc committee on the issue to
explore it further.
Algeria: On 14 February, Algeria's Ambassador Hamza Khelif
took note of draft PPWT, and indicated his delegation has
communicated it to their capital for consideration. He said
he would like discussions on the issues of outer space to
provide sufficient time to examine the proposal. However,
the draft PPWT is based on elements proposed in 2002 and on
substantive discussions that took place in the CD in 2006
and 2007—it should not be new information for capitals.
Brazil: On 14 February, Ambassador Paranhos of Brazil welcomed
the draft PPWT. In the past, the Brazilian delegation has
been a strong proponent in the CD of preventing the weaponization
of outer space, and in his farewell statement, Ambassador
Paranhos said, “It is of utmost importance that this
negotiating forum takes the lead in ensuring that the outer
space remains a peaceful domain.”
Canada: On 12 February, welcoming “Russia’s efforts
to energize discussions” on PPW, Canada’s Ambassador
Grinius said his delegation had “submitted detailed
comments” on the draft. He also highlighted the Hague
Code of Conduct (HCOC) as “a valuable and existing”
transparency and confidence-building measure (TCBM) and suggested
it would be unrealistic to create TCBMs ones when “existing
ones ... are regrettably falling into disuse.” Ambassador
Grinius also argued, “the dividing lines between civil
and military issues in space are increasingly irrelevant in
practical terms,” and called for greater cooperation
among the UN’s space-related institutions and between
the UN Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space and the
CD.
European Union: On 28 February, Mr. Jerman of Slovenia, on
behalf of the European Union, said work is needed to achieve
consensus on definitions and an “effective and robust
verification system” for an outer space security treaty.
He argued, “it is not sufficient to only refer to a
possible future additional protocol” as suggested in
the draft PPWT. In the meantime, Mr. Jerman said, the EU “wishes
to focus on a pragmatic and incremental approach,” through
transparency and confidence-building measures. The EU plans
to present these measures to the CD for discussion. They will
presumably be based on the concrete proposals that the EU
submitted to the Secretary-General, which were included in
his report of 17 September 2007.
Germany: On 19 February, Ambassador Bernhard Brasack of Germany
welcomed the draft treaty. He argued, “Clear delimitations
between purely peaceful uses and distinct military uses have
become a meaningless fiction. Just as an example: Space tracking
and surveillance capabilities for monitoring debris, following
satellites for avoiding potential collisions, inherently also
have a potential for offensive space applications.”
With this in mind, Ambassador Brasack suggested elaboration
through discussion on three issues “not yet sufficiently
covered by the draft”: the relationship between a potential
new instrument and the existing ones, particularly the Outer
Space Treaty; the dangers posed by the development and testing
of anti-satellite weapons; and compliance and verification
mechanisms. He also remarked, however, that “meaningful
discussions” in the CD on space security issues “will
only be possible if the CD agrees to a Programme of Work.”
Group of 21: On 28 February, speaking on behalf of the Group
of 21, Syria’s Ambassador Faysal Khabbaz Hamoui raised
concerns over the inadequate existing legal instruments “to
deter further militarization of outer space or prevent its
weaponization” and emphasized the necessity of further
measures that effectively provide for verification. He further
lamented the development of missile defense systems and other
“advanced military technologies ... which have, inter
alia, contributed to the further erosion of an international
climate conducive to the promotion of disarmament and the
strengthening of international security.” Ambassador
Hamoui argued, “it is time to start negotiation in the
Conference on Disarmament on matters related to the Prevention
of Arms Race in Outer Space,” and referred to UNGA Resolution
62/20, which recommends the establishment of an ad hoc committee
in the CD in 2008. He said the draft treaty submitted by Russia
and China “is a good basis for further discussion toward
adopting an international binding instrument.”
Kazakhstan: On 4 March, the Foreign Minister of Kazakhstan
welcomed the draft treaty in the CD.
Malaysia: On 14 February, Malaysia's Ambassador Hsu King
Bee said the draft PPWT is “a positive step,”
and expressed hope “that the CD would set an objective
to approach the issues in a comprehensive manner, engaging
in structured substantive discussions with a view for an early
commencement of negotiations, for an international legally
binding treaty.” She also proposed the “establishment
of Ad Hoc Committee with the appropriate mandate agreeable
to all,” and called for a “moratorium on the testing
of all kinds of weapons and on the deployment of weapons in
outer space.”
Netherlands: On 4 March, the Foreign Minister of the Netherlands
welcomed the draft treaty in the CD.
Romania: On 4 March, the Foreign Minister of Romania welcomed
the draft treaty in the CD.
Sri Lanka: On 12 February, Sri Lanka’s Ambassador Dayan
Jayatilleka congratulated China and Russia’s collaboration
on the draft PPWT and “did not see why a fissile material
treaty should take priority over the draft treaty submitted.”
Switzerland: On 14 February, Ambassador Jürg Streuli
of Switzerland welcomed the draft treaty, though he said,
“a number of technical and legal points still needed
to be worked out,” and recognized the need to overcome
“significant political obstacles.”
Ukraine: On 4 March, the Foreign Minister of Ukraine welcomed
the draft treaty in the CD. Minister Khandogiy suggested that
substantial discussion on outer space in the CD should focus
on providing greater transparency of space programmes; expanding
the scope of information about space objects in orbit; and
developing rules of behaviour while performing activities
in space, including establishing a Code of Conduct.
United States: On 19 August, the United States delegation
to the CD circulated its response
to the draft PPWT. In turn, Reaching Critical Will responded
to the US analysis in the 2
September CD Report.
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