Reaching Critical Will

Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT)

Conference on Disarmament

General Assembly First Committee

UN Disarmament Commission

Special Session on Disarmament

RCW Opposes Referring Iran to the Security Council

Letter to the International Atomic Energy Agency

Dear Ambassador,

The IAEA Board of Governors is holding a meeting February 2 to consider “the implementation of IAEA safeguards in Iran and related Board resolutions". As a civil society organization dedicated to the global elimination of nuclear weapons, we are adamantly opposed to nuclear proliferation and believe Iran should abandon all nuclear ambitions. The IAEA must verify the peaceful nature of Iran’s nuclear program, and the international community is right to put pressure on Iran to abandon all nuclear ambitions. However, we also insist that all the pressure the international community brings to bear with regard to Iran’s latest actions be peaceful, multilateral, legal and with respect for possible ramifications to the NPT regime.

It is not yet time for a referral to the Security Council. A February referral would escalate tensions before diplomatic negotiations and factual investigations have reached a conclusion. While we recognize Iran’s recent resumption of nuclear research has increased tensions, we see no reason to continue spiraling escalation that could disrupt and preempt a diplomatic solution and impede the Agency’s ability to complete its investigation.

Diplomatic negotiations are ongoing, and should be given the time and space to work. Negotiations between Iran and Russia on the EU3 and US supported compromise proposal to enrich uranium in Russia are scheduled to resume on February 16. The Iranian Ambassador to Russia, Gholamreza Ansari, recently called the proposal “constructive” and “a good initiative to resolve the situation.”

To date, the IAEA has not uncovered substantial evidence of an Iranian nuclear weapons program. Non-compliance under the Safeguards Agreement requires a finding of diversion, or uncertainty regarding diversion, of nuclear materials toward military use. The IAEA concluded in November 2004 that no diversion had occurred, but it is not yet in a position to determine the presence or absence of additional undeclared nuclear materials or activities.

We are also concerned that the Security Council still has not dealt with the other IAEA referral (Democratic People’s Republic of Korea) already on its agenda. Dealing with the Iranian matter promptly will highlight a double standard.

Iran remains five to ten years from possessing the capability to enrich uranium for use in a warhead. This leaves ample time to allow the process to continue; the situation has been needlessly and artificially elevated into a crisis. El Baradei will give his report at the regularly scheduled 6 March Board Meeting, and the IAEA Board of Governors should at least wait until then before a referral to the Security Council.

However, this artificial crisis could result in a real crisis, now or years from now. As we saw in Iraq, a decade old resolution was used to justify the use of force. Any military action would be dangerous for the region and would strengthen the position of hard liners in Iran and unite the population behind them reducing possibilities for dialogue and flexibility from within Iran. Bombing nuclear facilities is particularly dangerous, as it has the potential to disperse radioactive materials into the environment. Any attack on nuclear facilities would be an irresponsible and irrational act. Protocol I to the Geneva Convention states that “nuclear electrical generating stations, shall not be made the object of attack, even where these objects are military objectives, if such attack may cause the release of dangerous forces and consequent severe losses among the civilian population.” Moreover, as we saw when Israel bombed the nuclear facilities at Osirak in Iraq, it will most likely drive any nuclear program underground rather than destroy it.
Instead, the IAEA Board should support the Agency’s ability to successfully verify compliance with safeguards. The Board, with the advice of the Agency, should set a timeline for the conclusion of the investigation into Iran’s past activities. The Board should involve the Security Council only if Iran fails to comply with its obligations, including if the Agency finds it cannot verify the presence or absence of undeclared nuclear materials or activities due to Iranian non-cooperation.

We urge Iran not to pursue capabilities to produce nuclear fuels. Iran and everyone else should rather work towards an energy economy oriented towards energy efficiency and renewable sources of energy. To symbolize and implement this mission, the international community should create an International Sustainable Energy Agency.

In the long term, the solution must address the root causes of security concerns in the region as a whole. Restart the peace processes in the Middle East. Put political weight and drive behind establishing the Middle East Nuclear Weapon Free Zone. The Security Council supported this in a 1991 resolution (687), and the General Assembly unanimously adopts a resolution supporting the establishment of a Nuclear Weapon Free Zone in the Middle East every year (A/RES/60/52 this year).

With this as a test case, nuclear weapon states must take the lead in non-proliferation by totally, irreversibly and verifiably disarming their nuclear weapons. For the health of the non-proliferation regime, nuclear weapon states must live up to their end of the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty bargain. There is no moral high ground in either proliferation or nuclear weapons possession, but states with nuclear weapons will have more credibility in their non-proliferation efforts while they are disarming their own arsenals.

Sincerely,

Jennifer Nordstrom, Reaching Critical Will
Women's International League for Peace and Freedom

Susi Snyder, Secretary General
Women's International League for Peace and Freedom