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US-India Deal
A condensed version of this backgrounder is also
available in PDF
format.
Introduction
On 18 July 2005, US President Bush and Indian Prime Minister Manmohan
Singh reached agreement on a plan for civilian nuclear energy and
outer space cooperation. The deal, if approved by the US Congress,
Indian Parliament, and the Nuclear Suppliers Group, would lift the
US moratorium on nuclear trade with India, provide US assistance
to India's civilian nuclear energy program, and facilitate opportunities
for bilateral space activities.
Nuclear cooperation: Under the proposed deal, India would
separate its military and civilian nuclear reactors, and place many—but
not all—of its civilian nuclear reactors under International
Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards. Military facilities, and
stockpiles of nuclear fuel that India has produced up to now, will
not be subject to inspections or safeguards. Meanwhile, the US will
be allowed to build nuclear reactors in India, and provide India
with nuclear fuel for its civilian reactors.
In December 2006, US Congress approved legislation changing US law
to allow US exports of civilian nuclear fuel and technology to India
for the first time in 30 years. The approval was granted, however,
with the conditions that the US and India conclude a formal nuclear
cooperation agreement, that India and the IAEA conclude a nuclear
safeguards agreement, and that the deal is approved by the Nuclear
Suppliers Group. In July 2007, an operating agreement adopted by
Bush and Singh, known as the 123 agreement, sought allowances for
India to reprocess spent nuclear fuel under IAEA safeguards. Under
this agreement, the US would also support the creation of an “Indian
strategic fuel reserve” and allow India access to the international
fuel market. These measures still have to be approved by Congress.
Space cooperation: The deal would create closer ties between
the US and India in space exploration, satellite navigation and
launch, and in the commercial space arena through mechanisms such
as the US-India Working Group on Civil Space Cooperation. For example,
in May 2006, the US and India signed an agreement to fly two US
instruments on India's unmanned mission to orbit the moon, scheduled
for 2008.
Problems
Problem #1: The deal increases
India's ability to produce nuclear weapons
The supply of US nuclear fuel to India, under the deal as it is
currently structured, would allow India to divert more of
its own uranium resources to significantly expand production of
plutonium for nuclear weapons. The agreement does not call
for any additional measures that would constrain India's fissile
material1 or nuclear weapon
production, and does not call upon India to sign or ratify the Comprehensive
Test Ban Treaty, which would prohibit India from resuming nuclear
weapon testing.
Under the current proposal, India has pledged only to accept safeguards
over civilian nuclear facilities of its choosing. This could allow
India to exclude nuclear facilities and fuel for nuclear weapons
from international safeguards. In addition, the safeguards would
only apply to facilities and material manufactured once the deal
is accepted—they will not cover the fissile material produced
by India since its nuclear programme began in 1948. Furthermore,
if India has access to the international fuel market (as it would
through the 123 agreement), it would be protected against the US
revoking its supply of nuclear fuel if India resumes nuclear weapon
testing.
India already has about 500 kilograms of weapons grade plutonium,
sufficient for roughly 100 nuclear warheads. It also has a stock
of about 11.5 tons of reactor grade plutonium produced in the spent
fuel of its power reactors. Under the terms of the deal, this stock
of plutonium, too, would be kept out of safeguards. India would
also keep out of safeguards its Prototype Fast Breeder Reactor,
which is scheduled to start in 2010. It is to be fueled with reactor-grade
plutonium and will produce weapons grade plutonium. This would result
in a roughly four-fold increase in India's current weapons plutonium
production rate. By substituting imports for domestic uranium and
expanding existing uranium recycling efforts, India also might be
able to produce up to 200 kg a year of weapon grade plutonium in
its unsafeguarded power reactors.
Problem #2: The deal could lead to missile proliferation
The space cooperation aspect of the deal could result in transfers
of technology and expertise relevant to nuclear missile development.
For example, India will use its rocket Chandrayaan-1, which has
previously been used to launch satellites into orbit, for its unmanned
mission to the moon. Experts have long warned that the same rocket
could also be armed with a nuclear warhead and turned into an intercontinental
ballistic missile (ICBM). The methods for integrating payloads into
space vehicles, which US engineers will assist Indian engineers
in doing for the joint lunar mission, are also relevant to integrating
multiple nuclear warheads into ICBMs. US assistance on Indian civilian
space exploration ventures could help India develop the know-how
for further developing its ballistic missile capabilities.
Problem #3: The deal could spark an arms race
in South Asia
In response to the proposed US-India deal, Pakistan's National Command
Authority stated that its “credible minimum deterrence requirements”
will continue to be met, indicating the possibility of an expansion
of fissile materials stockpiles in Pakistan. Both India and Pakistan's
stocks, however, already far exceed the fissile material requirements
for a “minimal” nuclear arsenal. China's response will
likely be similar if the deal goes through.
The space cooperation element of the deal provides India with the
opportunity to increase its missile technology expertise. This in
turn could lead to an increase in quantity and quality of its delivery
systems, to which its neighbours would surely respond.
US involvement in East and South Asia features policies of selectively
favouring or opposing nuclear activities that strongly affects the
regions' strategic balances. For example, the geostrategic benefits
of using India to assert its interests in Asia is likely one of
the primary rationales behind this deal for the US. Former RAND
Corporation analyst Ashley Tellis says, "accommodating India
on the issue of nuclear cooperation" would "buttress its
potential utility as a hedge against a rising China" and "encourage
it to pursue economic and strategic policies aligned with US interests,"
helping to "shape the Asian environment in a way that suits
our interests."
Problem #4: The deal violates international and
domestic law
Non-Proliferation Treaty
The deal violates Article I of the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty
(NPT), which states that “Each nuclear-weapon State Party
to the Treaty undertakes not to transfer to any recipient whatsoever
nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices or control over
such weapons or explosive devices directly, or indirectly; and not
in any way to assist, encourage, or induce any non-nuclear-weapon
State to manufacture or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons or other
nuclear explosive devices, or control over such weapons or explosive
devices.”
The deal also violates other positions agreed upon by consensus
by NPT members, including a 1995 agreement on principles and objectives
for nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament, which states, “New
supply arrangements for the transfer of source or special fissionable
material or equipment or material especially designed or prepared
for the processing, use or production of special fissionable material
to non-nuclear-weapon States should require, as a necessary precondition,
acceptance of the Agency's full-scope safeguards and internationally
legally binding commitments not to acquire nuclear weapons or other
nuclear explosive devices.”
The deal flagrantly ignores the thirteen practical steps for nuclear
disarmament from the 2000 NPT Review Conference, and the principle
of universality agreed to by all NPT member states. The deal provides
further examples to non-nuclear weapon states that the US does not
intend to honour its 1995 and 2000 commitments, compromising future
progress on both non-proliferation and disarmament objectives and
threatening the integrity of the core bargain on which the treaty
is based.
Security Council
It also contravenes United Nations Security Council Resolution 1172
of 1998, which calls for India and Pakistan to “immediately
to stop their nuclear weapon development programs... and any further
production of fissile material for nuclear weapons,” and encourages
all States to prevent the export of equipment, materials or technology
that could in any way assist programmes in India or Pakistan
for nuclear weapons or for ballistic missiles capable of delivering
such weapons, and welcomes national policies adopted and declared
in this respect.”
Intergovernmental organizations
The deal further undermines the Missile Technology Control Regime
(MTCR), of which the US is a signatory. The goal of the MTCR is
to prevent the proliferation of unmanned delivery systems capable
of carrying weapons of mass destruction. It is “not designed
to impede national space programs or international cooperation in
such programs as long as such programs could not contribute to delivery
systems for weapons of mass destruction,” a principle which
the US-India deal potentially violates. The proposed arrangement
could also trigger a significant erosion of the guidelines of the
45-member Nuclear Suppliers Group, which offer important barriers
against the transfer of nuclear material,
equipment, and technologies for weapons purposes.
US domestic law
The deal would require significant changes to US non-proliferation
laws and long-standing nonproliferation policies, including the
Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended by the Nonproliferation Act
of 1978, which bars civilian nuclear cooperation with non-nuclear-weapon
states as defined by the NPT that do not allow full-scope IAEA safeguards
(which includes India).
Problem #5: The deal normalizes India's status
as a nuclear weapon state
The deal effectively normalizes India's status as a de facto
nuclear weapon state outside the NPT, elevating it to the level
of a nuclear weapon state under the Treaty but not bound by any
of its obligations. It enables India to participate in the international
community's system of nuclear activities without conforming to the
systems norms, standards, or laws, including those regarding disarmament
and non-proliferation.
Conclusion
The deal thus represents a step backwards for non-proliferation
and disarmament: it allows for an increase in nuclear weapons, fissile
materials, and delivery systems, and the resumption of nuclear testing.
It undermines the NPT at a time when the regime is facing other
crises and needs support to retain its credibility and functionality.
The deal indicates the intention of US and India to develop a stronger
strategic relationship, which is detrimental to international security
because it is being established in an environment of mistrust and
geopolitical tensions, and is in clear violation of the spirit and
letter of international law and intergovernmental organizations.
1 While the deal does require India
to support a Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty, negotiations at the
Conference on Disarmament on such a treaty have been blocked for
over a decade.
Resources
Arms Control Association: In March 2006, the ACA created
a US-India
Nuclear Cooperation Agreement Resource Page, which provides
key documents, analysis, and up-to-date and comprehensive information
concerning the proposal.
Abolition 2000: The Abolition 2000 network of organizations
established a US-India
Working Group in May 2007, which tracks the issue, provides
lobbying materials, and issues press releases.
International Panel on Fissile Materials: The IPFM released
a research report in September 2006, by Zia Mian, A.H. Nayyar, R.
Rajaraman, and M.V. Ramana on Fissile
Materials in South Asia: The Implications of the U.S.-India Nuclear
Deal.
South
Asians Against Nukes: An independent platform to raise awareness
about military and civil nuclearization in India and Pakistan, SAAN
was established soon after the nuclear tests conducted by India
on 11 May 1998 to bring together information resources for peace
and anti-nuclear activists from all over South Asia.
Also see:
777 UN Plaza - 6th Floor - New York, NY - 10017 - Ph: 212.682.1265 - Fax: 212.286.8211 - info@reachingcriticalwill.org
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