The 45-member Nuclear Suppliers Group
on 22 August 2008 to discuss the US-India Deal - specifically,
whether or not the Group would lift a ban on nuclear trade
with India. The Group must agree to allow nuclear fuel and
technology exports to India for its civilian atomic energy
programme to help seal the US-India Deal. However, the meeting
ended inconclusively after several delegations, including
Austria, Ireland, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, and
Switzerland raised concerns about the deal undermining the
nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), which India has not
joined.
Almost half the suppliers' group membership proposed about
50 amendments to the US draft for a waiver that would allow
India to do business with the cartel. Phil Goff, New Zealand's
Disarmament and Arms Control Minister, ,
"Around 50 amendments have been proposed to the original
text, with many countries speaking in favour of amendments.
The key function of the NSG is to formulate guidelines for
managing exports of nuclear material, equipment and technology
to ensure that this trade does not contribute to nuclear weapons
proliferation. Discussions in Vienna focused on how to ensure
compatibility of these objectives with the exemptions, sought
for the US-India Civil Nuclear Co-operation Agreement."
The amendments
seek to impose three main conditions on the exemption for
India: period review of India's compliance with non-proliferation
commitments; explicit exclusion of uranium enrichment and
reprocessing of spent-fuel technologies from what can be exported
to India; and no more nuclear trade with India if it conducts
another nuclear weapon test.
On 27 August, the of sent letters to 13 governments. An example of these
letters can be found .
On 2 September, the Chairman of
the US House Foreign Affairs Committee, Howard L. Berman,
made public
between the US State Department and members of the US Congress
on the US-India deal. The US Congressmen had asked 45 questions
to the Bush Administration seeking clarifications on various
aspects of the agreement. The 26-page letter reveals:
The US has given no binding fuel-supply assurance to India.
There is no US consent to India's stockpiling of lifetime
fuel reserves for safeguarded power reactors.
Civil nuclear cooperation is explicitly conditioned to
India not testing ever again.
The US has retained the right to suspend or terminate
supplies at its own discretion.
The letter makes clear that the 123 Agreement has granted
India no right to take corrective measures in case of any
fuel-supply disruption.
The Bush administration's letter states that the 123 Agreement
fully conforms to the Hyde Act provisions.
The letter assures Congress that the US government will
not assist India in the design, construction or operation
of sensitive nuclear technologies, including enrichment
and reprocessing.
These conditions undermine the supposed agreement developed
between the Indian and US governments.
On 3 September, groups representing survivors of the
atomic bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki (Hibakusha) sent
to the six governments that have been blocking
the US-India deal at the Nuclear Suppliers Group. They called
on the six governments to continue to defend the NPT, saying,
"Hibakusha have poured their hearts and souls into the
movement for the elimination of nuclear weapons, that never
again may the human race be forced to endure the type of tragic
suffering that they experienced. And one of the main foundations
has been the conviction that only by strengthening the NPT
system will a path be opened up for the elimination of nuclear
weapons."
The Group met again on 4–6 September
to discuss the matter further. After intense pressure from
the United States, the six hold-out governments capitulated
and approved the .
New Zealand Prime Minister Helen Clark
that she had spoken to US President George W. Bush about the
matter on 4 September. Phil Goff, New Zealand's Disarmament
and Arms Control Minister, said New Zealand's concerns were
dealt with to a "significant degree". He
New Zealand had particular concerns it wanted to be addressed.
This included action to be taken in the event of the resumption
of nuclear testing and the question of the transfer of sensitive
technologies related to enrichment and reprocessing. New
Zealand also wanted India to sign up to the IAEA’s
Additional Protocol, which extends that body’s powers
of monitoring and inspection. It also sought review provisions
for the exemption.
The concerns were addressed to a significant degree by
India in a formal statement. India has reiterated its commitment
to a voluntary unilateral moratorium on nuclear testing.
It has indicated support for international efforts to limit
the spread of enrichment and reprocessing and pledged it
will not be the source of such proliferation. It has committed
itself to sign and adhere to the Additional Protocol with
respect to India’s civil nuclear facilities. These
undertakings are referenced in the NSG statement on Civil
Nuclear Cooperation with India, which also notes constraints
on transfer of sensitive exports. It makes provision for
reviewing the exemption and for countries to raise any concerns
about how the exemption is operating.
New Zealand, along with others at the NSG, pressed for
the strongest possible safeguards to be written into the
exemption. In the end we accepted the consensus reached.
In doing so, New Zealand noted that the NSG would need to
be vigilant in implementing the exemption in order to realise
the Non-Proliferation benefits and indicated that it would
be monitoring that process closely.
However, most experts believe the
waiver is a "massive setback" to non-proliferation
and disarmament.
Praful Bidwai of the Inter Press Service and co-founder of
the Movement in India for Nuclear Disarmament ,
"The NSG's waiver will allow India to resume nuclear
commerce with the rest of the world with very few restrictions
although India is not a signatory to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation
Treaty (NPT) and has refused to accede to any other agreement
for preventing the spread of, reducing the numbers of, or
abolishing nuclear weapons."
Bidwai notes, "Contrary to the claim that the waiver,
and more generally, the U.S.-India nuclear deal, will bring
India into the global 'non-proliferation mainstream' or promote
nuclear restraint on India's part, it will allow India to
expand its nuclear weapons arsenal and encourage a nuclear
arms race in Asia, particularly in the volatile South Asian
subcontinent, where Pakistan emerged as India's nuclear rival
10 years ago."
The of says the deal "creates a dangerous distinction
between 'good' proliferators and 'bad' proliferators and sends
out misleading signals to the international community with
regard to NPT norms. Furthermore, it was inappropriate for
the member states of the NSG to take it upon themselves to
make a decision on this matter for the 140-plus other members
of the NPT."
Australian Senator Scott Ludlam, Australian Greens spokesperson
on nuclear issues, ,
"The decision is dangerous and it is also invalid. Forty-five
countries have made a decision on behalf of the 189-strong
membership of the NPT. This minority has never been given
the authority to reinterpret the NPT, overturn NPT decisions
or violate existing international standards."
Many experts complained about the process as well. M.V. Ramana
from the Centre for Interdisciplinary Studies in the Environment
and Development, Banagalore,
Indian Foreign Minister Mukherjee's statement on 5 September
as "inane and dishonest," lamenting, "It is
really a sad commentary on the state of debate at the NSG
if such statements actually create what was described by the
U.S. delegate as a 'positive momentum'." Daryl Kimball
of the Arms Control Association ,
"it appears as if George Bush and his team engaged in
some nasty threats, misinformation about positions, and intimidation,
to wear down the core six members … and their allies.
You have to assume the conversations among foreign ministers,
presidents, and prime ministers didn't focus on the policy
and non-proliferation issues, but raw politics."
Kimball also noted that the German chair "let the Americans
run the show and keep asking for more consultations despite
the remaining differences. A more competent and less biased
chair would have provided more balance and would have adjourned
the meeting Friday night when it was clear there was still
disagreement on some fundamental issues." Achin Vanaik,
head of the department of political science at Delhi University
and a national coordination committee member of the Coalition
for Nuclear Disarmament and Peace (India), ,
"This was a triumph of crass power politics. It is sad
and profoundly disturbing that nobody resisted U.S. or Indian
pressure and stood up for elementary principles in a group
where even a single member could have blocked the waiver.
India's 'victory' is founded on crude muscle power and cynicism,
and negates rational, democratic decision-making based on
a commitment to making the world a safer place."
Even though the NSG approved a waiver on 5 September, the
deal might not make it through US Congress by the end of its
session on 26 September. However, the waiver approved on 6
September allows any NSG member to trade with India, which
means counties other than the United States can engage in
nuclear trade with India even if Congress does not approve
the US to.
Read .
Introduction
On 18 July 2005, US President Bush and Indian Prime Minister
Manmohan Singh reached agreement on a plan for civilian nuclear
energy and outer space cooperation. The deal, if approved
by the US Congress, Indian Parliament, and the Nuclear Suppliers
Group, would lift the US moratorium on nuclear trade with
India, provide US assistance to India's civilian nuclear energy
program, and facilitate opportunities for bilateral space
activities.
Nuclear cooperation: Under the proposed deal, India
would separate its military and civilian nuclear reactors,
and place many—but not all—of its civilian nuclear
reactors under International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards.
Military facilities, and stockpiles of nuclear fuel that India
has produced up to now, will not be subject to inspections
or safeguards. Meanwhile, the US will be allowed to build
nuclear reactors in India, and provide India with nuclear
fuel for its civilian reactors.
In December 2006, US Congress approved legislation changing
US law to allow US exports of civilian nuclear fuel and technology
to India for the first time in 30 years. The approval was
granted, however, with the conditions that the US and India
conclude a formal nuclear cooperation agreement, that India
and the IAEA conclude a nuclear safeguards agreement, and
that the deal is approved by the Nuclear Suppliers Group.
In July 2007, an operating agreement adopted by Bush and Singh,
known as the 123 agreement, sought allowances for India to
reprocess spent nuclear fuel under IAEA safeguards. Under
this agreement, the US would also support the creation of
an “Indian strategic fuel reserve” and allow India
access to the international fuel market. These measures still
have to be approved by Congress.
Space cooperation: The deal would create closer ties
between the US and India in space exploration, satellite navigation
and launch, and in the commercial space arena through mechanisms
such as the US-India Working Group on Civil Space Cooperation.
For example, in May 2006, the US and India signed an agreement
to fly two US instruments on India's unmanned mission to orbit
the moon, scheduled for 2008.
Problems
Problem #1: The deal increases
India's ability to produce nuclear weapons
The supply of US nuclear fuel to India, under the deal as
it is currently structured, would allow India to divert
more of its own uranium resources to significantly expand
production of plutonium for nuclear weapons. The agreement
does not call for any additional measures that would constrain
India's fissile material1
or nuclear weapon production, and does not call upon India
to sign or ratify the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, which
would prohibit India from resuming nuclear weapon testing.
Under the current proposal, India has pledged only to accept
safeguards over civilian nuclear facilities of its choosing.
This could allow India to exclude nuclear facilities and fuel
for nuclear weapons from international safeguards. In addition,
the safeguards would only apply to facilities and material
manufactured once the deal is accepted—they will not
cover the fissile material produced by India since its nuclear
programme began in 1948. Furthermore, if India has access
to the international fuel market (as it would through the
123 agreement), it would be protected against the US revoking
its supply of nuclear fuel if India resumes nuclear weapon
testing.
India already has about 500 kilograms of weapons grade plutonium,
sufficient for roughly 100 nuclear warheads. It also has a
stock of about 11.5 tons of reactor grade plutonium produced
in the spent fuel of its power reactors. Under the terms of
the deal, this stock of plutonium, too, would be kept out
of safeguards. India would also keep out of safeguards its
Prototype Fast Breeder Reactor, which is scheduled to start
in 2010. It is to be fueled with reactor-grade plutonium and
will produce weapons grade plutonium. This would result in
a roughly four-fold increase in India's current weapons plutonium
production rate. By substituting imports for domestic uranium
and expanding existing uranium recycling efforts, India also
might be able to produce up to 200 kg a year of weapon grade
plutonium in its unsafeguarded power reactors.
Problem #2: The deal could lead to missile
proliferation
The space cooperation aspect of the deal could result in transfers
of technology and expertise relevant to nuclear missile development.
For example, India will use its rocket Chandrayaan-1, which
has previously been used to launch satellites into orbit,
for its unmanned mission to the moon. Experts have long warned
that the same rocket could also be armed with a nuclear warhead
and turned into an intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM).
The methods for integrating payloads into space vehicles,
which US engineers will assist Indian engineers in doing for
the joint lunar mission, are also relevant to integrating
multiple nuclear warheads into ICBMs. US assistance on Indian
civilian space exploration ventures could help India develop
the know-how for further developing its ballistic missile
capabilities.
Problem #3: The deal could spark an arms
race in South Asia
In response to the proposed US-India deal, Pakistan's National
Command Authority stated that its “credible minimum
deterrence requirements” will continue to be met, indicating
the possibility of an expansion of fissile materials stockpiles
in Pakistan. Both India and Pakistan's stocks, however, already
far exceed the fissile material requirements for a “minimal”
nuclear arsenal. China's response will likely be similar if
the deal goes through.
The space cooperation element of the deal provides India with
the opportunity to increase its missile technology expertise.
This in turn could lead to an increase in quantity and quality
of its delivery systems, to which its neighbours would surely
respond.
US involvement in East and South Asia features policies of
selectively favouring or opposing nuclear activities that
strongly affects the regions' strategic balances. For example,
the geostrategic benefits of using India to assert its interests
in Asia is likely one of the primary rationales behind this
deal for the US. Former RAND Corporation analyst Ashley Tellis
says, "accommodating India on the issue of nuclear cooperation"
would "buttress its potential utility as a hedge against
a rising China" and "encourage it to pursue economic
and strategic policies aligned with US interests," helping
to "shape the Asian environment in a way that suits our
interests."
Problem #4: The deal violates international
and domestic law Non-Proliferation Treaty
The deal violates Article I of the nuclear Non-Proliferation
Treaty (NPT), which states that “Each nuclear-weapon
State Party to the Treaty undertakes not to transfer to any
recipient whatsoever nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive
devices or control over such weapons or explosive devices
directly, or indirectly; and not in any way to assist, encourage,
or induce any non-nuclear-weapon State to manufacture or otherwise
acquire nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices,
or control over such weapons or explosive devices.”
The deal also violates other positions agreed upon by consensus
by NPT members, including a 1995 agreement on principles and
objectives for nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament,
which states, “New supply arrangements for the transfer
of source or special fissionable material or equipment or
material especially designed or prepared for the processing,
use or production of special fissionable material to non-nuclear-weapon
States should require, as a necessary precondition,
acceptance of the Agency's full-scope safeguards and internationally
legally binding commitments not to acquire nuclear weapons
or other nuclear explosive devices.”
The deal flagrantly ignores the thirteen practical steps for
nuclear disarmament from the 2000 NPT Review Conference, and
the principle of universality agreed to by all NPT member
states. The deal provides further examples to non-nuclear
weapon states that the US does not intend to honour its 1995
and 2000 commitments, compromising future progress on both
non-proliferation and disarmament objectives and threatening
the integrity of the core bargain on which the treaty is based.
Security Council
It also contravenes United Nations Security Council Resolution
1172 of 1998, which calls for India and Pakistan to “immediately
to stop their nuclear weapon development programs... and any
further production of fissile material for nuclear weapons,”
and encourages all States to prevent the export of equipment,
materials or technology that could in any way assist
programmes in India or Pakistan for nuclear weapons or for
ballistic missiles capable of delivering such weapons, and
welcomes national policies adopted and declared in this respect.”
Intergovernmental organizations
The deal further undermines the Missile Technology Control
Regime (MTCR), of which the US is a signatory. The goal of
the MTCR is to prevent the proliferation of unmanned delivery
systems capable of carrying weapons of mass destruction. It
is “not designed to impede national space programs or
international cooperation in such programs as long as such
programs could not contribute to delivery systems for weapons
of mass destruction,” a principle which the US-India
deal potentially violates. The proposed arrangement could
also trigger a significant erosion of the guidelines of the
45-member Nuclear Suppliers Group, which offer important barriers
against the transfer of nuclear material, equipment, and technologies
for weapons purposes.
US domestic law
The deal would require significant changes to US non-proliferation
laws and long-standing nonproliferation policies, including
the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended by the Nonproliferation
Act of 1978, which bars civilian nuclear cooperation with
non-nuclear-weapon states as defined by the NPT that do not
allow full-scope IAEA safeguards (which includes India).
Problem #5: The deal normalizes India's
status as a nuclear weapon state
The deal effectively normalizes India's status as a de
facto nuclear weapon state outside the NPT, elevating
it to the level of a nuclear weapon state under the Treaty
but not bound by any of its obligations. It enables India
to participate in the international community's system of
nuclear activities without conforming to the systems norms,
standards, or laws, including those regarding disarmament
and non-proliferation.
Conclusion
The deal thus represents a step backwards for non-proliferation
and disarmament: it allows for an increase in nuclear weapons,
fissile materials, and delivery systems, and the resumption
of nuclear testing. It undermines the NPT at a time when the
regime is facing other crises and needs support to retain
its credibility and functionality. The deal indicates the
intention of US and India to develop a stronger strategic
relationship, which is detrimental to international security
because it is being established in an environment of mistrust
and geopolitical tensions, and is in clear violation of the
spirit and letter of international law and intergovernmental
organizations.
1 While the deal does require
India to support a Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty, negotiations
at the Conference on Disarmament on such a treaty have been
blocked for over a decade.
Resources
and documents
, 6 September 2008 (Arms Control Association
, 3 September 2008 (Arms Control Association )
, August 2008
, 1 August 2008 (Arms Control Association )
Arms Control Association: In March 2006, the ACA created
a , which
provides key documents, analysis, and up-to-date and comprehensive
information concerning the proposal.
Abolition 2000: The Abolition 2000 network of organizations
established a in May 2007, which tracks the issue,
provides lobbying materials, and issues press releases.
International Panel on Fissile Materials: The IPFM
released a research report in September 2006, by Zia Mian,
A.H. Nayyar, R. Rajaraman, and M.V. Ramana on .
: An independent platform to raise
awareness about military and civil nuclearization in India
and Pakistan, SAAN was established soon after the nuclear
tests conducted by India on 11 May 1998 to bring together
information resources for peace and anti-nuclear activists
from all over South Asia.
