Explanation of Vote on L.2 by the U.S. on behalf of the P-3

Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT)

Conference on Disarmament

General Assembly First Committee

UN Disarmament Commission

Special Session on Disarmament

EOV given after the vote on L.-2,
Reductions of non-strategic nuclear weapons,
by the U.S. on behalf of the P-3.

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Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I have asked for the floor to explain my delegation’s negative vote on draft resolution L.2, "Reductions of non-strategic nuclear weapons."

I have the honor to speak also on behalf of the delegations of France and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland. Although these countries have no non-strategic nuclear weapons in their arsenals, they wish to be associated with this statement.

Mr. Chairman, our delegations voted against the resolution not because we oppose dealing with non-strategic nuclear weapons. On the contrary, we are fully committed to doing so.

We also remain committed to he effective implementation of the 2000 NIPT Review Conference Final Document and the wording on non-strategic nuclear weapons contained in it. It is, of course, up to each state to decide how to implement the conclusions ill the Final Document.

Draft resolution L2, however takes a fundamentally flawed approach to this important question. It also fails to take into account alternative approaches that have borne fruit in the past, and that efforts to tackle this issue are already underway. Since 1991, the types and numbers of NATO sub-strategic nuclear forces have been significantly reduced including the elimination of entire categories of such weapons. None of these reductions required negotiation of formal, legal instruments as envisioned in draft resolution L.2.

The United States and Russia also undertook parallel unilateral initiatives in 1991 and 1992 that significantly reduced their non-strategic nuclear weapons.

In addition, Mr. Chairman, resolution L.2 selectively quotes from the 2000 NPT Final Document in away that distorts its language on non-strategic nuclear weapons.

One concept that is missing from the resolution is the idea, clearly stated in the Final Document, that steps by the nuclear weapon States lead to nuclear disarmament in a way that promotes international stability, and that they be based on the principle of undiminished security for all.

Mr.. Chairman, it is clear that a formal aims confront approach to non-strategic nuclear weapons, as called for in draft resolution L.2, would present problems of definition, fundamental verification problem, issues of access to sensitive facilities, vast force level asymmetries and other major obstacles.

Without in any way impugning the motives of the sponsor of L.2, we believe that the approach it outlines to dealing with non-strategic nuclear weapons is unrealistic and impractical, and would have virtually no prospect of success.

Nuclear confidence~bui1ding measures for non-strategic nuclear weapons are already being discussed with Russia in the NATO-Russia Council. In addition, transparency for non-strategic nuclear weapons was raised on September 20 in the first meeting of the U.S.-Russia Consultative Group for Strategic Security (CGSS). It will continue to be addressed in future COSS meetings.

Mr. Chairman, we believe that continuing dialogue and the effort already wider way ate the best way to achieve meaningful results in this area. By bringing non-strategic nuclear weapons into the UN arena, L.2 risks complicating and interfering with these efforts. We therefore have voted against it.

Thank you, Mr Chairman

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