Amendment OP2 and 3 L11 (Spain)

Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT)

Conference on Disarmament

General Assembly First Committee

UN Disarmament Commission

Special Session on Disarmament

Statement

Amendment to OP 2 and 3 of resolution L.11

African Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone (Treaty of Pelindaba)

Spanish Delegation

Thank you very much Mr. Chairman.

I would like to present the arguments that have led my delegation to table a written amendment to operative paragraphs 2 and 3 of the draft resolution, sponsored by Nigeria, on the “African nuclear-weapon-free zone Treaty (Treaty of Pelindaba)” – Doc A/C.1/58/L.11.

Spain has always considered that Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zones, created by means of arrangements freely arrived at by consensus among the States of the region concerned, are an important contribution to strengthening the non-proliferation regime and achieving nuclear disarmament. More specifically, Spain has always stated its unequivocal support to the goals set by the Treaty of Pelindaba, as a way to denuclearize a neighbouring continent, and its genuine wish that the Treaty enters into force as soon as possible.

As contemplated in the guidelines adopted by the UNDC in its 1999 substantive session on the “Establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones on the basis of arrangements freely arrived at among the States of the region concerned”, every zone is the outcome of specific circumstances and it must reflect the diversity of situations existing within it. Every nuclear-weapon-free zone must be a well defined geographical entity.

In this sense, Spain, after a very careful consideration of the invitation received to join Protocol III to the Treaty of Pelindaba, decided that it was not convenient to sign the said Protocol since such signature (and later ratification) would create a redundant nuclear control regime over certain parts of Spanish territory that, according to the Treaty, could fall within the area to which the Treaty is applied but are already subject to the comprehensive nuclear control established by the EU, NATO, OSCE and the IAEA for the whole Spanish terrotory.

Those parts of the Spanish territory included in the so-called geographical scope of the Treaty are, in their entirety, an integral part of the European Union and, therefore, of the process of political integration that the latter represents. As regards the field of security, they are also an integral part of the Treaty of Washington (NATO Treaty), the Treaty on Conventional Forces in Europe and the Vienna 1994 Document on Confidence Building Measures. Therefore, the said parts of the Spanish territory fall within EU, NATO and OSCE boundaries and, consequently, should not be included within the area contemplated in the Treaty on the African Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone.

All Spanish territory was denuclearized by means of the Treaty of Friendship, Defence and Co-operation signed with the United States in 1976. Such denuclearization has been reiterated in the succesive revisions of the said Treaty in 1982, 1988 and 2002. Furthermore, non-acceptance of the introduction, installation or storage of nuclear weapons by NATO in Spanish territory was included in the parliamentary authorisation to the Spanish government to adhere to NATO Treaty in October 1981. An identical provision, prohibiting the introduction, installation or storage of nuclear weapons in Spanish territory, appeared in the referendum held to decide Spain’s accession to NATO. There is no intention at all to change this policy, as proved on the occasion of Spain’s full integration into NATO’s military structure on 1 January 1999.

All Spanish nuclear facilities, which of course are exclusively devoted to peaceful uses of nuclear energy, are subject to a double control by the IAEA and the European Atomic Energy Commission (EURATOM), in the framework of the Generalized Safeguards Agreement between the non-nuclear weapon EU Member States and the said AIEA. Furthermore, Spain, together with such EU Member States, has ratified the Additional Protocol to the Generalized Safeguards Agreement.

In addition to the Non-Proliferation Treaty, Spain has also ratified the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty, the Convention on Physical Protection of Fissile Material and the Convention on Nuclear Security, and it implements IAEA recommendations.

All in all, Spain has contracted and abides by obligations that go well beyond those contained in the Treaty of Pelindaba.

Spain is also pleased to contribute to IAEA’s AFRA Programme, which finances projects for peaceful applications of nuclear energy in Africa.

Mr. Chairman.

It is worth restating that my country has always considered Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zones as an important contribution to strengthening international peace and security and that it, therefore, fully shares the goals set by the Treaty of Pelindaba. That is why Spain has always joined consensus on the First Committee’s resolution on the Treaty since first tabled in 1997.

Nevertheless, Spain, as it stated immediately after the adoption by consensus of this resolution in 1997, 1999 and 2001, does not consider itself bound by the said consensus as far as operative paragraph 3 is concerned, on which it upholds serious reservations.

Since 1997, we have tried to persuade the successive sponsors of the resolution of the need to reach a more balanced wording of o.p. 2 and 3, which is utterly and clearly discriminatory since it only singles Spain out of the six countries concerned by the Protocols to the Treaty of Pelindaba, enjoying the remaining five countries the “shield” of o.p. 2’s broader formula. In fact, the resolution as it stands now -and this year’s draft remains unchanged- only targets Spain (o.p. 3), provided that it does not call individually upon each nuclear-weapon State concerned by the Protocols, but only as a whole (o.p. 2).

All the good faith and transparent efforts carried out by Spain since 1997, aiming at a more balance wording of o.p. 2 and 3, have been in vain. They remain unchanged every two years. Such a stalemate is unacceptable.

Notwithstanding the validity of all the above-mentioned arguments, my delegation requests the withdrawal of its amendment to op 2 and 3, in order to preserve consensus on such an important issue for my country and confident that we can find a solution to the problem satisfying our legitimate interests, although the fact that the African Group does not intend to make the promised gesture of a conciliatory statement is not exactly an encouraging signal.

Finally, I would like to reiterate that Spain does not consider itself bound by the said consensus as far as operative paragraph 3 is concerned, on which it upholds serious reservations, and that it will make a statement in this sense after the resolution is adopted. Furthermore, I would like to anticipate to the distinguished delegates that unless an acceptable solution is reached before the First Committee considers this resolution in 2005, Spain will not be in a position to join consensus again.

Thank you very much Mr. Chairman.