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Israel
Explanation of vote on
L.25 Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty
Mr. Chairman,
Israel signed the CTBT in September 1996. This decision reflects
its long standing policy on arms control and its support for international
nonproliferation efforts, with due consideration to the specific
characteristics of the Middle East and our national security requirements.
Furthermore, Israel had played an active role throughout the negotiations
of the treaty in Geneva and contributed conceptually, technically
and politically to its drafting.
Since the establishment of the PrepCom in November 1996, Israel
has played a major part in the endeavors to develop the elements
of the CTBT verification regime, including the practical procedures
to be adopted in the operational manuals, by which the Treaty will
be implemented.
Israel decided to vote in favor on resolution A/C.1/59/L.25 because
of the importance it attaches to the objectives of the CTBT, notwithstanding
its reservations regarding some of the wording in operative paragraph
1.
Mr. Chairman,
Israel remains committed to the objectives of the CTBT. We would
like to emphasize however, that progress has still to be made on
several important issues:
First, the development and readiness of the verification regime:
In our view, its completion constitutes a prerequisite to entry
into force, as required by the first paragraph of Article IV of
the Treaty.
Moreover it is our belief that the verification regime should provide
for a robust system that is as effective as possible to detect non-compliance
with the basic obligations of the Treaty. At the same time, it should
be immune to abuse and allow every State Signatory to protect its
national security interests.
These principles guide Israel in the development of the CTBT verification
regime.
Second, resolving several salient political issues, in particular
those related to the geographical region of the Middle East and
South Asia (MESA).
Lastly, reversing the negative dynamics evolving in our region,
where certain States Signatories are not fully cooperative with
the efforts to complete and test the IMS element of the verification
regime, thus impeding the pace of development of this element in
the verification regime.
Mr. Chairman,
Recognizing that entry into force of the Treaty is still pending
and does not look imminent, we believe that the advancement of the
objective of the CTBT calls for the following commitments and activities
to be diligently pursued:
• First and foremost, sustain the commitment not to carry
out any nuclear test explosion in line with the Treaty basic obligations.
• Provide sufficient funds to the CTBTO in order to complete
as soon as possible the essential elements of the CTBT verification
regime.
• Operate, maintain and test the IMS stations and the IDC
as appropriate to gain experience in order to provide detection
capabilities prior to EIF, as well as a smoothly-operating monitoring
system by EIF. In addition, expand the seismic cooperation among
all member states.
• Build the OSI element of the CTBT verification regime.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman
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