OP-ED by the Foreign Ministers of Australia, Chile, Indonesia, Norway, Romania, South Africa and the United Kingdom

July 27, 2005

Earlier this year in New York, a critical opportunity to strengthen international resolve on nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament was missed at the 2005 Review Conference of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). This is particularly regrettable at a time when the risks of proliferation and actual use of nuclear weapons constitute one of the most fundamental threats to our common security.

The Treaty is a cornerstone of the global nuclear non-proliferation regime and the essential foundation for the pursuit of nuclear disarmament. We cannot be complacent about the challenges it confronts.

The spectre of nuclear terrorism has placed a new premium on the need to strengthen the global nuclear non-proliferation regime. Finding weapons of mass destruction in the hands of terrorists is today a real and frightening prospect. Terrorists would not hesitate to threaten to use them or to use them. And we know they are trying to acquire them.

Therefore, we the Foreign Ministers of Australia, Chile, Indonesia, Norway, Romania, South Africa and the United Kingdom have agreed on a number of critical steps forward in the field of nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation. We hope that these may contribute towards constructive debate and a strong outcome for the 2005 World Summit to be held in New York this September.

All states must take a strong stand on non-proliferation and disarmament, and reaffirm their commitment to the Treaty’s mutually supportive rights and obligations.

Full compliance with all articles of the NPT by all States Parties is crucial. States Parties are at all times accountable for compliance with their Treaty obligations. We call for universalization of the Treaty. We also call on States not party to the NPT to fulfill their responsibilities to the international community in the fields of non-proliferation and disarmament.

Current threats require the strengthening of effective measures to safeguard nuclear materials, and to control access to them. We emphasize all states’ solemn obligation under UN Security Council resolution 1540 to put in place and implement adequate national legislation and enforcement to this end. We also welcome recent amendments to the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material and encourage all states to ratify the convention and implement its provisions.

We reaffirm the inalienable right of all States Parties to the NPT to develop research, production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes without discrimination but also in conformity with their non-proliferation obligations and safeguards obligations under the Treaty. Peaceful nuclear activities must not be diverted for weapons purposes.

We must continue to strengthen verification to improve the effectiveness and efficiency of International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards. We call on all States that have not yet done so to conclude and implement relevant Safeguards Agreements and Additional Protocols without delay; conclusion of both is essential for effective verification.

We also recognize that states may choose to fully enjoy the benefits of nuclear energy without developing a domestic fuel cycle capability. We should establish mechanisms to ensure guaranteed access to the market for nuclear fuel and related services for States in compliance with their non-proliferation obligations and safeguards obligations under the NPT, as determined by the IAEA. In this regard, we welcome the report of the IAEA Director General's Expert Group on Multilateral Approaches to the Nuclear Fuel Cycle, and resolve to support all efforts to identify and develop a consensus solution that provides assurances of both supply of services and non-proliferation.

To ensure confidence in the NPT, we also need firm action to discourage any potential defection from the Treaty. Leaving the Treaty must not be considered a viable or consequence-free option. States Parties have a sovereign right to withdraw from the NPT, but they remain liable for any breaches committed prior to withdrawal; obligations cannot be retrospectively forgotten. To ensure confidence in the Treaty, we must respond decisively to non-compliance.

Finally, we believe that general and complete disarmament is a global responsibility. We recognize that the only full guarantee against the use of nuclear weapons would be complete security of nuclear materials and a world free of all nuclear weapons.
We must continue practical, systematic and progressive efforts to advance nuclear disarmament globally and reduce nuclear weapons towards such a world free of nuclear weapons. All States should increase transparency and security of their fissile material holdings. We must seek the early entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty, and we urge the soonest commencement of negotiations without preconditions on a treaty banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices.

This is a crucial time for the international community to take stock of how we respond to today’s threats. In the field of nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament, ours is a responsibility not only to our own citizens, but to all peoples. The 2005 World Summit at the United Nations in September offers an extraordinary opportunity. Our citizens, and we believe those of all states, cannot afford for us to miss it.