



PAKISTAN

PERMANENT MISSION TO THE UNITED NATIONS

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STATEMENT

BY

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TO THE UNITED NATIONS, GENEVA**

IN THE

**THEMATIC DEBATE ON NUCLEAR WEAPONS
IN THE FIRST COMMITTEE**

New York,
10 October, 2006

Thematic discussion on *Nuclear Weapons*
at the UNGA First Committee
Statement by Ambassador Masood Khan,
Pakistan's Permanent Representative to the UN Geneva
New York; October 10, 2006

Madam Chairperson,

We welcome your statement on the North Korean nuclear test made yesterday.

Pakistan deplores the announcement by the Democratic People's Republic of Korea that it has conducted a nuclear test. This would be a destabilizing development for the region.

We had urged the Democratic People's Republic of Korea to desist from introducing nuclear weapons in the Korean Peninsula. It is regrettable that the DPRK chose to ignore the advice of the international community not to test a nuclear weapons device.

Pakistan has consistently supported the Six-Party Talks. We believe this mechanism should have been used to address North Korea's concerns. We hope that all the countries in the region would exercise restraint.

Madam Chairperson,

The sheer number of nuclear weapons – about 27, 000 - their lethality and the lack of exact estimates about the existing stocks of fissile material pose the most serious threat to peace and security.

Vertical proliferation, or improvement in nuclear weapon systems, has a demonstration effect and engenders new uncertainties and instabilities. It also stimulates newer strategic competitions.

In case of suspected or alleged non-compliance with the NPT, the best course is diplomacy, not war. Motivation to acquire the WMD can be lowered by addressing the root causes. Intimidation, coercion, or wars are not effective responses to such situations.

Undersecretary General Tanaka has rightly pointed out that the subtle or not so subtle blame game or a litany of failures in the recent past is not the answer. We should look at the existing and emerging threats and try to understand their correlation in an objective setting.

The global security architecture is in a flux. The consensus dating back to SSOD-I and one that seemed to be developing in the post Cold War period is not holding well.

The prevalent divergent security interests have led to what we may call a "strategic pause". *Strategic pause* is one thing; it is now turning into a strategic vacuum, which is dangerous for peace and stability, especially in regions of tension. The consensus underpinning disarmament and non-proliferation has eroded and the multilateral disarmament machinery has atrophied. This opens the door for unilateral and discriminatory approaches.

We have proposed convening of an international conference to develop a new consensus on disarmament and non-proliferation. The original bargain on complete disarmament, non-proliferation and facilitation of peaceful uses of nuclear energy through exchanges has to be revalidated

Our quest for a new consensus should be guided by the principle of *equal security for all states* and sustained by multilateralism not by some self selected, even if well meaning, group of countries.

Discrimination and asymmetric possession of WMD will not ensure non-proliferation or regional or global stability. Nor are technology constraints a durable answer unless the motives for proliferation are addressed.

A new security consensus should take into account the need to address existing and emerging global challenges to regional and international security.

Madam Chairperson,

What we need to agree to is to revive the process of disarmament and non-proliferation while evolving a universally agreed basis for the promotion of the peaceful uses of nuclear energy under globally agreed conditions. An FMT should be tied to the twin objectives of non-proliferation and disarmament. Prevention of vertical and horizontal spread of nuclear weapons technology will ensure non-proliferation; cuts into existing stocks will move disarmament forward.

A comprehensive and balanced programme of work on the four core issues – nuclear disarmament, a FMT, PAROS, and NSAs, as envisaged in A-5 proposal, should not hamper but facilitate our work. The A-5 proposal has distilled all the proposals on the table. This is the minimum threshold we have. If we want to commence work, we can do so within these parameters, without preconditions.

To be credible and effective, a FMT must be verifiable and it should take into account the existing stocks. An FMT without verification would amount to a unilateral moratorium, which will not be acceptable to us.

Similarly, one can only presume that, overtime, fissile material stocks would be transformed into nuclear weapons. An FMT, which freezes or accentuates asymmetries, will accelerate, not arrest proliferation.

It is therefore important that a FMT provides a schedule for a progressive transfer of existing stockpiles to civilian use and places these stockpiles under safeguards so that the unsafeguarded stocks are equalized at the lowest possible level. In order to have full effect, it ought also to be accompanied by a mandatory programme for the elimination of asymmetries in the possession of fissile material stockpiles by various states.

Some delegations say that these issues are preconditions. We are of the view that insistence on dropping agreed basis for negotiations is a *precondition*. There are agreed principles that underlie the discourse on the FMT. The First Special Session of the UN General Assembly on Disarmament (SSOD-I) called for a ban on fissile material as part of the intertwined objectives of nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation. In 1993, the UN General Assembly upheld this principle; as did the NPT Review Conferences in 1995 and 2000. The objective has been to draft a FMT that would strengthen security of all states, irrespective of their size and status.

The Shannon Report of 1995 reflected consensus on two bases for a FMT: (a) an agreement to begin negotiations on a universal, non-discriminatory, multilateral and internationally and effectively verifiable treaty to ban the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices; and (b) the open, non-limiting scope of negotiations captured in the affirmation that the mandate for the establishment of an ad hoc Committee does not preclude delegations from raising for consideration the issues of past and future production, as well as management of the fissile material. This is not a precondition, but a built-in latitude to raise any issue – cut-off, existing stocks, management, and verifiability.

The so-called linkages between different issues are not extrinsic, but intrinsic to the collectively agreed bargains. Two assumptions must be addressed in this context. The four core issues are of post-Cold War, 21st century, contemporary "vintage". It is not correct to say that the time is ripe for a FMT, but not for other issues. There is sufficient legal, technical and political basis for movement on all the four issues. They will all qualify on grounds of *contemporaneity* and *ripeness*. Of course, when negotiations start, it is conceivable that each issue will have a varying pace and progress, but none of the items on the table can be removed from the CD agenda at will.

Madam Chairperson,

In 1968, at the time of the adoption of the NPT, it was understood that non-nuclear-weapon-states would seek legally binding negative security assurances. It is no coincidence that the UN Security Council Resolutions 255 (1968) and 984 (1995) were adopted to facilitate the NPT and its extension. The CD, which has NSAs on its agenda, should start its work early next year to draft a universal, multilateral treaty to assure non-nuclear states against the use of the threat of use of nuclear weapons. No issue is riper for negotiations than the NSAs. It has been on the front burner of the NPT regime since 1968 and on the CD agenda since its inception. By elaborating and codifying unconditional NSAs, the CD would help create a climate of confidence between nuclear and non-nuclear weapon states in the present tense international environment

Some well meaning delegates say that we should raise all these issues when the actual negotiations commence. Of course, we will do that. But one has to be sure what is sacrosanct and what is not. At one point the CTBT was considered to be the most important measure for disarmament and non-proliferation. It has become the victim of its principal sponsors. The Shannon mandate was agreed and now there are suggestions to shelve it. Verification was a goal and now non-verification is the objective for some delegations. If goal posts are moved constantly, it is difficult to define the goals of disarmament and non-proliferation.

Again some equally well meaning delegates have been suggesting majority principle as a working method in the CD. Because of the long impasse this may be quite tempting but let me underline that on issues related to collective security consensus is a good device for decision making. It also provides a sound basis for universal adherence and compliance. If we tinker with the principle of consensus in the CD, we will have an interminable and unproductive discussion even on this subject.

Madam Chairperson,

We should also give attention to reconciling *nuclear reality* within the global non-proliferation regime. Ways should be explored to normalize the relationship between the NPT and non-NPT nuclear weapon states. For quite some time, it has been suggested that the NPT could develop an additional protocol to resolve this issue.

Although Pakistan subscribes to the objectives of the NPT, it is a nuclear weapon state. We are already fulfilling the NPT's non-proliferation norms. Pakistan is prepared to continue to act in consonance with the obligations, undertaken by nuclear weapon states, under Article I, II and III of the NPT. But we cannot be expected to adhere to the treaty as a non-nuclear weapon state. We are observing a unilateral moratorium on further nuclear tests, but we cannot agree to a moratorium on the production of fissile material even as others are being aided in ways that will vastly expand their fissile material stocks.

Madam Chairperson,

It is being posited that overtime global reliance on nuclear power will supplement fossil fuels and gas. If that is the case, it is important that we evolve an agreed basis for the promotion of the peaceful uses of nuclear energy on a non-discriminatory basis and under appropriate international safeguards and in accordance with the international obligations of States.

Pakistan supports efforts to expand nuclear cooperation for civilian uses, while taking into account safety and security aspects and addressing the proliferation concerns.

Pakistan has a legitimate requirement for nuclear power generation to meet the energy needs of our expanding economy. We will continue to develop nuclear power generation under strict IAEA safeguards.

The Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) is considering new demands for exceptionalism. We trust the NSG will adopt a non-discriminatory, criteria-based approach that will on the one hand arrest horizontal or vertical proliferation and, on the other, offer equal opportunities for access to civilian nuclear technology under IAEA safeguards.

We are assessing the impact of recent developments on fissile material production in our region. This could impact our position on the fissile material treaty.

The international community and the NSG should also build firewalls that should prevent the spill-over of nuclear technology obtained for peaceful purposes into military applications.

Under its overarching concept of Strategic Restraint Regime, Pakistan has been pursuing with India a negotiated settlement of the issue of Jammu and Kashmir, nuclear and missile restraint, and a balance in conventional forces.

Pakistan does not want to enter into a strategic and conventional arms race, but we will do whatever is necessary to preserve the credibility of our minimum defensive deterrence level.

We have been holding consultations with our Indian counterparts on security concepts and doctrines to develop CBMs in the areas of communication, risk reduction, and strategic stability. The two sides have signed an agreement on pre-notification of flight-testing of ballistic missiles and operationalized a hotline link between the Foreign Secretaries of the two countries. We have also held discussions on a draft text of an agreement on reducing the risk from accidents relating to nuclear weapons.

I thank you, Madam Chairperson.